WHAT IS AMERICAN ABOUT AMERICAN ISLAM?

MUSLIM AMERICAN NARRATIVES AND THE CONFIGURATION OF ISLAM IN THE UNITED STATES

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Photos by Sabina von Fischer, Summer 2009

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INTRODUCTION

When conducting fieldwork in the United States in Summer 2009, I asked one of my interview partners what made life in the United States different from other places. Without hesitating, he answered: "America sells dreams". It was only later that I realized how this statement had fundamentally influenced the way I made sense of my object of research – the configuration of Islam in the US.

Although I lived in the US during different phases of my life, it is still a challenge to make sense of the *American Way of Life*. My hermeneutical background is not only the one of a scholar of *Islamwissenschaft* in a post 9/11 environment, but the one of a Swiss or European critical towards American foreign policy, a consumer of Hollywood movies, a friend of various people living in the US, a reader of American fiction and media, and so forth. The *American Way of Life* through this lens remains elusive and ambivalent – a promise, an illusion, entertainment, a sales strategy… The quote above breaks down this elusiveness by singling out two fundamental aspects that I consider to be characteristic for the *American Way of Life* in this study: Its narrative and its market-driven character. Accordingly, the *American Dream* is a story of promises in a capitalist setting.

This study aims to show how Muslim Americans and American Islam are constructed in this particular setting or, as the title of this study implies, to show what is American about American Islam. Thereby, it does not focus on Muslims as social agents but on the relations between Muslim American narratives and the narratives constituting the *American Way of Life*. The study's focus thus lies on the interaction of narratives – how they contradict and sustain each other, intermingle and fuse, appear and vanish. This perspective, as well as the methodological implications arising from it, differs somewhat from perspectives that research has applied to Muslim Americans and American Islam so far. I argue that this has to do with the predominance of scholars working at American universities that have been preoccupied with how Islam has become a part of the nation. As those frameworks are the result of particular research traditions, some thought has to be given to this: Generally, various disciplines have paid increased attention to Islam since 9/11. However, the study of Islam in the US has been institutionalized differently than, for example, in Europe. After World War II, in the US, Islam has increasingly been analyzed in departments of Near and Middle Eastern studies and hence has initially been the subject of area studies. (Adams, 1976; Ernst & Martin, 2010a; Ismael & Ismael, 1990) More recently, the study of Islam has gradually become part of religious studies departments. However, Islamic studies as a part of religious studies are still considered isolated, albeit in a process of

change. (Ernst & Martin, 2010a, p. 5) According to Ernst and Martin, the study of Islam is represented in only about ten percent of American religious study departments. (Ibid., p. 13) Islamic studies have focused predominantly on classical Arabic texts. Only recently, initiatives have been made to integrate approaches of comparative study of religion. American scholars have considered a better integration of Islamic studies and religious studies as "very relevant to considerations of Islam and Muslims in the United States" (Leonard, 2003, p. 134) as well as important for the establishment of "post-Orientalist Islamic studies" (Ernst & Martin, 2010a).

By contrast, *Islamwissenschaft* taught at European universities has not been bound to particular disciplines. The roots of academically institutionalized *Islamwissenschaft* has been traced to the founder of Arabic and Oriental studies Antoine Isaac Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838). (Poya, 2008, p. 246) Having its roots in philology, the range of *Islamwissenschaft* has been gradually expanded into a wide spectrum of research interests, adapting methodologies from other disciplines to analyze them. Although most scholars of the field still work historically, the number of scholars drawing on methodological approaches from the social sciences has increased. (Poya & Reinkowski, 2008a) Scholars of *Islamwissenschaft* thus have borrowed from other disciplines in the light of their respective research interests. The theoretical and methodological scope of *Islamwissenschaft* can thus be considered as more flexible and comprehensive as the ones provided by Middle Eastern studies or by religious studies at American universities. However, this flexibility has given rise to "discomfort" as a recent compendium representing German scholars of *Islamwissenschaft* has suggested. (Poya & Reinkowski, 2008b) As *Islamwissenschaft* neither has its "own" methodology nor an exclusive connection to a certain discipline, is there still a common concern or a core ascertainable? Do scholars of *Islamwissenschaft* have competencies scholars of other disciplines do not have and, if yes, what are they? (Poya & Reinkowski, 2008a, pp. 11-12) Those are the questions German scholars of *Islamwissenschaft* have recently discussed and – given their heterogeneity – not surprisingly, answered differently. Let me turn to the interdisciplinary approach of this study conducted in the field of *Islamwissenschaft*.

By analyzing how Islam is configured in the US context, this study, in its broader scope, aims to enhance the understanding of the status of religiosity in culturally complex societies and of the relationship between religiosity and those societies. Therefore, it analyzes Muslimness and Islamicity from a constructivist perspective. *Muslimness* and *Islamicity* (German *Islamizität*) are concepts that have been used to emphasize how Muslims construct themselves as Muslims and how they identify with Islam. (see for example Schmidt, 2004a; Tietze, 2004) This study does not analyze how Muslims construct their Muslimness and Islamicity individually but in accordance with constructions emanating from the narratives advanced by large Muslim

American organizations. In the light of the framework of this study that will be closely described in chapter 3, I consider Muslimness and Islamicity as discursive constructions. Thereby, Muslim American organizations are framed as marketers and thus co-constructors of narratives along with their adherents and with respect to the narrative repertoires emanating from the public sphere.

Thus, this study does not attribute the authorship of narratives to particular agents. Instead, it argues that narratives are constructed by means of configuration processes involving multiple agents: Muslims and non-Muslims, scholars and non-scholars, Americans and non-Americans, etc. Hence, although I do not attempt to make any normative claims on Islam, I am aware that this study takes part in its configuration as well. My analytical reconstruction of Muslim American narratives puts forth a narrative of its own. This epistemological perspective is expressed throughout this work by the notion of *(re)construction*. From this perspective, I claim that the distance of this study from its object of research is greater than in other studies on Muslim Americans and American Islam. I would even argue that distance is this study's unique selling proposition. Accordingly, the geographical distance between America and Europe is symbolic for the distance deriving from differing academic traditions actualized in different frames of research. Let me give an example by relating to what I have said above about the scholarly landscape concerned with American Islam: From a distance, the entanglement of American scholars studying Muslim Americans, as well as American Islam, with the Muslim American community comes into sight. To be aware of this relationship is important, as it is crucial for the construction of Muslimness and Islamicity in the American context. This relationship differs for example from the European context, where the distance between scholars of *Islamwissenschaft* and the Muslim community has in general been much greater. For an outsider – that is to say, a non-Muslim, neither American scholar, nor resident – those relations are probably easier to recognize than for someone who is a part of them. An outsider's perspective can thus reveal blank spots arising from an insider's lacking distance to a familiar surrounding. On the other hand, distance, or the lack of familiarity with a certain context, can of course also be a handicap. In order to compensate this handicap, this study aims to complement US-research on American Islam and Muslim Americans. Therefore, the aspects of American Muslimness and Islamicity singled out for closer examination were defined in close relation to research done on Muslim Americans and American Islam so far. Let me provide an overview of what the different chapters will discuss:

As a thematic introduction, chapter 1 will reproduce scholarly narratives that cover the historical Muslim presence in North America beginning with the transatlantic slave trade. For reasons of space, we can only catch a glimpse of this multifaceted narrative repertoire. Additionally, as this study's analytical focus lies on narratives

advanced by Muslim American organizations, I will provide an overview of the contemporary Muslim American organizational landscape. The overview is structured by a typology that distinguishes between the organizations' claims to represent, to serve a certain group, and to advocate a certain issue.

Chapter 2 characterizes the different perspectives scholars have taken up to describe Islam and Muslims in the American context. The particularity of the results, obtained from those perspectives will be highlighted. Chapter 2 is not a research overview in the classical sense, as my own perspective, explained in chapter 3, has not commonly been adopted so far. The same holds true for the suggested methodological procedure, which combines corpus analytical tools with a discourse analytical perspective.

Accordingly, and in compliance with this perspective, the historical scholarly narratives, as well as the different scholarly perspectives, presented in chapter 1 and 2, will be referred to in the analytical part of this study. This makes it possible to establish how they align with and differ from the constructions emanating from Muslim American narratives.

The empirical basis for this study is the output of four large Muslim American organizations: the *Islamic Society of North America*, the *Nation of Islam*, the *Council on American-Islamic Relations*, and the *Islamic Circle of North America*. Segments of those organizations' output were selected, according to certain criteria, and four different corpora were compiled from these segments. The selection criteria, the corpora, and their differing function for this study will be presented in chapter 4.

Then, on the basis of the proposed research design, five chapters deal more closely with corpus analyses carried out.

The purpose of chapter 5 is to familiarize the reader with the analytical procedure. It will do so by showing how historical narrative production is entangled with contemporary contexts. This chapter proposes a way to trace processes of integration by exploring narrative. Furthermore, it draws attention to the selectivity of historiography by establishing how Muslim American narratives selectively revert to the repertoire of historical narratives presented in chapter 1.

Chapters 6 to 9 will discuss different aspects of American Muslimness and Islamicity by gradually narrowing the focus geographically, thematically, and with respect to the data taken into account.

Chapter 6 analyzes the significance of the Muslim world for the Islamic knowledge production in the American context. It establishes the self-ascribed role of Muslim

Americans in what has been called the "transglobal umma". (Leonard, pp. 130-131) Corpus analyses will substantiate Leonard's proposition that "American Muslim aspirations to leadership of a transglobal umma are almost certainly reinforced by America's own current aspirations to world leadership." (Ibid.) The chapter also builds on the more general argument made by scholars that authority on Islam has shifted, initiated by social processes affected by globalization and new forms of communication. (Eickelman & Anderson, 1999b; Mandaville, 2001, 2007; Roy, 2004) The theory of a "new religious public sphere" (Eickelman & Anderson) has provided a new perspective on these authorities and their formation processes. A dominant role has been ascribed to new media, which are held responsible to have radically altered patterns of authority by reaching mass audiences, reducing production barriers, proliferating spheres of participation, and changing patterns of ownership and control. (Mandaville, 2007, p. 324)

This study's analysis contributes to assess new authority constellations by providing insight into how Muslim American narratives construct Islamic authority. Attention will be paid to the question whether Muslim American organizations perceive authorities of the broader Muslim world within the process of authoritative knowledge production. Besides this, analysis will establish how agents, institutions and platforms, as well as methodologies, relevant for Muslim American knowledge production, are entangled with the Muslim world.

As not to raise false expectations, let me stress that this chapter does not take up a transnational perspective. Throughout chapter 6, I will maintain the unidirectional perspective of the overall study that checks Muslim American narratives against an American repertoire. I will not analyze positions emanating from the broader Muslim world on American Islam. So, by exclusively looking at how Muslim American narratives emplot the Muslim world, this study deliberately analyses the vice without the versa. By this, I hope to have made it clear that I am aware that there is a transnational aspect to Muslim American narrative constructions but that this aspect is simply not an issue here.

Along with this, let me stress another important point: As concerned with what is American about American Islam, this study does not check Muslim American narratives against a repertoire displaying the Islamic knowledge tradition – mainly for obvious pragmatic reasons: To build an according reference corpus would be hardly feasible. Of course, this analytical focus does, again, not suggest that Muslim American narratives do not draw on the Islamic knowledge tradition. They do, naturally, and, as mentioned above, chapter 6 will – although unsystematically – show the highly heterogeneous recourse to this very broad repertoire.

In chapter 7, the focus is narrowed to the American context and, more specifically, to how the Muslim American community is constructed via narrative. American scholars have argued that "African American Muslims present immigrant Muslims with an opportunity to realize Islam's potential to overcome ethno-racial divisions, and together the two Muslim communities present the United States with a challenge and an opportunity to realize its potential as a postethnic society and nation-state." (Leonard, p. 130) Analysis will establish how this argument is integrated and configured by Muslim American narratives. Closely connected with this, the chapter concentrates on how boundaries within the Muslim American community are narratively drawn and redrawn. At the core lies the question of how the key categories research has used to describe the Muslim American community – *immigrant* and *autochthonous* – are relevant for the construction of difference in contemporary Muslim American narratives. Corpus analyses will further reveal how 9/11 has affected narrative boundary drawing among Muslim Americans.

Chapters 8 and 9 will build on the findings of chapter 7 and bring narratives advanced by one organization into focus – the *Islamic Society of North America*.

Chapter 8 concentrates on how Muslim American narratives relate to the American discussion on the integration of social manyness. The discussion on social manyness, its aspects, and the policies of dealing with it has a long tradition and is ongoing with verve as a recently published anthology of American Studies illustratively demonstrates. (Radway, Gaines, Shank, & Von Eschen, 2009) The discussion on different conceptualizations of the self and the thus resulting consequences for social coherence has meandered between liberal and communitarian paradigms. The American motto *E pluribus unum* has been translated into "from many, one" or "many-in-one" depending on the priority given to the respective aspects within a societal model. (Walzer, 1996, p. 26) Accordingly, the American context is unique with respect to the multiple conceptualizations of different societal models. This, of course, has affected among other differentiated groups Muslim Americans. In chapter 8, I will focus on Muslim American narratives relating to the negotiation of social manyness. The Muslim American position will, in a second step, be compared to American societal models circulating in the broader American discussion in order to establish correspondence or divergence between the different models.

In relation to this, attention will be given to the function of Islam within Muslim American narrative constructions. This aspect of Muslim American Islamicity will be discussed in chapter 9. In the US, Islam is legally incorporated via the category of religion. Religion has always been an important aspect within American societal models and is a category heavily influenced by standards particular for the context.

(Brocker, 2005; Radway et al., 2009) Dominant discourse has defined and redefined forms of expression and recognition of religious practice with reference to the constitutional regulation of the relationship between state and religion. Paying reference to this backdrop, chapter 9 will establish different contemporary functions of Islam in the American context.

As I will show in chapter 2, research so far has described many different thematic fields of Islamic intervention. Although a plethora of fields have been mentioned as reference points for Islamic practice, a theory on those different fields is still pending. Chapter 9 aims to contribute to closing this gap by shifting the focus away from the thematic aspects onto the functions of Islam for the different contexts.

The different (re)constructions described in chapters 5 to 9 will provide insights into how American Muslimness and Islamicity have been configured over the past years. I will argue in the concluding part of this study that those insights provide important implications for the adjustment of research perspectives on contemporary (American) Islam.

Finally, some practical aspects have to be mentioned at this point: As this study focuses on narratives and therefore on language use, let me make some comments on transliteration: To legitimize my deliberate disregard of the transliteration rules conventionally applied in *Islamwissenschaft*, I follow Metcalf (1996) and her remarks on Ismail al Faruqi's attempt to foster awareness about so-called "Islamic English". The English-language publications this study analyses represent and reshape Islamic English by integrating Arabic words as a matter of course, without othering them by means of diacritical marks or italicization. I agree fully with Metcalf that "a range of Arabic words are now acquiring a familiar presence in English publications, and they should, one might suggest, be spelled as Muslims currently spell them, and even be left as English terms – that is, not signaled as foreign by routine italicization." (p. xv) From this study's perspective, it would be inconsistent to "correct" spellings of Arabic terms along rules of transliteration. Also, I will reproduce different spelling options emerging from the texts based on the same argument made above. Hence, inconsistency will be represented rather than erased, because it is characteristic for Islamic English as well as for the construction of American Muslimness and Islamicity.

PART I

HOW TO (RE)CONSTRUCT AMERICAN ISLAM: RESEARCH DESIGN

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES & CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS

HISTORICAL NARRATIVES & CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS

This thematic introduction (re)produces historical narratives of the Muslim presence in North America. With this, I aim to draw attention to dominant historical narratives, which represent a narrative repertoire available to contemporary Muslim Americans to configure their Muslimness and Islamicity – that is to say, to construct themselves as Muslims and to adapt Islam to those constructions. Thus, I'm not concerned with the actual history of Muslims in North America in the narrower sense but with how this history is narrated today. I argue that this narrative repertoire represents the backdrop, against which contemporary Muslim American narratives are configured. In the course of this study, this will be demonstrated at different points. Therefore, it is important to become familiar with the currently available narrative repertoire. The following paragraphs will hence (re)produce dominant narratives without discussing them any further. However, it is important to keep in mind that historical narratives always entail an evaluation of certain events, groups, and individuals by distributing emphasis unevenly. It is symptomatic for historical narratives to single out certain events and agents, which are regarded as especially noteworthy today. A historical event can always be discussed from different perspectives. Typical for the historical

perspective on Muslim Americans is for example the general focus on agents and their works and deeds. As the following paragraphs will show, the historical narratives presented are often connected to certain Muslim American personalities. Some of them, such as for example Mohammed Alexander Russell Webb, have drawn much attention from scholars and thus take up quite some space in the following overview. Furthermore, scholars have been particularly concerned with tracing the Muslim presence in North America to its origin, often connecting it to the so-called discovery of America. Although highly speculative, this alleged early Muslim presence is very important for how Muslim Americans understand themselves today.
On top of these selective historical perspectives, I made a selection myself by (re)producing the historical narratives in the limited space below. Naturally, as I am unable to escape the famous Gadamerian hermeneutic circle, in what follows, I constructed historical reality in a very particular way, by including certain events and agents and leaving out others. I am fully aware that the following overview is incomplete and biased. However, as I consider neither completeness nor objectivity as feasible criteria for the compilation of historical narratives, let me describe the underlying rationales my selection is based on: On the one hand, the aim was to describe inclusively the major historical narrative trends referring to Islam in the American context put forth today. On the other hand, as this study argues that Islamicity and Muslimness have always been configured in relation to the American zeitgeist, I intended to draw attention to this by including cross-references to the respective dominant American debates on the integration of social manyness.
Additionally, in the second part of this thematic introduction, I will provide an overview of the contemporary landscape of Muslim American organizations. As Muslim American organizations will take center stage further on, it is important to gain an insight into their variety at the beginning of this study. This variety comes into sight, if we consider the organizations' claims to cater to the different needs of Muslim Americans. Accordingly, I will categorize the organizations along a typology that distinguishes between their claims to represent, to serve a certain group and to advocate a certain issue. Special attention will be paid to the question, if 9/11 affected the organizations' focus on representation and advocacy.

Having made these preliminary remarks, let's now turn to the multi-layered historical narratives of Muslim Americans:

MUSLIMS AND SLAVERY – RETAINING ISLAM

With reference to the question of origin, historians have debated over the date the first Muslim set foot onto American shores. Some have connected the early Muslim presence to the expedition of Christopher Columbus in the late 15th century, oth-

ers have pre- or postdated it to what has been called the discovery of America. (Ansari, 2004, p. 223; Curtis, 2009, p. 4f; Gomez, 2005, p. ix; Turner, 1997, p. 11) As unsure as dating the early Muslim presence are numbers referring to Muslims being taken to the Americas during the transatlantic slave trade. (Ansari, p. 225f; Curtis, p. 4) Estimates are built on estimates of the Muslim population that lived in countries exploited by slave traders. An according estimation thus not only has to take into account the spread of Islam in the respective African countries within certain periods of time, but the reasons why West African Muslims were victims of the slave trade, for: "These Muslims did not arrive in the New World by accident." (Diouf, p. 18) Along with the inner West African conflicts beginning with the disintegration of the Jolof Empire in the late 15th century, the slave trade began to prosper. (Ibid., pp. 18-34) Naturally, it was not only the West African situation that influenced the development of the slave trade but the colonial project on the other side of the Atlantic. Old World contexts shaped the conditions in the New World. These complex interrelations and their influence on Muslim lives have been described vividly in connection with the early slave trade to what is now called Latin America.[1] However, in what follows, the focus lies on the North American Southern territories, which became "the epicenter of the African Muslim community in colonial and antebellum North America" (Gomez, p. 143).

The West African regions of Senegambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and the Bight of Benin were important supplier countries for slaves in the Southern regions of North America.[2] Gomez has estimated that 21 percent of the traded slaves originated from Senegambia. Islam spread in the Senegambian region between the 15th and mid-19th century, and hence, he holds that "Senegambia was the major source of Muslims for the early American South." (p. 162) The four regions mentioned represent the regions of origin of the majority of Muslims brought to the American South. They supplied over 50 percent of all slaves taken to North America. Thus, more than half of the estimated African slaves imported to North America originated from regions influenced by Islam. Building on this, Gomez has cautiously argued: "It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Muslims arrived in North America by the thousands, if not tens of thousands." (Ibid.)

In order to reconstruct Muslim practices in North America during the period of slavery, scholars have concentrated on different sources: Documents, such as slaveholder

1 See Gomez for a detailed history of the Muslim presence in Spanish-claimed domains and especially on the contrast of Muslim experiences in the Anglophone realms.

2 Within the vast region of Senegambia, the slave trade concentrated on the coast between the lower Senegal and the lower Casamance valleys, parts of the Senegal and Gambia valleys, and the middle and upper Niger. Imported slaves from Sierra Leone are estimated to 17 percent, from the Gold Coast around 12 percent and about 3 percent from the Bight of Benin.

ledgers, runaway slave advertisements that reveal Muslim names; documents describing Muslim practice written by slaveholders or by Muslim slaves themselves, such as diaries; and oral history data build the basis of their observations. Most approaches have focused on Muslim individuals, whose presence can be deduced from these sources.

In *African Muslims in Antebellum America: Transatlantic Stories and Spiritual Struggles* (1997) Austin has compiled the stories of 75 Muslims taken to North America from West Africa between 1730 and 1860. Some African Muslims have drawn broader attention, such as Ayuba Suleyman Diallo (Job ben Solomon), Ibrahima Abd ar-Rahman, Omar Ibn Said, Salih Bilali, and widely known in the field of popular literature also Kunta Kinte[3] and his successors. From their own descriptions and from different sources mentioning them, we know details about where and when these African Muslims were captured, whom they were sold too, and how they pursued their Islamic practices in captivity. Ayuba Suleyman Diallo (Job ben Solomon) for example was enslaved 1731 near the Gambia River and sold to a tobacco farm in Maryland. Ibrahima Abd ar-Rahman was a Muslim noble and a colonel, who fought to maintain the transatlantic slave trade. On a military mission in 1788, he was captured himself and sold various times. Finally, he worked on a cotton farm in Mississippi. Omar Ibn Said, a scholar and trader, was captured 1807 and enslaved in North Carolina. Salih Bilali was captured around 1790 in the upper Niger valley and sold to a plantation on St. Simon Island.[4]

Different thematic fields are touched on when Muslim practice in the context of slavery is described. A central feature to determine Muslim presence is connected with names. Slaveholders usually renamed slaves when they bought them from overseas. Scholars have evaluated the renaming of the newly arrived African slaves as "(…) an attempt to annihilate their past, sense of self, culture, kinship, ethnic origin, and religion" (Diouf, p. 82), or, in an another account, as an imposed "rite of passage" (Turner, p. 44). However, some African and among them Muslim names were maintained despite the slaveholders' routine. Different retention-techniques were employed: Slaves adapted several names, depending on whom they were addressed by, or they adjusted their names to versions more familiar to English-speakers. Job ben Solomon for example is the English adaption of Ayuba Suleyman, a name indicating the holder's adherence to Islam. Omar Ibn Said was called Moro/Moraeu, a version of Omar. In runaway slave advertisements, names that indicate an Islamic origin are not uncommon. However, this does not mean that slaveholders would recognize names

3 Kunta Kinte is the main character of Alex Haley's (1976) famous novel *Roots*.

4 For more detailed descriptions on the lives of these African Muslims see Diouf, 1998; Gomez, 2005; Turner, 1997.

such as Bullaly (Bilali), Mustapha, or Bocarrey (Bukhari or Bubacar from Abu Bakr) as Muslim names. (Diouf, pp. 82-87; Gomez, pp. 145-154) Similar to their names, African (Muslim) slaves had to give up their habitual manners of dressing. Their slave masters determined what they had to wear, if they provided cloth at all. Ways of dressing were strictly regulated for blacks in general, regardless if they were slaves or if they were free. Being very different from the traditional African Muslim clothing style, these restrictions presented a challenge to Muslim slaves. Descriptions of contemporaries and drawings, however, reveal that some male and female slaves wore cloths that appeared strange to their surroundings. These descriptions refer to veiled women, men wearing turbans or skullcaps, and other garments scholars have associated with Muslim traditions. (Diouf, pp. 72-82; Gomez, p. 154f) Besides names and dress scholars have mentioned further indicators for Islamic practices during slavery, such as the practice of polygamy, the observance of dietary rules, the abstinence from alcohol, alms giving, and particular manners of praying. (Diouf, pp. 87-93; Gomez, pp. 154-157) Special attention has further been given to the high literacy rate among African Muslims and the thus connected ability to reproduce and read the Qur'an. (Diouf, pp. 107-123)

Building on his detailed study and his cautious conclusions, the main findings on the Muslim presence in the American South can be summarized with Gomez as follows:
Although numbers are contested, the Muslim presence among African slaves is evident and seems to have been considerable. In captivity, African Muslim slaves were able to retain their Islamic practices to some extent. It is possible that these Islamic practices have influenced some worship practices of the Christian African American community. This point, however, needs to be inquired further. (p. 184)
The slave communities made a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. One distinctive element was the high literacy rate among Muslim slaves. Slaveholders considered Muslims more intelligent than other slaves and assigned domestic or supervisory roles to them. (pp. 173-183)

The Muslim African presence during slavery is highly relevant for the development of Islam in the United States. However, the direct historical connection between the Muslim presence and Islamic practice during slavery and the emergence of movements such as Noble Drew Ali's *Moorish Science Temple* is contested. With a remark on its speculative character, Gomez has offered an interesting theory on a possible linkage. (pp. 185-200) Notwithstanding this fascinating part of Muslim American history, its detailed historical reconstruction is not central for the following observations and will not be examined further. What will be important later on, is how the heritage of slavery and its Muslim component is referred to in Muslim Americans' contemporary narratives.

THE FIRST PARLIAMENT OF RELIGIONS – DISPLAYING ISLAM

Before returning to the role Islam played among the African American community in the early 20th century, let's cast a spotlight on another Muslim, who holds a prominent place in the narrative repertoire on Muslims and Islam in America: Mohammed Alexander Russell Webb, a white American convert to Islam. Webb came by a few days of fame as a spokesperson on behalf of Islam at the First World's Parliament of Religions that was part of the Chicago World's Fair of 1893. In order to understand Webb's appearance, a few remarks have to be made on the parliament itself.
The parliament is considered a symbol of a new emerging tolerance for religious pluralism. The invitation of members of different religious commitments was an acknowledgement of their – even though limited – self representations on American ground. (Lüddeckens, 2002, p. 271f) The *Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions* accordingly appraises the parliament: „The 1893 Parliament marked the first formal gathering of representatives of eastern and western spiritual traditions. Today, it is recognized as the birth of formal interreligious dialogue worldwide."[5]

Religious tradition was the reference point of the parliament's discussion that shifted between particular presentations and universal claims. The sheer presence of non-Christian traditions at the parliament was a concession to the existence of religious plurality. However, this did not mean that universal claims had lost their validity. It just meant that with the recognition of religious diversity, the engagement and the self-perception of religious traditions would somehow relate to an acknowledged manyness. (Lüddeckens, pp. 283-286) This resonated in the opening statement of the parliament's chairman John Henry Barrows:

> What, it seems to me, should have blunted some of the arrows of criticism shot at the promoters of this movement (i.e. the Congress of Religions, S.v.F.) is this other fact, that it is the representatives of that Christian faith which we believe has in it such elements and Divine forces that it is fitted to the needs of all men, who have planned and provided this first school of comparative religions wherein devout men of all faiths may speak for themselves without hindrance, without criticism and without compromise, and tell what they believe and why they believe it. I appeal to the representatives of the non-Christian faiths, and ask you if Christianity suffers in your eyes from having called this Parliament of Religions? Do you believe that its beneficent work in the world will be one whit lessened?
>
> On the contrary, you agree with the great mass of Christian scholars in America in believing that Christendom may proudly hold up this Congress of the Faiths as a torch of truth and of love, which may prove the morning star of the twentieth century. (Barrows, 1993, p. 24f)

5 http://www.parliamentofreligions.org/index.cfm?n=1&sn=4 (retrieved January 12, 2009).

In her foreword to the collection of speeches given at the parliament and with reference to the title – *The Dawn of Religious Pluralism* – Eck (1993), with a note of caution, reminds that "mere diversity or plurality is not pluralism. Pluralism is an attempt to come to terms with plurality in a positive way. It is an interpretation of diversity, not simply its manifestation." (p. xiii) Eck's remark is important. It is questionable whether it is legitimate to associate the concept of pluralism to the parliament. The concept of pluralism entered the American discussion only later, as I will show further on. Thus, attesting pluralism to the parliament tells us more about today's interpretive framework than about the context of the parliament's taking place. The same holds true for the notion of "interreligious dialogue" used in the statement of the *Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions* above.

The absence of Native and African Americans from the parliament and the way in which Islam was presented and acknowledged by the audience gives reference to how social variety was evaluated at the time. Do probably to Sultan Abdul Hamid's negative reaction to the parliament, all invited Muslim representatives of the Muslim world rejected the invitation. (Lüddeckens, p. 195) This is how Webb became a spokesperson on Islam to the parliament. His two speeches, *The Spirit of Islam* and *The Influence of Islam on Social Conditions,* were revised by general chairman John Henry Barrows, a churchman committed to the liberalization of Christian creeds as well as to a missionary perspective.[6] Barrows most likely requested Webb to open his lecture with remarks on polygamy, a highly controversial topic Webb had not intended to talk about it in his first lecture, and it is interesting to note what he said:

> But to-day I have been requested to make a statement, very briefly, in regard to something that is considered universally as part and parcel of the Islamic system. There are thousands and thousands of people who seem to be in mortal terror that the curse of polygamy is to be inflicted upon them at once. Now, I want to say to you, honestly and fairly, that polygamy never was and is not a part of the Islamic system. To engraft polygamy upon our social system in the condition in which it is to-day, would be a curse. There are parts of the East where it is practiced. (…) But we must first understand what it really means to the Mussulman, not what it means to the American. (Webb, p. 270)

The audience responded emotionally with outcries to Webb's explanations on polygamy. Especially his statement that polygamy was "beneficial" under certain "conditions" provoked outcries and hisses. These and other remarks were removed from the reprint of Webb's talk displayed above.[7] Although Webb's further explanations on Islam produced some positive responses, his words on polygamy finally drew

6 Barrows also changed the title of Webb's second speech. (Abd-Allah, 2006, pp. 219, 226f, 237)

7 See Abd-Allah for the inclusion of these controversial remarks and reactions of the audience. (p. 238f)

broad media attention. Despite the public reactions, Webb considered the Parliament as a success and a gesture of tolerance. (Abd-Allah, pp. 239-242) His positive reaction might have been a consequence of what he had already experienced as a Muslim American. A part of his talk revealed his sympathetic attitude towards his fellow citizens and his optimism concerning their attitudes towards Islam:

> (…) I am an American of the Americans. I carried with me for years the same errors that thousands of Americans carry with them to-day. Those errors have grown into history, false history has influenced your opinion of Islam. It influenced my opinion of Islam and when I began, ten years ago, to study the Oriental religions, I threw Islam aside as altogether too corrupt for consideration.
>
> But when I came to go beneath the surface, to know what Islam really is, to know who and what the prophet of Arabia was, I changed my belief very materially, and I am proud to say that I am now a Mussulman.
>
> I have not returned to the United States to make you all Mussulmans in spite of yourselves; I never intended to do it in the world. I do not propose to take a sword in one hand and the Koran in the other and go through the world killing every man who does not say, *La illaha illala Mohammud resoul Allah* – "There is no God but one and Mohammed is the prophet of God." But I have faith in the American intellect, in the American intelligence, and in the American love of fair play, and will defy any intelligent man to understand Islam and not love it. (Webb, pp. 268, 271)

This extract reflects Webb's own journey to Islam, which is somehow exemplary for the time. He was not the only one seeking to escape the spiritual crises of Victorian America. In the 1870s, agnosticism prospered, philosophical experiments of Boston's intellectuals marked the beginning of what would later become the Pragmatist School, and seekers of different shades experimented with the rich spiritual offering, of which Webb's promoted Islam was just one option. (Abd-Allah, p. 69f)

Today's research characterizes Webb as the "first known American convert to Islam". (Turner, p. 64) This points to Webb's significance within the historical narrative repertoire on Muslim Americans. Not his conversion is of unique character but the fact that he was able to make his adherence to Islam known. The contemporary perception of Webb as a pioneer in many fields is a recent phenomenon and results from the appraisal of his public appearances on behalf of Islam as "(…) among the first efforts to give the religion permanent footing in the United States". (Chaudrey, 2007c) However, it is important to note that some scholars have evaluated an according appraisal of Webb as a marginalization of the African American Muslim heritage going back to the period of the slave trade. (Rashid, 2000) Before discussing this controversy at various instances further on, I will now turn to another aspect of the historical narrative of Muslim Americans, namely, the African American appropriation of Islam.

EARLY AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSLIMS – APPROPRIATING ISLAM

In the early 20th century, different Muslim groups emerged in the United States. Let's focus here on what has been called the "appropriation" of Islam by African Americans. (Jackson, 2005, p. 43)
Scholars have argued that the different African American adaptations and configurations of Islam were far more heterogeneous than the historical narrative in general displays. (Bayoumi, 2001; McCloud, 1995) In order to illustrate this heterogeneity somewhat, this chapter discusses two readings of Islam that spread among the African American community at the time: the one of the *Moorish Science Temple* and the one of the *Ahmadiyya*.

Before entering the discussion, some considerations have to be given to the zeitgeist: In the at the time dominant societal models, African Americans played only a marginal role. This can be traced with respect to the discussion on pluralism. Different societal models were constructed with respect to the struggle people fought to find their place in America. With *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), William James laid the foundation for the concept of "cultural pluralism" developed in the 1920s. Israel Zangwill's play, *The Melting Pot,* first staged in 1908, became the metaphor for Americanization theories. One of the first critiques on melting pot or Americanization theories was Horace Kallen's article, *Democracy versus the Melting Pot* (1915), published in *The Nation*. Kallen, a student of William James, is held to be a founder of cultural pluralism.

It is important to note that African Americans were largely excluded from these theoretical conceptions framing American society. In discourse as well as in social reality, they occupied a marginalized category of their own. From this marginalized perspective, they constructed their own frameworks. Scholars have considered this backdrop as crucial for explaining how Noble Drew Ali rose as a "prophet of the city" (Turner, 1997). Turner has argued that Pan-Africanism, formulated by Edward Wilmot Blyden, was "the ideological bridge" between the Islamicity of African Muslim slaves and the "'new American Islam'" rising in the early 20th century. (p. 47) Blyden, a Presbyterian minister, propagated Islam as a better-suited religion for blacks than Christianity. The concept of brotherhood and the lack of racial prejudice were central to Blyden's reading of Islam and lay at the core of his transnational Pan-Africanism. Blyden's Pan-Africanism inspired the *Universal Negro Improvement Association* (UNIA). The UNIA, under the leadership of Marcus Garvey, attracted followers of different religions on the basis of concepts such as Pan-Africanism, race pride, and self-help. Turner has argued, that among others, Marcus Garvey was a core influence for Noble Drew Ali. (p. 90)

In *Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection* (2005), Jackson has discussed the reasons for the "appropriation" of Islam by "the early 'Islamizers'" from a different angle. Crucial, according to Jackson, was the role of "Black(american) Religion". The concepts of "Black Religion" and the "Blackamerican" embody Jackson's framework, based on the argument that "(…) American history has essentially transformed these erstwhile Africans into a new people. This is especially true to their *religious* orientation." (p. 17) Accordingly, Black Religion was a response to a particular American reality – "a subset of the aggregate of black religious expression in America". (p. 29) Black Religion's main aim thereby was "to annihilate or at least subvert white supremacy and anti-black racism". (Ibid.)
Jackson has argued that the Black Church was incapable to respond successfully to the spirit of Black Religion. While struggling to assimilate, the leaders of the Black Church did not reach the masses of "Blackamericans" that migrated into northern cities. According to Jackson, this created the vacuum, which Noble Drew Ali and later Elijah Muhammad successfully filled. (p. 42f)

Before describing Noble Drew Ali's teachings, it is important to note, that African Americans also turned to other Muslim groups that advanced a different reading of Islam, such as for example the *Ahmadiyya*. The appearance of *Ahmadiyya* da'wah workers in early 20th century America and their success among African Americans has challenged the typology scholars have applied to Muslim American groups. With reference to the *Ahmadiyya*, Smith (2010) has pointed out that: "While the classification of Islamic individuals and associations in America into immigrant, African American, and convert is generally useful, some groups do not fall neatly into these categories." (p. 75) The standard classification disseminated by scholars will be called into question at different points of this study. At this point, let's just take notice of Bayoumi's (2001) argument that the scholarly narrative of Islam and African American Muslims in the United States perpetuates a homogenization of a complex historical reality, of which the *Ahmadiyya* (and other Muslim groups) were in fact a part of.[8] Let me now turn to the different readings of Islam by the two mentioned groups:

In the light of the above sketched zeitgeist, Noble Drew Ali began to develop Moorish Science, which would become the foundation of what Turner (1997) has considered the "first mass religious movement in the history of Islam in America". (p. 71f) Ali's early life is hard to reconstruct and different assumptions about his background have been made. (Gomez, pp. 203-205)
In 1913, Ali founded the Canaanite Temple, the predecessor of the *Moorish Science*

8 Besides the Moorish Science Temple and the *Ahmadiyya,* Mc Cloud (1995) has mentioned the following African American Muslim communities that took up activities before 1930: the Universal Islamic Society (1926), the First Muslim Mosque of Pittsburgh (1928), and the Islamic Brotherhood (1929). (p. 10)

Temple, in Newark. In the following years, he developed Moorish science and transferred his headquarter to Chicago in 1925. In 1928, after several instances of reorganizing, the *Moorish Science Temple of America* emerged.

Adherents of the *Moorish Science Temple* see in Ali "a Prophet of Islam" that "was sent also to the Moors of America, who were called Negroes."[9] This statement, made by his contemporary adherents, is a short summary of Ali's significance and points to the issues, unacceptable for other Muslim Americans. In research Ali stands for "unorthodox" (Gomez, p. 274), "heterodox" (Turner, p. 128) or "proto-" (Jackson, p. 45f) Islam, "racial ideology" (Gomez, p. 274) or "separatism" (Turner, Ibid.). Furthermore, the *Moorish Science Temple* has often been referred to as a "movement", in contrast to "immigrant Muslim communities". (Haddad & Smith, 1994, p. xix)
Ali called himself God's last prophet, "who was to bring the true and divine Creed of Islam" to the people. (N. D. Ali, pp. Chapter XLVIII, 3) According to Berg (2009), Ali published *The Holy Koran of the Moorish Science Temple of America* to support his claim of being a prophet. (p. 55) The 1927 published Koran, which Ali's followers called the *Circle Seven Koran,* exposes the sources that inspired Ali. It consists of a compilation of different texts, which Ali partially adopted verbatim. Ali's Koran has no vicinity to the Qur'an. Instead, it extensively reverts to New Thought or Rosicrucian texts and reveals Ali's inclination towards Freemasonry.[10]
The composition of Ali's doctrine became a source for controversy: One historically transmitted reaction to the publication of the *Circle Seven Koran* came from Satti Majid, a Sudanese Sunni Muslim, who stayed in New York City at the time. After he unsuccessfully requested Ali to withdraw his revelation, Satti Maijd left the United States. Abroad, he was able to obtained three fatawa – one from al-Azhari and two from Sudanese ulama' – to discredit Noble Drew Ali. (Gomez, pp. 254-256)

Noble Drew Ali's Islam legitimated an identity of delimitation. In trying to overcome the uprootedness of African-Americans, Ali created a group identity – a divinely sanctioned frame of reference for Moorish Americans. The identity construct he offered his followers is a nationality – the „nationality of the Moors". This particular nationality was attributed to his followers afresh, since according to Ali, they had been Moors until under European influence they were called "negroes, blacks, and coloreds". Ali reassured his followers that there was just one human race and therefore, the attributes "negro, black or colored" were invalid: „Come all ye Asiatics of America and hear the truth about your nationality and birthrights, because you

9 http://www.moorishsciencetempleofamericainc.com/MoorishHistory.html (retrieved January, 20. 2009).

10 For a detailed review of the relation between Ali's Koran and the different incorporated texts, see Gomez, pp. 232-238.

are not negroes.“ (N. D. Ali, 1927, pp. Chapter XLVII, 10) Ali argued further: “The Asiatics of America who were of Moorish descent” were given an identity that differed from the one of “the pale skin nations of Europe”. Interestingly, this “Moorish identity” did not bear any nationalistic notions such as, for example, Marcus Garvey’s and the UNIA’s back to Africa rhetoric. Ali did not reject the United States politically and called on his adherents to respect the laws of the country. (Gomez, p. 274; Mintzel, 1997, p. 640; Turner, pp. 80-90)

I suggest to interpret Ali’s construction of nationality as a conscious or unconscious attempt to become part of the conceptualization of American social pluralism, which puts the concept of *nationality* center stage and excluded “negroes” – as Kallen’s widely read article for example shows.[11] Although deliberately constructed in delimitation from “the pale skin nations of Europe”, nationality assigned “Moorish Americans” to a category, which was part of the conceptualization of pluralism. Ali did not envision to melt differences between social groups – on the contrary, difference was meant to be sustained, as the following extract shows: „We, as a clean and pure nation descended from the inhabitants of Africa, do not desire to amalgamate or marry into the families of the pale skin nations of Europe.“ (N. D. Ali, pp. Chapter XLVII, 6) Although the construction of “a pure nation” drew on racial considerations, the appropriation of the new category possibly represents the adaption to the dominant conceptualization of pluralism. The *Moorish Science Temple’s* distribution of ID cards among its adherents that identified the holder as Moor, Muslim, and citizen of the USA[12] could also be interpreted as an attempt to adapt to another, less devalued category. These assumptions however are speculative and have yet to be substantiated.

Let’s now turn to the *Ahmadiyya*: Although different from the *Muslim Science Temple,* the *Ahmadiyya*’s reading of Islam appealed to African Americans as well. The *Ahmadiyya* emerged in late 19th century British India along with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s claim to be the Mahdi – a claim that gradually alienated the Muslim mainstream from him and his followers. Although Ahmad’s vision was a reaction to the colonialist rule at home, it proved to be attractive in other parts of the world as well. Therefore, the *Ahmadiyya* is often labeled “transnational”, a label that somewhat undermines

11 Kallen’s *Democracy versus the Melting Pot* can be read as a reference to shifting paradigms – from biological to cultural and from monistic to pluralistic. Kallen’s criterion of classification is nationality. Accordingly, each nation has its own culture, which its adherents should be allowed to act out. The symphony of civilizations exemplifies Kallen’s vision of the interplay of different nationalities in an idealistic manner. Speaking of his “symphony of civilizations”, Kallen had a vision of the social groups, which composed his “orchestration of mankind”. Even though he acknowledged the presence of “nine million negroes” in “the proletarian South”, he thought of social groups such as “immigrant Irishman, German, Scandinavian, Jew, Pole, or Bohemian”, when he described his vision of a “orchestration of mankind” or a “commonwealth of nationalities”.

12 The ID cards served as some sort of amulet that was meant to protect the holder from the harm of “a white man”. (Gomez, p. 265f)

its adaption to particular settings, as has recently been argued. (Leonard, 2009) The first missionary sent to the United States in the service of the *Ahmadiyya* was Muhammad Sadiq. Sadiq arrived in Philadelphia in 1920 and started his mission, transferring his headquarters from New York City to Detroit and finally to Chicago. In 1921, he started publishing *The Moslem Sunrise*. The *Ahmadiyya* is widely known for its publishing activities and its dissemination of Islamic literature. In the United States, the *Ahmadiyya* is held to have published the "first major English translation" of the Qur'an. (Gomez, p. 229) The English Qur'an was translated by Maulana Muhammad Ali and has been circulated since 1917.

Different from the *Moorish Science Temple* the *Ahmadiyya* stands for the "first multi-racial model for American Islam". (Turner, p. 110) Sadiq himself was a victim of US immigration policy at the beginning of his stay and became more and more alienated in the course of experiencing racism. Realizing that his multi-racial vision did not appeal to white Americans, he began to direct the *Ahmadiyya*'s missionary work towards the African American community. According to figures provided by *The Moslem Sunrise,* 1'025 mostly African Americans, converted to Islam between 1921 and 1925. (Ibid., p. 124)

Due to the careers African Americans made within the folds of the *Ahmadiyya,* members of the UNIA were gradually attracted to it. Both "movements" overlapped in their internationalist perspective, which stretched to different religious commitments. The UNIA was sympathetic to the *Ahmadiyya*'s Pan-Islamic and Indian nationalistic positions rejecting imperialist rule. (Ibid., p. 128) By fusing Pan-African and Indian cultural and political elements into a multi-racial identity, the *Ahmadiyya* offered African American Muslims a different vision than the *Moorish Science Temple*.

Turner has made the claim that "(u)ntil the mid-1950s, the *Ahmadiyya* was arguably the most influential community in African-American Islam." (p. 138) It was the rise of the *Nation of Islam* and the immigration of Middle Eastern Muslims that finally challenged the *Ahmadiyya*'s position. However, its influence and the plea for a multi-racial Islam did not disappear completely. By influencing Elijah Muhammad and Warith Deen Mohammed,

> "(…) the *Ahmadiyya* movement played a pivotal role in keeping the option of multi-racial Islam alive in black America until the 1960s, when African American interest and participation in Sunni Islam challenged its position and came to provide the most popular multi-racial community experience in the religion." (Ibid.)

The historical popularity of both, the *Moorish Science Temple* and the *Ahmadiyya,* shows that African American Islam is far from homogenous. With different influences

at work, Islam was reformulated in order to provide new identity models for African Americans. And even though African Americans all faced discriminatory practices, they still responded differently to their situations.

IMMIGRANT MUSLIMS – INSTITUTIONALIZING ISLAM (UNTIL EARLY 1980S)

Scholars have conceptually framed immigrant Muslims and their Islamicity for example with regards to the fields of migration and transnational studies. Thereby, in contrast to descriptions on African American Muslims, the descriptions on immigrant Muslims have often stressed the heterogeneity of thought and practice prevalent in the community. Questions concerning the relationship between emigrants and their home countries, the relationship between different generations of immigrants in the US, and the relationships between US-immigrants from various origins have been given special attention. (Haddad & Smith, 1994, p. xxif) Research on Muslim immigration to the United States has predominantly focused on national labels instead of religious ones. Therefore, the focus only shifted more recently from "Arab" immigration to "Muslim" immigration. Still, the labels have often been used interchangeably, and research only recently began to focus increasingly on the immigration of South Asian Muslims.

Scholars have differentiated between several waves of immigration. (Leonard, 2003, pp. 9-15) In what follows, I reproduce Haddad's descriptions. (2004, pp. 3-8) According to Haddad, Muslims immigrated to the United States from regions of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century. They mostly originated from rural areas of the Syrian province and escaped poor economic conditions. Immigration from this region increased before World War I. During the war, immigration was halted. In 1924, the *National Origins Act* restricted Middle Eastern immigration to 100 persons annually.

These early Muslim immigrants were assimilated and Americanized. Accordingly, the melting pot transformed Muhammad into Mo, Rashid into Dick, and Ali into Al. Alongside their fellow citizens, Muslims served in both of the World Wars, while their children attended public school.

After World War II, another wave of immigrants came to the United States. Among them were many students from an upper and middle class background that were supposed to be trained at American Universities in order to serve American interests in the newly independent Arab states. However, not few of them settled in the United States.

Finally, when the *Asian Exclusion Act* was lifted in 1965, Muslims immigrated to the United States from all over the Muslim world causing a brain drain in Arab and South Asian countries. In contrast to these highly professional Muslim immigrants,

the latest arrivals also included refugees from places such as Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, and Palestine.

When describing the Islamic practice of Muslim immigrants from a historical perspective, scholars have often mentioned the establishment of institutions, such as mosques and Islamic centers, schools and organizations. Early mosque building all over the country is documented. There is a controversy as regards the establishment of the first mosques. (Ba-Yunus & Kone, 2006, p. 46) Two prominent examples, held to be of the earliest ones, are the mosques built in Ross, North Dakota, and in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in the early 1930s. (Nimer, 2002, p. 39f; Smith, pp. 56-62) However, mosque building in general only started later. According to a report issued by *The Mosque Study Project* (Bagby, Perl, & Froehle, 2001) of all 1209 mosques established between 1925 and 2000 only two percent were founded prior to 1950. Mosque building began to increase in the 1970s. Today, 87 percent of the existing mosques were founded since 1970. (pp. 23-26)

Referring to the example of the mosque, scholars have explained relationships among Muslims of different origins. Accordingly, it was often for pragmatic reasons that Muslim communities have developed beyond ethnic affiliation. If an ethnic group of Muslims was too small in numbers to build a mosque of its own, it was likely to cooperate with other Muslim groups in this area. The contrary of course was found as well. (Haddad & Smith, p. xxii) Overall, however, the findings of *The Mosque Study Project* suggest that mosques have generally been ethnically diverse. (Bagby et al., pp. 17-20)

As in the case of mosque building, other institutions focused on Islam as a collective identity did not prosper until the 1960s, with the exception of the *Federation of Islamic Associations in America* (FIAA) founded in 1953. (Ba-Yunus & Kone, 2006, p. 47) Muslim students organizations emerged from American campuses due to the large amount of students immigrating to the US from Muslim countries. In 1963, the *Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada* (MSA) was founded as an initiative to provide a platform for these campus based organizations. Although starting rather small with less than a hundred Muslim students, the MSA grew rapidly. It was soon more influential than the FIAA and attracted Muslims from different origins; especially after immigration laws were loosened in 1965. (Ba-Yunus & Kone, pp. 49-51) Due to the relaxation of immigration policy, not only Muslim students but also Muslim professionals immigrated to the US. Consequently, many non-students joined the MSA. And, since their needs differed from the ones of Muslim students, the MSA gradually found itself unable to respond to all of them. Consequentially, the *Islamic Society of North America* (ISNA) was founded in 1982 at the 19th annual conven-

tion of the MSA. In addition to the MSA, the following MSA-founded institutions became affiliates of ISNA: the *North American Islamic Trust* (NAIT), the *Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers* (AMSE), the *Association of Muslim Social Scientists* (AMSS), and the *Islamic Medical Association* (IMA). (Ibid.)
Whereas from early on, ISNA has tried to appeal to Muslims from various origins, other early-founded Muslim American organizations had a narrower range. The *Muslim American Society* (MAS), founded in 1969 in Chicago, attracted mainly Muslims from the Middle East, and the *Islamic Circle of North America* (ICNA), founded in 1968 in New York, appealed predominantly to Muslim immigrants of South Asian background. ICNA and MAS have been dedicated to Islamic activism as well as educational and spiritual development. The *Muslim Brotherhood* and the *Jama'at-i Islami* heavily inspired both organizations. (Haddad, p. 33; Nimer, pp. 68-71)

Prominent thinkers of the Muslim world have influenced early Islamic institution building of Muslim immigrants to the US. These thinkers are considered as progenitors of "Islamism" (Mandaville, 2007), the "neo-Salafiya" (Schulze, 2000) or "Neofundamentalism" (Roy, 2004). The terminology points to the innovative aspects central to the theories these thinkers disseminated: its political dimension and its intellectual grounds. Thereby, the conceptualization of a sociopolitical order was, on the one hand, inspired by the paradigmatic example of the forefathers (*al-salaf al-salih*) and, on the other hand, directed against the political, cultural, and economic dominance of the West.[13] Haddad (2004) has argued that among immigrants coming to the United States after 1965 were "Muslims who had given up on the nationalist ideology and were influenced by the Islamic vision of a society that is an alternative to Marxism and capitalism, one that is eager to recreate an Islamic order in the world." (p. 30)

An inspiration for such an "Islamic order" was provided by Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-79), the founder of the *Jama'at-i Islami* in Pakistan, and by Sayyid Qutb, a leading intellectual of the *Muslim Brotherhood (Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin)*, founded by Hassan al-Banna (1906-49) in Egypt.[14] Important for Muslim immigrants to America and central for Mawdudi's and Qutb's reading of Islam was the notion of *jahiliyya*, originally referring to the time of ignorance allegedly predominant before the revelation of the Qur'an. It has been argued that Qutb probably built on Mawdudi's understanding of *jahiliyya* for his diagnosis on the condition of the social orders prevalent at his time. (Mandaville, 2007, p. 80) Qutb stayed in the United States from 1949 until 1950 on behalf of the Egyptian administration. This stay influenced his view of "the West" as a representation of "a pervasive system of values and beliefs that

13 For an overview of neo-Salafi theory and its main influences, see Schulze.

14 For a description of the conceptualization of the socio-political order by Mawdudi, al-Banna, and Qutb, see Mandaville pp. 57-83.

would undermine any society that chose its path". (Ibid., p. 77) For Qutb, a stern dichotomy existed between *jahiliyya* and the uncompromised Islamic way of life, which he outlined in the 1964 published *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq*, often translated as *Milestones*. (Qutb, 1996)

Qutb's readings transcended the classical distinction between *dar al-harb* (the abode of war) and *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam), because, according to Qutb, ignorance predominated not only in non-Muslim but in Muslim states as well. (Mandaville, p. 250f) The repeal of this distinction was consequential for legitimating Muslims living as minorities in Western states. While Mawdudi in his early teachings and during his travels to the United States warned Muslims about living in a non-Muslim environment, he later adapted his view and considered Muslims' residence in the US as a chance to spread the message of Islam. (Haddad, p. 30f) In the 1980s, intellectuals such as the Tunesian Rashid Ghannushi or the Sudanese Hassan Turabi further strengthened this view. The United States was gradually theorized as *dar al-da'wa* (the abode of the invitation to Islam). Therefore, the 1980s have been considered as the years of American Muslims' "opening up". (Schumann, 2007) Accordingly, Muslim organizations that were heavily inspired by the *Muslim Brotherhood* and the *Jama'at-i Islami,* such as ISNA and ICNA, began to alternate their conviction and to advocate participation in American society. (Haddad, p. 33) I will discuss the process set in motion from this change of perspective shortly. Before that, let's now turn to one important Muslim group that emerged in 1930 and is still active today: The *Nation of Islam*.

THE NATION OF ISLAM –DIFFERENT SHADES OF COUNTER-DISCOURSE

The historical development of the *Nation of Islam* has to be discussed with reference to the historical developments in the US in general. When Noble Drew Ali passed away in 1929, the *Nation of Islam* emerged in Detroit in 1930 as an initiative of Fard Muhammad. Fard Muhammad's background is largely unknown and subject of various speculations. (Gomez, p. 278) Furthermore, it is unclear, if and to what extent contacts between the *Moorish Science Temple* and Fard Muhammad existed. (Gomez, p. 276f; Marsh, 2000, p. 31f) However, it seems plausible that Fard profited from Noble Drew Ali's ground breaking work. His teachings did not radically differ from what Ali had already familiarized people with, although they were more explicit. Fard, claiming to have been born in Mecca as a member of the Quraysh, toured the streets of Detroit as a peddler and began to unfold his message. His message appealed to African Americans in search for a better life. Fard's followers were mainly recent migrants from the rural South that were well aware of the inhuman practices of the Jim Crow era. Thus, Fard's and other, already mentioned narratives emanating from

the African American communities in the northern cities, fell on fertile ground. Turner has argued that migrants from the South were attracted to the early *Nation*'s teachings, mainly because, as being part of the last wave of the Great Migration, their hopes of assimilation and escaping exploitation died quickly along with their loss of employment and housing during the first years of the Great Depression. (p. 154)

Fard enforced and amplified the dichotomy between blacks and whites and the rejection of Christianity. Additionally, he also gave instructions on life worldly practices, such as dietary proscriptions.[15] Early research attributed significance to Fard's *Nation* because "of its unique expression of race consciousness." (Beynon, 1938, p. 894) And with regards to the adherents, it concluded: "There developed among them a way of living which isolated them to a certain extent from all persons not members of their cult, (…)" (Ibid.)

While Fard Muhammad is held responsible for launching the *Nation of Islam*, his ardent follower Elijah Muhammad established and developed its theoretical basis. (Gomez, p. 277) After Fard was arrested twice and charges were pressed against him, he mysteriously disappeared in 1934. (Lincoln, 1994, p. 15) Elijah Muhammad took the lead and moved the *Nation*'s headquarter from Detroit to Chicago's Temple No. 2. Elijah Muhammad, at this time still Elijah Poole, had himself been part of the Great Migration. In 1923, at the age of twenty-two, he migrated from Georgia to Detroit. Due to the worsening conditions in the Northern cities, he was unable to provide for his family. When he first heard Fard Muhammad's message, it had a deep impact on him. Quickly, Elijah Poole adapted a new narrative to make sense of his life.

Turner has described this transition in terms of a process of signification: "For Elijah Poole, the change in status that his new-found signification symbolized was dramatic. When he became Elijah Karriem and eventually Elijah Muhammad, he was no longer a down-and-out unemployed Negro laborer on relief, but instead a dignified black Asiatic Chief Minister of Islam." (p. 156)

As the newly born Elijah Muhammad rose in the ranks of the *Nation,* the bonds between him and Fard grew stronger. According to the *Nation*'s narrative that was spread later via Elijah Muhammad's works, this bond was sealed by the initially secret revelation Elijah received from Fard concerning the latter's divine nature. In *Message to the Blackman in America* (1965), Elijah recounts his moment of truth as follows:

> I asked him, "Who are you, and what is your real name?" He said, "I am the one that the world has been expecting for the past 2'000 years." I said to Him

15 Gomez has stressed the centrality of these dietary proscriptions for the *Nation*'s public reception: „A disciplined diet became coterminous with the Nation, quickly constituting an iconographic symbiosis by which the Nation came to be known, or labeled." (p. 281)

> again, "What is your name?" He said, "My name is Mahdi; I am God, I came to guide you into the right path that you may be successful and see the hereafter." (p. 17)

It has been argued that it had been Elijah Muhammad, who ascribed divine nature to Fard (Gomez, p. 286; Lincoln, p. 15). Research has further speculated that Fard's reported self-identification as Mahdi might have been inspired by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim to be the Mahdi. (Berg, 2009, p. 78; Gomez, p. 282f) This claim is tied to presumptions concerning Fard's background and a possible link to the *Ahmadiyya* in British India.[16]

Until the rise of Malcolm X and finally his death in 1975, Elijah Muhammad was from then on the creative mind behind the *Nation*'s teachings. The following works contain the core of Elijah Muhammad's thoughts: *Supreme Wisdom: Solution to the So-called Negroes' Problem; The Supreme Wisdom: Volume Two;* and *Message to the Blackman in America*. (Berg, 2009, p. 4) Elijah Muhammad underlay his teachings with his interpretation of the Bible and the Qur'an, which he read in the Muhammad Ali and the Yusuf Ali translations. (Ibid., p. 64)

Berg, who has closely examined how Elijah Muhammad adapted the Qur'an to his time-space context, has argued that the recourse occurred only partially:

> Oddly, for some of his teachings that seem to lend themselves to drawing on material from the Qur'an, such as his teachings about Allah, creation, other prophets, the protection of women, and fasting, Elijah Muhammad felt no need to avail himself of the scripture. However, for discussions of his race myth about Yakub, his eschatology about the Fall of America, his regulations on diet, his polemics against hypocrits, and his description of prayer, he often did. (Ibid., p. 76)

For reasons of space, not all topics mentioned in the quote can be discussed here. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Elijah Muhammad's teachings covered a broader range than what is touched on generally. Frequently, the focus has lain on Elijah Muhammad's ascription of divinity to Fard and of prophethood to himself as well as on his conceptualization of race. Because Muhammad's concept of race demonstrates clearly how the American context has influenced the Islamicity of the *Nation,* some details have to be provided here as well.

Elijah Muhammad's narrative of Yakub and the white devils is legitimated with reference to verses from the Bible and the Qur'an. However, the recourse to the Qur'an

16 See Gomez for the state of research on Fard's origin and the different theories connected with this. (p. 277f ; 282f)

is inconsistent and contradictory, due to Elijah Muhammad's technique of referring to particular verses "as discrete, unconnected entities." (Berg, p. 86) The accordingly composed narrative has it that the white man is the result of experiments performed by the evil scientist Yakub, who had created whites out of blacks in a process of genetic crossbreeding. At one instant, Elijah Muhammad (1965) describes the outcome of this process as follows: "The Yakub made devils were really pale white, with really blue eyes; which we think are the ugliest of colors for a human eye." (p. 116 For six thousand years, the narrative goes on, the white race ruled the world with the permission of Allah. This time witnessed great destruction, such as the invasion of America, the dispossession of its Native inhabitants, as well as the enslavement of Africans.[17] As opposite to the "white devils", the narrative constructs the "so-called Negroes", members of "the black nation", "the Asiatic nation", and more specifically "the Tribe of Shabazz from Mecca". As Qur'anic reference to "the black nation", Elijah Muhammad mentions verse 15:28. (Ibid., p. 85) The end of the rule by the "white devils" and the resurrection of "the Lost-Found Nation of Islam in America" had been initiated by the appearance of the Mahdi, personified by Fard.

Elijah Muhammad's teachings translated into political demands. By joining the *Nation*, members were assigned an X instead of their last names. The X stood (and still stands) for the loss of identity induced by the heritage of slavery. Furthermore, a demand for a separate territory is articulated clearly, in what is referred to as the "Muslim Program" (i.e. *Program and Position).* (E. Muhammad, 1965) Point four states: "We want our people in America whose parents or grandparents were descendants from slaves to be allowed, to establish a separate state or territory of their own – either on this continent or elsewhere." (p. 161)

Race-relations in the US did apparently not develop into a direction Elijah Muhammad approved of. In the early 1960s, previously acknowledged American societal models were given up, that is, "the dream of 'cultural pluralism'" as well as "the hope of a 'melting pot'". (Glazer & Moynihan, 1970, p. 13) And by now, "Negroes" were part of the idea on how integration processes should take place in American society. In the 1950s, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s *Civil Rights Movement* had reached the masses and with the *Civil Rights Act* of 1964, its juridical goal by outlawing discriminatory state practices. However, Martin Luther King's liberal integration program did not appeal to large parts of the African American population. The *Nation of Islam* or the *Black Panthers* were successful because their political claims were more radical. This radicalization is considered a reaction to the opposition that emerged against the political and socioeconomic emancipation of African Americans. The poor economic

17 See Berg for the detailed scriptural reference made to the narrative of Yakub. (p. 85-88)

conditions African Americans had to put up with in the American South and in the Northern cities persisted along with the predominance of racism. (Hildebrandt, 2005, p. 50f) Malcolm X, who will now take center stage, not least came to fame because he played African Americans' emotions arising from this situation with great skill.

Various authors explored the life and works of Malcolm X (see chapter 2). This historical overview can only give a quick glimpse on the multi layered personality of this Muslim leader.

Malcolm changed his identity narrative fundamentally at least twice: The first time, when he joined the *Nation of Islam* and the second time, when he adopted Sunni Islam. Malcolm Little was introduced to the *Nation*'s teaching while serving a sentence between 1946 and 1952. He received his X after he left prison and began to work full time for the *Nation* in 1953. Initially active as a recruiter and organizer for the *Nation*, Malcolm gradually came to fame as a spokesperson. Due to Elijah Muhammad's poor health condition, he became the *Nation*'s national spokesman in 1959. This position provided a broader platform for his charismatic appearances. In the early 1960s, the relationship between the *Nation*'s leadership and Malcolm X began to change for the worse. Malcolm became more powerful than Elijah Muhammad and started to question the *Nation*'s religious and political positions. (Marsh, p. 58)
In 1964, Malcolm left the *Nation* and founded the *Muslim Mosque Inc.* and the *Organization of Afro-American Unity.* A month later, he left for Hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage and wrote the following widely noticed lines back home:

> Never have I witnessed such sincere hospitality and the overwhelming spirit of true brotherhood as practiced by people of all colors and races here in this Ancient Holy Land, the home of Abraham, Muhammad and all other prophets of the Holy Scriptures. For the past week, I have been utterly speechless and spellbound by the graciousness I see displayed all around me by people of *all colors*. (...)
>
> There were tens of thousands of pilgrims, from all over the world. They were of all colors, from blue-eyed blonds to black skin Africans. But we were all participating in the same ritual, displaying a spirit of unity and brotherhood that my experiences in America had lead me to believe never could exist between the white and non-white.
>
> America needs to understand Islam, because this is the one religion that erases from its society the race problem. Throughout my travels in the Muslim world, I have met, talked to, and even eaten with people who in America would have considered 'white' – but the 'white' attitude was removed from their minds by the religion of Islam. I have never before seen *sincere* and *true* brotherhood practiced by all colors together, irrespective of their color. (…)

> During the past eleven days here in the Muslim world, I have eaten from the same plate, drunk from the same glass, and slept in the same bed, (or on the same rug) – while praying to the *same God* – with fellow Muslims, whose eyes were the bluest of blue, whose hair was the blondest of blond, and whose skin was the whitest of white. And in the same *words* and in the *actions* and in the *deeds* of the 'white' Muslims, I felt the same sincerity that I felt among the black African Muslims of Nigeria, Sudan and Ghana. (X, 2001, p. 454f)

Malcolm's experiences during Hajj made him reject the teachings of the *Nation* once and for all. He adopted the name El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz as a symbol for his transition from "Black Muslim" to "Muslim" only, as his wife Betty Shabazz commented on it. (Marsh, p. 61) El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz was killed while giving a talk in New York City on February 21, 1965. The responsibility for his assassination is discussed controversially. (Haskins, 1996, pp. 116-117; Turner, pp. 219-221)

When Elijah Muhammad died in 1975, his son Wallace D. Muhammad became his successor. Along with Malcolm X, Wallace D. Muhammad had been a stern critique of the teachings of his father and was expelled from the *Nation* several times. His closeness to Sunni Islam made him a major reformer of the *Nation*. He discarded his father's teachings on the divine nature of Fard as well as his concept of race. Instead, he encouraged his followers to observe the five pillars of Islam. The *Nation* was renamed in 1975 to *Bilalian*, to *World Community of al-Islam in the West* in 1976, to *American Muslim Mission* in 1980, to the *Ministry of Imam W.D. Mohammed* in 1985, to *Muslim American Society* in 1997, and to *American Society of Muslims* in 2002. (P. R. Muhammad, 2007) Along with the name changes of the organization, Wallace D. Muhammad transformed his own name into Warith Deen Mohammed. This is considered as symbolic for his transition from "Supreme Minister" to "Imam". (Berg, p. 132)

The narrative advanced by Warith Deen Mohammed is based on the figure of Bilal, who according to the Islamic tradition had been a companion of the prophet as well as his Muezzin. Bilal, who was of Ethiopian descent, had been born into slavery in Mecca. Because of his early acceptance of Islam, he suffered heavy punishment from his slave master. Bilal gained his freedom through Abu Bakr, who bought him, and from then on, Bilal became a close companion of the prophet. ('Arafat, 2010) Thus, the narrative Warith Deen Mohammed presented to his followers reconfigured the concept of black ancestry previously associated with "the Tribe of Shabazz". According to Curtis, Bilal, as "an example of a Muslim who became great through his devotion to Islam and his refusal to accept the social stigma of being a former slave", served as a paradigmatic example, because "many believers saw parallels between their own life circumstances and those of Bilal". (p. 180f) Building on this,

Warith Deen Muhammad renamed the *Nation*'s newspaper *Muhammad Speaks* into *Bilalian News,* and ex-*Nation*'s adherents began to call themselves "Bilalians".[18] It has been argued that the identification Bilalian stands in the tradition of "Ethiopianism", a tradition evoking that "black people, Ethiopians, were powerful and respected when white men in Europe were barbarians". (Mamiya, 1982, p. 139) Accordingly, "the theme and myth of Ethiopianism has persisted from slavery to the present", and had already inspired Edward Blyden's Pan African theories. (Ibid.)

When interpreting the achievements of Warith Deen Mohammed research has stressed that the transition to Sunni Islam started long before 1975: "Wallace Muhammad's Sunni reformation may have been a dramatic break with the past, but it was also a remarkable perpetuation of already-established African American Islamic traditions." (Curtis, p. 185) In addition to this, Mamiya (1982) has argued that Warith Deen Mohammed's teachings fell on fertile ground because the socioeconomic status of many members of the *Nation* had ameliorated due to the self-help policy, Elijah Muhammad had efficiently implemented. According to this, the separation from political, social, and economic life of mainstream America had lost its appeal. The change, however, did not affect all members. Those unimpressed by Warith Deen Mohammed became the followers of Louis Farrakhan, who reestablished the *Nation of Islam* in 1977.

Louis X had initially been trained by Malcolm X to become a charismatic speaker. Nevertheless, Louis X publicly denounced Malcolm X when the latter withdrew from the *Nation*. Louis took Malcolm's place as the minister of Temple No. 7 in New York City and later as national spokesman. As a signal of recognition, Elijah Muhammad replaced Louis' X with the name Farrakhan in the late 1960s. (Berg, p. 134) After Elijah Muhammad's death, Farrakhan supported Wallace D. Muhammad for a short conflict laden period but soon revived the *Nation* on the basis of its original teachings. In competition with Warith Deen Mohammed, Farrakhan began to reinforce the racial factor as well as the policy of separation. He founded the newspaper *The Final Call* that circulated Elijah Muhammad's "Muslim Program" on a regular basis. Farrakhan's teachings especially appealed to those parts of the African American community that suffered a socioeconomic setback under the Reagan/Bush administration in the 1980s. (Mamiya, p. 150; Marsh, pp. 73f, 116)

In 1984, Farrakhan broke with one of the *Nation*'s principle and registered to vote to endorse Jesse Jackson as presidential candidate. He supported Jackson despite the latter's integrationist views, which were inspired by the concept of multiculturalism

18 See Curtis for individuals' descriptions on their understanding of the notion "Bilalian".

politically expressed by the *National Rainbow Coalition*. It has been argued that Jackson and Farrakhan connected, because they saw the problem of racism in the US in economic terms. (Haskins, p. 83f) Farrakhan's support, however, became a burden for Jackson, when he became entangled and accused for anti-Semitic speech. This eventually led to a break between the two.[19]

With respect to the accusation of anti-Semitic tendencies, Gates, Jr. (1996) described Farrakhan's complex and ambivalent public personality as such that "apologists and detractors alike feel free to decide which represents the 'real' Farrakhan". (p. 144) And further, he explained:

> It turns out that there is in Farrakhan's discourse a strain that sounds awfully like liberal universalism; there is also, of course, its brutal opposite. The two tendencies, in all their forms, are constantly in tension. Pundits like to imagine that Farrakhan is a kind of radio program: the incendiary Louis Farrakhan Show. In fact, Farrakhan is more like a radio station: what you hear depends on when you tune in. His talk ranges from farfetched conspiracy theories to Dan Quayle-like calls for family values. (Ibid.)

Keeping this in mind, I will now conclude this historical introduction and turn to contemporary Muslim Americans. Although not nearly adequate, above, I have given an insight on the diverse and multi-layered heritage this community is built on. Some of the described personalities, like Farrakhan, still have a major impact today. Others, already gone, are still present via the large narrative repertoire they have left for contemporary Muslim Americans to draw on.

19 See Marsh for extracts of speeches that finally led to the breakup. (p. 122f)

CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM AMERICANS – SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS & ORGANIZATIONAL LANDSCAPE

It is not an easy task to outline the demographic profile of the Muslim American community and its affiliation with Muslim American organizations. One major reason is that the US census does not collect data on religious affiliations. Thus, official data on the size of the Muslim American community is lacking. Further, the estimates available are often based on a narrow definition of the category Muslim and thus are not necessarily representative for those identifying as Muslims. Accordingly, recent estimates excluded particular Muslim groups, for example the Nation of Islam and others, by arguing that they "claim to be Muslims, although they may not be recognized as such (...)". (Ba-Yunus & Kone, 2006, p. 43)

Demographic estimates are thus a highly political matter and are closely tied to the historical development of the Muslim American community, as it has been outlined above. In line with the epistemological principles of this study, which will be explained in chapter 3, I argue here that the actual number of Muslims living in the US is secondary to the number constructed via dominant discourse. According to this, about 7 million Muslims are estimated to live in the US now. This figure was advanced for example in a statement that reached a mass audience, namely, the US president's address in Cairo in June 2009. Furthermore, the restrictive study, already mentioned above, has concluded "that there may not be less than 5'745'100 Muslim men and women of all ages in the United States today." (Ba-Yunus & Kone, p. 42)

Apart from numbers, research holds that the Muslim American community is highly diverse. However, some categories, such as the differentiation between "immigrant" and "indigenous" Muslims have been sustained and, as has been mentioned before, there has been a tendency towards considering especially the "indigenous" fraction as homogenous. Curtis has deviated from this tendency by stating:

> Contemporary African American Muslim communities include black American members of immigrant-led mosques, African American devotees of Salafi and Wahhabi versions of Islam, African American Shi'is, African American Sufis, Five Percenters, Sunni followers of Wallace D. Muhammad, members of the *Moorish Science Temple*, members of local Muslim Students Associations, and followers of Minister Louis Farrakhan (...). (p. 185)

It is thus difficult to categorize Muslim Americans, as I will demonstrate in chapter 7.

However, there is a scholarly consent with reference to the backgrounds predominantly represented within the community. Accordingly, Muslim Americans are

predominantly African American, South Asian, and Arab.[20] Looked at more closely, immigrant Muslims to the US are highly diverse in origin. A recent report of the Pew Research Center (2011) on Muslim Americans holds that the overall majority of first-generation immigrants come from at least 77 countries, of which no single county accounted for more than one-in-six Muslim immigrants. (p. 13f)

Let me now provide some figures from the Pew report in order to give an impression of the sociodemographic profile of Muslim Americans. The Pew Research Center has put forth a report on Muslim Americans previously (2007), which serves as a comparative basis for the observations made here.

The latest report concluded that in 2011 63 percent of Muslim Americans were first-generation immigrants. Despite this large percentage, 81 percent of Muslim Americans have American citizenship, 70 percent of those were born outside the US. This rate is much higher compared to the general immigrant population to the US, of which only 47 percent of those foreign-born hold US citizenship. (p. 8)

Compared to the general public, Muslim Americans are much younger. 59 percent of Muslim Americans are between 18 and 39 years old, compared to 40 percent of the general public. 12 percent of Muslim Americans are 55 years and older, compared to 33 percent of the American public overall. (p. 15)

With regard to their socioeconomic status 14 percent of Muslim Americans report household incomes of $ 100'000 or higher (compared to the general average of 16 percent). 46 percent report to be satisfied with their financial situation compared to the general public's satisfaction amounting to a lesser 38 percent. (p. 6)

As regards college education, similar numbers of Muslim Americans and the general public report to have graduated (26 percent vs. 28 percent). However, a greater amount of Muslims is currently enrolled in college than the general public (26 percent vs. 13 percent), because Muslim Americans are younger than the general public. (p. 6f)

The 2011 report concludes that Muslim Americans are "Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream". This conclusion is based among other similarities on a set of questions targeting attitudes towards assimilation. Interestingly, Muslim Americans attitudes

20 Ba-Yunus & Kone have found in their survey concerning mosque leadership that 29 percent of mosques were run by Muslims of Arab descent, 26 percent by Muslims with African American background, and 25 percent by Muslim of South Asian descent. (p. 37) *The Mosque Study Project* concludes that "at the average mosque, one-third (33%) of members are South Asian, three-tenths (30%) are African American, and a quarter (25%) are Arab." (p. 3) These numbers have translated into general statements on the composition of the Muslim American community, such as for example made by Smith, 2010, p. xiiif.

vary considerably from the general public's perception. For example: While 56 percent of Muslim Americans approve of American customs and ways of life, only 33 percent of the general public believes that Muslims want to assimilate.
While only 20 percent of Muslim Americans indicate that Muslims want to be distinct from the larger American society, 51 percent of the general public believes that Muslim Americans want to be distinct. (p. 6)

Illustrative are also the answers given to a question asking Muslim Americans to choose if they self-identified first as Muslims or as Americans. 49 percent of Muslim Americans answered that they thought of themselves first as Muslims; 26 percent answered to identify as American first and 18 percent answered in favor of both criteria equally. A comparable survey collected data on the same question answered by Christian Americans: 46 percent of those answered that they identified first as Christians (among white evangelicals even 70 percent) and 46 percent identified as American first. (p. 7)

According to another section of the report, Muslim Americans are more satisfied with the conditions in the US (56 percent) than the general public is (23 percent) – a possible reason thereof given by the report is that Muslim Americans evaluate the political situation of the country much more favorable compared to the survey Pew published in 2007. According to the 2011 report, the majority of Muslim Americans support the Democratic Party and 76 percent approve of Obama's performance. By comparison, only 46 percent of the general public approves of Obama. (p. 3)

Despite their approval of Obama, Muslim Americans are still a bit less engaged in political participation than the general public is. 66 percent of Muslims holding American citizenship said that they are registered to vote (compared to 79 percent of the general public). 64 percent of Muslim American citizens affirmed to have voted in the 2008 presidential election. By comparison 76 percent of the general public said they voted. (p. 56)

The report further highlights a set of questions related to the religiosity of Muslim Americans. The results were again compared to the general American public or particular religious groups:
Asked how important religion was to them, 69 percent of Muslim Americans answered that it was "very important". This percentage is similar to the religious commitment of Christians, among whom 70 percent considered religion as very important in their lives. According to the report, Muslim Americans attend religious services about as frequent as Christian Americans, more frequent than the general public and less frequent than evangelical Protestants. (p. 25f)
Questions on the acceptance of religious pluralism brought forth that 56 percent of

Muslim Americans believe that other religions than Islam can lead to eternal life. 35 percent are convinced that Islam only leads to eternal salvation. By comparison, another Pew survey found that among all adults of the general American public affiliated with a religion, 29 percent believe that their religion only leads to eternal salvation. Among evangelical Christians 51 percent answered that theirs is the one true faith. (p. 29)

Finally, a set of questions points to the effects of 9/11 on Muslim life in the US. 55 percent of Muslim Americans answered that to be a Muslim in the US has become more difficult since 9/11. This number is slightly higher than the one generated in the survey of 2007 (53 percent). Especially collage graduates answered that being Muslim in the US has become more difficult since 9/11 (62 percent). Still, however, 66 percent of Muslim Americans answered that life in the US is of better quality compared to the one in most Muslim countries. (p. 43f)
Asked about the top problems they faced, Muslim Americans most frequently gave the following answers: "Negative views about Muslims", "Discrimination/Prejudice/Not treated fairly" and "Ignorance about Islam". Younger Muslims were more likely to report having been victims of religiously based discrimination or intolerance. (p. 46)

After having given a numerical impression of the sociodemographic profile of Muslim Americans, which fittingly is labeled "Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream" by the Pew report, let me now analyze a correlation, very important for this study, into further detail, namely, the Muslim American communities' organizational ties.
The *Mosque Study Project* (Bagby et al., 2001) analyzed the affiliations of Muslim Americans with Muslim American organizations. According to the findings, 55 percent of mosques were affiliated with at least one organization, among those 27 percent with ISNA, 19 percent with the Ministry of Warith Deen Mohammed, and 5 percent with ICNA. (p. 57f) This estimate, however, is restrictive, mainly because it excludes the *Nation of Islam*.
Before introducing a different approach to establish the impact of various Muslim American organizations in chapter 4, I will at this point provide a survey of the development of the organizational landscape. "Muslim" and "Islamic" thereby correspond to the organizations' self-identification. The following table displays the founding activities of Muslim American organizations as well as of movements that are considered to be transnationally active. As I will show further on, these organizations advocate a "Muslim perspective" or "Islamic respectively Muslim issues". The organizations and movements are influenced by and influential for the American context. They predominantly identify explicitly as Muslim American organizations, have their residence in the US, or consider the US as a field for their activities.

Foundation Date	Name of Organization
1913	Moorish Science Temple (MST)
1926	Tablighi Jama'at (founded in British India)
1928	Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt)
1930	Nation of Islam (W.D. Fard) (NOI)
1941	Jama'at-i Islami (founded in British India)
1952	Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (founded in Jerusalem)
1953	Federation of Islamic Associations (FIA)
1963	Muslim Student's Association of the United States and Canada (MSA)
1964	The 5% Network (5%)
1967	Islamic Medical Association of North America (IMANA)
1968	Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA)
1970	Ansaaru Allah Community (AAC)
1972	Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS)
1973	North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)
1976	World Community of al-Islam in the West (W.D. Mohammed)
1977	Nation of Islam (Louis Farrakhan) (NOI)
1978	American Muslim Mission (W.D. Mohammed) (AMM)
1980	North American Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities (NASIMCO)
1981	International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)
1982	Islamic Council on Scouting of North America (ICSN/NICS)
1982	Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA)
1982	Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)
1982	United Muslims of America (UMA)
1983	International Association of Sufism (IAS)
1983	IQRA' International Education Foundation (IQRA)
1984	Islamic Relief (US branch) (IRUSA)
1986	Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)
1988	Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)
1989	Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA)
1989	Ahmadiyya (founded in British India) (AC)
1989	American Muslim Alliance (AMA)
1990	American Muslim Council (AMC)
1990	Council on Islamic Education (CIE)
1992	American Muslims Intent on Learning and Activism (AMILA)
1992	Muslim Women's League (MWL)
1992	North American Council for Muslim Women (NACMW)
1992	Naqshbandiya Foundation for Islamic Education (NFIE)
1993	Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA)
1993	Islamic Networks Group (ING)
1993	Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights (KARAMAH)
1993	Muslim American Society (MAS)
1994	Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
1994	Council of American Muslim Professionals (CAMP)
1994	Islamic Shura Council of North America (ISCNA)

1995	As-Sunnah Foundation of America (ASFA)
1995	Inner-City Muslim Action Network (IMAN)
1996	Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS)
1996	National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML)
1996	Zaytuna Institut
1997	American Learning Institute for Muslims (ALIM)
1997	American Society for Muslim Advancement (ASMA)
1997	Latino American Dawah Organization (LADO)
1998	Al Fatiha
1998	American Muslim Political Coordination Council (AMPCC)
1999	American Muslims for Jerusalem (AMJ)
1999	Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID)
2000	Nawawi Foundation
2000	Peaceful Families Project (PFP)
2001	American Islamic Congress (AIC)
2001	Al Maghrib Institute
2002	Assembly of Muslim Jurists in America (AMJA)
2002	Internet Islamic University (IIU)
2003	American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD)
2003	North American Imam Federation (NAIF)
2003	Progressive Muslim Union of North America (PMUNA)
2004	American Muslim Taskforce (AMT)
2004	Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP)
2004	Companionships
2004	Free Muslims Coalition (Against Terrorism) (FMC)
2005	Muslim Advocates (MA)
2005	Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA)
2006	Hilal Sighting Commitee of North America
2006	Muslim Chaplains Association (MCA)
2008	Shura of Islamic Family Counselors of America (SIFCA)
2009	Zaytuna College
Not available	American Islamic Chamber of Commerce (AICC)
Not available	Council of Islamic Schools of North America (CISNA)
Not available	Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA)
Not available	Muslim Public Service Network (MPSN)
Not available	Muslim Ummah of North America (MUNA)
Not available	Project Islamic Hope (PIH)
Not available	Qur‘an and Sunna Society of North America (QSS)
Not available	Shari‘a Scholars Association of North America (SSANA)
Not available	The Mosque Cares (Ministry of W.D. Mohammed)
Not available	Young Muslims of North America (YM)

Figure 1: Chronology of emergence of Muslim American organizations or organizations active in the US.

In what follows, I will introduce a typology of these organizations based on how they position themselves. The typology is the result of an analysis of the different organizational websites, listed in appendix I, conducted in September and October 2009. The table below displays extracts that mainly originate from the organizations' mission and vision statements. The underlying rationale of this approach is to show the variety of the contemporary Muslim American organizational landscape and thus the many options available for Muslim Americans. The analysis considered most but not all of the above listed organizations. The main reason for exclusion was the lack of online resources available to establish an organization's position. Furthermore, transnationally active organizations were excluded, if they did not operate a website for the US context in particular.

The organizations analyzed have various features in common:

Firstly, they have adapted to the same legal regulations: Most organizations are incorporated as 501(c)(3) nonprofits.

Secondly, they have adapted to the same communication channels: They all communicate among other channels through online media, and they all maintain websites to position themselves in a broad online-market.

Thirdly, they have adapted to particular communication modes and modalities: All of them use English as their main language and employ similar strategies of communication design.

The typology of Muslim American organizations below illustrates the variety of claims these organizations make. Categorization is based on their claims to represent or serve a certain group or to advocate a certain issue. The groups or issues referred to suggest that the Muslim American community is highly diverse. By considering their service range, I assigned the organizations to five categories. Their advocacy focuses predominantly on serving *Muslim Americans*, *Muslims*, *America* or *Americans*, *Humanity* or *God*. Of course, the boundaries of an according categorization are fluid. Many organizations could be assigned to more than one category. The following table categorizes organizations according to the key statement(s) made in mission and vision statements. It reproduces the respective extracts from these statements.[21]

21 As a concession to readability, references to websites are not indicated directly in the text but in appendix I. The extracts displayed in the table, as well as additional quotations in the discussion section, were all deduced from vision and mission statements. Vision and mission statements are mostly a fixed element of the analyzed websites, usually displayed in the section "about us".

Advocacy of / Serving a particular Muslim American group	An issue advocated for the benefit of Muslim Americans	Advocacy of / Serving Muslim Americans (collectively / individually)
AICC (2001): to help Islamic owned or managed businesses in the United States prosper in this highly competitive environment	HSC (2006): to start all Islamic months correctly on the basis of actual crescent sighting in North America and celebrate both Eids on one day on this basis	AMA (1989): to organize the American Muslim community in the mainstream public affairs, civic discourse and party politics all across the United States
AIFD (2003): a leading voice for liberty-minded Muslims in America in the war on terror	MCA (2006): chaplaincy is a critical area of American society where the religious needs of Muslims must be addressed on parity of other faith groups	AMILA (1992): helping to build the American Muslim community through activism, Islamic education, spirituality, and networking with other Muslim groups
CIP (2004): mobilize moderate American Muslims in their progress toward integration as an equal and respected religious community in the American interfaith environment	NAWAWI (2000): building a successful American Muslim cultural identity	AMJA (2002): setting a plan for conducting lawful researches and studies on the circumstances of Muslims in the American society and the economic, social, intellectual, and educational problems Muslims recently face in such a community; Issuing fatawa
ICSN/NICS (1982): developing the spiritual phase among Islamic youth by means of the Scout oath and law		AMT (2004): seeks to define the objectives, issues, and strategies that concern the American Muslim community through a bottom-up, community-based decision-making process
MANA (2005): committed to Muslims issues and concerns that especially impact indigenous Muslims		FCNA (1986): to provide guidance to the Muslims of North America in all matters related to Shariah
MPSN: enable American Muslim students, scholars and professionals to engage effectively with governmental, non-governmental, educational and political institutions in the United States		ISNA (1982): to be an exemplary and unifying Islamic organization in North America that contributes to the betterment of the Muslim community and society at large
MSA (1963): meeting the needs of our Muslim youth on campus		MPAC (1988): to establish a vibrant Muslim American community that will enrich American society through promoting the Islamic values of Mercy (21:107), Justice (4:135), Peace (8:61), Human Dignity (17:70), Freedom (2:256), and Equality for all (49:13)
NASIMCO (1980): to enhance social and religious excellence of Islamic Shia Ithna-asheri communities in North America		NAIT (1973): facilitates the realization of American Muslims‘ desire for a virtuous and happy life in a Shari‘ah-compliant way
		UMA (1982): to educate and encourage American Muslims to actively participate in the mainstream American political system

Advocacy of / Serving a particular Muslim group	An issue advocated for the benefit of Muslims or advocacy of / Serving Muslims (collectively / individually)
Companionships (2004): to provide a dignified platform for young Muslims to meet and be introduced to matrimonial education from an Islamic perspective	ALIM (1997): dedicated to empower Muslims through education AMSS (1972): to serve the interest of the larger Muslim community by bringing together Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in an academic setting to examine and define Islamic perspectives on issues of global concern that contribute to the prosperity of Muslims around the globe and the betterment of humanity ASFA (1995): to promote the unity of Muslims ASMA (1997): to elevate the discourse on Islam and foster environments in which Muslims thrive CAMP (1994): to promote unity for the global Muslim community by encouraging professional networking development through educational, social and intellectual activities within an Islamic framework GSISS (1996): one of the first privately held, independent institutions in the United States dedicated in its entirety to teaching and research in Islamic Studies IFANCA (1982): to promote halal food and the institution of halal IIIT (1981): dedicated to the revival and reform of Islamic thought and its methodology in order to enable the Ummah to deal effectively with present challenges IIU (2002): to help shape the destiny of the Muslim Ummah through the opening of the vistas of Islamic knowledge IQRA (1983): stands worldwide as a trusted name in Islamic education PFP (2000): to promote awareness regarding the dynamics of domestic violence and to work towards ending all types of abuse in Muslim families SIFCA (2008): addressing the critical need for a solid base for the Ummah, which is solid Muslim families
Al Fatiha (1998): dedicated to Muslims of all cultural and ethnic backgrounds who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, and questioning or exploring their sexual orientation and/or gender identity (LGBTIQQ), and their families, friends and allies	
FMC (2004): Muslims and Arabs of all backgrounds who feel that religious violence and terrorism have not been fully rejected by the Muslim community in the post 9-11 era	
KARAMAH (1993): focuses on the domestic and global issues of human rights for Muslim women	
MWL (1992): to strengthen the role of Muslim women through increased awareness of their rights guaranteed by Islam	
NAIF (2003): confined to Imams „Islamic Clergies“ from the mainstream Muslim group which properly follows Qur‘an and Sunnah	
Advocacy of / Serving a particular American group	**An issue advocated for the benefit of America / Americans or advocacy of/Serving Americans (collectively / individually)**
IMAN (1995): our services, organizing and arts agenda stem from our spiritual convictions about community service, human compassion, and social justice, particularly for marginalized people of color (Urban America)	AMC (1990): a political movement for the Civil Rights and Justice for all Americans CIE (1990): to support and strengthen American public education as the foundation for a vibrant democracy, a healthy civil society, and a nationally and globally literate citizenry NAML (1996): promoting justice and improvements in the American legal system
LADO (1997): promote Islam among the Latino community within the United States	

<table>
<tr><th>Advocacy of / Serving a particular group</th><th>An issue advocated for the benefit of humanity or advocacy of / Serving humanity/people</th></tr>
<tr><td>Al Maghrib (2001): we envision our learning system entering every nation of the world, and being accessible to all people who seek to gain a deeper understanding of Islam</td><td rowspan="4">AC (1989): to be an advocate for universal human rights and protections for religious and other minorities

AIC (2001): a civil rights organization promoting tolerance and the exchange of ideas among Muslims and between other peoples

CAIR (1994): to be a leading advocate for justice and mutual understanding (worldwide)

IANA (1993): to achieve the final goal of reviving the Islamic nation to its proper state and condition, then we, while working for Islam, must return to its original spirit of work and action.

IAS (1983): to introduce Sufism in all its varied forms to the public

IAU: spreading the knowledge and wisdom of this great religion of Islam, and fore filling the teachings of Prophet Muhammad

IMANA (1967): to become the recognized leader in national and global healthcare, guided by Islamic values

ING (1993): promoting interreligious understanding, tolerance and harmony by increasing religious literacy (worldwide)

ISCA: educating Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and developing good citizenry through the teaching of moral excellence

MA (2005): promote equality, liberty, and justice for all

MAS (1993): an Islamic revival, and reform movement, that uplifts the individual, family, and society

MST (1913): to adhere to the principles of Love, Truth, Peace, Freedom, and Justice in your relations with mankind in general

Zaytuna: committed to reviving time-tested methods of educating and transforming human beings</td></tr>
<tr><td>IRUSA (1984): strives to alleviate poverty and suffering among the world‘s poorest people</td></tr>
<tr><td>The Mosque Cares: to cultivate human excellence and good character through building relationships with all God conscious people</td></tr>
<tr><td>5% Network (1964): the blackman is god and his proper name is ALLAH. Arm, Leg, Leg, Arm, Head.</td></tr>
<tr><th colspan="2">Advocacy of / Serving God</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">ICNA (1968): seeks to obtain the pleasure of Allah (SWT) through working for the establishment of Islam in all spheres of life</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">MUNA: to seek the pleasure of Allah (s.w.t.) by striving for personal, moral, and social development of entire humanity</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">NOI (1930): we are forging ahead in the Spirit of Almighty God, Allah, to unite with all of humanity in the Oneness of God, where all people of goodwill of every Race and every Nation may participate in the Universal Expression of the Principles of Peace and the Brotherhood of man</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">YM: to seek the pleasure of ALLAH (SWT) by educating, training and developing the Muslim youth to be Islamic workers for Iqamat-ad-Deen in North America</td></tr>
</table>

Figure 2: Typology of organizations resulting from their main focus of advocacy.

The following discussion of the typology will elaborate on main tendencies. Special attention is given to the connection between main advocacy fields advanced by the organizations and their foundational dates. This perspective enables us to grasp trends connected to a particular time-period. As a result, the potential influence of 9/11 on the development of the organizational landscape can be established.

SERVING MUSLIM AMERICANS

This category encompasses organizations with a focus on Muslim Americans or issues concerning them in particular. Three different types can be distinguished:

Organizations claiming to advocate for or serve a particular Muslim American group: These organizations provide a platform for a certain fraction of Muslim Americans. Fractions are constructed by the focus on a particular mind-set, racial or ethnic adherence, the belonging to a certain age group, a certain occupation, a certain function, or an affiliation with a particular sectarian group. Considering the offers these organizations make, we can assume that Muslim Americans are fragmented along multiple lines. Thereby, the organizations' self-positioning is strongly interwoven with the American setting and the Muslim American history connected with it.
Organizations of this group that advance a moderate mind-set and those promoting public policy involvement were founded after 2001. The same holds true for the *Muslim Alliance in North America*, which is committed primarily to concerns of indigenous Muslims. The organization with the oldest tradition is the *Muslim Student's Association* founded 1963, followed by the organization of *North American Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities* (1980) and the *Islamic Council on Scouting of North America* (1982).
AIFD and CIP are both organizations that position themselves in dissociation from "Islamo-fascist" or "militant Islamist groups". This can be considered as a reflection of the construction of Islam by dominant discourse in a post 9/11 environment. Fittingly, AIFD and CIP both specialize in the field of public information, where the battle over denotation is fought.
Whereas AIFD and CIP try to influence by means of public speech, organizations like MANA and NASIMCO both pursue an agenda of community building. Typically, their main activities are connected to the needs of a particular group, such as "indigenous" or "Shia Ithna-asheri" Muslims.
Other organizations of this group, such as ICSNA, MSA, and AICC focus on a particular situation, Muslim Americans allegedly encounter. Accordingly, their activities aim to influence a particular situational context, such as "promoting Islamic values in Scouting" (ICSN/NICS), "help Muslim students organizations carry out Islamic programs and projects" (MSA), or "help Islamic owned or managed businesses in the United States" (AICC).

Along with the organizational focus, the aim to engage a particular audience shifts. Those organizations that concentrate on shaping public speech aim to engage a like-minded audience. Those with a community-building approach aim to serve an audience adhering to a particular racial or religious group. Organizations that focus on situational activities try to provide their audience with an "Islamic solution" in a "non-Islamic setting".

Organizations claiming to advocate an issue for the benefit of Muslim Americans: The organizations of this category focus on issues that emerge from the American setting and are considered to be important for Muslim Americans, such as the unified celebration of Muslim American holidays, the institutionalization of Chaplaincy, or the formation of a Muslim American cultural identity.
The organizations of this category were all founded in recent years aiming to benefit Muslim Americans in general. This category displays recent tendencies of the configuration of American Islam especially well because the advocated issues are unique for the American context. Concrete steps towards the *NAWAWI foundation*'s expressed goal to establish "a successful Muslim American cultural identity" are advocated by other organizations of this category as well. The installation of the *Hilal Sighting Committee of North America,* for example, is described as a reaction to the lack of a consistent approach to determine Muslim holidays in the US and the thus emerging practical problems. Accordingly, the committee's describes its aim to challenge "the lack of unity among the Muslim communities". Unity – manifested in the jointly celebration of Muslim holidays – is promoted on the basis of two arguments: Unity among Muslims is, on the one hand, considered as a Qur'anic imperative: "Hold fast to the rope of Allah and do not get divided" (3:103); On the other hand, it is characterized as a necessary means to signal paradigmatic behavior:

> Our children are puzzled and confused. Ahmad celebrates Eid on Tuesday and Hamed on Wednesday though live in the same town and are in the same classroom. What kind of example are we providing to our next generation and what message to their non-Muslim friends and teachers?

The two arguments made by the HSC reflect core issues of the discussion concerning the determination of Muslim holidays: the theological one, focused on the proper methodology to determine the holiday dates and the life worldly one, concerned with proper Muslim behavior in a non-Muslim society.

Another organization assigned to this category is the *Muslim Chaplains Association,* founded in 2006. Although this organization serves Muslims working as chaplains, its main concern is chaplaincy; "a critical area of American society where the religious needs of Muslims must be addressed on parity of other faith groups". The MCA's

activities concentrate on the expansion of the institution of chaplaincy, by means of incorporating Muslims, in order to "contribute to the public discourse on ethical and spiritual concerns and challenges facing diverse populations".

Recently founded issue focused organizations, such as the HSC and the MCA, aim to serve particular Muslim American needs by adapting Muslim practices to the conditions religious communities encounter in the US.

Organizations claiming to advocate for or serve Muslim Americans: The largest group of organizations ascribed to this overall category claims to serve Muslim Americans in general, either as a collective (the Muslim American community) or as a group of individuals (Muslims living in the United States). Most of these organizations were founded before 2001, the majority in the 1980s. Their main objectives are to advance Muslim political participation, to improve the conditions for Muslims living in the United States, or to build the community and establish it as a part of American society. Furthermore, some provide counseling services, especially in the legal field (AMJA, FCNA, NAIT).
Organizations with a focus on public policy making, such as AMA, MPAC, and UMA, promote political and civic Muslim American participation. Whereas AMA and UMA simply advocate the political empowerment of Muslims, MPAC additionally provides a Qur'anic legitimation for it by seeking to advance "the Islamic values of Mercy (21:107), Justice (4:135), Peace (8:61), Human Dignity (17:70), Freedom (2:256), and Equality for all (49:13)", in order „to establish a vibrant Muslim American community that will enrich American society".

SERVING MUSLIMS

This category of Muslim American organizations widens its potential base of adherents or service beneficiaries by foregoing the national marker. Although some of these organizations operate mainly in the United States or advocate issues relevant particularly for Muslims living in Western countries, their claims made are considered to concern Muslims in general. Again, different groups can be distinguished:

Organizations claiming to advocate for or serve a particular Muslim group: These organizations serve/represent particular Muslim groups in the US and beyond its boarder by focusing on age, gender, sexual orientation, function, or mind-set. Three organizations were founded before 2001: *Al Fatiha*, the *Muslim Women's League,* and the *Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights* (KARAMAH).
Al Fatiha concentrates on concerns of "Muslims of all cultural and ethnic backgrounds who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, and questioning

or exploring their sexual orientation and/or gender identity (LGBTIQQ), and their families, friends and allies". KARAMAH and the *Muslim Women's League* focus on concerns of Muslim women.

The other organizations of this category were founded as a reaction to 9/11 (the *Free Muslims Coalition*) or as a reaction to the Muslim minority situation (*Companionships* for "single Muslims of all backgrounds", the *North American Imam Federation* for „Imams 'Islamic Clergies' from the mainstream Muslim group which properly follows Qur'an and Sunnah").

Organizations claiming to advocate (an issue) for the benefit of Muslims: The separation of organizations that serve Muslims or advocate a certain issue for the benefit of Muslims is more or less fluent. These organizations focus on different issues concerning Muslims in general, for example the education on Islam (ALIM, GSISS, IIT, IQRA, IIU), the institution of halal (IFANCA), networking (CAMP), or the protection of the family (PFP, SIFCA). These organizations are specialized in a particular field, which is potentially relevant beyond the American boarder and considered to be important for the consolidation of the Umma. All of these organizations were founded long before 2001, except IIU and the two organizations concerned with Muslim families (PFP, SIFCA).

SERVING AMERICANS

Some Muslim organizations broaden their potential base of adherents or service beneficiaries by foregoing the religious marker. Their work is strongly related to the American context. Two different categories can be distinguished:

Organizations claiming to advocate for or serve a particular American group: Two organizations can be assigned to this category: the *Latino American Dawah Organization* that promotes Islam especially among Latino Americans and the *Inner-City Muslim Action Network* with a focus on the inner cities and especially on problems of „marginalized people of color". Both of these organizations have been established in the 1990s.

Organizations claiming to advocate an issue for the benefit of America/Americans: Three organizations, all founded in the 1990s, claim to serve America and Americans in general by promoting "Civil Rights and Justice" (AMC) and the strengthening of American public education through the "civic, ethical, and educational principles in Islam" (CIE). The *National Association of Muslim Lawyers* finally is dedicated to "justice" as well as to "improvements in the American legal system".

SERVING HUMANITY

Some Muslim American organizations serve potential adherents beyond religious or national ties. The following categories can be distinguished:

Organizations claiming to advocate for or serve a particular group: Potential groups result according to the individual's approach to Islam, its socio-economic position, its ethnic/racial ties, or its spiritual attitude. Included here are the *5% Network*, founded in 1964, with the aim to serve "the blackman"; *Islamic Relief USA*, founded in 1984, with a focus on "the world's poorest people"; and further, *AlMagrib Institute,* as well as *The Mosque Cares*, both younger organizations that claim to serve "all people who seek to gain a deeper understanding of Islam" or, more general, "God conscious people".

Organizations claiming to advocate (an issue) for the benefit of humanity: A large number of organizations can be grouped in this category. They promote certain rights, concepts, and values for everybody, such as "universal human rights" (AC), "tolerance and the exchange of ideas" (AIC), "justice and mutual understanding" (CAIR), "interreligious understanding, tolerance and harmony" (ING), "moral excellence" (ISCA), "equality, liberty and justice" (MA), or "love, truth, peace, freedom, and justice" (MST). Besides those organizations, some promote different "Islamic" issues, Islam in general, or a specific reading thereof. The *Muslim American Society* claims to serve "the individual, family, and society" through "Islamic revival". Most of the organizations of this category have been founded prior to 2001.

SERVING GOD

Whereas organizations categorized above might make the same claim, some organizations state as their main aim to "seek the pleasure of Allah" with their actions. Along with transcending the beneficiary party, the claims of these organizations are by the majority exhaustive. They pursue "the establishment of Islam in all spheres of life" (ICNA), "striving for personal, moral, and social development of entire humanity" (MUNA), to "unite with all of humanity in the Oneness of God" (NOI), or to "train Islamic workers for Iqamat-ad-Deen" (YM). All of these organizations were founded prior to 2001.

DISCUSSION

In summary, the following tendencies result from the suggested typology:

Muslim American organizational activities increased from the 1980s onwards.

Some organizations do specify their target audience by ethnical, racial, or sectarian markers (IMAN, LADO, MANA, NASIMCO). However, those organizations are a minority. By contrast, fragmentation potentially results from an alleged needs-oriented approach organizations advance vis-à-vis their target audience.

Recently established organizations tend to be specific in their aims and means (HSC, MCA). The precise definition of a target audience/issue points to fields important for Muslims in the American context.

The larger the service range of an organization, the more universal are its claims. Such organizations tend to be active in the field of education, spiritual development, or in promoting rights and values.

9/11 can be evaluated as an accelerator of tendencies already implemented before, as can be observed for example in the field of public policy involvement. However, only few organizations position themselves by directly relating to 9/11 (AIFD, CIP, FMC).

Considering the multi-layered history, emphasized by the historical narratives described in the first parts of this chapter, and the different interests of Muslim groups and individuals connected with it, the variety of Muslim American organizations comes to no surprise. As a result, contemporary Muslim Americans are able to rely on a big machinery of institutions if they desire assistance. The range of service, as well as the issue based differentiation and the thus connected work sharing by Muslim American organizations, display the advanced development of Muslim American institutions.

RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES & OBJECTIVES

RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES & OBJECTIVES

By (re)producing scholarly narratives, the previous chapter has shown that the historical presence of Muslims in North America reaches far back in time. I have discussed two aspects of the thus connected legacy: The multifaceted repertoire of historical narratives available today as well as the heterogeneity of the contemporary Muslim American organizational landscape. In what follows, I will draw attention to how this legacy has affected research on Islam in the American context. It is important to note that the following paragraphs cannot be considered as a discussion of the state of research in the classical sense. The main reason for this is that the epistemological perspective suggested in this study is not widely spread among scholars, who have focused on Islam in the American context. Hence, a discussion of scholarly work employing a similar framework would be quite rudimentary.

I consider scholarly narratives of Islam and Muslims in the US as a part of the narrative repertoire available to Muslim Americans to construct their Muslimness and Islamicity. Accordingly, I do not consider research on American Islam and Muslim Americans as detached from the constructions of American Islam and Muslim Americans. Naturally, this study is not an exception. As mentioned before, I express my awareness of this by referring to my own analyses as *(re)constructions*, indicating that I

consider my *reconstructions* of how Muslimness and Islamicity are constructed by Muslim American narratives as *constructions* of their own.

Furthermore, although I am aware that American Islam has not been analyzed solely by American scholars, the following discussion focuses on research predominantly undertaken by American scholars and only on contributions written in English. This restriction with respect to language is a concession to the methodological approach taken up in this study, which aims to establish accord and discord between different constructions of American Islam as they emerge from Muslim American narratives. As I will discuss my own epistemological and methodological perspective at length in the following chapter, let me now outline the aims of this chapter:

The scholarly occupation with Islam connected to the American context has already started in the 1920s, as articles published in *The Muslim World* show. However, passing various stages, research with a broader scope and based on methodological variety became available only in the 1990s. (Brodeur, 2001, p. 74f) Instead of compiling an encompassing list of studies published since, in what follows, I will take into account the above-mentioned considerations. As a result, the following paragraphs are rather a reflection on how American Islam has recently been approached as an object of research. This reflection draws and builds on recently published research overviews. (Brodeur, 2001; Leonard, 2003) In what follows, I will characterize the different perspectives scholars have taken up to describe Islam and Muslims in the American context. Resulting from this, I will draw attention to the different constructions of Islam and Muslims that have emerged from those perspectives. This will prepare the ground for advancing a perspective in chapter 3 that differs from most discussed accounts.

Two questions that will be touched on repeatedly in the course of this study will be raised in the following paragraphs:

Who speaks for Islam?

In what ways has Islam been approached as an object of research?

The answer to the first question is constitutive for the second question. For my purpose here, it is useful to differentiate between *American* Islam and Islam *in America*. In what follows, I will show that the relation between the designator and the designated determines the former's perspective as well as the latter's attribution. I will, in a first instant, focus on the designators or the different perspectives cast onto Islam. The second paragraph will be occupied with the designated; respective the different ways Islam connected to the American context has been approached as an object of research and the findings that have resulted from this.

THE DESIGNATORS

Who speaks for Islam? This question reaches far beyond the realm of academia. The struggle over how to obtain representative answers has been solved differently. A recent study for example, conducted by American scholars considered top experts on Islam, has answered the question by claiming to put forth "what a billion Muslims really think". (Esposito & Mogahed, 2008) The study has drawn on "tens of thousands of hour-long, face-to-face interviews with residents of more than 35 nations that are predominantly Muslim or have substantial Muslim populations." (pp. x-xi) The underlying rationale of this approach is clear: Muslims in majority Muslim countries shape and reshape Islam.

A similar credo has underpinned studies focusing on Islam configured in a minority situation. To avoid "the essentialist trap", Cesari (2004) has argued in *When Islam and Democracy Meet. Muslims in Europe and in the United States*, "one must examine the social and historical contexts within which Muslims create their discourse on what is important or unimportant in Islam, in *their* Islam" (p. 5). This statement advances two points: The demand for contextualization and historicization, which outlines a scholarly perspective, as well as a particular ideal, namely that Muslims are the legitimate "proprietors" of Islam. The urge to respect this ideal can be held as a reaction to a highly politicized discussion on Islam in a post 9/11 environment; a response to the questions, weather Islam legitimates the hijacking of airplanes or, if it is in fact Islam that has been hijacked; a reaction to discussions related to Islam's compatibility with democracy, with human rights, equal rights for women, etc.; in short: it reacts to essentialist, as well as conflicting statements, on what Islam *is* and what Islam *does* by assigning the legitimacy to interpret it to Muslims.

Cesari's demand has been programmatic for one scholarly perspective long before 9/11: If Islam is to be understood one must turn to Muslims. A perspective on Muslim Americans hence uncovers *American* Islam, as an early study has confirmed by claiming: "(…) that indeed there is an American Islam, and that it comes in more than one form". (Haddad & Lummis, 1987, p. 22) Most studies have followed suit: Studies on American Islam are in general studies on Muslim Americans. Historical approaches have focused on Muslim American key speakers and their readings of Islam, as chapter 1 has demonstrated. Ethnographic studies have described Muslims' Islamicity in the manifold forms it has emerged with respect to the American life world.

Additionally, this research overview takes into account the perspective of scholars that advance different readings of Islam in the American context. This perspective does not assess Islam in terms of sociocultural influence (*American* Islam) but in terms of

the correct methodology to read Islam in a particular sociocultural context (Islam *in America*).

What in religious studies has been called the "insider" perspective (McCutcheon, 1999) is included here as a representation of the particular composition of the research community occupied with the configuration of Islam in the US. Many scholars occupied with *American* Islam, or what Esposito and Cesari have called *their* Islam, are Muslims and Americans themselves. Hence, the "insider", as well as the "outsider" perspective, are manifested in a personal union. It is not implied here that this double adherence leads to a collision, even though some Muslim American scholars mention their entanglement arising from it. (McCloud, 1995, p. 6f) On the contrary, many scholars combine the two perspectives or what has been called the Eliadian approach fruitfully. In line with this, the recently published compendium on *Identity and the Politics of Scholarship in the Study of Religion* (Cabezón & Greeve Davaney, 2004b) has made a strong case by arguing "that scholars always bring their identities to the table and that such identities should in no way rule them out as scholars." (p. 20) The authors have rightly pointed out that identities are not only shaped by religious adherence. Nevertheless, for my purpose, it is important to note that many scholars occupied with the configuration of Islam in the US are often also active and influential members of the Muslim American community, as I will show in chapters 6 and 7. Thus, academia and activism form a close relationship, not only in the shape of personal unions and social groups, but also as a characteristic of research agendas. Anthologies on Muslim Americans compile research done on American Islam/Muslims and readings of Islam by Muslim American scholars as a matter of course. Furthermore, transdiciplinary approaches add a problem-oriented perspective to the scholarly occupation with Islam in the US. This field of mixed perspectives and the emerging results will be discussed later on.

THE DESIGNATED

AMERICAN ISLAM

The claim that there are various forms of American Islam naturally results if the heterogeneous Muslim American community is considered as empirical field. Social heterogeneity is represented in heterogeneity of designation, which often leads to some confusion. To give an example: the anthology *Muslim Communities in North America* (Haddad & Smith, 1994) suggests in its table of contents that Muslim communities can be subdivided into "religious", "Islamic", or "ethnic" communities. Additional categorizing features, such as "Shi'a" for example, appears in the "religious" as well as in the "ethnic" subchapter of the monograph. This example shows that there seems to be confusion about how "Muslim" and "Islamic" as categories relate to each other.

However, this confusion concerns mainly terminology and not the underlying perspective, which clearly focuses on Muslims and partly on their Islamic practices.

HISTORICAL APPROACH

General introductions to Islam in America or Muslim Americans have often adopted a historical approach. Different historical narratives have been put forth. As already demonstrated in the previous chapter, a common approach has been to divide Muslim Americans into two groups. The divided groups have been labeled differently, their labels often pointing to different claims concerning authentic reading of Islam. A common division scholars have made separates *African American* from *immigrant* Muslims. The division has also been constructed by alternative terminology, for example by distinguishing *autochthonous* or *indigenous* Muslims on the one side and *immigrant* Muslims on the other. As an alternative to stress the transnational ties of the different Muslim American communities, several studies have drawn on concepts, such as *diaspora* and/or *umma* (Cesari, 2004; McCloud, 1995; Schmidt, 2005; Schumann, 2007; Turner, 1997).

The politics inherent in terminology not only displays the history of different American social groups in general but also legitimacy claims circulating among different Muslim groups within the US. These complex contexts resonate with every notion employed, however, they are rarely made explicit. Of course, there are exceptions: While some scholars have given a closer definition (Mazrui, 2004; McCloud, 2004), others have discussed the problems arising from the commonly used terminology (Schmidt, 2002). Jackson (2005) has further provided an illustrative description of the historical and political dimensions terminology adopts. (p. 17-18)

In accord with the terminological boundaries, scholars have commonly traced the heritage of *African American* and *immigrant* Muslims separately, as the previous chapter has shown. Hence, the self-perception of being Muslim has not necessarily correlated with the perception of other Muslims. Therefore, the historical narrative constructed by a certain group of Muslims has often excluded the one of others. Accordingly, (Muslim American) historians have fused and separated the narrative of American Muslims/Islam according to the boundaries relevant in their own time-space context. Hence, the focus on one particular narrative has partly been mirrored in scholarly work.

Historical approaches have often focused on Islam on the basis of its reading and practice by prominent figures of Muslim American history. (Curtis, 2010) A compilation of important source texts was published in 1992 (Köszegi & Melton). Some broader historical overviews have included the narratives of both immigrant and African American Muslims (Curtis, 2009). A large body of literature exists on the history

of African American Muslims and the readings of Islam by their respective leaders. Some scholars have provided overviews of the different historical stages (Ansari, 2004; Gomez, 2005; Turner, 1997); others have done detailed research on particular periods. Austin (1997) and Diouf (1998), for example, have provided insights into the Muslim practice during the transatlantic slave trade. In *African American Islam* (1995), McCloud has given an overview of the movements of the 20th century. McCloud and Bayoumi (1999, 2001), as well as studies on smaller African American Muslim groups, such as for example the Five Percenters (Allah, 2007), have raised awareness of the heterogeneity of the African American Muslim history – a quality that has often been missing from the mainstream narrative. The *Moorish Science Temple* has been generally described as a part of the broader mainstream narrative of African American Muslims. Turner and especially Gomez have provided accounts that are more detailed.
Since Lincoln's dissertation (1994) *The Black Muslims in America* was published in 1961, many scholars have written the history of the *Nation of Islam*. Most of them have focused on its central leaders and the *Nation's* counter discourse directed against American racist practice. (See for example Curtis, 2002, 2006; Gardell, 1996; Marsh, 2000) Berg (2009) has recently deviated from this approach by providing an attempt "to understand" Elijah Muhammad "as a Muslim" by "contextualizing" him "within the larger Islamic tradition". (p. 4) This perspective has provided a contrast to how the *Nation* has been contextualized so far.
Focusing on "urban Blacks" in Newark, Nash (2008) has recently provided another contrasting approach. His contribution is important because it draws attention to the different facets of Islamic thought prevalent within a territorial fixed community.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis aims to prioritize questions of how Islam is configured in the American context over descriptions of the multiple shapes American Islam has adopted. Few studies have approached American Islam in this sense, one prominent exception being *Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection.* (Jackson, 2005) Jackson has explicitly distanced his account from being "a descriptive survey". Instead, he has theorized *Blackamerican* Islam being influenced by three contextual fields characterized by authority-struggles particular for them: the discourse of *Blackamerican* self-definition, the discourse of "white supremacy", and the discourse of immigrant Islam. (p. 3) Jackson's analysis has demonstrated how different constellations of discursive authority have been shaped and reshaped. What he has called the "Third Resurrection" was initiated by a shift of authority, which he described as follows: "Rather than to Black Religion, it is to the sources and authorities of historical Islam that Blackamerican Muslims now appeal in order to authenticate their views and actions and earn these recognition as Islamic." (p. 55) According to Jackson, the difference between the Islamicity of Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims derives from their distinct historical perspectives. Both heritages have been constituted by

a discourse of opposition – towards Western dominance in the case of immigrant Muslims and towards white supremacy in the case of Blackamerican Muslims. Therefore, Jackson has argued, "(…) the challenge confronting Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims is essentially whether they can find common *historical* ground. For it is ultimately history, or more properly historical perspective, that separates the two communities." (p. 92) To fuse the historical perspectives, Jackson has suggested that Blackamerican and immigrant Muslims recognize and respect "(…) their respective legacies and experiences as 'objects of the West' (…)" (Ibid.). He has further argued: "While this would not obliterate the other elements in their respective identities, it would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the utility of appealing to the latter as an ultimate or greater authority in the context of contemplating American Islam." (Ibid.)

Jackson's argument is based on the assumption that contemporary historical narrative depends on contemporary discourse. This argument is backed by this study. The consequences of it will be analyzed in chapter 7 by considering boundary drawing by means of contemporary Muslim American narratives.
Islam has rarely been approached as an object of discourse by the literature discussed above. This is even stronger the case, if historical approaches have focused on immigrant Muslims. This focus has clearly emphasized the ethnical marker and thus the issue of immigration and how different groups have coped with it. (See for example Haddad, 2004) Moreover, most studies of this type have adopted an ethnographical approach. Leonard (2003) has provided an overview of historical research done within this field (pp. 9-15).

In order to understand the situation of immigrant Muslims and their Islamicity, scholars have applied different theoretical frameworks. Frequently, they have been related to theories on migration and transnational studies. In contrast to studies on African American Muslims, studies on *immigrant* Muslims have often emphasized the heterogeneity of thought and practice prevalent in the community. Furthermore, special interest has been paid to questions related to the relationship between emigrants and their countries of origin, the relationship between different generations of Muslim immigrants, and the relationship among Muslim immigrants from various origins. (Haddad & Smith, 1994, p. xxif)
The influence of the country of origin, as well as the country of residence, on Muslim immigrants identity formation have been explained in the light of concepts such as *diaspora* (Schumann, 2007), *transnationality* (Schmidt, 2004b, 2005), or *hybridity* and *third space* (Hermansen, 2000; Mir, 2006). The generational conflicts among Muslim immigrants have been addressed with reference to the concepts of *culture* and *ethnicity* (Haddad, 2004, p. 51; Schmidt, 2004b). And, processes taking place within the immigrant "community" accordingly have been explained with reference to concepts

such as *transethnicity* (Cesari, 2004, p. 42; Schmidt, 2004a, p. 5f). The field of theoretical approaches of course is vast and cannot be discussed here at length. Vast as well is the body of literature on immigrant Muslim communities and their respective Islamic practices. All the factors outlined above have influenced the readings of Islam by the different communities. Hence, general tendencies should only be established cautiously.

Apart from advancing historical narratives of *immigrant* or *autochthonous* Muslims, scholars have begun to focus on issue-based developments concerning Muslim Americans and American Islam. Recent examples are studies on the dissemination of Islam in American Prisons (Kusha, 2009) and on American Christians stance vis-à-vis Islam and Muslims (Kidd, 2009).

ETHNOGRAPHICAL APPROACH

A large body of literature deals with what has been called *lived Islam* (Schmidt, 2004a, p. 11) or *identity Islam* (Hermansen, 2003). Research on *lived Islam/identity Islam* has often adapted micro perspectives and ethnographic approaches. Such studies have contributed different pieces to the larger reconstruction of the manifold Muslim American life worlds. Schmidt's research on Chicago Muslims is an important and very illustrative study of this type. Her study is based on historical references as well as on field work conducted in Chicago over the period of one and a half years (pp. 12-15). Focusing on Sunni Muslim immigrants in Chicago, *Islam in Urban America* has provided deep insights into Muslim identity constructions, Islamic practices, as well as community organization.
Another example was put forth in 2005, when *The Muslim World* dedicated a whole issue to the identity formation of young American Muslims. The various articles depicted Islam as driving force behind identity formation and gave reference to what an Islamic identity encompasses. (Al-Johar; S. Ali; Schmidt)

Descriptions on Islamic practice are often descriptions on Muslims' individual and collective interactions with the American life world. The fields of practices described in toto point to the specific conditions formative for Muslim American Islamicity. However, this has not yet been the focus of thorough analysis. Mostly, the fields of Islamic intervention have been compiled without further theoretical integration. *The Encyclopedia of Islam in the United States* (Cesari, 2007) for example lists its entries by distinguishing the following topics:

Culture
Economics
Education and Intellectual Thought

Ethnicity, Identity, and Immigration
Events
Food and Drink
Government
Health
Holidays
Media and Communications
Movements
Organizations/Councils/Societies/Communities/Associations
People
Places
Religious Beliefs and Practices
Sexuality
War, Conflict, Violence, and Peace
Women, Gender, and Family

This list is a very good overview of the thematic fields American Islam has been associated with. Similar connotations can be found elsewhere. (Haddad & Lummis, 1987; Smith, 2010) As in the Encyclopedia, *Islam in America* (Smith, 2010) describes Islam mainly as Muslim practice and/or identity. The chapter on "The Public Practice of Islam" (pp. 104-128) is a description of Muslim institution building in the American context. Smith has associated the public practice of Islam with mosque building, the roles of imams and chaplains, with da'wa, and the development of various Islamic organizations. Similarly organized is the chapter "Living a Muslim Life in American Society", which according to her is constituted by the fields: "Education", "Economics", "Nutrition and Health", "Holidays", "Islamic 'Products'", "New Forms of Communication", the question "Islamic Music: Is It Acceptable?", and "Personal Problems and Islamic Solutions". (pp. 155-184) This motley arrangement of fields of Islamic intervention can be expanded by including scholarly work focusing on one field, such as "Islamic Dress" (Kopp, 2002), "Islamic Hip Hop" (Abdul Khabeer, 2007), "Islamic education" (Haddad, Senzai, & Smith, 2009), etc.
Hence, Islam has mainly been described as the heterogeneous practice of Muslims in ethnographic studies. As a result, the variety of thematic associations with Islam is large, and accordingly large is the body of literature describing them. Fields of Islamic intervention have mostly been listed, without further reflection on the resulting compositions. Thus, Cesari (2004, p. 4) has, I think, rightly concluded that attempts to reflect on these compositions considered as particular constituents of American Islam have been few. Consequentially, the signification of "Islamic" has become somewhat all embracing and hence empty.

Several scholars have discussed how Islam complies with the American context and have provided their own interpretations. Here, I will focus on the configurations of Islam that have emanated from American academia and from established Islamic educational institutions in the US.

The judicial field is one important area of the contemporary configuration of Islam in the US. Scholars, such as Taha Jabir Alalwani, president of the *Cordoba University,* and the former Chairman of the *Fiqh Council of North America*, Khaled Abou El Fadl, professor in Islamic Law at the *UCLA School of Law,* or Sherman Jackson, professor of Arabic and Islamic studies at the *University of Michigan,* are specialists of Islamic jurisprudence. They have reformulated Islamic law with reference to the American context. (Abou El Fadl, 2001; Abou El Fadl & Cohen, 2002; Alalwani, 2002, 2003, 2004; Jackson, 1999-2000, 2006)

Abou El Fadl is known for the rejection of the "modern ugly" in Islam, which according to him presents itself in the form of "Salafabism", the fusion of Wahhabism and Salafism. He has propagated the reclamation of "the beautiful in Islam" by means of approaching "Islam from a moral point of view"[22]. (Abou El Fadl, 2003)

Alalwani is known for having advanced "a Fiqh for Minorities" (2004). From his perspective, the adaption of Islamic jurisprudence to specific contexts does not violate universal Islamic principals but is an integral component thereof: "(…) Islamic fiqh relating to Muslim minorities is essentially derived from the general fiqh of Islam as a whole." (p. 31)

Again closely tied to the American context, Jackson has formulated an Islamic position on affirmative action. He has argued that affirmative action is supported by Islamic tradition by identifying it "(…) as a Qur'anic response to fitnah" (1999-2000, p. 419).

The area of knowledge production is another important field of scholarly intervention on Islamically legitimated grounds. As will be shown later on, this field is important for organizational activity and constituted by many factors. At this point, an early initiative has to be mentioned: In 1981, Alalwani and Ismail al-Faruqi[23] co-founded the *International Institute of Islamic Thought*, which has been dedicated to the "Islamization of Knowledge", an attempt to blend social and physical sciences with Islamic ethics.[24]

Besides in the fields of jurisprudence and knowledge production, American scholars of Islam have been active in Qur'anic exegesis. Singled out as a recent trend have

22 See Abou El Fadls profile on http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=386 (retrieved August 10, 2010).

23 For a short biographical description see (Unus, 2007a).

24 For an overview of today's activities of the Institut see http://iiit.org/.

been interpretations of the Qur'an by Muslim American female scholars (Hammer, 2008). Amina Wadud (1999, 2007), Asma Barlas (2002), Nimat Hafez Barazangi (2004), and Ingrid Mattson (2008) are Muslim American female exegetes. Besides their work in academia, Wadud and Mattson have been strongly involved in the Muslim American community. Wadud is a professor of Islamic studies at *Virginia Commonwealth University* and has gained publicity for leading a mixed gender Friday prayer congregation in New York in 2005 (Omar, 2007). Mattson, a professor at the *Macdonald Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* at *Hartford Seminary*, was the first female president of the *Islamic Society of North America*. The argument has been made that "it is not accidental that the majority of Muslim women scholars engaging in contemporary reinterpretation of the Qur'an are located in North America" (Hammer, 2008, p. 459). The American setting is held responsible for this circumstance. Accordingly, Hammer has stressed that "(…) Muslim women scholars such as Wadud, Barlas, and Barazangi are embedded in their American context and thus need to be read and understood within this context" (p. 459).

Another example of how the Qur'an has been read and interpreted with respect to the American context is an *Agenda to Change our Condition*. (Yusuf & Shakir, 1999) The "agenda" is based on an interpretation of the Qur'an with regards to "taqwa (conscious awareness of our Lord)" (p. 1), carefully deduced by employing traditional Islamic methodology. The founders of Zaytuna College, a recent initiative dedicated to traditional Islamic studies, have written the guide.

Further apart from the traditional methodology on how to interpret Islam, a plethora of initiatives could be named, ranging from harsh, as well as popular critics of Islam (Manji, 2003; Pipes, 2002), to Muslim Americans self portraits and apologetics (Abdul Rauf, 2005; Ali-Karamali, 2008). Publishing activity after 9/11 reflects the broad spectrum of self-made experts that speak for Islam. The result is a jumble of voices, in which quality often is less important than volume. This situation is crucial for how Islam is configured in the US and will be reflected on in various parts of this study.

However, let's turn to another trend of contemporary Islam reading that has emanated from American Universities after 9/11: a trend that has been ascribed to the "progressive Muslims". Despite the identification as "progressive Muslims", Muslim Americans have had trouble to agree on what the attribution stands for. (Mir, 2007) An ambition for consolidation has been made by the anthology *Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism*. (Safi, 2003b) The anthology displays various approaches to the configuration of Islam. According to Safi (2003a), they have in com-

mon their location between "steadfast conservative traditionalism" and "knee-jerk rejectionism of the traditional Muslim heritage by certain Muslim modernists". (p. 5) Safi's own approach is unconventional: He has drawn on the Qur'an and lyrics of Bob Dylan songs to state his preliminaries, which carry the title: *The Times Are A-Changin' – A Muslim Quest for Justice, Gender Equality, and Pluralism*. He explained this combination as follows: "Evoking the sacred message of the Qur'an and the revolutionary spirit of Bob Dylan's lyrics, this book represents the collective aspirations of a group of Muslim thinkers and activists. We realize the urgency of the changin' times in which we live, and seek to implement the Divine injunction to enact the justice ('adl) and goodness-and-beauty (ihsan) that lie at the heart of the Islamic tradition." (p. 1)

AMERICAN ISLAM AND ISLAM IN AMERICA

Besides being configured by scholars of Islam, Islam has also been shaped by research agendas. As mentioned above, research done *on* Islam (including this study) is at the same time its configuration – as it is the case with every object of research. Thus, research agendas on a particular field are always responsible for its configuration. At the same time, research agendas are shaped discursively, changing according to time-space contexts. This interrelation is evident if we consider research agendas on Islam in the US.

The collection of essays *Muslims' Place in the American Public Square* (Bukhari, Nyang, Ahmad, & Esposito, 2004) is a good example of how different scholarly perspectives have been compiled. The aim of the compilation is stated as to discuss "five areas of interest that could help us understand the hopes, fears, and aspirations of the American Muslims". Those areas have been identified as: "theoretical perspectives on the Muslim experience in the United States, the historical and sociological understanding of the mainstreaming of Muslims, the question of Islam and the Black experience, and the demographic and behavioral aspects in our quest to locate Muslims in the American landscape." (Ibid., p. xiv) The spectrum of the anthology's perspectives reaches from Alalwani's formulation of a fiqh for minorities to demographic observations on the Muslim American community.

Another example is the special issue of *The Muslim World* (Mirza, 2008b) on different *Hermeneutical Approaches to the Future of Islam in America*. Several articles deal with different hermeneutics of Islamic source interpretation. As a whole, it is very interesting to observe how contemporary research has approaches the "Future of Islam in America". It has often advanced a hermeneutical perspective of its own, unfortunately without further elaborating on it. The special issue encompasses papers that were

presented at the sixth annual *Critical Islamic Reflections* conference at Yale University in 2007. Papers invited were requested to "carefully examine the terminology, assumptions and methodologies that underlie the prevailing or emerging approaches to Islam in America." (Mirza, 2008a, p. 397) The first three articles of the volume are described as "case studies into different hermeneutical approaches" (Ibid.). Whereas one author has discussed Muslim American women's interpretations of the Qur'an as a recent trend (Hammer, 2008), two authors have discussed Qur'anic exegesis not undertaken by Muslim Americans and thus connected to the American context by the authors themselves. Al-Husain N. Madhany (2008), for example, has stressed the necessity of establishing "extremist logic". He has contended that: "It is our responsibility as intellectuals to understand the logic of Muslim extremists without interpretively dismissing their arguments as the understandings of medieval civilizations, or worse, as invalid theologically in the modern world, both of which are an opportunistic and dangerous fad among many in the academia today." (p. 407) However, rather than reconstructing what he has called "extremist logic", Madhany has given an opposing interpretation of the Qur'anic verses that have allegedly served as the legitimation for it. Thus, his approach has not fulfilled what it set out to find initially (understand "extremist logic"). Rather, he has offered his own normative counter-interpretation to those Qur'anic verses that have legitimated "extremist logic".

In the same issue, Mark Gould (2008) focused on the work of the Pakistani intellectual Kemal A. Faruki in order to offer arguments to Muslims, who "(...) are looking for ways to characterize Islam humanely, in a way consistent with fundamental human rights (...)" (p. 423). He evaluated Farukis work as "(...) embedded deeply in Islam, in the principles that one might extract from Islam, while at the same time, one that is (mostly) compatible with post-Enlightment modernity" (Ibid.).

The two articles are illustrative examples of how research agendas have been affected deeply by the contemporary discourse on Islam. They are rather needs analyzes and recommendations on how to cope with Islam in a post 9/11 environment than analyses of hermeneutical approaches to Islam from a contemporary Muslim American perspective. By associating particular readings of Islam with the American context, they provide normative guidelines on how to shape future Islam in America. These examples demonstrate, how American research agendas have combined and fused studies on American Islam and studies on Islam in America.

At last, the discursive configuration of research agendas is most obvious in the field of transdiciplinary approaches. Transdiciplinary research is committed to problems that are considered socially relevant and to the societal interest in solving them. It

bridges perspectives from various academic disciplines with non-academic perspectives. Transdisciplinary research agendas that are connected to the configuration of Islam in the US have focused for example on interfaith dialogue as the special issue of *The Muslim World* on *Christian-Muslim Relations in North America* indicates (Smith, 2004). Another focus have been human rights as the initiative launched by the *Center for Strategic and International Studies* in Washington D.C to advance "U.S. – Muslim Dialogue" suggests. The initiative aimed to bring together "Muslim and U.S. scholars who are dealing with these issues, as well as representatives of the U.S. government, the broader policymaking community, and nongovernmental organizations active in the human rights field." (Hunter & Malik, 2005)

DISCUSSION

To conclude and bridge the findings of this chapter with the main analytical aims of this thesis, let me quickly recapitulate what has been said so far and connect it to the following chapters: The overview above has shown first and foremost that scholars with different perspectives translating into different research objectives construct Islam in the US. The different perspectives show how the predominantly American research community on Islam in the US approaches the subject matter. In the following chapter, I will outline a shift of perspective. Thereby, the different scholarly perspectives will be framed as a part of the analytical field of this thesis. At the same time, research will be tested and built on by this study in the following ways:

Above, I have argued that the cooperation between Muslim American activists, (Muslim American) scholars (*American* Islam), and scholars of Islam (Islam *in America*) is characteristic for the discursive field configuring Islam in the US context. The thus emerging authority constellations will be part of analysis discussed in chapter 6. Resulting from the different scholarly perspectives, I have discussed the constructions of Islam emerging there from. *American* Islam, approached historically, is an important field of research, which has predominantly highlighted the works of different Muslim American agents and groups. Thereby, historical narratives have enforced boundary constructions between different Muslim American groups. Those alleged boundaries will be examined thoroughly in chapter 7. Building on this, chapter 8 will introduce the consequences arising from redrawn boundaries.

Furthermore, I have shown above that approached ethnographically, *American* Islam has been deduced from Muslim practice. Considered in toto, the findings have pointed to a plethora of fields of Islamic intervention. From the perspective of Muslim American scholars, Islamic intervention has also been discussed by focusing on methodological questions to deduce guidelines from the authoritative texts with regards to

different fields (juridical, educational). In chapter 9, I will take up another perspective on fields of Islamic intervention by focusing on the function of Islam with respect to three areas.

Once again, it is important to note that the observations made above are those of an outsider, namely of a non-Muslim, non-American scholar socialized within the European tradition of *Islamwissenschaft*. From this standpoint, the natural fusion of the above outlined perspectives is a cause for irritation – not in a negative sense. Reasons have already been given in the introduction and shall not be reproduced here. Let me instead turn to explain my perspective taken up for this study.

THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES & METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES & METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES

Studies of *Islamwissenschaft* have approached Islam form a variety of epistemological and methodological perspectives. Hence, interdisciplinarity has been programmatic for the field and correspondingly is for this thesis. Here, I discuss how the fusion of tools and perspectives, borrowed from various disciplines, have catered to the theoretical and methodological needs of this study.

The previous chapter has described the different perspectives from which research has approached Islam and Muslims in the US context. This chapter aims to advance a perspective that to my knowledge has not been applied in this field so far. The following paragraphs lay out a framework that enables us to (re)construct American Muslimness and Islamicity emerging from complex configuration processes that reshape Islam and Muslims in the US.
Epistemologically, this study's discourse analytical perspective owes much to the Foucauldian legacy. Since this legacy comprises a plethora of approaches, the task will

be to clarify, which approaches this study follows. At this point, it is useful to introduce the main analytical category of this study: Analysis will mainly focus on what I consider a particular part of discourse – narrative. Given the large amount of data this study used as its empirical basis, the underlying rationale to concentrate on narrative was to reduce complexity. Narrative as analytical category was defined in line with the aims of this study and served to adjust the focus to certain aspects of data. Before explaining how I defined narrative for the purpose of this study, let me shortly introduce the concept and the research tradition behind it in general.

WHY NARRATIVE?

The analysis of narrative has a long history: Scholars have traced the development of narrative analysis from literary theory, beginning with Russian formalists (Vladimir Propp) and post-formalists (Mikhail Bakhtin), to an increased attention given to narrative that gradually spread to other disciplines of the humanities and the social sciences, such as anthropology (Claude Lévi-Strauss), history (Hayden White), sociolinguistics (William Labov), psychology (Jerome Bruner), etc. (see for example Czarniawska, 2004; Müller-Funk, 2008; Nünning, 2003). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to reproduce this multifaceted history of narrative analysis. Nonetheless, it is necessary to explain why this study's analytical category is narrative.

Crucial to this study is the shift in the understanding of narrative as an ontological rather than a representational category, as has been expressed for example by the American sociologist Margaret Somers (1994): "Recently, (...) scholars are postulating something much more substantive about narrative: namely, that social life is itself *storied* and that narrative is an *ontological condition of social life*." (p. 613f) This refers to what has been called the 'narrative' or 'narrativist' turn, an expression emphasizing the rising awareness narrative has been given since the mid 1960s across disciplines, including the social sciences. (Czarniawska, 2004; Kreiswirth, 2000) Since then, an increasing number of scholars have understood narrative as an anthropological constant. Accordingly, those scholars have argued that reality is not represented, but constructed by means of narratives. (For an overview see Sparkes & Smith, 2008) Before providing a more customized definition for this study below, I define narrative broadly here, namely as the organization of meaning by means of language. (Klein, 2009, p. 167)

It has been argued that individual, as well as collective agents, draw on narratives in order to render interpretations of the self and the world more coherent. (Viehöver, 2001) Not surprisingly, narrative has become an analytical focus of constructionist studies – a field that has expanded in many directions after Peter Berger's and Thomas

Luckmann's groundbreaking work *The Social Construction of Reality* was published in 1966. Narrative constructionist inquiries have focused on how people construct their world and their selves by means of narrative. Sparkes and Smith (2008) have distinguished between two important strands of narrative constructionist analysis: On the one hand *narrative constructivism* has described relations between the inner realm of individuals and narratives, or in other words, the cognitive dimension of narrative. On the other hand, *narrative construtionism* has been concerned with narrative as a form of relational, social, or discursive action. This study follows the latter by understanding narrative as "ongoing social practices that people *perform* and *do* in relation to others as opposed to something they *have*." (Sparkes & Smith, p. 299) Thereby, two important components of a narratively constructed self are stressed: its relationality and its fluidity.

The argument that the self, or what others have called identity, "(...) is not within us because it exists only as a narrative" (Currie, 1998, p. 17) has been taken as reference point to introduce "a more autonomous model of agency" (McNay, 2000, p. 27). As a result, scholars have argued that the resemantization of narratives is crucial in struggles over the self. McNay for example has drawn on the narrative construction of the self not only to challenge essentialist conceptualizations, but also as an argument against the poststructural conceptualization of the subject as "one-dimensional (...), externally imposed effect of power." (p. 27) In line with this argument, some scholars have focused on *counter-narratives* constructed vis-à-vis *master* or *dominant narratives*. (Bamberg & Andrews, 2004) The thereby implied ability of the self to reflect its own construction and to consequentially adopt counter-narratives has challenged the conceptualization of the subject as effect of power relations by advancing a stronger model of agency. This model of agency connected to the idea of a narrative constructed self is important for this study as well.

DISCOURSE AND NARRATIVE

To explain the relation between discourse and narrative and this study's focus on the latter, I follow McNay's critique on Foucauldian constructionism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. According to her, both have advanced a determinist understanding of subjectification. What McNay has called the "negative understanding of subject formation" or the *negative paradigm* (p. 2), denotes the poststructural conceptualization of the subject as discursive effect. In order "to sketch out other aspects of subjectification and agency" or "a more *generative* theoretical framework" (p.4) McNay for example has drawn on Paul Ricoeur to temporalize the understanding of the self by means of narrative:

> The coherence of the self is not conceived as an exogenously imposed effect, but as the result of an active process of configuration whereby individuals attempt to make sense of the temporality of existence. Narrative is the privileged medium of this process of self-formation. The process of active appropriation immanent in the construction of narrative identity suggests a more autonomous model of agency than is offered in the negative paradigm. (p. 27)

The need to incorporate a concept of agency in discourse analysis has been stressed by various sociological approaches (see for example Keller, 2001, 2005b). In the light of Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, one sociological adaption of the Foucauldian concept of discourse has framed it as *structured and structuring practice*. (Diaz-Bone, 2010, p. 71) Accordingly, the rules of discourse are immanent to discursive practice and thus reproduced by it. Various scholars of sociology have combined discourse theory with aspects of Bourdieu's work, in order to integrate social conditions into discourse analysis and frame language use as a component of the social struggle over symbolic power. (Keller, 2005a, p. 145f) In such a framework, agency is crucial to the reproduction of discourse.

For the purpose of this study, Viehöver's (2001) approach is particularly interesting. Borrowing from Bourdieu, he has framed narrative as structured and structuring structure and hence distinguished between narrative as *opus operatum* and narrativization as *modus operandi*. (p. 181) This distinction is useful because it enables us to specify whether we are interested in narrative as structured by discourse or in narrative as discursive practice. As a result, narrative might either be analyzed as opus operatum by focusing on structure or form and content. Or, by focusing on processes of narrativization, one might consider how agents make sense of their selves and their world by means of narratives. This study's analytical focus lies on the former. Yet, before describing the methodological guidelines for analysis, I will provide a theoretical perspective on the sociological dimension of narrative construction.

NARRATIVE AS MODUS OPERANDI AND OPUS OPERATUM

As mentioned before, this study's empirical basis consists of Muslim American organizations' output. Narratives that will be reconstructed from this output are considered as products of narrativization. Muslim American organizations are understood to engage in processes of narrativization. To describe the agency of these organizations within this process, I was partly inspired by a theory of marketing.

The theory that will be introduced below has stressed the importance of narrative in market behavior. By adapting it to what has been said above, Muslim American organizations can be conceptualized as co-constructors of narrative. By fusing theories

of *cultural branding* (Holt, 2004) and *cultural consumption* (G. McCracken, 1988; 2005) Heding, Knutzen and Bjerre (2009) have concluded: that a "(...) brand gains competitive power by providing the consumer with the appropriate web of associations and the most powerful myths of its time." (p. 211f) With this, I argue that Muslim American organizations act as marketers. Of course, this claim will need further explanation, as economic theories have conceptualized agents fundamentally different than discourse theory.

The theory of cultural branding is introduced here to frame the setting Muslim American organizations operate in by engaging in processes of narrativization. The figure below adapts and fuses the theories that are discussed in this chapter.



Figure 3: Narrativization as modus operandi and narrative as opus operatum.

If economies and economics are defined with Diaz-Bone and Krell (2009) as discursive constructs, marketing theories can be considered as part of this discourse and marketing therefore as discursive practice. The theory of cultural branding is influenced by cultural studies and adds a macro-level perspective to the relationship between marketers and consumers. (Heding et al., p. 209) Building on this, I consider the process of narrativization as exchange taking place between marketers and consumers with respect to what Somers (1994) has called *narrative repertoires* – a concept that will be elaborated further on. The opus operatum – that is, narratives and narrative repertoires – is the outcome of the process of narrativization, i.e. the modus operandi. From a discourse analytical perspective, the process of narrativization is thus a discursive practice and a narrative in turn a part of discourse.

In what follows, I will firstly focus on the modus operandi by describing the co-constructors of narrative as well as processes of narrativization. However, as not to raise expectations that will not be met later on, let me emphasize that the following discussion of the modus operandi is a mere theoretical discussion and will not be part of analysis. My intention here simply is to offer a theoretical framework in order to contextualize this study's analytical category within a sociological setting.
The analytical part of this study is empirically based on the opus operatum only and thus – one-sidedly – only on what is colored red in the graph above. Speaking in terms of the graph, analysis will not focus on the social interactions marked blue and hence does not provide what could be called a consumers' analysis.
Therefore, after the theoretical discussion of the modus operandi, I will turn more closely to narrative as opus operatum and explain this study's main analytical category. The aim then will be to introduce the methodological perspective cast on narrative and the analytical tools I used for this study.

MODUS OPERANDI – THE PROCESS OF NARRATIVIZATION

My intention now is to add a concept of agency to a discourse analytical perspective. Thereby, narrative will be embedded sociologically, as the outcome of a process that involves different agents. This chapter will firstly focus on the co-constructors of narrative relevant for this study and secondly turn to the process of narrativization.

THE CO-CONSTRUCTORS OF NARRATIVE

The theory of cultural branding considers the construction of narratives as co-constructions. Figure 3 above has arranged agents in a triangle of narrative construction. Therefore, I will focus here on marketers, consumers, and the sociological locus of narrative repertoires formation – the public sphere.

The marketers: Many of the Muslim American organizations listed in chapter 1 are faith-based organizations incorporated as 501(c)(3) nonprofits. They compete with other nonprofit organizations that operate under the same legal constraints. So, even though they belong to the nonprofit sector, Muslim American organizations can be considered as competitors of a market. Unlike for profit organizations, they are not focused on the optimization of profit. Nevertheless, research has considered nonprofits to operate in various markets as "rational optimizers" as well, not with respect to profit, but with respect to their mission. (Brown & Slivinski, 2006, p. 140) From this study's perspective, optimization can of course not be considered as rational and I will later discuss how from this point of view agency is constrained.

For the time being, however, I follow Holt's argument, that regardless if they brand a product or a mission, brands compete in a "myth market". (p. 39) Accordingly, a brand manager

> (...) must be able to spot emergent cultural opportunities and understand their subtle characteristics. To do so, managers must hone their ability to see the brand as cultural artifact moving through history. They must develop sensitive antennae to pick up tectonic shifts in society that create new identity desires. And they must view their brands as a cultural platform – just like a Hollywood film or a new social movement – to respond to these desires with effective myths. (Holt, 2004, p. 215)

Holt has considered various "market entities that people rely on to express their identity" as "prime candidates for cultural branding". (p. 5) Such market entities are for example film stars, cartoon characters, NGO's, tourist destinations, social movements, or politicians.

Inspired by Holt, this study argues that Muslim American organizations, however multiple their mission and vision statements are, brand *Muslimness* and *Islamicity* by engaging in processes of narrativization. This study thus argues that by marketing narratives of *Muslimness* and *Islamicity*, Muslim American organizations partake in the construction of Muslim selves.

The consumers: Having identified Muslim American organizations as marketers, let's now focus on the consumers. Since there are no consumer surveys available for the organizations this study is interested in, assumptions based on what research on nonprofits in general has revealed will serve as reference.

Scholars have argued that nonprofit organizations usually provide goods and services to various stakeholders. (Brown & Slivinski, 2006; Cadge & Wuthnow, 2006) The overview extracted from mission and vision statements displayed in chapter 1

has shown that this applies to Muslim American organizations overall. Even though many mission statements target Muslim Americans as main audience, this orientation is often not exclusive and contains claims to provide public service to a variety of stakeholders regardless of their religious orientation. Thus, a nonprofit's mission is potentially multidirectional. Furthermore, research on nonprofits has stressed that donors of nonprofit organizations are often "interested third parties whose demand for an organization's service is on behalf of a client base to which they do not themselves belong." (Brown & Slivinski, 2006, p. 143) With this, the relevance of multidirectionality is expanded further. Accordingly, the supporters of Muslim American organizations' goods, services, and narratives can not be considered as necessarily and exclusively Muslim American.

For the purpose of this study, it is important to keep in mind the potential multiplicity of stakeholders. Thus, when Muslim American self-reference is established on the basis of narrative, narrative represents a particular co-constructed claim. To be clear: this study does by no means aspire to put forth what "Muslim Americans really think", a scholarly claim that has been discussed in chapter 2. Rather, it aims to draw attention to the co-constructed dimension of Muslimness and Islamicity traceable in narrative. Thereby, the interference of co-constructed Muslimness and Islamicity with individual constructions of Muslim selves will be left out, because it is beyond the scope of this study.

The public sphere: The theory of cultural branding considers the co-construction of narratives taking place with reference to culture. For the purpose of this study, the broad concept of culture is replaced by what Somers (1994) has called *narrative repertoires*. Further on, I will explain how narrative repertoires influence processes of narrativization and how those repertoires can be grasped empirically. Here, however, I want to establish the sociological locus from which narrative repertoires emerge.

The market of narratives and the processes of narrativization can be related to the concept of the *public sphere*. The academic discussion that has been taking place since the publication of Jürgen Habermas' *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* in 1962 has taken various turns and shall not be reproduced here. (See instead Wodak & Koller, 2008b) However, since this study considers the public sphere as the setting from which narrative repertoires emerge, I will now touch on a few aspects.

Three main trends in public sphere research have emerged as critique of the Habermasian model: "a late-modern school, a postmodern school and a relational school". (Wodak & Koller, 2008a, p. 3f) Accordingly, the different schools have connected different aspects with the concept. Whereas the late-modern school has embedded the

public sphere in the *lifeworld*, the postmodern school has stressed its *plurality* and the relational school has conceptualized it by focusing on social relations connected to the idea of the *milieux*. (Ibid.)

Research on a *Muslim public sphere* has further observed:

> (The) combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates foster an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created and feeds into new senses of a public space that is discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities. (Eickelman & Anderson, 1999a, p. 2)

The Muslim public sphere thus has been framed as participatory space that challenges traditional authority structures by means of the transformative potential new media has provided. The influence of modern communication technology on the public sphere has been broadly acknowledged by research in general. (Wodak & Koller, 2008a) The thereby warranted increased accessibility has challenged authority structures and transcended the public sphere beyond national boundaries.

Building on the positions mentioned above, this study considers the public sphere as multi-directional, fluid, transnational communicative space that blurs binary oppositions such as public and private more and more and constantly re-negotiates parameters of inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, this study considers the public sphere as the locus from which narrative repertoires emerge. As figure 3 has indicated, narrative repertoires belong to the opus operatum. Below, the empirical manifestation of a repertoire that is important for this study will be described.

NARRATIVIZATION AND ITS BOUNDARIES

Building on what has been said about the co-constructors of narrative, let's now turn to the process of narrativization. Firstly, the focus lies on the relationship between marketers and consumers. Secondly, the influence of narrative repertoires onto this relationship will be discussed.

Along the lines of the theory of cultural branding it can be argued that Muslim American organizations are not the "authors" of narratives: Above, Muslim American organizations have been identified as marketers. Accordingly, the agency of those organizations extends to marketing narratives. With respect to the criteria of optimization, the theory of cultural branding considers marketing as most successful if it complies with consumers' desires. Thus, the agency of consumers extends to the selection of narratives that resonate with their current identity projects best. If orga-

nizations and consumers are in this way considered as co-constructors, narrative is a product of relational dependencies that are multilayered.

Having deduced the relationship of marketers and consumers, let me introduce Somers' and Gibson's (1994) concept of the *narrative repertoire* to restrict the voluntary aspects of cultural branding theory. Accordingly, the narrative repertoire restricts the agency of marketers, as well as consumers, or as Somers points out:

> Although social action may be only intelligible through the construction, enactment, and appropriation of narratives, this does not mean that social actors are free to fabricate narratives at will. Rather, there is only a limited repertoire of available representations and stories. Which kind of narratives will socially predominate is contested politically and will depend in large part on the distribution of power. (p. 629)

The agency of marketers and consumers thus extends to the appropriation of narratives from a limited, yet fluid repertoire. Accordingly, the process of narrativization is tied to the opus operatum and vice versa. Hence, Muslim American organizations act by marketing narratives just as their supporters act by means of consuming or appropriating narratives. However, the agency of both is limited because narrative adaption and configuration always takes place with respect to narrative repertoires provided in particular temporal and spatial contexts. Narrative repertoires are reshaped as newly configured narratives become part of them at different points in time.

By what has been said so far, it should have become clear why the question "Who speaks for Islam?" referred to in chapter 2 cannot be easily answered from the perspective advanced here. By pointing at Muslims, one might express an opinion on who *should* speak for Islam, but not necessarily, who actually *does*. The fact that this study considers Muslim American organizations' output as empirical basis for reconstructing Muslim narratives does not mean that it considers these narratives as constructed exclusively by Muslims. The two main reasons thereof summarize what has been said so far:

Firstly, by focusing on agents, I have argued above that narratives are co-constructed by Muslim American organizations and a base of consumers or supporters that is potentially diverse and hence not necessary composed solely by Muslims.

Secondly, by focusing on process, I have argued further that organizations, as well as supporters, act by means of adapting, performing, and configuring narratives to construct Muslimness and Islamicity. However, their agency is tied to adapting narratives from narrative repertoires available at a given time and a given place. Thus, as the modus operandi produces the opus operatum through "retranslation" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 172), narrativization and narrative intermingle and presuppose each other.

OPUS OPERATUM – NARRATIVE AS ANALYTICAL CATEGORY

Having delineated the process from which narratives emerge, I will now turn to the opus operatum, that is, narrative and narrative repertoires. The aim now is firstly to provide a closer definition of this study's understanding of narrative, which is quite different from how narrative has been understood so far. Secondly, the methodological approach to this study's narrative analysis will be introduced.

THIS STUDY'S DEFINITION OF NARRATIVE

Above, narrative has been broadly defined as the organization of meaning by means of language. In what follows, this broad definition will be limited. It is important to note that for the purpose of this study, I use the notion of narrative as a metaphor to designate particular linguistic patterns. Thus, the definition of narrative was tailored to this study in order to ensure analytical practicability in the light of a large amount of data. Let me explain this by firstly turning to a discourse analytical approach to introduce guidelines for the (re)construction of meaning organization.

More specifically, (re)construction in this study is obtained by focusing on what Reisigl and Wodak (2009) have called *discursive strategies*. Wodak and Reisigl have defined a 'strategy' as a "more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal". (p. 94) They have differentiated between various discursive strategies of which this study will focus on three: The *strategy of nomination*, which discursively constructs social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions; the *strategy of predication*, which discursively qualifies social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes, and actions positively or negatively; and the *strategy of argumentation*, which justifies and questions claims of truth and normative rightness. (Ibid.)

Relating to what has been said above, I connect the practice of narrativization to the just introduced definition of discursive strategies. Accordingly, I argue that discursive strategies serve to narrativize or *emplot* objects, social actors, events, actions, etc. Emplotment has been framed by drawing on Paul Ricoeur. White's (1987) argument that historians *emplot* events into meaningful sequences has built on Ricoeur's conceptualization of temporality. Accordingly, historians "endow the experience of time with meaning". (White, p. 173) More recently, by drawing on Ricoeur and Greimas, Viehöver has argued that a plot does not simply organize events, actors, and objects chronologically but rather gathers them into a meaningful and coherent matrix embedded spatially and temporally. (p. 189)
Following this idea of a plot as a matrix, I consider the interplay of discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation as representing spatially and

temporally embedded matrixes. Hence, this study views the interplay of discursive strategies as a plot and thus as constitutive for narrative.

With respect to the temporal aspect, narrative is not restricted to lend meaning and coherence to the past. It bears an innovative potential by its ability to emplot potential future realities. Narrative is able to assume a model role and suggest guidelines for action. Scholars have stressed the transformative potential of narrative. By analyzing the discourse on climate change, Viehöver for example has illustratively demonstrated how narratives are what Ricoeur has called "bearers of possible worlds". (Viehöver, 2008) Others have argued similarly by relating narratives to moral or ethic questions. (Klein, 2009) Thus, here I suggest that the degree of intentionality that Wodak and Reisigl have attributed to discursive strategies corresponds to the innovative potential that has been attributed to narrative. And, as has been deduced above, this innovative potential results from the ability of agents to appropriate and configure narratives from a spatially and temporally fixed narrative repertoire; a repertoire, which is consequentially transformed itself, as the reconfigured narratives become part of it along the axis of time.

To summarize, this study will analyze the narratives Muslim American organizations market by reconstructing strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation constituting social actors, objects, etc. from their output. Accordingly, Muslim American narratives are considered as those claimed, configured, and reshaped by Muslim American organizations belonging to a relational setting. A diachronic perspective enables us to observe how these claims change.
Furthermore, this study will draw conclusions regarding processes of integration by means of establishing relations between Muslim American organizations' narratives and an American repertoire. Thus, the process of integration is established by observing narrative interaction.

METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE

Let's now concentrate more closely on the methodological aspects of this study's analysis. The suggested approach is the result of a pragmatic decision-making process that took place during data collection and -analysis. The study's main intend was to uncover narratives on the basis of a large amount of data, that is, output extracts provided by Muslim American organizations. Therefore, a suitable method had to comply first with two major criteria: Its ability to manage relatively large amounts of data and its ability to deduce narratives from this data. In a process of testing different methods the recently proposed combination of techniques deriving from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Corpus Linguistics (CL) was particularly inspiring. (Baker et al., 2008) This methodological approach is relatively new and has predominantly been developed by scholars with a background in linguistics. Since here, a scholar of Islamic studies drew on this methodology; some preliminary remarks on chances, as well as pitfalls, of an according approach have to be made:

On the chances side, this study is able to make a twofold contribution: On the one hand, it might contribute to the expansion of methodological approaches relevant to research questions of Islamic studies. On the other hand, it might contribute to developing the methodological approach itself, by testing its limits for qualitative studies.

On the pitfalls side, the lack of familiarity with the tradition behind corpus linguistics has to be mentioned. This study was – although heavily influenced by various sources – a one woman show. A fast acquisition of yet unfamiliar tools was thus necessary. Although this process of acquisition was very fruitful and inspiring, it has yet to be evaluated, especially from the perspective of corpus linguistics.

COMBINING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACHES

Discourse analysts have only scarcely used CL tools so far. However, recently scholars have demonstrated the potential of an according approach. (Baker, 2007; Baker et al., 2008; Bubenhofer, 2008, 2009; Mautner, 2009) Especially scholars identifying with CDA have been open to incorporate CL tools. (Mautner) From a CDA perspective CL has been acknowledged to complement and assist analysis in the following ways (Ibid., p. 123):

By providing tools and techniques to cope with large amount of data.

By helping reduce researchers bias by means of broadening the empirical basis of CDA studies.

By providing software to organize textual data for quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Overall, those advantages provided by CL tools complied very well with the needs of this study.

Along with choosing CL techniques to assist discourse analysis, certain assumptions are made. Discourse analysts that have used CL tools assume that there is a fundamental relation between discourse and particular patterns predominating in textual data. (Baker; Bubenhofer) They assume that frequently occurring linguistic patterns are particularly relevant for the "order of discourse". (Bubenhofer, p. 38f) Frequency is thus regarded as key criterion for the manifestation of dominance within the linguistic construction of objects.

On the basis of these presumptions, CL provides powerful heuristic tools, which make it possible to track salient linguistic patterns within corpora. Before discussing the advantages of these tools, their limitations have to be mentioned as well: CL tools are valuable first and foremost for analyzing text. Non-textual data such as for example still or moving images, as well as layout specifics, are not taken into account. Additionally, CL tools, however powerful, offer limited interpretative scope from the perspective of qualitative research. CL tools are able to search for words but not for concepts or meaning. Interpretation of salient patterns thus has to be supported otherwise, such as for example by CDA.

Being aware of the advantages and limitations, this study employed the heuristic tools provided by CL along with CDA guidelines for interpretation. It drew on CL tools based on the assumption that frequently occurring linguistic patterns provide points of entry for the deduction of dominant narratives. Accordingly, it was not the goal to establish statistical significance for word co-occurrence. Rather, statistical tools were used to systematically deduce manifestations of dominance in data, which was then closely examined further. CL tools were used to organize and manage data, to test assumptions in various corpora; and finally, to provide an angle of view onto areas that would possibly have been left unnoticed. The advantage of this approach results from its ability to combine different perspectives, or what have been called *corpus-based* and *corpus-driven* procedures. (Bubenhofer, pp. 99-102) Whereas corpus-based procedures are employed to test hypothesis, corpus-driven procedures make it possible to generate theory from data. Hence, the alternation of inductive and deductive procedures within the process of analysis encompasses both, innovation and verification.

In what follows, I will discuss the techniques and perspectives this study employed by firstly describing how CL tools contributed to analysis and secondly by discussing how the reconstruction of narratives proceeded along hermeneutical guidelines provided by CDA.

One central concern of analysis was to establish semantic fields surrounding certain words from a diachronic perspective. The underlying rationale of this approach was to deduce re-semantization processes that were formative for certain concepts and eventually narratives. Impetuses to analysis were either provided by research contexts or by the data itself. Different procedures were combined. On the one hand, explorative search processes obtained inputs for the queries. Many different sources provided inputs, ranging from research done so far, to the corpus data itself, and, not least, to insights gained in the course of fieldwork carried out in 2009. Accordingly initiated queries correspond to the procedure of testing hypotheses and represent a corpus-based approach. On the other hand, corpus-driven procedures, such as the establishment of word-frequency lists, provided computer-generated points of entry to further analysis.

It should be kept in mind that a great amount of search words have been tested, of which only a fractional amount will be described.

As CL techniques provided powerful heuristic tools for this study, they will be described by means of their utility – a perspective, which forgoes describing the complexity of their development. Bubenhofer (2009), Baker (2007), and McEnery, Xiao & Tono (2006) have provided detailed contextualizations of these tools within the research tradition of CL. Their research not only provides valuable insights but potential connection possibilities for scholars that are newcomers to the field of CL.

As stated above, this study was an attempt in interdisciplinarity. Analysis did not use the described CL tools to their full potential but in a way, I understood them to be most useful. I am thus aware that from a CL perspective the proposed procedure is a scratch of the surface. However, analysis tried to take into account pitfalls that are attached to the different procedures as well as possible.

Data analysis was performed using AntConc, a freeware concordance program.[25] The screenshots included below all display its user interface. Let me now describe the tools used for analysis:

Word-Frequency: Word-frequency counts establish lists of words sorted by the frequency of their appearance in a given corpus. Usually, top positions on such word-lists are occupied by grammatical words (pronouns, determiners, conjunctions). Grammatical words are useful especially for linguistic studies. Therefore, I mainly drew on fre-

25 http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/antconc_index.html (retrieved September 13, 2010).

quency lists of lexical words (main verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs) as well as names of people and institutions. Such frequency lists gave first hints to words that are dominant in a corpus and hence potential indicators for the location of word clusters and narratives. I thus used word-frequency lists as possible entries for analyses.[26]

To give an example, the following table displays the top ten lexical words and names along with the frequency of their occurrence extracted from two of the corpora that will be discussed into detail below.

IH Corpus		FC Corpus	
Lexical word	**Frequency**	**Lexical word**	**Frequency**
Muslim	8‘153	Muhammad	9‘055
Muslims	5‘343	People	7‘346
Islamic	5‘203	God	7‘134
Islam	4‘125	Honorable	5‘990
American	2‘752	Minister	5‘771
Community	2‘610	Farrakhan	5‘287
America	2‘100	Black	4‘845
People	2‘098	Allah	4‘696
ISNA	2‘010	Elijah	4‘611
Allah	1‘971	America	3‘897

Figure 4: Word frequency lists.

Concordances: According to Baker, concordance analysis is “one of the most effective techniques” to closely examine what has been called *keywords in context* (KWIC) from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. (p. 71) A concordance displays all occurrences of a word under investigation including the respective textual surrounding or what is called co-text. In order to deduce salient language patterns from concordances, they can be sorted, for example, by arranging the words on the left or on the right of the word under investigation alphabetically. The screenshot below displays an extract of the concordance of *Islam* (*Islam* as KWIC). *Islam* as word under investigation brought forth 4’124 concordance hits. The concordance was sorted alphabetically according to the 3 words occurring on the left side of *Islam*. The window displays the first 32 lines of the accordingly sorted concordance. The File-Window displays the reference to the source texts.

26 For additional usage of word-frequency counts see Baker, pp. 47-69.



Figure 5: First 32 lines of an alphabetically sorted concordance of Islam.

Collocates: Words that typically occur next to or near each other in a corpus are called collocates. Together, they form collocations. In Hunston's (2002) words: "Collocation is the tendency of words to be biased in the way they co-occur. For example, the word *toys* co-occurs with *children* more frequently than with *women* or *men*." (p. 68)

Collocations are searched for within a particular word span on the left and on the right of the word under investigation or the so-called *node word*. Different word spans have been considered optimal for collocation analysis, usually within the range of five words to the left and to the right of the node word.[27] In this study, the search span reaches from one up to five words left and right of the node, depending on the analytical concern pursued. The table below for example displays collocates of *Islam* queried in a corpus of the study. The query has been undertaken with a span of +/- five words next to the node (i.e. *Islam*). They are listed according to the frequency of their occurrence.

27 Sinclair for example has argued that an adjustment to five words on the left and four words on the right of the node might improve results as regards semantic relevance, because "pattering in general is a little stronger on the left than on the right". (Sinclair, Jones, Daley, & Krishnamurthy, 2004, p. xix) Baker (2007) has demonstrated how the span size affects results and has himself analyzed collocations using a span of three words left and right of the node. (p. 103) Hunston (2002) has again argued that in some cases it is useful to take into account a wider span to calculate collocations. (p. 75)

In addition to the frequency of their occurrence, the table displays their *t*- and MI-scores. The *t*- and the MI-test are two possibilities to establish significance of collocations. They are the two statistical measurement tools provided by AntConc. Both are calculated by considering on the one hand *the Observed,* that is, how many times the co-occuring word is found in the span defined on the right and left of the node word. On the other hand, they consider *the Expected,* that is, the expected frequency of the co-occurring word in the span, given the frequency of its distribution in the corpus as a whole. (Hunston, p. 70) According to this, the "t-score is calculated by subtracting Expected from Observed and dividing the result by the standard deviation"[28], whereas the "MI-score is the Observed divided by the Expected, converted to a base-2 logarithm". (Ibid.)

Thereby, the *t*-score tends to show high-frequency collocations and measures the likelihood that there is an association between the search word and its collocates. The MI-score displays the strength of a collocation and tends to include collocations with low frequency. Thus, whereas the t-score measures the certainty of collocation, the MI-score measures its strength. (Hunston, p. 73) The higher the MI score, the stronger the collocation. Hence, if the MI score is close to 0, the two words are likely to co-occur by chance. (McEnery et al., p. 56) An MI-score higher than 3 is considered significant – that is, as evidence for a collocation – whereas a *t*-score higher than 2 is considered statistically significant. (Hunston, p. 71f) Since corpus size is important for the t-score, the MI-score is more suitable for comparisons across corpora of different size. (Hunston, 2002, p. 73)

The table below shows collocates of *Islam* (nouns, adjectives and names) found in one of the corpora used for this study (IH corpus). Collocates occurring over 40 times were included and grouped hierarchically according to their frequency. Additionally, the table shows how *t*- and MI-score differ from each other. While the significance measured by the *t*-score shows a direct connection to frequency, the MI-score shows no direct connection, as the highlighted fields display by indicating the respective top five positions singled out with respect to frequency.

28 The standard deviation "takes into acount the probability of co-occurrence of the node and its collocate and the number of tokens (i.e. the actual occurrence of a word, S.v.F.) in the designated span in all lines." (Hunston, p. 70)

Collocate	Frequency	t-score	MI score
Muslims	366	18.16593	4.30895
Muslim	208	12.46634	2.88242
America	175	12.68288	4.59895
Religion	105	9.9866	5.29858
American	94	8.71391	3.30431
Islamic	91	7.65897	2.34284
People	88	8.66055	3.70307
Nation	87	9.28283	7.70988
Americans	83	8.67655	4.39214
Women	77	8.24849	4.05895
West	72	8.24536	5.14433
World	71	7.83478	3.83274
True	49	6.82291	5.30479
Way	48	6.49525	4.00021
Qur	47	6.01064	3.02025
Message	47	6.68706	5.34566
Community	44	5.40878	2.43756
Teachings	42	6.36543	5.81261
Religious	42	5.80614	3.26406
Latino	41	6.28478	5.75776
Life	40	5.62281	3.17194
ISNA	40	5.25344	2.56185

Figure 6: Significant collocates of the search word Islam.

The methodological guidelines provided by the *Discourse-Historical Approach* (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) are most useful to contextualize and interpret the results generated by CL tools. The *Discourse-Historical Approach* (DHA) is a variety of CDA and has been developed in order to trace stereotypical constructions emerging from public discourse from a historical perspective. (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 18)

This study draws on the DHA to deduce narratives from CL findings and to contextualize these narratives further. At this point, it is worth mentioning again that this study's definition of narrative is neither equivalent to what has largely been understood as narrative so far, nor is it a part of the DHA's framework. In the paragraphs above I have explained why the notion is still maintained here.

The DHA proposes a triangulatory approach to contextualization; an approach that conceptualizes context by differentiating between four levels: Co-text; intertextual relations; context of situation and sociopolitical and historical context. (Ibid., p. 31) The context of situation and the sociopolitical and historical context will not be part of analysis in the narrower sense. Whereas the sociopolitical and historical context has been discussed in chapter 1, the previous chapter on narrativization has proposed a possible contextualization of situation on a theoretical basis. As such, the two levels influence my hermeneutical background from which I interpret the results. However, the analysis of narrative in a narrower sense will mainly be obtained on the level of co-text and intertextuality.
The analysis of co-text, that is, the immediate textual surrounding of a certain word, makes it possible to derive narratives from words or word clusters. As already discussed above, this study grasps emplotment or narrativization by means of what the DHA has called discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation. Hence, narratives are deduced by (re)constructing discursive strategies framing certain words or word-clusters that have turned out significant according to CL queries.

The intertextual contextualization adds to the contextualization of co-text. I follow Reisigl & Wodak in their definition on intertextuality:

> *Intertextuality* means that texts are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present. Such connections are established in different ways: through explicit reference to a topic or main actor; through reference to the same events; by allusions or evocations; by the transfer of main arguments from one text to the next, and so on. The process of transferring given elements to new contexts is labelled *recontextualization*: if an element is taken out of a specific context, we observe the process of de-contextualization; if the respective element is then inserted into a new context, we witness the process of recontextualization. (p. 90)

The (re)constructed potentially heterogeneous narratives can be described and compared by establishing their intertextual distribution. By means of establishing the intertextual meandering of narratives, it is possible to trace their development (diachronic) as well as the range of their distribution (synchronic).[29]

From a synchronic perspective, the dominance of a particular narrative can be established by tracing its intertextual distribution. Intertextual distribution means that a narrative or parts of it appear in several texts of a defined corpus or in different corpora. Thus, analysis might start off by establishing dominant narrative trends characteristic for a particular corpus. In succession, those trends can subsequently be compared between corpora or checked against already existing theories.

Additionally, a diachronic perspective makes it possible to trace processes of re-semantization that configure narrative along an axis of time. This perspective is particularly interesting to deduce the relations between narrative and narrative repertoires.

To sum up, analysis proceeded in the following steps:

1. Search words were determined on the basis of contextual knowledge (findings of research, close-reading of source texts, interview partners) or on the basis of corpus-driven queries (word frequencies).

2. Search words were queried in the different corpora (concordance, collocation).

3. Dominant linguistic patterns were established on the basis of the results.

4. Narratives were (re)constructed by contextualizing patterns, that is, by deducing discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation.

5. (Re)constructed narratives were compared comprehensively with respect to the different corpora and to existing theory.

Prior to analysis, data had to be selected and prepared. In the next chapter I will discuss the criteria on the basis of which the corpora were compiled. And, I will explain how this study empirically grasped what until now has been called *output* and *narrative repertoires*.

29 On the significance of diachronic and synchronic perspectives for discourse analysis in general see for example Jäger & Meier 2009.

DATA COLLECTION & CORPUS BUILDING

DATA COLLECTION & CORPUS BUILDING

In this chapter, I will introduce the empirical basis of this study by describing data and data providers. To a large extent the analyses that will be presented shortly are based on what have been called "specialized" (Baker, p. 26f) or "do-it-yourself" (McEnery et al., p. 71f) corpora. This means that, with one exception, the corpora below were exclusively built for the purpose of this study. Research has suggested an according procedure, especially for discourse analytical studies. (Baker, pp. 26-31; McEnery et al., pp. 111-113)

In the light of this, the process of corpus compilations has to be reflected closely at this point. In what follows, I will firstly discuss the general criteria and restrictions that led to data selection.
Secondly, the empirical basis this study is built on will be described by characterizing the different corpora, as well as the publications, and the organizations the data has been collected from. The description of the data providers builds on chapter 1 that has, on the one hand, described Muslim institution building from a historical perspective and, on the other hand, provided an overview of the contemporary Muslim American organizational landscape.

SELECTION CRITERIA

In order to obtain answers to the leading research interests of this study, Muslim American organizations' output was collected. However, as the Muslim American organizational landscape is broad (see chapter 1), a suitable amount of data had to be extracted on the basis of certain selection criteria. Data was selected on the basis of its ability:

To display the discursive strategies of Muslim American organizations that claim to have national or broader validity.

To provide answers to the leading research interests.

To reveal potential contrasts and contradictions of organizations' discursive strategies.

To enable a diachronic perspective by covering the time span of the last ten to fifteen years.

Especially the time frame reduced the amount of suitable data considerably. Because, even if an organization was founded within the desired time span, its output was often no longer accessible or only fragmentary available.
The selection process revealed that data meeting the criteria was predominantly provided by organizations with a broad popularity. Popularity was established on the basis of the attention a certain organization has received from the research community as well as from internet users. The organizations' web-popularity was determined based on the *Alexa Traffic Rank*. Alexa measures web traffic by counting page views of Alexa Toolbar users within periods of three month.[30] Although Alexa is widely used to establish traffic data, especially in marketing, its limitations have to be mentioned here. The main bias results from how the sample is generated by Toolbar users that are not necessarily representative for Internet users in general. Additionally, the reliability of data diminishes with lower rankings. Despite these limitations, Alexa is held to be one of the best traffic data guide available. (Fortunato, Flammini, Menczer, & Vespignani, 2006, pp. 12685, 12687; Viney, 2008, pp. 231-233)

The table below displays traffic ranks of Muslim American organizations' websites in the United States queried at different points in time. Of all queried organizational websites (see appendix I), the websites below were most frequently visited by internet users. The websites are listed according to their average ranking deduced from Alexa over the period of a year.

30 For a description of how Alexa ranks different Web pages see http://www.alexa.com/help/traffic-learn-more (retrieved August 30, 2010).

Foundation Date	Organization Name	Online Since	US Rank 2009/9	US Rank 2009/12	US Rank 2010/4	US Rank 2010/9	Average Rank
1977	Nation of Islam	1996	63‘519	36‘471	84‘497	66‘501	62‘747
1994	Council on American-Islamic Relations	1996	136‘243	54‘721	93‘558	54‘580	84‘776
2001	Al Maghrib Institute	2002	68‘000	88‘733	187‘505	57‘623	100‘465
1982	Islamic Society of North America	1996	79‘212	107‘392	172‘898	147‘030	126‘633
1996	Zaytuna Institute	1997	134‘237	144‘414	199‘757		159‘469
1968	Islamic Circle of North America	1995	118‘914	250‘330	213‘309	168‘813	187‘842

Figure 7: Alexa Traffic Ranks of Muslim American organizations' websites.

Except *Al Maghrib Institute* all of the organizations with the highest Alexa Traffic Ranks have been covered by research. (Cesari, 2007; Lotfi, 2002; Nimer, 2002) Therefore, despite the limitations of Alexa, they can be evaluated as those with the widest name recognition. Two of the organizations, *Al Maghrib Institute* and *Zaytuna Institute*, had to be excluded from further analysis, because they did not provide a sufficient amount of data within the desired time span. The other four organizations best met the selection criteria.

CORPORA & DATA PROVIDERS

On the basis of the output provided by the selected organizations above, four different corpora were compiled. Extracts of the flagship publications of ISNA and the NOI were included as well as full sample surveys of press releases published by CAIR and ICNA. The *Corpus of Contemporary American English* was used as reference corpus. The table below gives an overview of the corpora analyzed in this study:

Publication Name	Data range	Number of Texts	Number of Words
Final Call Columns (NOI)	2002 – 2009	1'282	1'944'530
Islamic Horizons (ISNA)	1996 – 2009	786	1'161'535
CAIR Press Releases	2000 – 2009	2'771	680'034
ICNA Newsroom Press Releases and Media Coverage	2005 – 2009	246	91'140
Corpus of Contemporary American English	1990-2010	169'140	414'771'808

Figure 8: Overview of corpora considered by analyses.

Before describing the corpora more closely, a few overall remarks can be made at this point as regards how the compiled corpora served this study in different ways:

The *Islamic Horizons*[31] (IH) corpus served as main corpus, not only because it covers the set time frame, but also because ISNA is a Muslim American organization with a broad focus on different issues, which attempts to represent Muslim Americans on a large scale. The IH corpus is the only corpus collected from different text categories. While the other corpora were collected from one category only (Press Releases, Columns) the IH corpus comprises different categories. The collection criteria applied will be discussed into detail below.

The *Final Call*[32] (FC) corpus provide a comparative perspective for this study. Due to the particular history of the NOI it was included to complement the study by means of potentially contrasting the IH corpus. The provision of contrast, however, remained hypothetical at the stage of selection and was only tested in the process of analysis.

31 http://www.isna.net/Islamic-Horizons/pages/Islamic-Horizons.aspx (retrieved August 2010).

32 http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/Columns_4/index.shtml (retrieved August 25, 2010).

The corpora built from the press releases of CAIR[33] and ICNA[34] were only partially drawn on, particularly if the focus lied on Muslim American activism and the Muslim American community at large.

The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)[35] finally served as reference corpus. It was mainly used to deduce the American context in the shape of a narrative repertoire.

It is obvious that the corpora differ greatly from each other regarding their composition. Therefore, it is necessary to describe here how results were gained on the basis of an accordingly composed empirical sample. Primarily, as has already been mentioned, the corpora served the study in different ways. Consequentially, analysis approached the different corpora more or less selectively. This seemed justifiable as the corpora at large were not the focus of this study. The goal was neither to provide in depth analyses of the different corpora nor of the output of the four organization. The framework described in chapter 3 has made it clear that although analyses drew on media texts, it is not a media analysis. First and foremost, analytical procedures drew on the different corpora according to their ability to provide answers to the different fields of interests of this study. Hence, the corpora represented pools of text extracts, from which the narrative practice of an organization could be deduced. Rather than establishing an inventory of all narratives displayed in one corpus, analyses aimed to (re)construct narratives framing particular subject matters. Therefore, corpus compilation already took into account this analytical focus as well as possible.
Hence, collection criteria differed from corpus to corpus. Thereby, collection procedures deviated from some discourse analytical studies that have used CL tools. Some of those studies compiled corpora by selecting texts from a certain publication within a certain time span randomly (Bubenhofer, p. 190f) or wholly as well as by focusing on particular search words. (Baker, pp. 26-31)
In what follows, I will provide a detailed description of the empirical data compiled here and the underlying rationale of the compilation. Firstly, I will give a portrait of the organization that provided the data. Secondly, the media product the data was extracted from will be described. And thirdly, the collection criteria, as well as the composition of the corpora themselves, will be depicted.

33 http://www.cair.com/PressCenter/PressReleases.aspx (retrieved August 25, 2010).

34 http://www.icna.org/category/newsroom/ (retrieved August 25, 2010).

35 Davies, Mark. (2008-) The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 410+ million words, 1990-present. Available online at http://www.americancorpus.org.

ISNA is a well-known umbrella organization as its Alexa Traffic Rank, as well as its coverage by research, have indicated. ISNA is further an organization with a comparatively long history. As delineated in chapter 1, it has emerged already in 1982 from the MSA, installing its headquarters in Plainfield, Indiana. Thus, ISNA already matched several of the selection criteria outlined above. Before discussing ISNA's output, let's briefly turn to the organization itself:

ISNA is an umbrella organization with several constituent organizations: the *Muslim Students Association of the US & Canada* (MSA), the *North American Islamic Trust* (NAIT), the *Islamic Medical Association of North America* (IMANA), the *Association of Muslim Scientists & Engineers* (AMSE), the *Canadian Islamic Trust Fund* (CTIF), the *Muslim Youth of North America* (MYNA), the *Council of Islamic Schools of North America* (CISNA), and *the Islamic Media Foundation* (IMF).[36]
ISNA claims to have over 100'000 individual members and 300 affiliates and constituent organizations. Its annual conventions are held to attract over 40'000 attendees, among them several members of the local, national, and international media community.[37]
The organization is divided into different departments, which are overseen by the General Secretariat: The *Convention and Conferences Department*, the *Community Outreach Department*, the *Leadership Development Center*, the *Youth Programming and Services Department*, the *Development Foundation*, the *Community Development Department*, the *Department of Program Development and Educational Services*, and the *Office of Interfaith and Community Alliances*.
The organization is led by a Board of Directors (Majlis Ash-Shura) – its members representing ISNA and its constituents – and the Executive Council, consisting of representatives of the different regions ISNA is active in.

Scholars have characterized ISNA as "immigrant" organization with a negative stance towards "minority movements, such as Shiite or Sufi Islam, and sectarian groups such as Ahmadiyya." (Cesari, 2004, p. 85) However, others have described ISNA as more inclusive, be it vis-à-vis women, African Americans or other US born Muslims and converts of various backgrounds. (Leonard, 2002; Nimer, 2002, p. 176f) Regarding views and positions, ISNA has been characterized with a broad array of labels, such as "conservative, Sunni, and responsive to the messages of Saudi/Wahabi Islam or of the Muslim Brothers" (Cesari, 2004, p. 85); as "leaning too much to the right in terms

36 http://www.isna.net/ISNAHQ/pages/Constituent-Organizations.aspx (retrieved October 19, 2010).

37 ISNA Newsletter (July 14, 2010); http://www.isna.net/ISNAHQ/pages/Department--Services.aspx#conventions (retrieved October 19, 2010).

of global Islam" (Ibid.); as representing "a traditionally based moderate orientation of Islam" (Unus, 2007b, p. 341); or "an Islam that is fully at home in American society." (Smith, 2002, p. 16).

The explanatory power of the attached labels generally remains low, especially because scholars have often not further elaborated on them. At the same time, labels such as "Salafi" or "Wahhabi" are highly politicized markers in contemporary public debate. Thus, ISNA's self-description can be considered as a direct response to how it is perceived. This can be deduced for example from a position statement issued in 2007 with the headline *ISNA Statement of Position: Who we are and what we Believe*[38]. Therein, ISNA positions itself inter alia in the following ways, responding to particular sensitive issues that have become highly relevant since 9/11:

> ISNA is not now nor has it ever been subject to the control of any other domestic or international organizations including the Muslim Brotherhood. (...)
>
> ISNA is an original signatory to the "Amman Message, (http://ammanmessage.com/) which recognizes the validity of Islam's different theological and legal schools, including Sunnism, Shiism and Sufism. (...)
>
> ISNA rejects all acts of terrorism, including those perpetrated by Hamas, Hizbullah and any other group that claims Islam as their inspiration. (...)
>
> ISNA does not accept funding from foreign governments. ISNA endeavors to achieve strict compliance with mandatory laws and regulations, as well as voluntary guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Treasury on the receipt and distribution of all donations and other funds.

This statement reflects dominant discursive positions, which have emanated for example from research as has been shown above. Hence, this leaves us with the unsatisfactory situation deriving from opposing claims framing the same subject matters. To conclude, let's consider ISNA's mission and vision statement as a complement:

> Our Vision
>
> To be an exemplary and unifying Islamic organization in North America that contributes to the betterment of the Muslim community and society at large.
>
> Our Mission
>
> ISNA is an association of Muslim organizations and individuals that provides a common platform for presenting Islam, supporting Muslim communities, developing educational, social and outreach programs and fostering good relations with other religious communities, and civic and service organizations.[39]

38 http://www.isna.net/articles/Press-Releases/ISNA-STATEMENT-OF-POSITION-Who-we-are-and-what-we-believe.aspx (retrieved October 19, 2010).

39 http://www.isna.net/ISNAHQ/pages/Mission--Vision.aspx (retrieved October 19, 2010).

Islamic Horizons is ISNA's flagship publication and has been published since 1971. Its distribution rate is between 60'000 and 75'000 copies per issue with an estimated 250'000 readers.[40] According to its advertising department, "Islamic Horizons not only reaches a large but also a select slice of the Muslim market."[41]
From the beginning of 2008 *Islamic Horizons* is available online. It is published bi-monthly, printed in color and tabloid format encompassing around 60 pages. Some of the later issues have up to 100 pages. *Islamic Horizons* features articles in more or less fixed categories, such as *Islam in America*, *Departments*, *The Muslim World,* and *Perspectives*. Besides those and additional categories each issue features a cover story. Appendix II displays the cover story titles of all issues incorporated in the corpus.

Scholars have assessed *Islamic Horizons* as one of the leading Muslim American publications. (Leonard, 2002; Lotfi, 2002; Nimer, 2002) However, the magazine has not been subject of in depth analysis so far.

The IH corpus was compiled from online[42] and printed material. Issues not available online (prior to 2008) were collected in their print version. The collection of IH issues is almost complete and goes back to January 1996 (see appendix II). Articles from the print edition were electronically processed with the OCR software Readiris.[43] Due to the time consuming procedure of data preparation and thanks to the selection criteria outlined above, it seemed not only unreasonable but also unnecessary to obtain a full sample survey. Hence, data was selected on the basis of its ability to provide answers to the different research interests. Naturally, this qualitative approach to data selection was time consuming, as it required a great degree of familiarity with the data at hand. Guidelines for the data selection were initially developed on the basis of an in depth analysis of a sample and gradually refined during the collection process. Generally, an open attitude characterized the collection process; in other words, in case of doubt, data was included. The following intertwined guidelines led the selection:

With regards to this study's interest in Muslim Americans' Islamicity, texts were include if they displayed the configuration of Islam in the US. Of course, it could be argued that a large amount of articles – if not all – could have been included following this guideline. However, some articles displayed the configuration more explicitly than others. Mainly articles that negotiated a certain topic with reference to Islam were included. Often, they appeared in the category *Islam and America*, but also in

40 http://www.isna.net/Documents/Islamic-Horizons/Advertising_Specifications_for_IH_Advertisers.pdf (retrieved October 19, 2010).

41 Ibid.

42 Data was collected from www.isna.net/Islamic-Horizons/pages/Islamic-Horizons.aspx in Spring 2009.

43 http://www.irislink.com (retrieved October 20, 2010).

other categories. The thematic spectrum of the included articles is accordingly broad.

With regards to the research interest in Muslim Americans' relations, texts were included, if they negotiated relations between Muslim Americans and the American society, other Muslim Americans, or Muslims of the broader Muslim world. Those texts appeared in different categories.

By trend, texts with a high share of soft news or opinions were more likely to be included, such as comments, columns, reviews, or features, because I considered them to display the spectrum of positions particularly well.

On the average, data included in the corpus amounts to 10 articles of various length distributed on 23 pages per issue. Articles were all included wholly. If a topic was discussed in a main article and various sub-articles, they were all incorporated as one entry (text) in the corpus. The underlying rationale was to reduce bias with regards to the dominance of particular topics.

The IH corpus consists of 786 texts or 1'161'535 words. References to it in footnotes and tables of this study indicate year of appearance, number of issue, as well as page numbers of the included texts.

THE NOI'S FINAL CALL

The NOI has already been described from a historical perspective in chapter 1. Its history, the attention it has been given by research, and its popularity suggested by the Alexa Ranking have made a clear case that it had to be included in this study. However, the NOI and its output were not the central focus. Before describing how its data was considered by analysis, let's focus on its contemporary organizational form:

The NOI's headquarter is located at mosque Maryam in Chicago Illinois. The NOI has several regional branches located in the US, in Canada, and in the UK.[44] The resurrection of the NOI initiated by Farrakhan has led to the gradual establishment of NOI mosques and study groups all over the US.
Mosques can affiliate with the NOI by applying to the headquarters and by declaring to accept the NOI rules and regulations. (Gardell, 1996, p. 141) Farrakhan leads the state-like organized NOI with the assistance of the *National Council of Laborers*. He appoints the ministers who head the NOI's subdivisions. A staff of ministers assists Farrakhan in "state operational matters", such as financing, business development, and defense. The minister of defense oversees the *Fruit of Islam*, a unit providing paramili-

44 http://www.noi.org/reg_noi_global.htm (retrieved October 20, 2010).

tary training for the NOI's male adherents. The *Fruit of Islam* has a counterpart for female members; the M.G.T. Further ministers are the minister of education, who is responsible for the *Universities of Islam*, the minister of youth, and the minister of health. (Ibid.)

The *Final Call*, the NOI's main publication, was first published in 1979 financed by the then new NOI leader Louis Farrakhan and initially produced in the basement of his house. (Ibid., p. 140f) By the late 1980s, the *Final Call* was produced in the South Side of Chicago and began to appear biweekly. In the mid 1990s, circulation reached 500'000 copies. (Ibid.) With respect to its content, the *Final Call* has been described of "professional quality" that touches on issues "relevant for the African American community". Therefore, Gardell has argued that it is "not comparable with the average sectarian paper". (p. 141)
Today, the weekly *Final Call Newspaper* is complemented by the *Final Call Online Edition*, which started as a tool to promote the Million Man March in 1995. According to its self-description, it "aims to serve as an essential source of information for those who thirst for uncompromised reporting in today's arena of corporate driven media".[45]
The *Final Call Online Edition* covers national and international news, as well as discussions on various issues from a NOI's point of view. Articles are grouped under the following categories: *Front Page*, *National*, *World*, *Business*, *Tech*, *Health*, *Perspectives*, *Columns*, *Entertainment,* and *Store*. Contributing authors range from the NOI's key personnel to non-affiliated members of various American newspapers, as well as to news agencies.
"Undoubtly," Gardell has argued, "this technique of mixing NOI material with articles by professional nonmembers is effective and allows the paper to attract readers far beyond the NOI membership." (p. 140)

The FC corpus was built with the main purpose to make comparison possible and to provide answers to questions on how Muslim American narratives construct communal relations. Even though the NOI's positions on Islam were relevant for analysis, a thorough (re)construction thereof was by no means intended and has extensively been done by others (see chapter 2). The corpus thus served to selectively contrast results gained from the IH corpus.
In order to deduce a potentially contrasting view, data was collected if it displayed positions of the NOI distinctively. As above, the assumption was made that soft news or opinions would best suit this criterion.
Due to the large amount of output still available after this restriction, further selection criteria had to be introduced to obtain a manageable corpus size. Therefore, data col-

45 http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/aboutus/aboutus.shtml (retrieved August 26, 2010).

lection was limited to the category *Columns* of the *Final Call Online Edition*.
This category seemed to be especially suitable, because it has almost exclusively featured authors closely affiliated with the NOI and its display of opinion is correspondingly high. Thus, the selected data was expected to display NOI doctrine.

Differing from authors published in other categories of the FC, columnists have almost exclusively been members of the *Nation of Islam*. Some columnists belong to the key-personal of the Nation, such as Tynnetta Muhammad, who is presented as Elijah Muhammad's wife (Gardell, p. 125), as well as Jabril Muhammad, an old associate of Farrakhan (Ibid. , p. 123). Furthermore, Louis Farrakhan himself and Elijah Muhammad are columnists, along with less known members of the Nation.

Data of the category *Columns* was collected fully.[46] However, to obtain a sample with regularly published data, an additional restriction was made: Columns have been archived on a regular basis only from 2002 onwards. They were integrated in the corpus until the end of the year 2009.
Overall, a total of 1'282 texts or 1'944'530 words make up the *Final Call* corpus.
The columns touch on different topics. Life worldly, as well as theological issues, are discussed. Overall, the above-mentioned columnists wrote about half of the 1'282 columns included in the corpus: Tynnetta Muhammad 176, Jabril Muhammad 216, Louis Farrakhan 170, and Elijah Muhammad 82.
The corpus encompasses columns that appeared more than once. All duplicates were included in the frequency counts of the study. The underlying rationale was to mirror the increased attention attributed to some columns by repetitive publishment. References to the FC corpus in footnotes and tables of this study mention the publication dates (year/month/day) of the included texts.

CAIR'S PRESS RELEASES

CAIR was established in 1994 with its headquarters in Washington, D.C. and has 32 chapters in 20 states, and one in Canada. Its staff consists of 60 members and it is supported by over 300 volunteers distributed over the different chapters.
CAIR is community founded. It raises its funding mainly at annual banquets organized all over the country. CAIR claims to have processed around 2'500 civil rights discrimination cases in 2006 and to have been present in "hundreds of mainstream newspaper or magazine articles and television programs in 2006, locally, nationally and globally".[47]

46 Data was collected from www.finalcall.com/ in summer 2010.

47 All information based on CAIR's self presentation: http://www.cair.com/AboutUs/CAIRataGlance.aspx (retrieved August 30, 2010).

CAIR's press releases mirror the organization's main field of activity in civil rights activism. Its press releases are thus in general short notes on CAIR's procedure against discriminatory practice directed against Muslim Americans. Additionally, the press releases disseminate CAIR's comments on domestic and foreign policy issues affecting Muslims in particular. The press releases are published on CAIR's website and distributed to subscribers of its mailing list.

The CAIR corpus was collected because it seemed essential to include a data sample with a focus on civil rights issues in the aftermath of 9/11. However, analysis overall drew on the CAIR PR corpus only marginally and for specific purposes.
The compiled corpus took into account the archived press releases from the beginning of the year 2000 until the end of 2009.[48] 2'771 texts amounting to 680'034 words were included. References to it in footnotes and tables of this study mention the publication dates (year/month/day) of the included texts.

ICNA'S PRESS RELEASES

ICNA is one of the leading Muslim American grassroots organizations. Founded in 1968, it expanded gradually and launched various outreach projects.
ICNA's headquarter is located in Queens, New York, and its chapters are distributed throughout the country.
Its *Muslim Family Day*, first organized in the year 2000, is held to attracted up to 50'000 participants.[49]

The ICNA *Press Releases* cover domestic and foreign policy issues affecting Muslims as well as ICNA's activities. The press releases are available online and distributed in a Newsletter, which reportedly serves over 50'000 subscribers.[50]

The ICNA corpus was collected to give an impression on the discursive practice of an organization with a strong engagement in grassroots activism. As in the case of the CAIR corpus, analysis drew on this corpus only marginally as well. Press releases were collected from 2005 until 2009.[51] They were included in a corpus of 246 texts amounting to 91'140 words. References to it in footnotes and tables of this study mention the publication dates (year/month/day) of the included texts.

48 Data was collected from www.cair.com/PressCenter/PressReleases.aspx in summer 2010.

49 http://www.icna.org/about-icna/ (retrieved September, 2010).

50 http://www.icna.org/category/newsroom/ (retrieved September, 2010).

51 Data was collected from www.icna.org/category/newsroom/ in summer 2010.

THE CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH

The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) complemented this study as a reference corpus. It was particularly relevant for the research interest in Muslims' reactions to American societal paradigms. Aside from existing theory, it provided an additional possibility to contextualize results, with the advantage that the comparison between Muslim American narratives and American narratives in general could be generated on the basis of the same methodological procedure. The COCA further displays American narrative repertoires.

The COCA was created in 2008 and contains texts collected in five categories: *Spoken*, *Fiction*, *Popular Magazines*, *Newspapers*, and *Academic Journals*. It covers the period between 1990 and 2010.

This study drew on the same time span the other corpora cover, that is, from 1996 up to 2009. Further, queries were only made on the basis of spoken texts, popular magazines, and newspapers, because those correspond closest with the categories included in the other corpora.

The category *Spoken* is made up by transcripts from over 150 TV and radio programs; texts of almost 100 magazines were gathered in the category *Popular Magazines*; and the category *Newspapers* encompasses texts of ten US newspapers.

PART II

NARRATIVES OF AMERICAN MUSLIMNESS & ISLAMICITY: ANALYSIS

EMPLOTING MUSLIM AMERICANS & AMERICAN ISLAM

Above, I have argued that narrativization takes place with respect to narrative repertoires. As a prelude to the analytical part of this study, I will demonstrate how narrative is constructed with respect to a particular repertoire. I will deal here with the recourse to the repertoire by considering how the IH corpus emplots the history of Islam and Muslims in the US. Analytically, the recourse will be established by looking at a certain figure of speech, which will be introduced shortly.

The insights we gain from this approach are multilayered and complex. This chapter focuses on three aspects thereof: Firstly, it (re)constructs parts of the particular historical narrative of Muslims and Islam in the US as it emerges from the IH corpus. I will compare this (re)constructed narrative with the historical narratives of Muslims and Islam in the US as they have been advanced by scholars. Thus, chapter 1, that has presented the scholarly narratives will provide the comparative perspective for the (re) construction below. The underlying rationale of this approach was to establish exclusions and inclusions in narratives, which become evident if two narratives are checked against each other. Historical (and other) narratives are constructed selectively, I have argued. Hence, by means of comparing them, we are able to grasp if they rival, which they potentially do, as they are written from differing perspectives.

Secondly, this chapter gives a quick insight into how I intend to grasp processes of integration on the basis of narrative in this study. Below, some illustrative examples will be focused on. Thirdly, this chapter shows – only superficially – how insights can be gained into Muslim American relations, as they are constructed by narrative. As those relations will be part of analysis further on, it is not intended to provide a detailed picture at this point. Rather, I do intend to show the construction of Muslim American narratives in its broadness, as the analytical angle will be narrowed steadily in the course of this study. My aim here is to sensitize the reader for a perhaps yet unfamiliar perspective and show what we gain from it.

THE SELECTIVE RECOURSE TO THE REPERTOIRE

The following results were obtained based on the IH corpus only. The analytical goal was to (re)construct historical events onto which the corpus bestows symbolic meaning. As we will see shortly, the (re)construction below is a collection of Muslim American interaction with the American context considered as symbolic. The symbolic value of course is not inherent to a certain event. Rather, symbolic meaning is bestowed on it by its emplotment. As they are perceived to be assertions of success in a process of interaction, the symbolic events listed below are almost all positively qualified. Pointing to the status of integration of Islam and Muslims in the US by means of narrative, the IH corpus displays a widely distributed figure of expressing a symbolic event, namely to characterize it as a „symbolic first"[52] for American Muslims or simply as a „first". (Symbolic) „firsts" in the IH corpus are labels for discursive events that are described as „significant toward the public affirmation of Islam in America"[53], as "symbolic moments of inclusion, which mark breakthroughs toward greater equality"[54], or simply as „historical"[55]. They are either seen as results of initiatives launched from within the Muslim community („Muslim victories are coming as a result of involvement in public affairs"[56]), as dependent on agents outside the community („President Clinton scored another first for Muslims"[57]; „Muslim Americans were invited to make history"[58]), or, in most of the cases, as simply happening.

The significance of a (symbolic) „first" is twofold, deriving, on the one hand, from its taking place for the first time and, on the other hand, from the symbolic meaning

52 IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49.
53 IH 2007/5/52-54.
54 IH 2007/5/52-54.
55 IH 1999/6/12; IH 2000/5/16; IH 2000/6/64.
56 IH 1999/1/24/25.
57 IH 2000/6/26-30/32-34/36/38/40/42/48/50.
58 IH 2000/6/64.

attributed to it in a certain time-space context. The link constructed by considering an event taking place at a given time as symbolic, allows us to analyze two different processes connected with this:

1. Chronologically aligned „firsts" expose events with attributed symbolic meaning at a given time. Since not all events qualify to be symbolic „firsts", we can trace the process of potential content shifting of symbolic meaning from a diachronic perspective. This chronology can be compared to the historical narrative described in chapter 1.

2. Additionally, particular events attributed as „firsts" can be traced because the numerical attribution implies a possibility of repetition. Thereby, we are able to witness processes of integration by means of narrative, as events, at a given time considered as symbolic, attain routine status. Thus, we can establish moments of integration along the axis of time.

The events below are only listed if they are explicitly referred to as „firsts" in the IH corpus. It is important to note that it is not intended here to verify, if a symbolic „first" actually took place in the past. Rather, I intend to show how symbolic „firsts" are part of a discursive strategy, which creates past realities in a certain way. Therefore, as can be observed below, it is possible that more than one thematically similar „first" struggles for a unique status. These struggles offer a small glimpse onto the different historical narratives clashing among Muslim Americans.

From the IH corpus, the following list of "firsts" can be deduced:

1530 First slave ships with Muslims on board land in America[59]
1870s First white American to convert to Islam (Reverend Norman)[60]
1880s First Muslim inmate of a prison in the state of North Carolina[61]
1893 First mosque in America established by Alexander Russell Webb[62]
1893 First American Muslim journal launched by Alexander Russell Webb (The Moslem World)[63]
1915 First mosque in America established by Albanian Muslims in Biddeford, ME[64]
1929 First mosque in America established by Lebanese Muslims in Ross, ND[65]
1930 First Mosque established in Pittsburgh[66]
1932 First Islamic school system in the U.S. formed by Sister Clara Muhammad schools[67]
1932 First Mosque established in Cleveland[68]

59 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.
60 IH 2005/1/36/38-40/42-45.
61 IH 2009/6/22/24-26/28/29.
62 IH 1999/4/46-48/51.
63 IH 1999/1/28/29/31; IH 2005/1/36/38-40/42-45.
64 IH 2005/1/36/38-40/42-45.
65 IH 1997/1/54/55; IH 2009/1/52/53.
66 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.
67 IH 2006/2/18-26/28/30; IH 2009/2/32-43.
68 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.

1934 First Islamic school established by Muslim African Americans in Atlanta, GA[69]
1952 First national organization of immigrant Muslims established (IMS)[70]
1957 First Islamic Center in a major American city (Washington DC)[71]
1963 First Muslim Student Association established in North America[72]
1963 First annual national MSA convention[73]
1964 First MSA publication brought forth (al-Ittihad journal)[74]
1968 First MSA youth camp organized[75]
1972 First annual youth camp held by MSA[76]
1972 First all-women's conference held by MSA[77]
1976 First hiring of Muslim Chaplains by the state of North Carolina.[78]
1981 First Muslim think tank founded (International Institute of Islamic Thought)[79]
1982 First ISNA convention[80]
1985 First Muslim Youth Conference of North America held by newly founded MYNA[81]
1991 First invocation to the House of Representatives by Siraj Wahhaj[82]
1991 First Muslim mayor in a U.S. city (Charles Bilal of Kountze)[83]
1992 First invocation to the US Senate by Warith Deen Muhammed[84]
1992 First national mobilization by American Muslims (Bosnia Task Force)[85]
1993 First hiring of a chaplain by the US military (Imam Abdur Rashid Muhammad)[86]
1995 First observation of Eid holiday at Syracuse University[87]
1996 First Islamic Economics seminar held at MSA conference[88]
1996 First visit of a sitting New York Mayor (Rudolph W. Giuliani) at Malcolm Shabazz Mosque in Harlem[89]
1996 First reception at the White House on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr[90]
1996 First American airport to open a mosque (Denver International Airport)[91]

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69 IH 2002/3/14/15.
70 IH 2003/4/42-44/46-53.
71 IH 1996/5/40/41.
72 IH 2003/3/16-24.
73 IH 2003/4/14/16-18/20.
74 IH 2003/4/14/16-18/20.
75 IH 2003/4/14/16-18/20.
76 IH 2003/4/42-44/46-53.
77 IH 2003/4/42-44/46-53.
78 IH 2009/6/22/24-26/28/29.
79 IH 2007/3/36-42/44-52.
80 IH 2003/5/40-42/44-49.
81 IH 2004/2/42-49.
82 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37; IH 2007/5/52-54.
83 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.
84 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37; IH 2007/5/52-54; IH 2008/6/16-18.
85 IH 2005/5/28/29.
86 IH 2003/5/16/18/19; IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37; IH 2005/6/32-42/44; IH 2006/6/44-54.
87 IH 1996/4/41/42; IH 1997/4/s2/s6-s17.
88 IH 2003/4/42-44/46-53.
89 IH 1996/3/24/25.
90 IH 1996/3/21; IH 1996/5/24-26; IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49; IH 2000/6/64; IH 2007/5/52-54; IH 2008/6/32-42.
91 IH 1996/2/9.

1996 First American hospital to offer total Islamic care (Detroit's Riverview Hospital)[92]
1996 First full-time charitable clinic established by Muslim community in South Central LA[93]
1996 First hiring of a chaplain by the US Navy[94]
1997 First conference on Islam in America organized by ISNA[95]
1998 First Iftar-reception at the Pentagon[96]
1998 First opening of a permanent mosque on an US military base[97]
1998 First conference on Islam in American Prisons organized by ISNA[98]
1999 First hiring of a full-time chaplain at Georgetown University[99]
1999 First Iftar-dinner hosted at the State Department[100]
1999 First reply from the Maryland Department of Education to Muslims claiming religious accommodations in schools[101]
1999 First international business and trade dinner at ISNA 36th Annual Convention[102]
1999 First Islamic History Day held in Buffalo on April 17[103]
1999 First Islamic Investment Bank (FIIB) started its U.S. business acquisitions[104]
2000 First Iftar-reception hosted by the California state assembly speaker[105]
2000 First state passing a law ensuring the authenticity of Halal food (New Jersey)[106]
2000 First video-message from Bill Clinton to the ISNA Convention[107]
2000 First benediction to the Republican and Democratic Party national conventions by Muslims[108]
2000 First appointment of a Muslim District Court judge in Maryland (Hassan Ali El-Amin)[109]
2000 First meeting of Muslim American community leaders with a sitting American president[110]
2000 First unified endorsement of Muslim Americans in the presidential race of George W. Bush[111]
2000 First Annual ISNA hosted Community Development Conference in Arlington Park, IL[112]
2000 First Annual ISNA hosted Islamic Perspectives on Counseling Conference[113]
2000 First fair of IBTF at the 37th Annual ISNA Convention in Chicago[114]

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92 IH 1996/5/36.
93 IH 2006/5/32-34.
94 IH 1996/6/11; IH 1999/1/33.
95 IH 1997/4/13; IH 1997/4/s2/s6-s17.
96 IH 1998/1/11/12.
97 IH 1999/1/33.
98 IH 1998/4/68-71.
99 IH 1999/6/12; IH 2009/3/46-53.
100 IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49.
101 IH 1999/2/58/59.
102 IH 1999/6/19/20/23/24.
103 IH 2001/3/10.
104 IH 2001/6/82/84/85.
105 IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49.
106 IH 2000/5/16.
107 IH 2000/6/26/30/32-34/36/38/40/42/48/50.
108 IH 2000/6/64.
109 IH 2000/6/67.
110 IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49.
111 IH 2003/6/20-24/26/28-30/34/36.
112 IH 2000/5/58/59.
113 IH 2000/5/58/59; IH 2000/5/60/62.
114 IH 2000/5/11.

2000 First-ever Mahboob Khan Memorial Award for Community Service awarded at the 37th Annual ISNA Convention [115]
2000 First International Trade Fair at the 37th Annual ISNA Convention[116]
2001 First issuing of an Eid-stamp by the United States Postal Service[117]
2001 First „Muslim Identity Symbol“ (crescent and star) displayed for holiday season in Wappingers Fall, NY[118]
2001 First Annual ISNA Conference on Muslim Refugees in America[119]
2001 First interactive Islamic university on the Internet started (IIU, New York)[120]
2002 First-ever ISNA convention in Washington D.C.[121]
2002 First mosque especially for Spanish speakers at home in New York City[122]
2003 First get together of Muslim leaders and scholars of Islam, irrespective of ethnicity and schools of thought sponsored by the Islamic Internet University[123]
2003 First time ISNA convention dedicates sessions solely to entertainment[124]
2003 First time ISNA calls on artists nationwide to submit work for exhibition on annual convention[125]
2004 First English Language Muslim television channel in North America (Bridges TV)[126]
2004 First female president elected by MSA National (Hadia Mubarak)[127]
2004 First time female Muslim receives Mahboob Khan Community Service Award[128]
2005 First sending of a government representative to the ISNA Convention[129]
2005 First fashion show for Muslim women sponsored by a Western retailer in Northern Virginia[130]
2005 First Muslim member (ISNA) on the Board of Governors for the Religion Communicators Council[131]
2005 First Islamic sorority at Guilford College, Greensboro, NC[132]
2005 First Muslim Chaplains' Conference hosted by ISNA[133]
2006 First Muslim elected to Congress (Keith Ellison)[134]
2006 First female president elected by ISNA (Ingrid Mattson)[135]

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115 IH 2000/6/26-30/32-34/36/38/40/42/48/50.
116 IH 2000/6/26-30/32-34/36/38/40/42/48/50.
117 IH 2001/1/8(1); IH 2001/5/58/60; IH 2001/6/26-28/30-32/34/35; IH 2007/5/52-54; IH 2009/6/9.
118 IH 2008/1/14.
119 IH 2001/1/78-81.
120 IH 2004/3/36-40.
121 IH 2002/4/12.
122 IH 2002/4/22-26/28-30.
123 IH 2003/4/56-58.
124 IH 2003/6/20-24/26/28-30/34/36.
125 IH 2003/6/20-24/26/28-30/34/36.
126 IH 2003/4/26(1).
127 IH 2004/5/12(1); IH 2004/6/16-22/24-30; IH 2008/6/11; IH 2008/6/32-42.
128 IH 2004/6/16-22/24-30.
129 IH 2005/6/32-42/44.
130 IH 2007/4/45-50.
131 IH 2005/4/9.
132 IH 2005/6/14(2).
133 IH 2005/6/32-42/44.
134 IH 2007/1/12; IH 2007/2/18-21; IH 2007/5/52-54; IH 2008/6/32-42; IH 2009/1/18; IH 2009/6/40-43.
135 IH 2006/6/10/11; IH 2008/6/32-42.

2006 First Muslim chaplain at Princeton University (Khalid Latif)[136]
2007 First Muslim Homecoming Queen nominated in Naperville, IL[137]
2007 First Muslim appointed to command an operational aviation squadron[138]
2007 First senior mainstream politician to address a Muslim American Convention[139]
2007 First Resolution passed by Congress to recognize the month of Ramadan as the Islamic holy month[140]
2007 First green illuminating of the Empire State Building for Eid al-Fitr[141]
2007 First national summit for Jewish and Muslim religious leaders in America held in New York City[142]
2008 First negotiation concerning paid Muslim holidays accomplished by a union[143]
2008 First Muslim woman elected to the State Legislature in Michigan (Rashida Tlaib)[144]
2008 First National Interfaith Ramadan Iftar at Washington National Cathedral's Cathedral College[145]
2009 First Muslim to give opening prayer to the Florida House of Representatives[146]

Figure 9: Chronology of "firsts" deduced from the IH corpus.

This list shows the integration of Islam and Muslims in the US by means of events that the IH corpus attributes as symbolic. Hence, we look at single events attributed as "firsts" that I have gathered into the chronology above. The chronology was (re) constructed on the basis of the corpuses dating of the respective events.
Based on those findings, the overall conclusion can be drawn that most of the events, designated as "firsts", refer, on the one hand, to forms of representation and, on the other hand, to aspects of community building. If we anticipate the findings of chapter 9, the "firsts" can be largely considered relevant for the development of the Muslim American community. (See figure 23) "Firsts" designating aspects of community building set in earlier than "firsts" referring to forms of representation. Up to the 1990s, they deal with the building of mosques and educational institutions, as well as the founding of Muslim American organizations. After that, "firsts" attributing aspects of community building mainly refer to activities undertaken by Muslim American organization, especially by ISNA. "Firsts" designating forms of representation preponderantly refer to events that took place from the 1990s onwards. Ini-

136 IH 2008/6/14(2).
137 IH 2007/1/13.
138 IH 2007/4/20.
139 IH 2007/6/43/44-50.
140 IH 2007/6/8.
141 IH 2008/1/18.
142 IH 2008/1/12.
143 IH 2008/6/14(4).
144 IH 2009/1/18.
145 IH 2008/6/8(2).
146 IH 2009/4/16.

tially, they cover the representation of Muslims in political institutions (invocations), the military, as well as educational institutions (chaplaincy). A bit later, they refer to the recognition of Muslim holidays by the administration, as well as by educational institutions, and the symbolic representation thereof in the public sphere. Finally, "firsts" point to the appointment of Muslims to political, military, and judicial offices.

If we reconsider the historical introduction presented in chapter 1 and compare it to the list above, it is evident that the list (as well as the historical introduction) entails a certain perspective. A comparative glance reveals what is included and what is absent from the list. If considering the different aspects of the historical narrative outlined in chapter 1, the lion's share of the above listed "firsts" refers to what I have subsumed there under *Contemporary Muslim Americans*. Absent from the list to a large extent are "firsts" referring to the *Nation of Islam* as well as to the early appropriation of Islam by African Americans. As an exception, the "first Islamic school system" in the US is mentioned as symbolic event, and credit for establishing it is given to Sister Clara Muhammad, the wife of Elijah Muhammad. This example, however, is a rare one. In chapter 7, I will trace the discursive strategies displayed in the IH corpus to emplot the *Nation of Islam* more closely.

The other aspects of the historical narrative outlined in chapter 1 are taken into account by the list of symbolic "firsts" – although only marginally. The Muslim entanglement in the history of slavery marks the starting point of the "firsts"-chronology and represents one of the rare "firsts" that does not positively qualify an aspect of the Muslim American historical narrative, which is otherwise largely constructed as a success story. As in the scholarly narrative of Muslim American history, Alexander Russell Webb is given some attention as well as the early Muslim immigrants' institution building. The "firsts"-chronology does not only illustrate the absence of Muslim groups that are part of scholarly narratives (e.g. *Moorsih Science Temple*, *Nation of Islam*) but also controversies among the included groups as the various claims to first mosque building show. These absences and controversies will be part of analysis further on.

Overall, the list reflects the scholarly argument that Muslim participation and representation within American institutions and the public sphere has increased since the 1990s (Haddad, 2004: 26-28; Nimer, 2002: 129). Accordingly, the list displays largely a gathering of events considered as symbolic from the 1990s onwards. Thus, the chronology of "firsts" mainly represents the more recent historical Muslim American narrative.

FROM SYMBOLIC "FIRSTS" TO ROUTINE EVENTS

At the beginning of this chapter, I have singled out two processes that I want to highlight here considering (symbolic) "firsts" as references for the status of narrative integration: the observation of how symbolic meaning meanders through time and accordingly how events, once considered as symbolic, attain routine status. These processes can be observed by means of establishing "first"-careers – that is, by interpreting "firsts" with respect to a diachronic co-text analysis. The two intermingling processes can be described as follows:

1. From general to specific: This process shows how the co-text of thematically similar symbolic "firsts" is gradually specified. Good examples to highlight this process are symbolic "firsts" attributed to mosque building. The symbolic meaning „firsts" of this field award shifts from the event of mosque building in general to the specific context in which mosque building occurs. This shift can be traced from a diachronic perspective as follows:

1893 First mosque in America established by Alexander Russell Webb[147]
1915 First mosque in America established by Albanian Muslims in Biddeford, ME[148]
1929 First mosque in America established by Lebanese Muslims in Ross, ND[149]
1930 First Mosque established in Pittsburgh[150]
1932 First Mosque established in Cleveland[151]

1996 First American airport to open a mosque (Denver International Airport)[152]
1998 First opening of a permanent mosque on an US military base[153]
2002 First mosque especially for Spanish speakers at home in New York City[154]

As this example shows, whereas up to the 1930s "firsts" refer to the event of mosque building, from the 1990s on "firsts" only describe mosque building if taking place within increasingly specific contexts. Thus, I argue here that from the 1990s on, the narrative of Muslim Americans, as it emerges from the IH corpus, no longer considers mosque building in general as a symbolic event. We can therefore conclude that mosque building in general is considered as integrated in the American context. I do neither suggest, however, that this status of integration is fixed and definite as it is a

147 IH 1999/4/46-48/51.
148 IH 2005/1/36/38-40/42-45.
149 IH 1997/1/54/55; IH 2009/1/52/53.
150 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.
151 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.
152 IH 1996/2/9.
153 IH 1999/1/33.
154 IH 2002/4/22-26/28-30.

potential subject matter of future narrative development. Nor do I suggest that this consideration can be generalized. It is a particular construction emerging from the IH corpus.
Let's now have a closer look on how the IH corpus bestows routine character on events previously constructed as symbolic "firsts".

2. From specific to general: The routine character symbolic „firsts" attain as a result of their repetition can be observed based on the example of the public representation of Muslim holidays. Symbolic „firsts", such as the Eid and Iftar receptions taking place in leading American institutions, figure prominently in the Muslim American historical narrative:

1995 First observation of Eid holiday at Syracuse University[155]
1996 First reception at the White House on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr[156]
1998 First Iftar-reception at the Pentagon[157]
1999 First Iftar-dinner hosted at the State Department[158]
2000 First Iftar-reception hosted by the California state assembly speaker[159]
2008 First National Interfaith Ramadan Iftar at Washington National Cathedral's Cathedral College[160]

However, it is remarkable how the process of repetition has set off a change in the discursive construction of those events. Accordingly, Eid and Iftar receptions taking place in the same institutional context are, as they are repeated, described as „traditional" or "annual", i.e.:

> The tradition of a government sponsored iftar, started by former president Bill Clinton, continues to thrive. On October 16, President George W. and Laura Bush invited Muslim diplomats and Muslim Americans, especially those connected to his "war on terror," to the White House's State Dining Room for the annual iftar dinner.[161]

Similarly, only four years after the first Eid-reception at the White house in 1996 has been attributed by a symbolic "first", the same event is described as the White House's "annual Eid celebration"[162]. With respect to the status of integration by

155 IH 1996/4/41/42; IH 1997/4/s2/s6-s17.

156 IH 1996/3/21; IH 1996/5/24-26; IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49; IH 2000/6/64; IH 2007/5/52-54; IH 2008/6/32-42.

157 IH 1998/1/11/12.

158 IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49.

159 IH 2000/1/16; IH 2000/2/48/49.

160 IH 2008/6/8(2).

161 IH 2007/1/16/17(1); see also IH 2000/1/16.

162 IH 2000/2/48-49.

means of narrative, the shift of meaning attached to the construction of the same event is remarkable. Accordingly, within a very short time span, the White House's Eid reception has become a matter of course, exemplary expressed in the IH corpus as follows: "Ever since former first lady Hillary Clinton hosted the first White House iftar, Ramadan has become an official American fixture."[163] We can thus conclude that the discursive strategies constructing the White House's Eid and Iftar receptions have shifted from attributing symbolic meaning to routine status to the same events.

As discursive strategies transform symbolic „firsts" into „annual" or „traditional" events, symbolic meaning connected to the same thematic field is diffused as in the case of mosque building. More recent „firsts" concerning Ramadan and the observation of Eid al-Fitr are for example attributed to the passing of a first resolution by the U.S. Congress to acknowledge Ramadan as „the Islamic holy month"[164], the „U.S. Eid postal stamp" issued by USPS in 2001[165], and the green illumination of the Empire State Building for Eid in 2007[166]. Those events are more recently considered as symbolic for Muslim American holidays' representation, whereas the White House's Eid reception is considered as routine and hence an integrated part of American institutional proceedings. Again, this is a particular construction as it emerges from the IH corpus, which does neither represent a definite fact nor a general view.

This short introduction aimed to provide a first impression on how this study approaches the integration of Islam and Muslims in the US by means of their narrative construction. The examples given are of course a scratch of the surface, and, in what follows, I will describe different narrative constructions into more detail. The purpose here was to familiarize the reader with the kind of analysis undertaken by this study and to highlight its advantages on the basis of some illustrative examples. Let me thus summarize what we gain from an according approach:

The procedure suggested above has demonstrated how a diachronic perspective on narrative constructions allows us to trace processes of integration. A diachronic perspective enables us to locate the temporal aspect of this integration more closely. By analyzing "firsts", I have focused on events of Muslim interaction considered as symbolic in the American context. As this study considers narratives as co-constructions, the findings above illustrate how Muslim integration, Muslim relations, as well as Muslim American history, result from adapting, performing, and configuring a narrative repertoire in a very particular way. An according (re)construction always en-

163 IH 2008/6/32-42.

164 IH 2007/6/8.

165 IH 2001/1/8(1); IH 2001/6/26-28/30-32/34/35.

166 IH 2008/1/18.

tails a certain perspective – in the case above the one resulting from the IH corpus. By comparing the findings – for example to the scholarly historical narrative – we are able to differentiate between the different perspectives narratives entail. Thus, as the adaption and configuration of narratives with regards to a repertoire is potentially contingent, we are able to capture contingency by comparing different corpora. Ultimately, contingency also prevails in the various corpora themselves. However, by employing different corpus analytical tools, we are able to establish dominant narrative trends. I Argue that These trends give reference to the contemporary status of Muslim integration or Muslim relations as they are narrated by different Muslim organizations in the American context.

THE MUSLIM WORLD & AMERICAN ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE

THE MUSLIM WORLD & AMERICAN ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE

At this point, I return to the question: *who speaks for Islam?* – a question that has been raised in the chapter on the state of research. There, I have shown that scholars have answered this question from different perspectives. Here, I build on arguments presented in the introduction claiming that, as a consequence of globalization and the emergence of new media, patterns of Islamic authority production have fundamentally been changed. (Eickelman & Anderson, 1999b; Mandaville, 2001, 2007; Roy, 2004) Consequentially, contemporary Islam has been thought of in terms of "bricolage", constructed by "heterarchy" – a situation suggesting that "no *one* speaks for Islam". (Mandaville, 2007, pp. 303, 306) As significant these arguments are, they still have to be substantiated with reference to different contexts. Processes of Islamic authority production have to be examined in particular settings, or as Mandaville has emphasized:

> The only way to really gain a clearer sense of how and why a particular voice is privileged over others within a given national setting is to look sociologically at the particular circumstances surrounding the production, consumption, and politics of religious knowledge in that locale. (p. 306)

Considering this, the aim of this chapter is to contribute to the analysis on how Islamic authority is produced in the American context. Thereby, analysis focused on one aspect thereof, namely on the significance of the so-called *Muslim world* within Muslim American Islamic knowledge production.
In order to deduce this relation, analysis framed the Muslim world twofold – as a concept and as a locus. The two frames proved to be useful in order to deduce, on the one hand, how Muslim American narratives assess the Muslim world and, on the other hand, the significance of the Muslim world for Muslim Americans' Islamic knowledge production.

In what follows, I will in a first step discuss how Muslim American narratives conceptualize or emplot the Muslim world. Hence analysis focused on the very notion of *Muslim world* in order to deduce the discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation constructing it. In order to capture potentially different discursive strategies the IH as well as the FC corpus were queried. The (re)constructed strategies are then discussed comparatively.
In a second step, I will discuss the significance of the Muslim world for the Muslim American production of knowledge. Analysis aimed to establish how agents, institutions and platforms, as well as methodologies, relevant for Muslim American knowledge production are connected to the Muslim world. Hence, the Muslim world in this analysis is framed in a more spatial sense, namely, as a realm outside the US, where Islamic knowledge is produced. The underlaying rationale was to deduce agents, institutions, and platforms outside the US, which are considered relevant for the Muslim American knowledge production and hence to define the realm by means of analysis. Analysis was predominantly carried out on the basis of the IH corpus. The findings of corpus analysis, however, were complemented by taking into account further contextual information, mainly in the form of online as well as encyclopedic source material on different agents, institutions, and platforms. This procedure deviated slightly from the general analytical procedure of this study as it added broader contextual information to analysis, which could not be deduced from the corpus. Naturally, additional data taken into account will be closely indicated.
Finally, in order to make Muslim American knowledge production on Islam comparable, the results of analysis are categorized along contemporary typologies on key figures of Muslim knowledge production in general.

EMPLOTING THE MUSLIM WORLD

In order to compare potentially different and diverse constructions of the Muslim world, the following analysis (re)constructed narratives from two corpora revolving around the notion of *Muslim world*. Analysis focused on discursive strategies of nomi-

nation, predication, and justification relating to the notion. The FC corpus and the IH corpus served as bases for (re)construction and comparison.

The notion of *Muslim W/world* occurs 309 times in the IH corpus and 119 times in the FC corpus. The narratives framing the notion can be grouped by distinguishing different fields of concern. Those concerns refer to:

The Muslim world

Relations between the US/the West and the Muslim world

Relations between Muslim Americans and the Muslim world

Relations between Muslim Americans, the US, and the Muslim world

1. *The Muslim world*: Discursive strategies relating to the Muslim world can be found in both corpora. Both corpora qualify the conditions prevalent in the Muslim world predominantly as negative. Corpus extracts often point to what the Muslim world is lacking by emphasizing its opposing ideal, such as for example: "In the modern-day Muslim world, mutual respect and unity are on the endangered species list"[167]; or: "The Muslim world has not fulfilled its covenant to Allah (God)"[168].

The negative predications of the Muslim world displayed by the IH corpus additionally result from nominating the lack of:

"Democratic order, legitimate government, shifting majority"[169]

Women's participation[170]

Knowledge (production and consumption)[171]

"Modern ijtihad"[172]

Justice, freedom, wealth[173]

"Constructive, unapologetic discussion of human rights issues"[174]

The Muslim world is further described as inflicted by:

"Poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, technological underdevelopment, bureaucratically

167 IH 2004/6/16-30.
168 FC 2004/10/12.
169 IH 1997/1/32-34; similar formulations in IH 2007/5/22-24, IH 2008/3/52-55.
170 IH 2003/3/16-24; IH 2005/3/22-24.
171 IH 2004/3/51/52; IH 2007/5/22-24.
172 IH 2005/1/20-26.
173 IH 2007/5/22-24.
174 IH 1998/2/44-51.

inefficient and corrupt governments, politically instability, and military weakness."[175]

The perception "that anything in the West is haram"[176]

"Corruption, despotism and unwarranted luxury"[177]

Extremism[178]

Censorship[179]

Negative predication is expressed further by the words *decline*[180], indicating a process of descent, *deficit*[181], indicating a status of incompleteness, or *gaps*[182], indicating the Muslim world's distance from "the West".

The FC corpus predominantly addresses the negatively qualified conditions directly as deviations from an ideal, not always made explicit. Examples are:

"The Muslim world is divided against itself"[183]

The Muslim world "had Islam, but it degenerated"[184]

"The condition of the Muslim world is getting worse by the minute"[185]

"The Muslim world has lost its way"[186]

A more specific deficit is constructed via the claim that the "poison" of racism still exists in the Muslim world.[187]

In contrast to the IH corpus, the FC corpus is more explicit in depicting conditions as negative. However, the descriptions in general remain more unspecific.

2. *Relations between the US/the West and the Muslim world*: Discursive strategies constructing the relations between the US/the West and the Muslim world appear mainly in the FC corpus. They take on the form of a harsh critique of US foreign policy,

175 IH 1996/5/20-22.
176 IH 1998/4/34/35.
177 IH 1998/5/18-20.
178 IH 2004/6/16-30.
179 IH 2005/1/20-26.
180 IH 2003/3/16-24; IH 2004/3/51/52.
181 IH 2004/3/51/52.
182 IH 1998/2/44-51; IH 2005/5/20-26.
183 FC 2003/9/1.
184 FC 2004/10/11/3.
185 FC 2007/3/8.
186 FC 2005/12/19.
187 FC 2007/4/30.

especially carried out by the Bush administration. US policy is predicated as *unjust*[188] and the cause for *incense*[189]. Several corpus extracts argue that US foreign policy is likely to unite the Muslim world on the basis of a hostile attitude towards the West as the following statement directed at the US president exemplary shows:

> (...) Mr. President, if you follow what you have in your mind, which many of those around you are encouraging you to do, then, you will do what Osama Bin Ladin and no Muslim extremist could ever do.
>
> You will unite the Muslim world in hostility against America and Great Britain, and, you will use your great position of power inadvertently to call for a Holy War against the West.[190]

In the IH corpus, few critique surfaces regarding an Orientalist view of the Muslim world.[191] The general lack of statements concerning US/Western policy towards the Muslim world in the IH corpus is possibly a result of the corpus composition and should therefore not be overestimated.

3. *Relations between Muslim Americans and the Muslim world*: The corpus extracts describing the relations between Muslim Americans and the Muslim world are most interesting for the purpose of this chapter.

Few extracts of the IH corpus describe collaboration between Muslim Americans and the Muslim world, one relating to business[192] and one to education[193]. The main argument emerging from the IH corpus emphasizes Muslim Americans' paradigmatic role for the Muslim world, as for example in the following extract:

> In particular the Muslim world, from Africa and the Middle East to Brazil and Indonesia, should find among American Muslims the gateway to solve nagging problems. Exemplary models for technology transfer, planning careers, management systems, discipline to balance TV viewing and entertainment, mastery of hi-tech and informative technology; tasty and wholesome health food preparation, planning urban and rural communities should be readily found among American Muslims.[194]

Most statements differ from the one above only with regards to agency. The Muslim world often occupies a passive part in the relationship. Instead, Muslim Americans are

188 FC 2002/10/18.

189 FC 2005/6/6.

190 FC 2006/2/7; for similar arguments see FC 2002/2/12; FC 2003/2/20; FC 2005/6/6; FC 2006/1/3.

191 IH 2006/6/18-31; IH 2007/2/46-48.

192 IH 2000/6/26-42/48/50.

193 IH 2001/2/12(2).

194 IH 1996/5/15-16.

described as responsible agents to take care of various deficits prevalent in the Muslim world. Accordingly, the argument goes, it is the responsibility of Muslim Americans to participate in American politics that affect the Muslim world[195] and to share their knowledge with the Muslim world[196].

Corpus extracts relating to Islam are particularly interesting. Accordingly, Muslim Americans and Muslims in the West in general:

"(...) bear the responsibility for the success of Islamic revival in the Muslim world"[197]

"(...) are well-placed to make a fresh start in Islamic terms" because "they are relatively free from the deadweight of the cultures of the Muslim world, and have greater resources, not only financial, but also scholarly, at their disposal."[198]

"(...) have a vital role to play in helping the Muslim world develop interfaith orientation"[199]

The importance of the American context for the paradigmatic role of Muslim Americans is further stressed in the following extract:

> American Exceptionalism can, and should, work today to enable Muslim Americans to reorganize their communities in accordance with their Islamic ideals. This process could be uninhibited by the cultural norms and habits that prevent many in the Muslim world from breaking out of decadent conditions resulting from centuries of complacency and neglect of Islamic values, the values that built the great Islamic civilization. Muslim Americans are blessed with an opportunity to liberate Islam and Islamic values and principles from the cultural limitations of historical Muslim societies; they have an opportunity to bring the pristine and sublime Islamic values to bear on the modern world.[200]

The evaluation of cultural influence on Islam is crucial for the argument. It accentuates that Islam was corrupted by the culture prevalent in the Muslim world. In contrast, the argument goes, Muslim Americans are free from these cultural constraints and thus able to revive Islam. The references to „American Exceptionalism" and in another extract to a „manifest destiny"[201] are illuminating as they point to a powerful American narrative the discursive strategies emerging from the IH corpus seemingly align with.

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195 IH 1996/5/20-22; IH 1996/5/24-26; IH 1997/2/49/51; IH 1997/4/s2-s17; IH 2002/1/56.

196 IH 2000/1/14(2); IH 2000/5/11; IH 2001/2/46-49; IH 2001/6/26-35; IH 2002/3/62; IH 2003/6/38-45; IH 2005/5/58.

197 IH 1996/5/20-22.

198 IH 1998/2/29.

199 IH 2005/5/58.

200 IH 2004/2/18-24.

201 IH 1996/5/15-16.

The FC corpus is more ambivalent than the IH corpus as regards the relations between Muslim Americans and the Muslim world. The acceptance or non-acceptance of the Nation of Islam by the Muslim world is a minor issue.[202] If mentioned, it is often explained by emphasizing the unique situation of African American Muslims:

> Brothers and Sisters, when Elijah Muhammad came among us, he taught what you could call a "Black Theology." A lot of people were offended by that; turned off by that. In the Muslim world, they were angry. They said, "Islam does not teach color. What's wrong with you people?" But they don't know what happened to the Black people of America.[203]

However, such statements are rare and descriptions of interactions with the Muslim world and the emphasis on it being desirable predominate.[204] Of those, many statements stress the Muslim world's favorable response to Farrakhan or to his works, such as the Million Man March.[205] And, once again, hostilities towards Muslims in general are considered as a potential basis for unification, as Farrakhan hints at in the following extract:

> We are not trying to stay away from the Muslim world; we love the Muslim world, and we are trying our best to link up with Muslims all over the world, for we share a common faith; a common practice. And also today, in a world that, in the West, is increasingly becoming anti-Islam, we face common threats.[206]

Besides all the emphasis placed on the interaction with the Muslim world, the FC corpus also shows that the *Nation of Islam's* teachings integrate the Muslim world. This becomes evident from the following statement, which implies the Muslim world's expectation of the Mahdi – a prediction of Elijah Muhammad:

> It is written, and the Honorable Elijah Muhammad has said to us, that the Coming of Allah (God) or the One in the Bible Who is called the Christ, or the Mahdi in the Muslim world, is to take over the rule of the nations, because the rulers of the nations have failed to give justice to those under their rule. Therefore, the Kingdom of God is promised because the rulers of this world are wicked.[207]

Due to the corpuses negatively predicated conditions prevalent in the Muslim world already (re)constructed above, the coming of the Mahdi emerges as a necessity:

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202 FC 2003/11/4/4; FC 2008/11/4/4.

203 FC 2008/11/4/4.

204 FC 2003/1/17; FC 2003/11/4/4; FC 2003/5/27/3; FC 2006; 4/25; FC 2007/7/17; FC 2008/11/11/4; FC 2008/12/1/2; FC 2009/12/2; FC 2009/12/24; FC 2009/8/25.

205 FC 2008/10/24/7.

206 FC 2008/12/1/2; see also 2006/11/21/3.

207 FC 2004/2/4; further examples are FC 2004/2/9/2; FC 2004/4/19; FC 2005/12/19.

> The Prophet knew that those who followed him, Satan would cause them to deviate. If he did not cause the Muslim world to deviate, there would not be a need for a Mahdi to come, One to guide. You only come to guide that which has lost its way, and the Muslim world has lost its way.[208]

4. *Relations between Muslim Americans, the US, and the Muslim world*: Finally, relations between Muslim Americans, the US, and the Muslim world are referred to in both corpora similarly. Corpus extracts emphasize Muslim Americans suitability to mediate between the US/West and the Muslim world in order to improve their relationship.[209]

By distinguishing strategies of nomination, predication, and justification, the following overall tendencies can be summarized: Both corpora predominantly construct the Muslim world as what I would call a *place of lacks*. The discursive strategies of nomination and predication construct conditions prevalent in the Muslim world as negative with respect to different thematic fields. The FC corpus additionally displays the argument that US foreign policy is partly responsible for those conditions and puts forth commonalities with the Muslim world as well.
Along with the nomination and predication strategies constructing a deficient Muslim world, the IH corpus depicts Muslim Americans as aides and role models. The argumentative basis for an according construction of Muslim Americans is the positive qualification of their environment, i.e. the US context. The US thus is qualified positively in stark contrast to a deficient Muslim world. Muslim Americans' role as models for their co-religionists is justified based on the argument that in the Muslim world Islam has been corrupted by culture. Again, the American context is qualified in opposition to this by means of its alleged provision of conditions devoid of cultural constraints. Whereas Muslim Americans are constructed as the key to ameliorate grievances impacting the Muslim world in the IH corpus, the FC corpus transfers this role to the Mahdi. The prognosis of the Mahdi's coming is justified based on the degree of deviation and failure prevailing in the contemporary (Muslim) world.

To sum up, the conclusion can be drawn that the compared corpora show similar discursive strategies of nomination and predication. However, strategies of argumentation differ: Whereas the IH corpus constructs the paradigmatic role of Muslim Americans vis-à-vis the Muslim world as a consequence of their citizenship, the FC corpus constructs a Muslim paradigm based on the *Nation of Islam's* teachings.

208 FC 2005/12/19.

209 IH 1998/2/44-51; IH 2005/3/9(2); IH 2006/6/18-31; IH 2007/2/46-48; FC 2003/2/4; FC 2009/1/13/2.

RELATING TO THE MUSLIM WORLD

Let's now focus on how Muslim Americans relate to the Muslim world in the course of Islamic knowledge production. Analysis was carried out on the basis of the IH corpus and took into account three aspects: Firstly, the corpus was queried in order to find agents held responsible for the production of Islamic knowledge. The two leading questions were: Who is considered to be a Muslim scholar? Does the recourse to Muslim scholars refer predominantly to Muslim Americans or to scholars of the broader Muslim world? Secondly, analysis established platforms of knowledge production, and thirdly, analysis focused on the methodology guiding Muslim American Islamic knowledge production. Leading questions were: How do Muslim American scholars methodologically configure Islamic knowledge? How does the Muslim world appear within Muslim American scholarly frames of reference?
This chapter focuses mainly on discursive strategies of nomination and thus is largely descriptive. In the discussion, however, the findings will be connected more closely to the above (re)constructed emplotment of the Muslim world.
The following analysis is primarily based on a co-textual search of the words *ulama*[210] (53 hits), *scholars*[211] (606 hits), *Imam* (1005 hits) and *Sheikh*[212] (147 hits) queried in the IH corpus. The search words were chosen because they are used in the IH corpus to attribute authority to agents in the field of Islamic knowledge production. The co-text of the search words thus revealed the names of agents, platforms, and issues considered to be important for the production of Islamic knowledge in the US. All names, platforms, and issues established from co-text were in a second step queried in the overall corpus again. The underlying rationale of this approach was to establish their overall distributional range in the corpus.

AGENTS – WHO?

The list below hierarchically displays the names of agents that are considered Muslim scholars and leaders in the IH corpus. Additionally, it reproduces their latest positions indicated by the IH corpus. Muslim American scholars and leaders are marked blue, scholars of the Muslim world red. Only names that appeared in at least five documents (DO) were included in the table. The numbers in the column OO refers to how frequently the corpus mentions an agent overall. Different spelling options of the agents' names are indicated in the footnotes.

210 Based on the query of the regular expression [Uu]l(a|e)ma, which turns up results for Ulama/s, Ulema/s, ulama/s, ulema/s, 'ulema/s, 'Ulama/s, 'ulama/s.

211 Based on the query of the regular expression [Ss]chola(r|s)[^ly][^ship], which turns up results for Scholar/s, scholar/s.

212 Based on the query of the regular expression [Ss]h(a|e)ikh Shaikh, which turns up results for Sheikh/s, Shaikh/s, sheikh/s, shaikh/s.

Muslim Scholars & Leaders		Latest positions indicated by IH corpus	OO	DO
Hagmagid[213]	Mohammed Ibn[214]	Vice president, ISNA; columnist, Islamic Horizons; Imam, All Dulles Area Muslim Society	95	71
Syeed	Sayyid M.	National Director, ISNA Office for Interfaith & Community Alliances	77	69
Siddiqi[215]	Muzammil	President, FCNA; former president ISNA	89	64
Mattson	Ingrid	President, ISNA	68	49
Mohammed[216]	Warith Deen[217]	Imam, The Mosque Cares	80	38
Badawi	Jamal	Professor, Saint Mary's University, Canada; member FCNA, ISNA Majlis al-Shura and the European Council for Fatwa and Research	48	30
Ali	Abdalla[218] Idris	Former ISNA president	50	29
Abdullah	Muhammad[219] Nur	Former ISNA president	44	29
Wahhaj[220]	Siraj	Imam Masjid al-Taqwa; Executive committee, MANA	49	28
Abu Hanifah[221]		Imam (699-767)	41	24
Malik[222]		Imam	36	21
al-Amin	Jamil	Imam, National Community of Jamil Al-Amin	33	20
Bagby	Ihsan	Islamic studies professor, University of Kentucky	23	20
Shakir	Zaid	Imam; Zaytuna Institute	32	19
al-Ghazali	Abu Hamid	Imam (1058-1111)	20	19
Nyang	Sulayman[223]	Department of African Studies, Howard University; vice president AMSS	29	18
Shaukat	Khalid	ISNA consultant on moonsighting	29	18
Athar	Shahid	Indiana University School of Medicine (former president, IMANA)	28	18
Iqbal	Muhammad[224]	Poet-philosopher (1877-1938)	206	17
Unus	Iqbal	Fairfax Institute	24	17

213 Other spelling options included in search results: Maged; Magid.

214 Other spelling options included in search results: Mohamad, Mohamed, Bin Muhammad.

215 Other spelling options included in search results: Siddiqui.

216 Other spelling options included in search results: Muhammad.

217 Other spelling options included in search results: W.D.; W Deen; W. Deen; WD; WD.; WDM.

218 Other spelling options included in search results: Abdallah.

219 Other spelling options included in search results: Mohammad.

220 Other spelling options included in search results: Wahaj.

221 Other spelling options included in search results: Abu Hanifa; Hanafi. Search term: Regular Expression "Han[i|a]f[i|a]".

222 Other spelling options included in search results: Maliki.

223 Other spelling options included in search results: Suleyman, Sulayman S.

224 Other spelling options included in search results: Mohammad.

Mazrui	Ali A.	Director, Institute of Global Cultural Studies SUNY Binghamton, NY	23	17
Elsanousi	Mohamed	Director, communications and community outreach, ISNA Office for Interfaith & Community Alliances	24	16
Yusuf	Hamza	Zaytuna Institute	28	15
Husain[225]	Altaf	Howard University; board member, ISNA (former president, MSA)	24	15
Mirza	Yaqub	CEO Sterling Management Group	22	15
al-Qaradawi[226]	Yusuf	Sheikh	22	15
Basit	Abdul	Northwestern University	24	14
Ellison	Keith	Rep. D-MN	19	14
Awad	Nihad	Executive director and co-founder, CAIR	15	14
Maududi[227]	Abul A'la	(1903-1979)	21	13
Alalwani[228]	Taha Jabir	President, GSISS; (former FCNA president)	17	12
Uddin	Zaheer	Founder and president, IIU	27	11
Ba-Yunus[229]	Ilyas	Member ISNA Majlis al-Shura; State University of New York (first ISNA president)	12	11
al-Shafi'i[230]		Imam	18	10
al-Marayati	Salam	Executive director, MPAC	13	10
Ahmed	Akbar	Ibn Khaldun professor of Islamic studies, American University	12	10
Maghraoui	Mokhtar[231]	Member, Central Shura, ICNA; member, Scholars Council of North America	17	9
Qutb	Sayyid[232]	(1906-1966)	15	9
Beekun	Rafik	University of Nevada	13	9
Kavakci	Merve	U.S. educated Turkish parliamentarian who was denied her post because she would not remove her hijab	13	9
Ibn Hanbal[233]		Imam	13	9
Siddiqui	Shariq	Community Development Director, ISNA	12	9
Ramadan	Tariq	Senior research fellow St Antony's College,	11	9

225 Other spelling options included in search results: Hussain.
226 Other spelling options included in search results: alQaradawi.
227 Other spelling options included in search results: Mawdudi.
228 Other spelling options included in search results: al-Alwani.
229 Other spelling options included in search results: BaYunus.
230 Search term: Regular Expression "Shaf[i|i']".
231 Other spelling options included in search results: Mukhtar.
232 Other spelling options included in search results: Sayed, Syed.
233 Search term: Regular Expression "Hanbal.".

		Oxford, UK; Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan; and the Lokahi Foundation, London		
Alwani	Zainab	Member, FCNA	10	9
al-Banna	Hasan[234]	Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (1906-1949)	58	8
Ahmad[235]	Syed Imtiaz	Vice-president, ISNA Canada	15	8
Zarzour	Safaa	President, Council of Islamic Schools in North America	14	8
Mujahid	Abdul Malik	Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago	13	8
Hathout	Maher	Senior advisor, MPAC	12	8
Barzinji	Jamal	Vice president, IIIT	12	8
Abduh	Muhammad[236]	(1849-1905)	10	8
al-Faruqi	Ismail Raji	Founder IIIT	25	7
Saeed	Agha	Chair, AMT	16	7
Kashif	Gayth Nur	Muslim American journalist; Imam, Masjid al-Shura, Washington DC	14	7
al-Tantawi[237]	Muhammad Sayed	President, al-Azhar; former Mufti of Egypt	8	7
Webb	Suhaib	Imam	13	6
Jackson	Sherman[238]	University of Michigan	8	6
Abdul-Malik	Johari	MANA Executive Committee	8	6
al-Qazwini	Hassan[239]	Imam, Islamic Center of America, Dearborn MI	7	6
Afghani	Jamaluddin	(1838- 1897)	8	5
Ahmad	Mumtaz	Hampton University; vice president, Center for American Muslim Research and Information	5	5
McCloud	Aminah	Islamic studies, DePaul University	5	5
Rida	Rashid	(1865-1935)	5	5
al-Uthaimeen[240]	Muhammad as-Salih	Scholar of Saudi Arabia	5	5

Figure 10: Muslim scholars and leaders mentioned in the IH corpus.

234 Other spelling options included in search results: Hassan.
235 Other spelling options included in search results: Ahmed.
236 Other spelling options included in search results: Mohammed.
237 Various spelling options included. Results based on search term Tantawi.
238 Other spelling options included in search results: Abdul Hakim, Abd al-Hakim.
239 Other spelling options included in search results: Hasan.
240 Other spelling options included in search results: al-Othaimeen, al-Othaimin.

The list displays scholars of the Muslim world (red), as well as Muslim American scholars and leaders (blue). Overall, observations can be made as follows:

Not surprisingly, the top positions are predominantly occupied by Muslim American scholars and leaders closely affiliated with ISNA.

Muslim American scholars and leaders mentioned are largely affiliated with Muslim American organizations and with American universities.

Muslim American scholars and leaders referred to are mostly contemporaries, most of them still active today.

The recourse to scholars of the Muslim world is relatively scarce.

Only few contemporaries of the Muslim world are cited; the majority cited represents a historical heritage.

Whereas affiliations of Muslim American scholars and leaders are mostly indicated, scholars of the Muslim world are not introduced any further, except for an every so often indication of their biographical details.

Having made these overall remarks, let's now turn to further interpreting the results. The purpose of the table above, after all, was not to put forth an exhaustive list of names. Rather, its purpose was to derive agents that are mentioned in the IH corpus as authorities of Islam as a starting point for further interpretation. Hence, I will now interpret the list in the light of theories that have been put forth by various scholars who have analyzed processes of change connected with authorities of Islam.

Criteria of categorization

In order to distinguish between different types of Islamic authorities, let me now introduce recently advanced typologies: Roy (2007) has distinguished between "clerical scholars (the ulamas), Westernized intellectuals, and 'new intellectuals'" with respect to "their relationship to knowledge" that "do not belong exclusively to the Muslim world". (p. 90) He has characterized the *clerical scholars* in terms of their relationship to the corpus of textual reference, which, according to Roy, they consider as "closed" and "homogenous", whereas *Western-style intellectual* consider the corpus as "desacralized". Roy has argued that both types of scholars have in common that "their social status is guaranteed by processes of investiture and authorization that distinguishes them from the masses." Therefore, "both have a vocation to exist as a 'profession,' the intellectual mostly within the university, the ulamas within a judicial system." (pp. 90-92) By contrast, Roy has argued further, that in the case of

the *new (Islamist) intellectual* "neither the transmission of knowledge nor the place of this transmission is institutionalized." Accordingly, "everyone is 'authorized'". (p. 95) Roy has characterized the *new (Islamist) intellectual's* relationship to the corpus as "autodidactic". Thus, resulting from the *new (Islamist) intellectual's* "do-it-yourself" approach knowledge is assembled in a "disparate and fragmented" corpus. (pp. 95-98)

Mandaville (2007) has built on Roy's typology by taking into account two additional criteria: On the one hand, he considered the agents relations to communication technology. Referring to Roy's category of the *clerical scholars,* he drew attention to the ulama's adaption of modern communication technology. As a new type, Mandaville has added the *global alim*, personified for example by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is able "to discuss and offer opinions on a wide range of contemporary and 'modern' issues (science and technology, globalization, health, etc.) while still remaining firmly anchored within the classical traditions of Islamic learning." (p. 315)
On the other hand, Mandaville suggested to qualify knowledge more closely because he was unable to assign "various 'reformist' scholars of contemporary Islam". According to Mandaville, they would fall into Roy's category of *Westernized intellectuals*. However, as this implies an abandonment of faith, the categorization is inaccurate, he has argued. Instead, Mandaville has pointed out that *reformist scholars*, such as "Abdolkarim Soroush in Iran, Fatima Mernissi in Morocco, Muhammad Shahrur in Syria, the late Nurcholish Madjid in Indonesia, and Amina Wadud or Ebrahim Moosa in the United States" characteristically "have developed highly innovative and pluralistic interpretations of Islam that combine a variety of Islamic and Western sources and methods." (p. 318) Furthermore, he has stressed that "not all of these new religious intellectuals can be defined as clearly 'Islamist' or 'liberal-modernist' in orientation". Consequentially, he has introduced the so called *hybrid figures*, such as Fetullah Gülen or Tariq Ramadan, who transcend categories with respect to their orientation as well as to their professional training. (Ibid.)

I will include Mandaville's additions to the typology except his arguments on the qualification of knowledge. The reasons why different lines of thought are not the focus of typology here are the following: First and foremost, as this chapter focuses on the role of the Muslim world for the Islamic knowledge production of contemporary Muslim Americans, to qualify knowledge is not a necessary analytical step. Secondly, I argue that what Mandaville has called "hybridity" of thought, i.e. frameworks between *Islamist* or *liberal-modernist,* can probably be found in more than one of his proposed categories, if the two concepts are meaningful at all in consti-

tuting the poles of a spectrum.[241] Let me illustrate this point briefly, because I think it is crucial to expose superficial categorizations of contemporary Islamic thought.

Roy (2004) has referred to the complexity of contemporary Islamic thought with the notion of "post-Islamism". What he describes as a "confusion between Salafis, moderate conservatives, Muslim Brothers and even some liberals" (p. 253), found on Western Muslim associations' websites, is reflected in the IH corpus as well. Complexity is increased by the fact that parameters for the qualification of knowledge are debated and knowledge production is fluid and innovative. To give an example: According to Roy, "al-Qaradawi is not a neofundamentalist", however, "he has been read as such by many born-again Muslims". (p. 253) I argue that the unpredictability of how a particular line of thought is perceived and adapted might be missed, if the above-suggested categorization of scholars along their line of thought predominates. The reception of a certain scholar does not naturally imply thorough conformity of thought.
The reception of the famous Saudi Arabian Sheikh Muhammad al-Salih al-Uthaimeen in the IH corpus is a good example thereof. Al-Uthaimeen is considered a representative of contemporary Wahhabism. (Roy, p. 241) Having taught in Medina until his death in 2001, writing mainly in Arabic, he has been paid broader attention thanks to platforms provided by the new media. Among other critical issues, al-Uthaimeen did not approve of Muslims living in non-Muslim states. (Ibid., p. 276f) However, this is not the issue al-Uthaimeen is cited on in the IH corpus. Instead, he is referred to in relation to a discussion on the correct methodology to deduct Muslim holidays as well as in an article on Hajj and Umrah.[242] Thus, it would be a bit far fetched to argue that the reference to al-Uthaimeen does naturally imply a thorough agreement with him, for instance also on his rejection of Muslims living in minority situations. This shows that a closer look increases complexity significantly. Therefore, I strongly suggest that if Islamic thought is to be qualified, this complexity has to be taken into account.

Having made those restrictions, let's now apply the introduced typology to the table above, in order to obtain a clearer picture of the agents of Islamic knowledge production in the US and their relations to the Muslim world. I will in a first step focus on the listed Muslim American scholars and leaders (blue) and secondly on the scholars of the broader Muslim world (red). Drawing on Roy, the key criteria for categorization here are the agents' relationships to knowledge. In addition, because the chapter focuses on how Muslim Americans are entangled with the Muslim world, the agents'

241 Zaman (2002) for example has drawn attention to the many shades of the ulama's lines of thought, which, although based on a traditional framework, can not be considered as homogenous.

242 IH 2000/1/26-30; IH 2001/6/40; IH 2001/1/78-81; IH 2002/3/64.

potential relationships to *institutionalized* knowledge is central. Thus, I will distinguish between the following categories:

1. *Clerical scholars*, who were trained and work at Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world. Due to modern communication technology some have adapted to new audiences (i.e. the *global alim*).

2. *Reformist scholars*, who were trained at (Western) universities in the field of Islamic studies or related fields. Their interpretations of Islam fuse a variety of Islamic and Western sources and methods.

3. *New intellectuals*, who were neither trained at Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world nor in the field of Islamic studies or related fields in universities. They approach Islam as "autodidacts".

4. *Hybrid figures*, who were trained at Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world as well as at Western universities.

Typology of mentioned Muslim American scholars and leaders

What is noticeable about the table above is that the connection of the listed Muslim American scholars and leaders to institutionalized knowledge is overall very strong. Many have degrees from American universities. Some hold chairs at American universities. Many received degrees from Islamic institutions of the Muslim world. Not few of the listed personas were trained at Islamic institutions of the Muslim world as well as at American universities.

In what follows, I included data on the respective agents and institutions, mainly from how they present themselves online and partly from how they are presented in the *Encyclopedia of Islam in the United States* (Cesari, 2007). Needless to say, boundaries of typologies are necessarily fluid. Therefore, some agents could have been assigned to more than one category. Not all agents listed above were assigned to the following categories.

1. *Clerical scholars*: Scholars who represent mainly Islamic institutionalized knowledge of the Muslim world belong to the category of the *clerical scholars*. However, Muslim American scholars of this category have to be differentiated, due to the lack of Islamic judicial institutions in the US, the realm the ulama of Muslim countries are usually active in. Thus, although Muslim American *clerical scholars*' knowledge derives from Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world, it is activated in new contexts. In this sense, Muslim American *clerical scholars* have similar characteristics as the *global alim*. However, they have to be distinguished from the *global alim* with respect to the range of their activities, which is not global but often tied to

very specific American contexts and audiences. Mohamed Magid, Siraj Wahhaj and also Taha Jabir Alalwani belong to this category. Mohamed Magid has received classical Islamic training from his father, who held a degree from al-Azhar University and was the Mufti of Sudan. Migrated to the US in 1987, Magid is currently active in different areas of the Muslim American community. He is the vice president of ISNA and Imam, as well as executive director of the *All Dulles Area Muslim Society*, which claims to serve over 5000 families and thus to be one of the largest communities in the US.[243] Magid is also the director of *Companionships*, an organization dedicated "to provide a dignified & discrete platform for Muslim singles who are seriously contemplating marriage, to meet and be introduced to matrimonial education from an Islamic perspective."[244]

Similarly entangled with the Muslim American life world is Siraj Wahhaj, one of the most prominent Muslim Americans. Wahhaj is an African American convert to Islam, a former member of the *Nation of Islam*. In the course of the NOI's transition under the leadership of Warith Deen Mohammed, Wahhaj turned to Sunni Islam. He received his education from Umm al-Qura University in Makkah. His popularity partly derives from his involvement as Imam of Masjid al-Taqwa in Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood, where he is held responsible for reducing drug dealing and criminality. (Chaudrey, 2007b) Additionally, Wahhaj has been active in various Muslim American organizations, such as ISNA, NAIT, and AMC.[245]

Taha Jabir Alalwani, a native of Iraq, can be considered a *clerical scholars* as well. He has not only received his education from al-Azhar University but has also taught in various Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world. After migrating to the US in 1984, he has co-founded the *International Institut of Islamic Thought*, founded the *Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences* at Cordoba University, and been active for FCNA. Alalwani is well known for having put forth a fiqh for minorities. (Tucker, 2007a)

Also in this category: Hassan al-Qazwini[246] and Zainab Alwani[247].

243 http://www.adamscenter.org/AboutUs/Default.aspx (retrieved August 11, 2010).

244 http://www.companionships.org/index.php (retrieved August 11, 2010).

245 http://www.isna.net/Programs/pages/Speakers-Services.aspx (retrieved August 3, 2010).

246 http://www.qazwini.org/ (retrieved August 11, 2010).

247 http://zainabalwani.com/ (retrieved August 11, 2010).

2. *Reformist scholars*: With respect to their adherence to institutionalized knowledge, scholars such as Ingrid Mattson[248], Ihsan Bagby[249], Sherman Jackson,[250] and Akbar Ahmed[251] can be assigned to the category of the *reformist scholars*. They all hold chairs at American universities in the field of Islamic studies. Thus, they can be considered as experts on Islam, even if they have not received classical training from Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world, although many have lived and worked in various Muslim countries.
Besides their positions within the realm of academia, scholars of this category occupy important positions in the Muslim American community. Mattson was the first female president of ISNA, Bagby has been active for ISNA, MANA, CAIR, as well as FCNA, and Jackson co-founded ALIM and has been active for FCNA, SSANA, and NAIT.[252] Hence, they are not only Muslim American scholars but also leaders of the Muslim American community.

Also in this category: Aminah Beverly McCloud[253] and Sulayman S. Nyang[254].

3. *New intellectuals*: According to the above-defined characteristics, *new intellectuals* do not represent institutionalized knowledge in the same way as the scholars categorized so far. *New intellectuals* were neither trained at Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world nor in fields related to Islamic studies at American universities. Nevertheless, they are well known public speakers on behalf of Islam, as well as leading figures of the Muslim American community. Examples are Nihad Awad, Salam al-Marayati, and Shahid Athar. Awad is the National Executive Director of CAIR, al-Marayati the president of MPAC, and Shahid Athar has been active for IMANA. Awad and al-Marayati are well known due to their activities for popular Muslim American organizations. As a medical doctor, Athar is held to be an expert on "Islamic Medicine". He maintains his own Internet platform where he publishes his online books and articles.[255] Awad and al-Marayati speak out on a broad range of topics on different platforms.[256]

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248 http://macdonald.hartsem.edu/mattson.htm (retrieved August 3, 2010).

249 http://www.as.uky.edu/academics/departments_programs/InternationalStudies/InternationalStudies/Islamic/Faculty/Pages/default.aspx (retrieved August 3, 2010).

250 http://www.umich.edu/~neareast/faculty/jackson.htm (retrieved August 3, 2010).

251 http://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/akbar.cfm (retrieved August 3, 2010).

252 http://www.isna.net/ISNAHQ/pages/Board-of-Directors.aspx and http://www.isna.net/Programs/pages/Speakers-Services.aspx (retrieved August 3, 2010).

253 http://www.aminahmccloud.com/5301.html (retrieved August 11, 2010).

254 http://www.gs.howard.edu/gradprograms/african_studies/profiles/nyang.htm (retrieved August 11, 2010).

255 http://www.islam-usa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=263&Itemid=229 (retrieved August 11, 2010).

256 http://nihadawad.blogspot.com/; http://www.mpac.org/about/staff-board/salam-al-marayati.php (retrieved August 11, 2010).

Also in this category: Iqbal Unus, Johari Abdul-Malik[257], Warith Deen Mohammed (P. R. Muhammad, 2007), and Jamil al-Amin (Chaudrey, 2007a).

4. *Hybrid figures*: Typical examples of *hybrid figures* are American born Muslims, as well as Muslim immigrants to the United States. The former ISNA president Muhammad Nur Abdallah for example migrated to the United States from Sudan. He received his training at the Islamic University of Madinah (B.A. in Shariah) and at the Umm al-Qura University in Makkah (M.A. in Shariah). Further, he has been trained at American universities: He holds an M.A. in Islamic studies from Chicago University and is currently a Ph.D. candidate. Besides for ISNA, he has been active in various Muslim American institutions, such as FCNA, ALIM, *Al Salaam Day School*, the *Shari'a Scholars Association of North America,* and the *Islamic Foundation of Greater St. Louis*.[258] Prominent examples of American born *hybrid figures* are converts to Islam, such as Hamza Yusuf, Zaid Shakir, and Suhaib Webb. They were all trained at Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world (North Africa, Middle East, and the Arabian Peninsula), as well as at American universities (Religious Studies, Health Care, International Relations, Political Science, Education).[259]

Hybrid figures thus are intellectuals who bridge classical Islamic traditions of knowledge with traditions of knowledge from the Social and Human Sciences taught at American universities. An attempt to institutionalize this amalgamate of knowledge has been made by Hamza Yusuf and Zaid Shakir along with Hatem Bazian. In 2009, they founded *Zaytuna College*, "committed to demonstrating, through practice, teaching, and the free exchange of ideas, Islam's critical role in the modern world."[260] The college is grounded on the conviction that "Islam has never become rooted in a particular land until that land began producing its own religious scholars."[261] *Zaytuna College* currently seeks accreditation from the *Western Association of Schools and Colleges*, an US based accrediting agency recognized by the Department of Education, as well as "recognition from Islamic institutions of higher learning in the Muslim world".[262] It is interesting to note that at the launch of *Zaytuna College* at ISNA's annual convention in July 2010 the guest speaker that joined Hamza Yusuf, Zaid Shakir, and Hatem Bazian was Tariq Ramadan, who belongs to the category of the *hybrid figures* as well.

Also in this category: Muzammil Siddiqi (Tucker, 2007b).

257 http://www.imamjohari.com/Imam_Johari/About_Me.html (retrieved August 11, 2010).

258 http://www.isna.net/ISNAHQ/pages/Board-of-Directors.aspx (retrieved August 3, 2010).

259 http://www.zaytunacollege.org/about/board_of_trustees/ (retrieved August 3, 2010) and http://www.suhaibwebb.com/aboutus/#webb (retrieved August 3, 2010).

260 http://www.zaytunacollege.org/ (retrieved August 3, 2010).

261 http://www.zaytunacollege.org/about/ (retrieved August 3, 2010).

262 http://www.zaytunacollege.org/academics/accreditation/ (retrieved August 3, 2010).

Typology of mentioned scholars and leaders of the Muslim world

If we turn to the scholars of the Muslim world listed above, we have to take into account different time-periods. The contemporary agents can be assigned to the categories above. As already mentioned, Tariq Ramadan has been characterized as a *hybrid figure*. (Mandaville, p. 319) Ramadan holds a Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic studies from the University of Geneva, Switzerland, and has additionally received training at al-Azhar University in Egypt.[263]

A typical contemporary *clerical scholar* mentioned above is the recently deceased Muhammad Sayed Tantawi, the former dean of al-Azhar University appointed in 1996, as well as the Medinensian Sheikh Muhammad al-Salih al-Uthaimeen, who died in 2001. (Roy, 2004, pp. 97, 241) Yusuf al-Qaradawi has already been mentioned as a representative of the *clerical scholars* with the addition of his expanded field of influence thanks to modern communication technology. (Mandaville, pp. 314-316)

Merve Kavakci finally can be categorized as *new intellectual*, having neither been trained at Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world nor in fields related to Islamic studies within American universities. Kavakci holds a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University and has become well known because of being prevented from serving her term in the Turkish Parliament due to her refusal to take of her headscarf.[264]

By stepping back in history, the typology can only be applied to some extent. Abu A'la Maududi, Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb partly represent the category of the *new Islamist intellectuals*. (Mandaville, p. 317f) Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Rida are considered as reformers of the 19th century and key figures of the "Salafiya movement", which was committed to return to the Islam of the forefathers. (Mandaville, p. 247f; Schulze, p. 18f) Further listed are the founders of the Sunni juridical traditions, scholars from what the IH corpus considers the "Golden Age of Islam"[265], as well as the famous Indian poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal.

Let me briefly draw attention to significant agents of the Muslim world, mostly absent from the table, because they are only very scarcely mentioned in the corpus. Whereas the recently deceased Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar University, Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantawi, as well as the Saudi Arabian Sheikh Muhammad al-Salih al-Uthaimeen are mentioned, similar authorities such as the (former) Grand Muftis of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Jerusalem and other prominent scholars are only very marginally covered

263 http://www.tariqramadan.com/BIOGRAPHY,11.html (retrieved August 11, 2010).

264 http://www.mervekavakci.net/biography.php (retrieved August 11, 2010).

265 IH 1998/5/54; IH 2003/1/30, 67; IH 2003/1/32,34; IH 2005/6/60-61(2); IH 2006/4/42-43; IH 2007/1/43; IH 2009/3/46-53.

(less than 5 texts of the overall corpus): Sheikh Bin Baz OO 6/DO 2; Abdul-Aziz al-Sheik OO 1/DO 1; Sheikh Ali Gomaa OO 1/DO 1; Sheikh Ekrima Sabri OO 2/DO 2; Muhammad Taqi Usmani OO 4/DO 4.

Before discussing the typology of Muslim American scholars and leaders, let's now turn to the institutions and platforms of Islamic knowledge production.

INSTITUTIONS AND PLATFORMS – WHERE?

In order to deduce platforms relevant for Muslim American knowledge production, analysis built on the previous findings. The co-text of the different names of scholars and leaders mentioned above gave reference to platforms of joint appearances. Where available, I crosschecked and complemented results from corpus analysis with data available from the mentioned platforms. Based on the findings of corpus analysis, three different types of platforms, where Muslim American scholars and scholars of the Muslim world appear together, can be distinguished:

1. *Educational institutions*: Above, educational institutions of the Muslim world have already been mentioned. Many of the Muslim American scholars and leaders listed above were trained at renowned institutions such as the Umm al-Qura or al-Azhar University. Additionally, analysis revealed that scholars of the Muslim world were guest speakers in Muslim American educational institutions (ALIM[266]). And finally, Muslim American educational institutions have been cooperation partners of Islamic educational institutions of the Muslim world (GSISS[267], Zaytuna College[268]).

2. *Internet forums*: Similar to educational institutions regarding their aim are Internet platforms, where knowledge on Islam is taught and distributed by Muslim scholars from different parts of the globe. Platforms where some of the above listed scholars participate are virtual classrooms provided for example by the *Internet Islamic University*[269] or fatwa banks provided, among others, by IslamOnline.net[270].

3. *Conferences*: From the IH corpus we learn that international conferences on Islamic issues are an additional platform of exchange for Muslim American scholars and scholars of the Muslim world. Conferences held in the US by Muslim American or-

266 http://www.alimprogram.com/scholars/scholars_instructors.shtml (retrieved August 11, 2010).

267 http://www.cordobauniversity.org/csps/Al-Azhar.asp (retrieved August 20, 2010).

268 http://www.zaytunacollege.org/academics/accreditation/ (retrieved August 20, 2010).

269 http://www.studyislam.com/iiu/university/uni/faculty.jsp (retrieved August 20, 2010).

270 http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1118742803189&pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask_Scholar%2FCollection%2FFatwaCounselorsE (retrieved August 20, 2010).

ganizations, such as ISNA, regularly invite guest speakers from the Muslim world.[271] In turn, corpus extracts reveal that Muslim American scholars and leaders were invited to conferences held in the Muslim world organized for example by the *Muslim World League*.[272]

METHODOLOGIES – HOW?

Let's now focus on one example in order to bring together what has been said so far as regards agents, platforms, and institutions of Muslim American knowledge production. The following corpus extract provides an exemplary insight into how Muslim American knowledge is actually produced and the part the Muslim world plays therein:

> The issue of having dogs as pets has arisen as more Americans, some of them dog owners, are embracing Islam and immigrant Muslims have to deal with a dog-loving culture.
>
> Many believe that dogs are to be avoided, writes al-Azhar graduate Kamal Badr (editor-in-chief, IslamOnline.net, II Sept. 2002). In fact, some of these hadiths state that violating this rule significantly reduces a person's record of daily good deeds ("Bukhari," vol. 3, no. 515; "Muslim," no. 3815). Others relate that the Prophet (*salla Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam*) ordered Madinah's dogs to be killed (as soon as the rabies danger was over, however, he rescinded his order) ("Bukhari," vol. 4, no. 540) and that Gabriel once refused to enter the Prophet's house because a dog was present ("Bukhari," vol. 4, no. 448; "Bukhari," vol. 7, no. 843; "Muslim," no. 5276). And yet many hadiths call for kindness to all animals, including dogs, and say that dogs can be kept for hunting, guarding, and other reasons. ("Sahih Muslim," book 10, chap. 31, no. 3814). Some Companions (*radi Allahu 'anhum*) kept animals for farming purposes or even for fun and pleasure.
>
> The Qur'an states that animals grabbed by hunting dogs can be eaten. It also relates the story of the Companions of the Cave, whose dog remained with them throughout their ordeal. This shows that dogs have historically been used to guard people and property and that all animals, including dogs, must be treated well (6:38). The Islamic concept of mercy covers people and animals, for Islam accords the latter inviolable rights, such as being well fed and not being subject to torture or ill-treatment.
>
> (...)
>
> Not all Muslim scholars regard dogs as impure. For instance, the predominant opinion among Maliki jurists is that a dog is pure, even its saliva, and

271 The annual convention of 2010 for example prominently featured Tariq Ramadan. See http://www.isna.net/assets/Conventions/2010/convention/Postcard.pdf (retrieved August 20, 2010).

272 For example, the *First International Islamic Conference on Dialogue* held in Mekkah in 2008. (see IH 2008/5/24).

> thus it is not obligatory to wash one's body or clothes if a dog has touched or licked them. However, one must still wash a bowl that a dog has touched or licked. Hanafi and some Hanbali jurists, as well as Ibn Taymiyyah, consider only a dog's saliva to be impure. Thus, if a person's clothes become moist from touching a dog, they do not become impure.
>
> (...)
>
> Sheikh Muhammad Ali Al-Hanooti states that "having a dog cannot be considered *haram*, but it is *makruh*, which means that it is better not to have one unless it is for guarding, herding, or a similar need or use. It is very important to realize that angels do not enter a room where there is a dog" (IslamOnline.net, 8 Mar. 2001). Dr. Muzammil H. Siddiqi (president, Fiqh Council of North America), responding to an inquiry on IslamOnline on 8 Jun. 2008, also opined that dogs can be kept only for specific needs, like guard duties or assistance, but not as pets.[273]

At its beginning, the corpus extract describes a life-worldly reality Muslim Americans encounter: the habit of keeping dogs as pets. The negotiation of the issue from an Islamic point of view begins by referring to Kamal Badr, who has previously covered the issue on the Internet platform IslamOnline.net. A comparison with the original shows that the text published in *Islamic Horizons* heavily draws on Badr's advisory.[274] It is interesting to note that the IH author not only referred to Badr's authorship but to his Al-Azhar University formation.
The argument gradually unfolded is based in a first instance on the paradigmatic behavior of the prophet and his companions, handed down by the hadith collections of Bukhari and Muslim. Yet, the cited hadiths are ambiguous. Subsequently, grounded on the Qur'anic verse 6:38[275] the "Islamic concept of mercy" is introduced. Additionally, different juridical positions based on the Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali traditions are introduced, Ibn Taymiyyah being the only scholar explicitly mentioned by name. Finally, contemporary scholars are cited with a tangible recommendation. Both are Muslim Americans providing legal advice on the platform IslamOnline.net.
The recommendations of Muslim American scholars were added by the IH author.

If we focus on how Islamic knowledge is processed in this example, it is interesting to consider temporal and spatial aspects. While a general position is deduced from the Qur'an (Islamic concept of mercy), the historical Islamic tradition is presented dialec-

273 IH 2009/4/46-53.

274 See http://mdarik.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?cid=1123996015602&counsel=aaislam&pagename=IslamOnline-Mobile%2FWapCounselDetailE (retrieved August 24, 2010).

275 "There is not an animal (that lives) on the earth, nor a being that flies on its wings, but (forms part of) communities like you. Nothing have We omitted from the Book, and they (all) shall be gathered to their Lord in the end." (http://www.isna.net/library/quran/quran_e/6.html, retrieved August 20, 2010).

tically, and finally contemporary Muslim American scholars provide specific guidelines on how dog keeping should be handled.
The extract mentions al-Azhar University, IslamOnline.net, and the *Fiqh Council of North America* as platform of contemporary Islamic knowledge production. The original article was posted in 2002 on IslamOnline.net. *Islamic Horizons* finally published a slightly extended version in 2009.
To sum up, the Islamic knowledge merged in the latter version consists of direct citations from the Qur'an and the Bukhari and Muslim hadith collections, anonymous rulings based on the Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali traditions, the ruling of Ibn Taymiyyah, and finally the recommendations Muslim American scholars gave on IslamOnline.net. Islamic knowledge production, as it derives from the corpus extract, thus deliberately transcends spatial as well as temporal boundaries.

The extract is an example of how guidelines are deduced from a variety of sources. However, the most widespread methodological procedure prevalent in the IH corpus to produce Islamic knowledge is the direct recourse to the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the prophet. Overall, the amount of direct reference to the Qur'an[276] (1413 hits) and the Sunnah[277] (561 hits) in the IH corpus is an expression of this tendency. The lack of systematically led recourse to the authoritative sources is a cause of concern, as the following extract points out:

> Muslim Americans come from a wide range of backgrounds. Thus, the existence of different juristic opinions in Islamic family law is a blessing, for it can be expected to lead to a healthy diversity of perspectives among American Muslims. For example, individuals may seek guidance from local Muslim scholars, community leaders, activists, or their own efforts.
>
> Unfortunately, however, there is no umbrella organization in America that certifies individuals to speak on Islam's behalf. Thus, the field is open for any Muslim, whether qualified or not, to become an imam or a spiritual leader. Muslim societies usually have some societal guidelines that can place a check on religious scholars' activities. In the absence of these, individual Muslims in America can claim authority with little or no training in such critical areas as Islamic jurisprudence, American law, and counseling and mediation skills.[278]

This statement emphasizes that it is often the ability to make one's own voice heard rather than the ability of the methodologically guided engagement with the source texts that makes a scholar known.

276 Other spelling options included in search results: Quran.

277 Also included in search results: Sunna, Hadith. The result would be greater if the names of Hadith-collections would have been integrated. However, due to problems of delimitation they were not included.

278 IH 2007/1/54-55.

DISCUSSION

To conclude, let's consider the two analytical frames applied above with respect to each other. As regards emplotment or narrativization, analysis has revealed that the Muslim world is constructed as a *place of lacks*. In the IH, as well as in the FC corpus, a negative picture of the Muslim world predominates. Whereas the FC corpus holds US foreign policy responsible for the negative conditions prevalent in the Muslim world, the IH corpus proposes a solution for betterment. This solution is embodied by Muslim Americans, who are constructed as aides and role models.

Considering this rather negative image painted of the Muslim world, the findings of the second analysis come to no surprise. In the IH corpus, contemporary non-Muslim American scholars play a rather marginal role for the production of Islamic knowledge in the United States. The classical jurists, Muslim scholars of the so-called "Golden Age" are perceived positively, as well as the reformers of the 19th century, and certain Islamist intellectuals. By contrast, contemporary Muslim American scholars and leaders are represented prominently in the IH corpus. By drawing on additional data, analysis has revealed that their connection to institutionalized knowledge is overall very high. Many hold degrees from American universities and were trained at institutions of the Muslim world. As analysis has spatially framed the Muslim world roughly, as being located outside the US, we can now narrow this realm based on the findings considerably. Educational training sites frequented by Muslim American scholars are predominantly located on the Arabian Peninsula, the Middle East and North Africa, whereas al-Azhar University in Cairo, the Islamic University in Medinah, as well as the Umm al-Qura University in Makkah, are prominently mentioned. Those institutions seem to compensate the lack of similar institutions in the US, especially in the field of higher education. This void, however, has been recognized and alternatives have been brought forth recently (Zaytuna College).

Besides a locus for training, the Muslim world – again in a narrow geographical sense – represents the historical site of authoritative knowledge production: Muslim American scholars and leaders approach the authoritative sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the Sunnah directly, as well as by applying different methodological approaches developed in Muslim tradition. Further, Muslim American scholars and leaders appear together with scholars from the Muslim world on different platforms; on the Web, in Muslim American educational institutions, or at international conferences.

From these findings, we can conclude that although the Muslim world is emploted as a *place of lacks* by narrative, Muslim Americans still rely on institutions located in Muslim countries for their Islamic education. The future will show whether home grown American Islamic educational institutions will be able to replace those institutions.

MUSLIM AMERICAN COMMUNAL CONSTRUCTIONS

MUSLIM AMERICAN COMMUNAL CONSTRUCTIONS

Above, I have shown how Muslim Americans are constructed by means of differentiation from a narratively devalued Muslim world. Furthermore, analysis has revealed that the production of Islamic knowledge in the US predominantly lies in the hands of contemporary Muslim American scholars and leaders. In what follows, I will focus on the inner American context. The main purpose of this is to discuss how communal boundaries are drawn and redrawn by contemporary Muslim American narratives. The complex composition of the Muslim American community has been mentioned at several points already. Chapter 1 has related contemporary Muslim American diversity to the historical development of the community. Historical narratives have distinguished between *immigrant* and *indigenous/autochthonous* Muslims – a boundary preponderantly disseminated by research, as chapter 2 has shown. Recently, scholars have questioned the adequacy of the existing typology: Garbi Schmidt (2002), for example, has called the legitimacy of the category *immigrant* into question by stating:

> The use of the terms "second generation" and "third generation" immigrants is in many ways misleading and potentially discriminatory. Quantitatively framing a group of people whose parents made the choice of resettlement (or were

> forced to do so) one, two, three, or more generations back may be reasonable, but at the same time we may ask whether the qualitative implications of the terms are equally justifiable. Should someone be referred to as an immigrant, years after his or her parents or grandparents arrived in the United States? Is the category "immigrant" appropriate at all for someone who has always lived in the same country? (p. 113f)

Whereas Schmidt's critique is directed at the representativeness of the category *immigrant*, Sherman Jackson, a *reformist scholar* introduced above, has argued that "it is ultimately history, or more properly historical perspective, that separates the two communities." (2005, p. 92) This separation is evident, if the historical narrative of Muslim Americans is considered. Jackson has offered a solution to overcome boundaries enforced by differing historical perspectives:

> Were both immigrants and Blackamericans to accept their Western experience as a primary element in shaping their respective identities, rather than as a post-facto pollutant added to an otherwise unadulterated mix, both would be able to see each other as participants in a common history. In other words, mutual recognition of their respective legacies and experiences as "objects of the West" could bring immigrants and Blackamericans to a shared historical perspective. While this would not obliterate the other elements in their respective identities, it would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the utility of appealing to the latter as an ultimate or greater authority in the context of contemplating *American* Islam. For, on a mutual recognition of a common history as "objects of the West," Modern Islam would have to abandon its claim to an historical perspective that is closed to everyone outside the Muslim world. And Modernized Islam would have to quit pretending that social injustice, cultural dislocation, and racial terror are negligible glitches that affect only a tiny (largely culpable) minority of marginalized Blackamericans. (Ibid.)

In contrast to Schmidt, Jackson is not concerned about the adequacy of categories but about frictions within the Muslim American community. Both scholars, however, are concerned with boundary drawing, which is also the main concern of this chapter. By taking into account the contrasting views emerging from two corpora, I will show how Muslim American narratives currently construct communal boundaries.

To start, the typology commonly employed by research is contested by considering Muslim American self-reference. Then, previously obtained results will serve to establish boundary drawing with respect to differing evaluations of Muslim American key figures. Besides the focus on agents, boundary drawing will additionally be illustrated by focusing on particular concepts. And finally, on the basis of further analysis, I will argue that we are witnessing boundary-shifts in recent Muslim American narratives.

BOUNDARIES NARRATIVELY CONTESTED

Let's begin by establishing the distribution rate of standard typology scholars have employed to describe the Muslim American community by considering Muslim American self-reference. A query along standard typology in the four corpora compiled for this study turned up the following results:

	FC corpus		IH corpus		CAIR corpus		ICNA corpus	
Search terms	OO	DO	OO	DO	OO	DO	OO	DO
Muslim immigrant/s	2	2	32	24	7	7	2	2
Immigrant Muslim/s	6	3	44	29	1	1	3	3
Autochthonous Muslim/s	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indigenous Muslim/s	-	-	19	17	1	1	-	-

Figure 11: Query of the typology advanced by research to describe boundaries within the Muslim American community.

The table displays the frequencies of search words' distribution in the different corpora. *Autochthonous* is never used to attribute Muslims. *Indigenous* occurs scarcely as an attribution of Muslims in the IH corpus, 19 times overall (OO) in 17 documents (DO). The notions of *Muslim immigrant/s* as well as *immigrant Muslim/s* occur in all corpora. However, only the IH corpus features stronger evidence. This indicates that the typology commonly used by research to distinguish parts of the Muslim American community does only marginally correspond to the Muslim self-understanding as it emerges from the four different corpora. Therefore, I will assess the complexity of communal adherence by (re)constructing alternative boundary impositions prevalent in narrative.

One possibility is to turn back to the table on Muslim scholars and leaders (figure 10). There, I have listed names of Muslim American scholars and leaders deduced from a co-text analysis of notions indicating a special status to certain agents in the IH corpus. I will now present results gained on the basis of the FC corpus, which, as already mentioned, was compiled in order to provide a comparative perspective to analysis. This agent-centered focus can be legitimated on the basis that research on Muslim Americans and especially on different Muslim American groups has been largely concerned with particular agents. The key figures deduced from analysis further on are almost all a part of the scholarly narrative of Muslim Americans, as the recourse to the thematic introduction reveals.

To resume the analytical procedure of chapter 6, co-text analysis of the equivalent search words *ulama* (2 hits), *scholars* (270 hits), *Imam* (84 hits) and *Sheikh* (10 hits) queried in the FC corpus turned up only a view names. However, as in the FC corpus authority is attributed to agents differently than in the IH corpus, analysis had to consider this. Therefore, co-text analysis was expanded on the basis of the search words *Master* (814 hits), *Honorable*[279] (6146), *Minister*[280] (6656), and *Mother* (650), – notions, which are commonly used to attribute special status to an agent in the FC corpus. As in chapter 6, all names found where queried in the overall corpus and listed below if they appeared in at least five documents. The list hierarchically displays the accordingly deduced names and the most commonly used title the agents are designated with in the FC corpus.

Title commonly used to attribute special status to an agent	Name of agent	Frequency (OO)
(The Honorable) Minister	Louis Farrakhan	5‘287
The Honorable	Elijah Muhammad	4‘611
Master	Fard Muhammad[281]	814
Minister	Jabril Muhammad	675
Mother	Tynnetta Muhammad[282]	592
Minister	Malcolm X	212
The Honorable	Marcus Garvey	62
Minister	(Abdul) Akbar Muhammad	60
Minister	Ishmael Muhammad	48
Mother	Khadijah (Farrakhan)	44
Imam	Warith Deen Mohammed[283]	27
Minister	Robert Muhammad	20
Minister	(Abdul) Rahman (Muhammad)	34
Minister	Abel Muhammad	15
Mother	Clara Muhammad	14
Minister	Ava Muhammad	13
Minister	Don Muhammad	10
Sheikh	Ahmed Tijani (Ben Omar)	8
Imam	Jamil (Abdullah) al-Amin	6

Figure 12: Overview of agents with a special status mentioned in FC corpus.

279 Also included in the search results is the abbreviation Hon.

280 Also included in the search results is the abbreviation Min.

281 Other spelling options included in search results: W[alla]ce Fard Muhammad; W.D. Fard; W. F. Muhammad; W. Fard Muhammad; Wallace Fard Muhammad.

282 Other spelling options included in search results: Tynetta Muhammad.

283 Other spelling options included in search results: W.D. Mohammed; W. Deen Mohammed; Warith D. Muhammad; Warithudeen Mohammed.

The list shows that the co-text analysis of search words bestowing a special status on an agent undertaken in the FC corpus only turned up two names (red) equivalent to the same search conducted in the IH corpus. Hence, we can conclude that a different understanding of authority prevails in the two corpora. This becomes evident if we consider the agents attribution: Warith Deen Mohammed and Jamil al-Amin are both labeled as Imams and thus appear in the results of both queries. In turn, all the other names of Muslim American scholars and leaders deduced from the IH corpus (figure 10) do not turn up in the co-textual search here. This means that they do not belong to the agents a special status is bestowed on in the FC corpus. The same holds true vice versa. However, this does not mean that the above listed agents names do not appear at all in the IH corpus. It only means that they are attributed differently. This attribution, I argue, potentially points to aspects of boundary drawing prevailing within the Muslim community. In order to establish the potential boundaries into further detail, an additional query was undertaken: the agents from the FC corpus listed above were queried in the IH corpus. In terms of displaying boundary drawing, I consider those agents as *key figures*.

The figure below indicates the overall occurrence (OO) and the number of documents (DO) a key figure is mentioned in the IH corpus. Included are names mentioned in at least five documents. In order to provide a comparative perspective, the results from the FC corpus are displayed once again as well. The key figures found in both corpora are sorted according to the most frequent reference in the documents of the IH corpus.

Key figure	IH OO	IH DO	FC OO	FC DO
Warith Deen Mohammed[284]	80	38	19	17
Malcolm X[285]	124	33	212	104
Elijah Muhammad	98	27	4‘611	1‘280
Jamil al-Amin	33	20	6	5
Louis Farrakhan	77	12	5‘287	999
Clara Muhammad	18	10	14	12
Fard Muhammad[286]	32	9	795	395

Figure 13: Overview of agents mentioned in the IH corpus and the FC corpus.

284 Other spelling options included in search results: analog query of chapter 6.

285 References to al-Hajj Malik al-Shabazz are not counted, as they mostly appear with additional reference to Malcolm X.

286 In the case of Fard (Muhammad), hits were not counted if „fard“ referred to Muslims’ individual or collective religiously mandated duties.

The table indicates that if we consider the frequency of the occurrence of their names, the key figures are evaluated differently in the two corpora. The most frequently mentioned figures in the IH corpus are Warith Deen Mohammed and Malcolm X. This does not correspond to the findings in the FC corpus, which is not surprising, since both have left the *Nation of Islam* at some point of their lives. If considering overall occurrence, Elijah Muhammad, Louis Farrakhan, and, a little less, also Jamil al-Amin are frequently mentioned in the IH corpus as well. The relation of a rather high overall occurrence to only few texts suggests that Elijah Muhammad and Louis Farrakhan are focused on in larger articles. In turn, the frequent reference to them in the FC corpus is of course not surprising. Scarcely mentioned in the IH corpus are further Clara Muhammad and Fard Muhammad. Considered as founding figure of the NOI, Fard Muhammad naturally obtains broader attention in the FC corpus. Instead, Clara Muhammad and Jamil al-Amin, who has never been a member of the NOI, are only very scarcely mentioned in the FC corpus.

Having established the numerical distribution of the key figures in the two corpora, let's now consider the co-text of the mentioned key figures in the IH corpus and give special attention to their evaluation.

EVALUATING KEY FIGURES

Malcolm X and Warith Deen Mohammed: Malcolm X and Warith Deen Mohammed occupy a prominent place in the narratives (re)constructed from the IH corpus. Besides the high frequency of texts referring to them, it is also the space that is given to them – taken up by descriptions of their lives and their impact on Muslim Americans. While the reference to Elijah Muhammad and Fard Muhammad is mostly short and part of larger historical overviews, the IH corpus dedicates some texts exclusively to Malcolm X and Warith Deen Mohammed, to the latter particularly in connection with his passing away in September 2008.

Both, Malcolm X and Warith Deen Mohammed, are overall represented in a positive light, the focal point being their changes of mindset with regards to Islam. The narrative of Malcolm X incorporates this change or transformation most clearly. The following statement is paradigmatic for others, by stating: "Malcolm X, one of the most militant of black racist leaders, completely transformed after his pilgrimage to Makkah where he was struck by the color blind nature of Islam."[287] Several other texts elaborate on Malcolm X's Hajj experience as the turning point of his Islam reading.[288] It is

287 IH 1997/2/28-30.

288 IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2001/3/42-45; IH 2004/4/16-39; IH 2005/1/36-45.

interesting to note the dialectical nature of the descriptions on the Islam interpretation that accompanied Malcolm X's transformation into Hajj Malik El-Shabazz. Whereas before Hajj, one text extract depicts, a "shell of misconception (…) cloaked upon him under the guise of Islam" after Hajj, it appraises him for discovering "the real Islam that was conveyed by Prophet Muhammad (…)".[289] The dominant narrative in the IH corpus hence describes how Malcolm X left the Nation of Islam, often referred to as a "movement"[290], in order to embrace "true"[291], "real"[292], or "orthodox"[293] Islam. Crucial point of this transformation is the evaluation of race, the key concept in Malcolm X's earlier preaching, which he abandoned after Hajj in favor of discovering "universal brotherhood"[294]. In the IH corpus, the concept of brotherhood and the thereby propagated "color blind nature of Islam"[295] is an important feature of the narrative of Malcolm X's transformation. It is in more recent times adapted for example "(…) to reach out to communities facing 'cultural tyranny,' such as the Latino Americans."[296] The exemplary role Malcolm X has had for African American(s) (Muslims) is mentioned repeatedly.[297] His struggle is even used as an analogy to describe the struggle of Islam in America, tied to the conviction that just as much as Malcolm "(…) Islam will face tough times and then, years later, be held in great honor."[298]
According to the narratives emerging from the IH corpus, Malcolm X is an integrative figure for many, providing a type of platform on the basis of which Muslim Americans from various backgrounds find common ground.

Just as Malcolm X, Warith Deen Mohammed occupies a prominent position in the corpus. Similar to Malcom, Warith is constructed as a key figure, accomplishing change in the reading of Islam. However, Warith is also emploted differently than Malcolm X. The narrative of Malcolm emphasizes his personal transformation, initiated by Hajj, on the occasion of which he recognized "real" or "true" Islam enabling "brotherhood" through "colorblindness". The narrative of Warith unfolds differently: Warith is credited for "moving"[299] or "steering"[300] the *Nation of Islam* towards "(Sunni)

289 IH 1999/3/16-19.
290 IH 2005/1/36-45; IH 2005/4/40-44.
291 IH 2004/4/16-39.
292 IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2001/3/42-45.
293 IH 1997/4/s2-s17; IH 2005/4/40-44.
294 IH 2009/5/20-22.
295 IH 1997/2/28-30.
296 IH 2007/3/54-55.
297 IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2004/4/16-39; IH 2005/4/16-37; IH 2008/6/32-42.
298 IH 2002/6/18-35.
299 IH 2005/4/16-37; IH 2009/2/32-43.
300 IH 2003/4/42-53.

mainstream"[301], "traditional"[302], or "orthodox (Sunni)"[303] Islam. Whereas Malcolm X's transformation initiated by his pilgrimage in 1964 abruptly came to an end because of his assassination in 1965, Warith transformational efforts initiated a process beginning in 1975, when he "announced the return of the community to the fold of Islam"[304] or: "when he declared his family reunion with the Muslim Ummah in America"[305]. Thus, Warith not only set in motion but also accompanied a longer process. As a leadership figure of this process, he is referred to in terms of his collaboration with various Muslim American organizations[306] and his symbolic interaction on behalf of Muslim Americans with the American political establishment[307]. Attention is paid to Warith Deen Mohammed in the IH corpus mostly in articles that appeared after 9/11. Responsible for this are recapitulations of his achievements after he passed away in September 2008.

Elijah Muhammad and Fard Muhammad: Fard Muhammad is mentioned only in a few IH texts and only together with Elijah Muhammad. Therefore, the focus here lies primarily on the latter. Although Elijah Muhammad is mentioned in various texts, the descriptions are rarely concerned with him. In most accounts, he is briefly mentioned as the co-founder of the *Nation of Islam* and, more importantly, as the father of Warith Deen Mohammed.[308] These accounts are written in a rather matter-of-fact style, without further evaluation. Elijah Muhammad is generally mentioned in connection with reports on others, such as Muhammad Ali[309] or Malcolm X[310]. Fewer text extracts are concerned with Elijah Muhammad's teachings, some with his positions on education[311] or on his suspension of Muhammad Ali from the *Nation*, because of the latter's professional athleticism[312].

Its interesting to note that several texts mentioning the *Nation of Islam*'s claim that Elijah Muhammad is the messenger of Fard Muhammad, who, according to this read-

301 IH 2003/4/42-53; IH 2003/5/40-49; IH 2006/2/18-30; IH 2009/2/32-43.

302 IH 2005/4/16-37.

303 IH 1997/4/s2-s17; IH 2005/4/40-44; IH 2006/2/18-30.

304 IH 2000/2/10-11.

305 IH 2000/2/10-11.

306 IH 1999/6/19-24; IH 2003/4/56-58; IH 2003/6/20-36; IH 2004/2/31-34.

307 IH 2003/1/10(1).

308 IH 1996/3/24-25; IH 1997/1/54-55; IH 1997/3/34-35; IH 1999/3/22-24; IH 2000/2/10-11; IH 2000/6/67; IH 2003/5/40-49; IH 2005/4/16-37; IH 2005/4/40-44; IH 2006/2/18-30; IH 2008/6/16-18; IH 2008/6/22-26; IH 2008/6/28-29.

309 IH 1998/1/49-53.

310 IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2009/6/22-29.

311 IH 1999/2/26-27; IH 2009/2/32-43.

312 IH 1998/1/49-53.

ing, is God, avoid to discuss this position any further.[313] Only one account dismisses this position harshly, as unacceptable for "true Muslims" and as "(…) pure, unadulterated shirk, a major sin that can only be expiated if the violator sincerely retracts and seeks Allah's forgiveness".[314] Aside from this, the few descriptions on Elijah Muhammad's teachings are mostly ambivalent. Elijah Muhammad is, on the one hand, held responsible for co-founding a "pseudoIslamic movement" disseminating "unIslamic teachings"[315], which is evaluated as "problematic for traditional Muslims"[316]. On the other hand, he is accounted for co-founding a movement, "(…) which committed itself to redeeming Black America through the restoration of its lost Islamic identity, moral and social reform, and resistance against the injustices of racism."[317] Other extracts again describe Elijah Muhammad's teachings rather unemotionally as "(…) a mixture of Black Nationalism, Black Freemasonry, and Islam, with an intention to counteract white supremacy."[318]

As a summary, the overall treatment of Elijah Muhammad in the IH corpus can be regarded as meager. However, the fact that he appears in many historical accounts, embed him as a recognized figure in the narrative of Muslim American history. Overall, harsh critics on his teachings are few. Although some texts imply that some of his ideas are considered as problematic, most avoid further details or strong critique. Further, the achievements of Elijah Muhammad connected with community building are mentioned and often evaluated positively.

Before discussing the IH corpus' findings any further, I will include a short digression here to the sensitive theological issue connected with Fard Muhammad's status. As we have seen above, the IH corpus is rather reluctant with regards to Fard Muhammad. In addition to that, some statements implicitly suggest that the NOI's ascription of divinity to Fard Muhammad belongs to the past.[319] In order to test this presumption, the FC corpus was queried.

Fard Muhammad's significance for the NOI in the course of the past years can be deduced from the concordance lines displayed in chronological order below.[320] They show that denoting Fard Muhammad as God has apparently not lost importance for the NOI in recent years. Of the overall 795 times Fard is mentioned in the FC corpus, 89 instances denote him as God and 47 as Allah.

313 IH 1996/1/22-23; IH 2003/4/42-53; IH 2005/4/40-44.

314 IH 1996/3/16.

315 IH 2005/1/36-45.

316 IH 2005/4/16-37.

317 IH 2005/4/16-37.

318 IH 2005/4/40-44.

319 IH 2005/4/16-30/36-37; IH 2008 6/22-26.

320 The results displayed are based on a query of the name *Fard* and the context word *God*.

Concordance	Reference
and says that he disbelieves. Allah (God) Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom Praises are due forever, has no	FC 2002/11/25
nation, and we are thankful to Allah (God) Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever for rai	FC 2003/10/1/3
e to Allah (God) Who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad. We went to Alabama – and to any state	FC 2003/11/10
God, Allah, who appeared in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, has given us the knowledge of self and	FC 2003/11/25/2
lmighty God, Allah, to us in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to whom praises are due forever and eve	FC 2003/11/25/2
a blade of grass out in your backyard that Master Fard Muhammad was/is God. He said to us that he was t	FC 2003/12/22/2
could do that after He was gone. That He (Master Fard Muhammad) was God, Himself, the Honorable Elijah	FC 2003/12/4
God, Allah, who appeared in the person of Master Fard Muhammad, has given us the knowledge of self and	FC 2003/5/28/3
lmighty God, Allah, to us in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to whom praises are due forever and eve	FC 2003/5/28/3
ke hell for you, and God, in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, makes	FC 2003/9/11/2
f years concerning the Reality of God. Master W. Fard Muhammad comes against all that preceded us in th	FC 2003/9/11/8
ld, in general, in 1931 when Almighty God, Master Fard Muhammad and the Honorable Elijah Muhammad first	FC 2004/11/16
ing of the word of God comes. First, what Master Fard Muhammad revealed to the Honorable Elijah Muhamma	FC 2004/1/26/2
(God) is present with us in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, the Great Mahdi, their plans would be s	FC 2004/7/5
ion bottles. Allah (God), in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, has taught me that fasting, with the ri	FC 2005/10/4/2
and women of God." A Masterful Teacher Master Fard Muhammad's star student was, in fact, a masterf	FC 2005/3/4
h (God) Himself, Who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom Praises are due forever. We cam	FC 2005/8/23
t of Truth has come to us in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, God in Person, to Whom Praises are due	FC 2005/8/23
arted on July 4, 1930. That God was and is Master Fard Muhammad. As I just noted, there were other sign	FC 2006/10/4/3
sed us – the God Who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, the Fi	FC 2006/10/8
Saviour. He said to us, "If Allah (God), Master Fard Muhammad, cannot save me, it would show that He c	FC 2006/10/9/4
would show that He cannot save you." If Master Fard Muhammad, the God of Elijah, could not save His M	FC 2006/10/9/4
(Allah) who has visited us in the name of Master Fard Muhammad (God in Person), the long-awaited Mahdi	FC 2006/11/21/2
ù the Honorable Elijah Muhammad wrote that Master Fard Muhammad told him: "My name is Mahdi; I am God,	FC 2006/11/28
The Most Honorable Elijah Muhammad He, Master Fard Muhammad, God in Person, will create a new heaven	FC 2006/12/8/4
ought about a universal change and so will Master Fard Muhammad, Allah (God) in Person, bring about a ne	FC 2006/12/8/4
the choice of Allah (God) in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad for building a new heaven on earth. The	FC 2006/12/8/4
of nothing, so will God, in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, build a new heaven on earth from nothin	FC 2006/12/8/4
e into which Allah (God), in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, will put him. He is to place him on top	FC 2006/12/8/4
d. You will have to look to your own God, Master Fard Muhammad, and your religion, which is peace, Isla	FC 2006/12/8/4
ut upon me by Allah (God) in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praise is due forever, is to pu	FC 2006/12/8/4
nce of Almighty God Allah in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad. He (meaning Master Fard Muhammad) will	FC 2006/12/8/4
rewarded for that good act by Allah (God), Master Fard Muhammad, and they know this. (Reprinted from ,Ä	FC 2006/12/8/4
ted by the Most High God, in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, as none other than the Most Honorable E	FC 2006/3/14/2
years of world history and the Identity of Master Fard Muhammad is actually God, In Person, Who has retu	FC 2006/3/21/2
praise Allah (God) for His Presence in Master W. Fard Muhammad and the great work of reform, resurrecti	FC 2006/4/18
e wrath of God." Under the Authority of Master Fard Muhammad, they have already conferred in person w	FC 2006/4/3/2
ld do that after He was gone. "That He (Master Fard Muhammad) was God Himself, the Honorable Elijah M	FC 2006/6/12/2
g of Allah (God) Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, on Jul	FC 2006/7/12/4
g of Allah (God) Who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad to Whom praises are due forever and give	FC 2006/7/12/4
our God, Allah, Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, and with the presence of His anointed s	FC 2006/8/24/2
that he starts with the Word of God, that Master Fard Muhammad revealed to the Honorable Elijah Muhamma	FC 2006/9/13/3
the Word of God, Who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad. He saw everyone and everything from a	FC 2006/9/13/3
m such a Great One as God in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad. (How To Eat To Live, Book Two, Chapter	FC 2006/9/19
from Allah (God) Who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever. This m	FC 2006/9/6
ob. Allah, God, has come in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, to fre	FC 2007/10/28
0) years that Allah (God) in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, came t	FC 2007/11/7
was begun by God Himself in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom be praised forever, as is proph	FC 2007/12/16
God. The coming of Allah in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, was fo	FC 2007/12/2
ting between Almighty God in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, and His Messenger, the Honorable Elijah	FC 2007/12/2/4
of Allah (God), Whom came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to whom praises are due forever. But Am	FC 2007/2/2
ighty God Allah, who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to whom praise is due forever, brought	FC 2007/3/21/3

r Allah (God). He is The Ever Living. When Master Fard was born, He was taught. He grew in knowledge. We	FC 2007/3/8
ing their prophecy. God, in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, will not be defeated. The more evil, de	FC 2008/2/19
t Allah (God) appeared in the Person of Master W. Fard Muhammad, July, 1930; the long awaited "Messiah	FC 2008/2/24
anifest, by Almighty God, in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, that s	FC 2008/2/6
er Farrakhan face to face so that the God, Master Fard and Elijah will be proud of me and all can see wh	FC 2008/3/26
ces us all to Allah, God, in the person of Master Fard Muhammad, to whom all holy praises are forever du	FC 2008/4/1/3
one explains why God who came in the person of W. Fard Muhammad had to come himself to make himself	FC 2008/4/22/2
ding to what Allah (God), in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, taught	FC 2008/6/11/4
ved us. The coming of God in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad (to Whom praise is due forever) is to ma	FC 2008/6/2
. So Allah (God) Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, To Whom Praises are due forever, taught	FC 2008/7/22
ling their prophecy. God, in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, will not be defeated. The more evil, de	FC 2008/7/7
ides Allah (God) Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad to Whom praises are due forever. It also	FC 2008/8/27/2
ay...only with God alone (in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad). And you will not have the power on tha	FC 2008/8/27/2
ick, Allah (God) Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom Praises are due forever Assured	FC 2008/8/4/2
, so Allah (God) Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom Praises are due forever, Taught	FC 2008/8/4/2
ah Muhammad, by him openly, who represents Master Fard Muhammad (who is God in person.) Even though I w	FC 2009/10/14
mmad first met his Teacher, God in Person, Master Fard Muhammad, Who gave and prepared him for his assig	FC 2009/10/2
y God Allah, who appeared in the person of Master Fard Muhammad, has given us the knowledge of self and	FC 2009/10/2
lmighty God, Allah, to us in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to whom praises are due forever and eve	FC 2009/10/2
Presence of Almighty God, in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad." He warned the nations of Latin America	FC 2009/10/23
er Louis Farrakhan, to Almighty God Allah (Master Fard Muhammad) had removed the spot of tuberculosis fr	FC 2009/11/17
lijah Muhammad as taught by God in Person, Master Fard Muhammad. The DVDs Mother shared with us while ri	FC 2009/11/17/2
t is, I believe, The Work of God. I thank Master Fard Muhammad for His coming. I thank Master Fard Muha	FC 2009/11/6
ack slaves). Allah (God) in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, has th	FC 2009/1/19/2
e promises of Allah (God) in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to Whom praises are due forever, Who is	FC 2009/1/19/2
hat Allah (God), Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad To Whom Praises are due forever, has bro	FC 2009/1/5
y God, Allah, who came in the Person of Master W. Fard Muhammad for His Coming and choosing our Lost and	FC 2009/1/7/3
hty God Allah who came in the person of Master W. Fard Muhammad's 132th birthday resonating into the fie	FC 2009/3/31/4
e linked to the manifestation of Master W[alla]ce Fard Muhammad, [God in Person]. We are continuing our	FC 2009/4/19/4
ghtened life-saving teachings from Master Wallace Fard Muhammad, (God in Person). "Say: Have you seen y	FC 2009/5/25/2
g of Allah (God) Who came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad to Whom praises are due forever and give	FC 2009/7/13/3
life, by Allah's (God's) permission. When Master Fard Muhammad went to jail, He sent for Elijah Muhamma	FC 2009/7/13/4
hammad, having been taught by the wise master, W. Fard Muhammad, God in Person, who first made himself k	FC 2009/7/1/2
ted that 'the ultimate aim and purpose' of Master Fard Muhammad was/is to make 'each one into a God.' If	FC 2009/7/23/3
his God, Allah, Who Came in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad; and in love with his people and humanit	FC 2009/7/23/3
y God Allah, who appeared in the person of Master Fard Muhammad, has given us the knowledge of self and	FC 2009/9/29
lmighty God, Allah, to us in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, to whom praises are due forever and eve	FC 2009/9/29

Figure 14: Concordance of Fard Muhammad with the context word God.

Having demonstrated how the FC corpus bestows divinity on Fard Muhammad, let me resume the discussion of the key figures:

Jamil al-Amin: The IH corpus mentions Imam Jamil al-Amin as one of the leaders and spokespersons of the Muslim American community[321] and then mainly with respect to his incarceration[322]. Jamil al-Amin, who came to prominence as a Black Panther

321 IH 1996/6/58-60; IH 1997/2/26/27.

322 IH 2000/4/10; IH 2001/3/46/47.

activist, is considered to be one of the important African American Muslim leaders, who have converted to Islam while imprisoned[323]. However, Jamil al-Amin has never been a member of the Nation of Islam.[324] Similar to Siraj Wahhaj, he is respected for his inner-city social activism.[325] One text is dedicated to al-Amin entirely, emphasizing that the charge of murder against him is wrongful and that the Imam is a victim of racial injustice.[326] Various members of the Muslim American community repeatedly expressed their support for al-Amin, who has been a member of ISNA's Majlis Ash-Shura.[327]

Louis Farrakhan: Articles of the IH corpus referring to Louis Farrakhan are few, their number decreasing considerably after 9/11. However, the few articles dealing with Farrakhan are extensive. Still, narratives of Farrakhan emanating from the corpus are ambivalent. In general, they express the principal willingness and wish to collaborate with Farrakhan. As Malcolm X and Warith Deen Mohammed, Farrakhan is often described in terms of change. The notion appears wrapped up in a question, such as: "Will Farrakhan change?"[328], in statements that celebrate already made changes[329], or in statements that encourage or express the wish for change[330]. Change in all statements relates to Farrakhan's Islam reading. Although not entirely, Farrakhan is accredited to disseminate "true Islamic values", for example fasting "during the proper Ramadan time period" or "holding a regular Friday prayer".[331] On the grounds of his "proper" Islamic practice, Farrakhan is not only assessed positively but interestingly, attested bravery: "Farrakhan deserves credit for being brave enough to use the Islamic greeting, and recite the opening chapter of the Qur'an at a public rally in the nation's capital."[332] Accordingly, especially the ritual aspects of the *Nation of Islam's* practices are evaluated positively:

> Ritually, the NOI is virtually indistinguishable from other traditional Muslim communities. For example, salat is taught and performed in Arabic; several NOI mosques regularly hold *salat ul-jummah*; Ramadan is observed along with the rest of the Muslim world; and Minister Farrakhan often speaks out in support of Muslim causes in America and abroad.[333]

323 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.
324 IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37.
325 IH 2000/4/54/56; IH 2001/3/46/47.
326 IH 2001/3/46/47.
327 IH 2001/3/46/47; IH 2001/5/23; IH 2001/6/26-28/30-32/34/35.
328 IH 1996/1/22-23.
329 IH 1996/1/22-23.
330 IH 1997/4/13.
331 IH 1996/1/22-23.
332 IH 1996/1/22-23.
333 IH 2005/4/16-37.

The issue of discussion that casts a shadow on the relationship is mainly the question whether Farrakhan „was ready to witness his belief in Allah (the One God) and the finality of the Prophethood in Prophet Muhammad (SAAS).“[334] Farrakhan's conceptualization of God and the prophet are regarded similarly problematic as the one of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.[335] His public testimonies to “monotheism, the universality of Islam“[336] are perceived as weakened, because they „had not gone down to the rank and file“[337] of the *Nation of Islam*, an impression that is supported by the findings related to Fard Muhammad's divine status above.
To sum up, Farrakhan's public performances of what the IH corpus recognizes as „true Islam“ are cheerfully acknowledged. However, the ongoing dissemination of beliefs „professed by the Hon. Elijah Muhammad“[338] for example in the *Final Call* newspaper is met with consternation[339]. Statements on Farrakhan have been few after 9/11. Thus, Farrakhan seems to have lost importance for the narrativization of Muslim American relations, not only as a partner but also as an opponent.

Clara Muhammad: The IH corpus mentions Clara Muhammad, the wife of Elijah Muhammad, in connection with her achievements in the educational field. She is described as a woman, who “(…) demonstrated her strength and courage in the face of opposition when she took her children out of the public school system and became a pioneer in home schooling, which at the time was illegal.”[340] Another passage establishes an analogy between Clara Muhammad's struggle in the early 1930s and the struggle of Muslim Americans today:

> (…) Sr. Clara Muhammad began to home school her children, developing a curriculum that included the historical and current contributions of Black people worldwide that had been excluded from public school curricula. In some ways, her efforts were similar to the efforts of Muslims today to set aright the systematic and deliberate omission of Muslim accomplishments in the American and European recounting of historical and significant events.[341]

Clara Muhammad is the name giver of the Clara Muhammad schools. Her name appears in the IH corpus mostly in this context. Clara Muhammad schools are evaluated as pioneers of Islamic education in the US. They are given credit for being the first

334 IH 1996/1/22-23.
335 IH 1996/3/16.
336 IH 1996/1/22-23.
337 IH 1996/1/22-23.
338 IH 1997/4/13.
339 IH 1996/1/22-23; IH 1996/3/16; IH 1997/4/13.
340 IH 2005/4/16-37.
341 IH 2009/2/32-43.

Islamic schools established in the US.[342] Their experiences are considered as valuable for Islamic schools founded later, and, Clara Muhammad schools are seen as partners within the process of advancing institutionalized Islamic education in the US context.[343] Hence, the schools are referred to in relation to problems Islamic schools face in the US generally.[344] Clara Muhammad schoolteachers are reported to participate in broader networks that address educational problems.[345] Only marginally addressed is the curriculum of the Clara Muhammad schools, one passage referring to the influence of Fard Muhammad and Elijah Muhammad[346] or Warith Deen Mohammed.[347]

Before providing a broader interpretation of the established narratives of key figures, I will now once again turn to the FC corpus to assess boundary drawing on the basis of particular concepts.

KEY CONCEPTS AND DIFFERENTIATION

As delineated above, *Muslim immigrant/s* or *immigrant Muslims* are not common categories expressed in the FC corpus. Of the Muslim scholars and leaders listed in chapter 6, the only two mentioned in the FC corpus are Warith Deen Mohammed and Jamil al-Amin. Muslim organizations, other than the NOI, are only mentioned very scarcely as well. CAIR is mentioned most, however, only in five documents.[348] Three refer to its advocacy in connection with hostilities towards Muslims in general and towards the *Nation of Islam* in particular.[349] Further mentioned are ISNA[350], IMAN[351], the *Muslim American Society*[352], and the *Muslim Alliance of North America*[353]. Because of the lack of according references found in the FC corpus, the analytical procedure of (re)constructing narratives revolving around particular key figures had to be altered. Other notions of potential boundary drawing had to be determined. A collocation analysis of the search word *Muslim,* as well as a query of standard categorization proved to be illustrative. Let's begin with collocation analysis: By establish-

342 IH 2006/2/18-30; IH 2009/2/32-43.
343 IH 1998/2/18-19; IH 1999/2/26-27.
344 IH 2001/5/27-48.
345 IH 2002/3/14-15.
346 IH 2009/2/32-43.
347 IH 2008/6/22-26.
348 FC 2005/1/4/3; FC 2009/12/17; FC 2009/12/24; FC 2009/4/22; FC 2009/6/24/2.
349 FC 2005/1/4/3; FC 2009/12/17; FC 2009/12/24.
350 FC 2009/7/23/4.
351 FC 2004/6/9.
352 FC 2006/10/23; FC 2006/8/15.
353 FC 2008/11/11/4.

ing immediate collocations of the search word *Muslim*, boundary drawing represented in the FC corpus became evident.[354] The following table displays top lexical collocates of the word *Muslim*:

Collocates	Frequency	t-score
World	120	10.92366
Leader	45	6.70248
Community	38	6.15202
Program	30	5.47021

Figure 15: Top collocates of the search word Muslim in the FC corpus.

Particularly interesting to determine boundaries narratively dividing the Muslim American community were the collocates *leader*, *community,* and *program*. These collocates are attributed by the search word *Muslim* in its function as an adjective. As the collocate *world* has thoroughly been discussed in chapter 6, let's focus on the three other collocates here:

The leader: The collocate leader occurs with the search word *Muslim* mostly as a fixed expression including the definite article, i.e.: the *Muslim leader.* The expression relates to Louis Farrakhan, mostly in texts reporting on his activities. The expression and the name are used interchangeably, such as for example:

> The Muslim leader has been an influential voice on the international stage for many years whose work includes three World Friendship Tours and peace missions to Africa, the Far East, the Middle East, Central and South America and the Caribbean. Through video, DVD and The Final Call newspaper, Min. Farrakhan's global impact has increased in Europe from the United Kingdom to Denmark, Sweden, Amsterdam, France and Germany.[355]

If Farrakhan himself is quoted, he uses the indefinite expression *Muslim leader* to describe others:

> (…) I said there is no Muslim leader that can call for jihad, or what is called a holy struggle. There is no Muslim leader strong enough in the world to call 1.6 billion Muslims and they answer.[356]

354 The query undertaken treated all data as lowercase with a window span of one word left and right of the node word (i.e. *Muslim*).

355 FC 2008/11/11/4.

356 FC 2003/2/20.

To construct Farrakhan as *the* Muslim leader bestows exclusivity on him. The findings thus point to Farrakhan's top position in the *Nation of Islam*. However, a couple of extracts attribute leader status to other Muslims as well.

The community: The corpus displays the words *community* and *Muslim* as fixed expression (*Muslim community*). However, the signification of the collocation is ambiguous. *Muslim community* frequently refers, on the one hand, to the *Nation of Islam* and, on the other hand, to Muslim Americans in general. In a few extracts, it also refers to the Muslim Ummah at large. The various significations of *Muslim community* are either explicit or can be deduced from the co-text of the collocations. The following extract, reporting on Elijah Muhammad, displays both, the co-textual and verbatim alignment of the collocation *Muslim community* and the *Nation of Islam*:

> He also stated that, upon his flight from the enemies that opposed him in the early days of Islam in Detroit, Michigan in 1935, Chicago became the city of refuge, which would later become the headquarters of the Muslim community or Nation. Thus, Chicago became likened to the City of Medina in relationship to Detroit as Mecca.[357]

If *Muslim community* refers to Muslim Americans overall, extracts relate mostly to discriminatory contexts, often in connection with the aftermath of 9/11.[358] They take on the form of a call on the Muslim community to unite against misrepresentations, or, in the words of Farrakhan:

> The plans of the United States government against the Muslims in the United States is bringing on this grievous hour. The government of the United States of America is so anxious to see the destruction of the Muslims, particularly the Muslim followers of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad, under my Leadership, that they have crafted mighty plans of destruction against us, and were it not for the fact that Allah (God) is present with us in the Person of Master Fard Muhammad, the Great Mahdi, their plans would be successful, but, as David the Psalmist prayed that the wicked would be caught in their own traps and snared in their own devices, our prayer today is the same.
>
> I say to the Muslim community do not allow this wicked enemy of Islam to put us against each other because of our theological differences, which Allah promises that He will settle Himself. The enemy wishes to strike a blow against Islam here in America and throughout the earth. We must not aid him in his evil plans against us.[359]

357 FC 2005/7/26/2.

358 FC 2005/6/6; FC 2009/12/17.

359 FC 2004/7/5; another example of this type is FC 2004/6/9.

The extract aligns the Muslim community in delimitation of "a wicked enemy of Islam" embodied by "the United States government". It is interesting that "theological differences" are mentioned as a potential hindrance for unity. Also interesting is the proposed approach to this potential area of conflict: In order to prevent a debate, the agency to solve disagreement is transferred to God. Further remarks on theology will be made below.

Other extracts encompass a call on Muslims to turn to the *Nation of Islam* in order to profit from its members' experiences with discrimination. By doing so, the following extract reveals the ambiguity of the collocation *Muslim community*:

> Since 9/11 (Sept. 11), Arabs and Muslims have suffered and are suffering now in the United States. There's great pain in the Arab and Muslim community because now they know what we've been knowing—that racial profiling exists. Now they understand it in a terrible way. Their homes are being broken into in the middle of the night. They are having their bank accounts closed so that they cannot do effective peace work. They have been detained even without counsel, or without justification. Many Arabs and Muslims now are even afraid to speak because they love America. They want to stay in America and they're afraid that if they speak out their green cards may be taken away. They may be forced to be deported. But I don't have a green card. I'm born in America. The Nation of Islam doesn't have that fear. So those who have rejected us as non-Muslims, look at us again. We are Muslims and we love you. It is our duty to defend the cause of justice where you are concerned. So, we will rise to that occasion. And whatever the consequences are, we are willing to pay that price.[360]

This extract displays boundary drawing of different forms: The first part differentiates between "Arabs and Muslims" and "us". Then, differentiations are exemplified. Accordingly, Arabs and Muslims are afraid of deportation and the seizure of green cards whereas adherents of the *Nation of Islam* are not afraid, because they are American born. This differentiation aligns with the common categorization distinguishing *immigrant* and *indigenous/autochthonous* American Muslims. The last part of the extract finally refers to intrafaith boundaries arising from the denial of Muslimness. At the same time, it contains a rectification ("we are Muslims") and a dedication to alliance and justice. Hence, in the extract, the word *Muslim* serves as a signifier of differentiation as well as an attribution of self.
Another extract differentiates between the *Nation of Islam* and the "broader arms of the Muslim community"[361] and one reports on the Ummah relating to the Muslim world[362].

360 FC 2009/1/13/2.
361 FC 2005/3/17.
362 FC 2007/9/16.

The theological references to the Muslim community draw heavily on the following sources: Maulana Muhammad Ali's English translation and commentary of the Qur'an[363] and Adil Salahi's (1995) description of the prophet's life. The arguments constructing the Muslim community are deduced from the prophetic example or the sayings of the Qur'an. However, they are always linked to the teachings of the *Nation of Islam*.[364] The following extract is a good example of the amalgamation of the different sources on the basis of which the character of the Muslim community is delineated on a theological basis:

> "Then We have given the Book as inheritance to those whom We have chosen from among Our servants: so of them is he who wrongs himself, and of them is he who takes a middle course, and of them is he who is foremost in deeds of goodness by Allah's permission. That is the great grace." (Holy Qur'an 35:32)
>
> To this verse Muhammad Ali's footnote # 2058 reads:
>
> "After speaking of the revelation of the Qur'an to the Prophet, we are told that the Holy Book was now being given as an inheritance to a chosen people, i.e., the Muslim community, who are chosen to carry this great message to the whole world. But the chosen people are not all alike. Among the elect are some people who wrong themselves—they do not fulfill Divine commandments. There are others among them who follow a middle course; they are not wrongdoers but they are not very active in the doing of good. There are others still, who are foremost in the doing of good, who are elsewhere called muqarrabun (56:11), those who have attained to nearness to God. It is thus made clear that when a community is spoken of as being a chosen community, all members of it are not alike. It is chosen because of those who are foremost in the doing of good, whose example the others should try to follow."
>
> This is but one of the places in this wonderful Holy Book which teach that, basically, there are three kinds or types of people that make up the chosen people.
>
> But we must remember, there is a solid basis for the Honorable Elijah Muhammad's strong statement to Minister Farrakhan that through him he would get all of his people—the chosen people. All of the dead will rise. We cannot make Him a liar!
>
> Allah has written down: I shall certainly prevail, I and My messengers. (Holy Qur'an 58:21)[365]

The first paragraph and the last one are both extracted from the above-cited English translation of the Qur'an. The second paragraph reproduces Ali's comment and relates

363 For the 2002 edition see www.muslim.org/english-quran/quran.htm (retrieved 20. 6. 2010).

364 FC 2006/2/14 (posted again: FC 2007/12/21/4 and FC 2008/4/22); FC 2006/3/7/6; FC 2007/12/30 (posted again: FC 2008/4/29/3); FC 2008/1/8/3 (posted again: FC 2008/5/5/3).

365 FC 2005/8/16/2.

it to the *Nation of Islam*'s teachings in the third and fourth paragraph. It is interesting to note that the argumentative structure reproduced in the extract is similar to the ones found in other corpora.

The program: The collocate *program* and the search word *Muslim* build a fixed expression as well. They occur mostly with the definite article, i.e. the *Muslim program*. The Muslim program refers to another authoritative source used to back arguments. It is part of Elijah Muhammad's (1965) *Message to the Blackman in America* (pp. 161-191). The program consists of explicit claims on behalf of "the Muslims" and is still a fixed component of the Final Call newspaper.[366] According to its frequent citation, it is a source that has not lost its centrality up to this day. It serves as an instruction, the timelessness of which is promoted by stressing unchanged conditions:

> (…) the Honorable Elijah Muhammad wrote decades ago that, "We want an immediate end to police brutality and mob attacks against the so-called Negro throughout the United States."
>
> That demand is as strong today as it was then. Why do Black men continue to die in the custody of the Cincinnati police? Why do the police there, and in other cities around the country, act as if they have a license to kill? Why is Black life so devalued?[367]

The place the Muslim program holds as an authoritative source is not only expressed by its frequent citation but also by its position with regards to other authoritative sources, as the following interview extract shows:

> FC: The Muslim program—though called "Muslim"—is not only for Muslims. Can you explain the universality of the Muslim program?
>
> HMLF: If we look at those prophets whose teachings are to be universal, Jesus and Muhammad, we see that they started with a specific focus to a specific people whom God was going to use as an instrument to bring a message universally.
>
> Jesus told his disciples, "Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not, but go rather to the Lost Sheep of the House of Israel." That was a very limited and specific focus. Later, he told them, "Go ye into all the world and preach this gospel to every nation, kindred and tongue."
>
> Though the message started with a limited focus, the germ of its universality was present, but the people whom God was going to use to spread that message universally had to be brought up to that point.

366 FC 2003/8/6/2; FC 2003/12/16; FC 2007/7/12.

367 FC 2003/12/16.

> So it was with Prophet Muhammad of Arabia (Peace be upon him). He started with a specific focus on the Arabs, and their great ignorance, disunity and immorality. He focused on them with the revelation of the Holy Qur'an. While he was building them into a nation, he also appealed to the leaders of Rome and Persia. During his time among the Arabs, he reached beyond the Arabs, so that after his death, they would begin to move out universally. They went westward toward Africa, northward into Europe and eastward toward China. So they spread the message of Islam to the known world, at that time.
>
> The Honorable Elijah Muhammad started with a limited focus on the Black man and woman of America; then a broader focus to Black people wherever we are found on the earth; then, another broader focus to all of humanity. That is suggested in the Muslim program, which reads: "We want freedom. We want a full and complete freedom. We want justice. Equal justice under the law. We want justice applied equally to all regardless of creed or class or color."
>
> So we have the universal approach, but it is a process of growth for us to grow up into the message; first seeing it as good for us, and then growing to see our mission, which is to bring this message on the universal plane to all the people of the earth.[368]

The extract draws an analogy between Jesus, Muhammad, and Elijah Muhammad. It is interesting to consider the argument made on the basis of the analogy: Jesus and Muhammad are evoked to postulate the legitimacy of Elijah Muhammad's teachings. In doing so, the argument creates a sense of sameness between the three.

Various extracts additionally refer to the political strategy Elijah Muhammad ascribes to the Muslim program, namely to put it to Congress.[369]

From the closer co-textual analysis of the expressions *Muslim leader*, *Muslim community* and *Muslim program* aspects of the particularistic NOI-teachings have appeared clearly. The reference to the *Muslim leader* (Farrakhan) and the *Muslim program* (Elijah Muhammad's teachings) is unambiguous. Slightly ambiguous is the emplotment of the *Muslim community*, referring not exclusively to the NOI but to the Muslim American community or the Muslim Ummah at large. This hints at the inconsistency of the discursive strategies constructing Muslim communal ties exhibited in the FC corpus. In what follows, ambiguity can be substantiated further, if the standard typology, which has been used to describe the Muslim community with regards to its different schools of thought, is queried in the FC corpus. (The same query will be undertaken on the basis of the IH corpus in chapter 8) The query turned up results

368 FC 2005/10/2.

369 FC 2004/11/9; FC 2007/1/6/2; FC 2008/11/11/4.

for the search words *Sunni (24 hits)*, *Shiite*[370]*(20 hits)*, *Sufi (8 hits)*, *Hanbali*[371] *(5 hits)*, and *Hanafi*[372] *(5 hits).* Although those words occur only marginally, they are nevertheless illustrative. Mostly, their co-text displays statements made by Farrakhan. The search words appear in arguments that refer to divisions among Muslims or in general. The context switches from the United States to the Muslim world and to the paradigmatic behavior of the prophet Muhammad. Muslim American intrafaith relations are not addressed explicitly. However, the general manner in which arguments are brought forth does implicitly concern them as well. Two main argumentative patterns can be traced:

1.) It is Muslims that cause divisions among Muslims. This is not what the prophet had envisioned.

The claim that Muslim groups are Muslims' constructions can be traced in an anecdote Farrakhan tells about his own experience in Mecca:

> When I was in Mecca, I met with Islamic scholars and wrangled over theology with them for three days. They wanted to know if I was a Sunni, Shiite, Hannifee or Hanbilee. No, I am none of these. I want to be what Muhammad was. He did not ascribe to any of these labels. Muslims have imposed these labels on the prophet to divide the house of Islam.[373]

Another extract shows a similar argument:

> (…) the Holy Prophet knew nothing about Sunni, he knew nothing about Shia, he knew nothing about Hanafi, he knew nothing about Hanbali, he knew nothing about Sufi—all he knew was 'La ilaha illa-Allah, Mohammedan rasul-Allah' (There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger).[374]

The argument is built on the dialectic relation between the paradigmatic behavior of the prophet and the dividing practice of Muslims. Farrakhan aligns himself with the prophet on the basis of this argument and challenges "Islamic scholars" in a theological dispute. His argument is not built on teachings particular for the *Nation of Islam* but on common ground provided by the example of the prophet and the Shahada. Furthermore, Farrakhan does not distance himself from the prophetic example, but distances "Muslims" from it. In the statement above, the prophet thus is constructed as a victim of faulty ascriptions made by "Muslims". The following question backs

370 Other spelling options included in search results: Shia.

371 Other spelling options included in search results: Hanbilee.

372 Other spelling options included in search results: Hannifee.

373 FC 2005/3/10/2 and FC 2005/3/25; similar argumentation in FC 2007/1/18; FC 2007/1/25; FC 2008/1/9/2; 2009/7/2; FC 2009/11/25.

374 FC 2006/4/25.

this argument implying that the prophet would not approve of divisions among Muslims: "Do you think the Prophet would be happy to see Shiite and Sunni Muslims slaughtering each other in Iraq?"
With reference to Iraq the second argument is constructed:

2.) Muslims and African Americans have the same enemy. This enemy fosters divisions to take advantage thereof.

The conflicts between Muslims found in Iraq and in general serve as examples to construct the argument that Islam does not approve of divisions.[375] The argumentative pattern differs from above depending on the focus change concerning the target of nomination and predication. The argument above qualified Muslims negatively in the light of their derogation from the prophetic example. The argument discussed here depicts Muslims as victims of dividing forces epitomized by "president Bush", "the enemy", or "Satan".[376] Hence, if the dividing forces are nominated, divisions among Muslims and non-Muslims are not self-inflicted as above, but imposed by "the age-old" policy of "divide and conquer".[377] According to this combination of discursive strategies, Muslims became enemies in Iraq as soon as president Bush stepped in ("when Bush went in Satan came in"[378]). Bush, depicted as the incarnation of evil, did not only cause divisions among Muslims in Iraq, the argument proceeds, but among African Americans in American inner-cities:

> The enemy is not going to focus on the root that makes you one, he focuses on the things where there is a difference and then he puts venom in it so that when we meet each other, we don't meet each other as brothers, we meet each other as enemies and who benefits if we fight and kill each other?[379]

Bush quite explicitly associated with Satan above, translates more generally into "the enemy" and later again into a rhetorical question. The closer the argument refers to familiar contexts, the more implicit is the reference to the dividing agent. However, the main analogy is drawn between violence among Muslims in Iraq and gang violence in the United States, as both are considered to result from politics of division. This argument aligning Muslims and African Americans on the basis of victimhood appears in various adaptations.[380]

375 FC 2007/3/8.
376 FC 2007/7/8.
377 FC 2008/1/9/2.
378 FC 2007/7/8.
379 FC 2007/7/8.
380 FC 2006/8/5; FC 2007/3/8; FC 2007/8/5; FC 2008/6/24.

To preliminary conclude, the collocation analysis of *Muslim* has pointed to the particularity of NOI teachings. The analysis of standard typology (Sunni, Shiite, etc.) has established the reference to the paradigmatic practice of the prophet Muhammad. This shows that NOI discursive strategies draw on a heterogeneous authoritative framework. This ambivalence is directly mirrored in the IH corpus, especially in the predication of Farrakhan. The findings from the IH corpus suggest that along with the ambivalent predication of Muslim individuals' or collective agents' readings of Islam, the nomination of boundaries between Muslim groups change.
The next chapter will show how 9/11 has influenced boundary drawing in Muslim American narrative. It will show that besides relating towards each other in difference on the basis of origin or doctrine, Muslim Americans increasingly align with reference to the concepts of discrimination and race.

BOUNDARIES SHIFTED

In what follows, I will build on the analysis above and argue that the discursive boundaries constructing the Muslim American community have shifted since 9/11. Crucial for this shift is how the category *Muslim* is emploted in relation with the concept of race.

The history of racial discrimination in the US has put forth a large repertoire of narratives. The concept of race has been crucial for the *Nation of Islam*'s narrative construction, as the thematic introduction, as well as the findings above, have shown. In what follows, I will argue that the construction of non-African American Muslims increasingly relies on the narrative repertoire revolving around the concept of race as well; and that thereby, the standard categorization applied thus far to the Muslim American community is challenged.

Since much has already been said about the centrality of race for the NOI's teachings, the significance of the concept will now be discussed into further detail based on the IH corpus. Chapter 8 will establish *race* as a feature of the Muslim American diversity narrative. Here, however, I'm concerned with *race* as a concept, on the basis of which Muslim American narratives are constructed increasingly integrative.

Starting point was a collocation analysis of the words *race* (166 hits), *racial* (139 hits), *racism* (86 hits), and *racist* (23 hits) in the IH corpus.[381] The table displays all lexical words collocating with those search words:

381 The query undertaken treated all data as lowercase with a window span of 5 words left and right of the words under investigation. Collocates with a t-score higher than 2 were included.

Race		Racial		Racism		Racist	
t-score	Collocate	t-score	Collocate	t-score	Collocate	t-score	Collocate
5.64078	Religion	5.65252	Ethnic	2.77346	America	No lexical words in range	
4.68975	Ethnicity	4.86542	Religious	2.64421	Hatred		
4.46468	Color	4.24168	Profiling	2.44810	Bigotry		
3.86980	Relations	3.73782	Discrimination	2.17869	World		
3.82569	Human	2.99505	Minorities				
3.31563	Gender	2.60237	Muslims				
3.12147	Muslims	2.44509	Harmony				
2.99914	Nationality	2.42584	Cultural				
2.99577	Status	2.40269	National				
2.97631	Based	2.34689	America				
2.96299	National	2.23318	Lines				
2.93540	America	2.20690	Justice				
2.82140	Regardless	2.23232	Equality				
2.73460	People	2.20915	Groups				
2.62842	Culture	2.20101	Group				
2.62181	Language	2.17511	Americans				
2.44919	Socioeconomic	2.01531	Islam				
2.43987	Origin						
2.37606	Community						
2.22693	Tribe						
2.22281	Age						
2.19589	Economic						

Figure 16: Collocates of the search words race, racial, and racism.

Co-text analysis of the collocates enabled to (re)construct different intermingling narratives. The (re)constructed narratives are combined in various ways, sometimes building on and sometimes contradicting each other. Before discussing them in further detail, they are listed below. The list shows that in toto, they form a fluid and complex repertoire reconfiguring the concept of race. The IH corpus displays:

Narratives that emplot race in relation to a "colorblind Islam" as…

…sanctioned by Islam (God, the prophet, Muslims' paradigmatic practice).[382]

…disrespected by the Muslim (American) community.[383]

382 IH 1997/2/28-30; IH 1997/3/34-35; IH 1997/4/s2-s17; IH 1998/2/35; IH 1999/5/36/37; IH 2000/2/10-11; IH 2000/5/29-31; IH 2001/5/27-48; IH 2001/6/72; IH 2002/3/62; IH 2004/4/16-39; IH 2005/1/36-45; IH 2005/6/64-65; IH 2008/6/44-45; IH 2009/1/26-29; IH 2009/4/23-27.

383 IH 1997/2/49-51; IH 1997/3/34-35; IH 1997/4/s2-s17; IH 2000/4/24-30; IH 2004/2/42-49; IH 2009/2/56-57.

…imperative for the Muslim (American) community.[384]
…disrespected by the Nation of Islam.[385]
…impulse for change for former NOI adherents.[386]

Narratives of American society's positive/negative practices based on its concept of race.[387]

Narratives of the paradigmatic role Muslim Americans/Islam can/could play vis-à-vis the American society with respect to its practices based on the concept of race.[388]

Narratives of Muslims being victims of "racial-discrimination", enforced by…
…Orientalist discourse.[389]
…American discursive practice since 9/11.[390]

Narratives sympathetic to the NOI's concept of race.[391]

As indicated by the number of references, the different narratives are all well represented – some are widely distributed in the IH corpus. Some texts display various narratives; others just touch on parts of a single narrative. Since analysis here derives from the contextualization of the established collocations, it is likely that the narratives are even wider distributed in the corpus if the search word r*ace* is replace for example with the search word *color,* as we will see below. Let's now focus on the different narratives more closely:

NARRATING THE COLORBLINDNESS OF ISLAM

Resulting from the findings above, one central criterion for the evaluation of the key figures is connected with the concept of race. The concept of race is crucial for the IH corpus' evaluation of the *Nation of Islam*, maybe even weightier than the NOI-positions

384 IH 1997/2/28-30; IH 1997/3/34-35; IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 1999/4/34-36; IH 2000/2/10-11; IH 2001/5/27-48; IH 2003/5/16-19; IH 2005/1/36-45.

385 IH 1996/1/22-23; IH 2005/1/36-45; IH 2008/6/20-21.

386 IH 1997/1/54-55; IH 1997/2/28-30; IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2000/2/10-11; IH 2001/3/42-45; IH 2004/4/16-39; IH 2008/6/20-21; IH 2009/6/9.

387 IH 1997/2/28-30; IH 1997/3/34-35; IH 1999/3/22-24; IH 2002/5/24-30; IH 2002/6/18-35; IH 2004/4/16-39; IH 2005/4/40-44; IH 2006/6/18-31; IH 2006/6/32-36; IH 2007/2/18-21; IH 2007/6/43-50; IH 2008/6/44-45.

388 IH 1997/2/28-30; IH 1998/2/35; IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 1999/1/21-22; IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2001/5/27-48; IH 2001/6/72; IH 2002/3/62; IH 2009/4/23-27.

389 IH 1996/5/20-22; IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 1999/1/28-31; IH 1999/1/38-40.

390 IH 1996/6/38-40; IH 2000/5/54; IH 2001/5/50; IH 2004/4/16-39; IH 2005/2/36-42; IH 2005/3/36-37; IH 2006/6/18-31; IH 2007/2/18-21; IH 2007/6/43-50; IH 2008/1/9; IH 2008/1/32-33; IH 2009/1/44; IH 2009/2/32-43.

391 IH 1999/2/26-27; IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2005/4/16-37; IH 2005/4/40-44.

on the divine nature of Fard Muhammad. The following IH extract supports this impression. At the annual *The Mosque Cares* convention in Chicago, ISNA interfaith director Sayyid Muhammad Syeed acknowledged the achievements of Warith Deen Mohammed as follows:

> Recalling the latest conversation with the Imam a few months before his death, Dr. Syeed mentioned that he had told him: "Imam, the greatest achievement of your life is separating color from Islam. Before you took over the Nation of Islam, the term 'Black Muslim' and 'Black Islam' was the only way people would talk about Muslims and Islam. The two had become inseparable. You made the historical transition from Islam with color to Islam without a color."[392]

The statement is based on the narrative of a colorblind Islam. "Islam without color" is depicted as the bridge that connects the Muslim American community. The emphasis of Islam's "colorblindness" often relates to Malcolm X and Warith Deen Mohammed, as the analysis of the key figures has revealed. So, two narratives have already been touched on: the one depicting the NOI's position on race as "unIslamic" and the one praising ex-NOI adherents for their discovery of the "colorblind nature of Islam". In addition to that, the colorblind nature of Islam is deduced from the Qur'an and the Sunna:

> Furthermore, the superiority of one man over another is only on the basis of Allah-consciousness, purity of character and high morals, not color, race, language or nationality. This was clearly articulated by the Prophet: "No Arab has any superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over a black man, or the black man any superiority over the white man. You are all the children of Adam, and Adam was created from clay." (Bayhaqi and Bazzaz).
>
> In this manner Islam established the principle of equality of the entire human race and struck at the very root of all distinctions based on color, race, language or nationality. According to Islam, Allah has given man this right of equality as a birthright. No man should therefore be discriminated against on the grounds of the color of his skin, his place of birth or his race.[393]

These extracts sanction equality as God given and universal. The concept of race is used in a double sense in the extract above: Firstly, to express the comprehensiveness of equality by validating it to the "human race"; and secondly, it delineates race as a concept, on the basis of which boundaries are drawn. The twofold comprehension can be tied to what will be outlined as a Muslim American theory of diversity in chapter 8. The narrative of a colorblind Islam is also constructed by means of differentiation. Thereby, it differentiates the dogmatic position of colorblindness with

392 IH 2009/6/9.

393 IH 2004/4/16-39.

the social practice of Muslims, for example in the following way: "Despite the lip service to the lofty ideals of brotherhood in Islam, Muslim communities in the United States seem to be split along racial and ethnic lines."[394] The frictions within the Muslim American community are mentioned in various statements, race being but one boundary marker.[395] The need to overcome the frictions is articulated at various points.[396] This again is part of the Muslim American theory of diversity, which constructs Islam as transcending difference.[397]

CLAIMING A MUSLIM AMERICAN PARADIGM

A second form of the dialectical emplotment of race, juxtaposes Muslim Americans or Islam and American society. Unlike the narrative described before, this narrative bestows a paradigmatic role on Muslim Americans as regards dealings with issues of race. "Unlike many religious communities", the argument goes, "the mosque has never been segregated along racial lines."[398] And it becomes even weightier in the following extract:

> Christianity in America, rather than transcending and eliminating racial discrimination and segregation, has itself succumbed to the evils of color intolerance. Fortunately Islam has so far successfully resisted this evil. Even the most intransigent of anti-Islamicists would agree that racial discrimination was never institutionalized in Islamic history, that Prophet Muhammad (salla Allah 'alayhi wa sallam) has never been historically appropriated by any racial or ethnic group.[399]

Thus, "Islamic history" and "Christianity in America" are differentiated with regards to their position on racial discrimination. Another passage explicitly refers to distinct positions on slavery, drawing an interesting analogy between Islamic law and international treaties:

> In America, slavery was coupled with racism. Slaves in the Muslim world, however, retained certain basic rights under Islamic law. The Geneva Conventions do the same thing today. Freeing slaves was strongly encouraged, and a freed slave in the Muslim world had equal citizenship rights. In addition, as a matter of justice in Islam, no one was enslaved based on skin color. This racism was the Achilles heel of the American system.[400]

394 IH 1997/3/34-35.

395 IH 1997/2/49-51; IH 1997/4/s2-s17; IH 2000/4/24-30; IH 2004/2/42-49; IH 2009/2/56-57.

396 IH 1997/2/28-30; IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 1999/4/34-36; IH 2000/2/10-11; IH 2003/5/16-19; IH 2005/1/36-45.

397 See also IH 1998/4/61-67.

398 IH 1998/2/35.

399 IH 1997/2/28-30.

400 IH 2009/4/23-27.

The juxtaposition between Muslim practice or Islam and American practice or Christianity prepares the ground to stretch the argument further to the following appeal: "Truly, Islam has done a successful job at curbing and resisting racism, and America needs to benefit from this experience."[401] By acting as role models, "American Muslims are in an advantageous position to facilitate improving race relations in America."[402] These extracts, and others[403] bestow a privileged position on Islam and Muslims within the struggle over the American race problem. The following extract is an example of how the narratives described so far intermingle and build on each other:

> What is an American Muslim should now be a tangible reality in the world and that is only possible if Muslims of America identify with each other. They cannot identify with each other on the narrow bases of language, color and artificial nationalities but Islam. Islam should be given precedence as a necessary idiom of their social coherence and must be used to forge a new identity by informing the system of American values and transforming them in such a way that they become Islamic enough for the American Muslims and serve as a model for rest of society.[404]

Thus, as a preliminary conclusion, the narratives relating to the concept of race can be aligned in the following argumentative sequence: Islam sanctions colorblindness. Muslim(s) (Americans) have/have not adapted this view. Color blindness is crucial for the positive development of the Muslim American community. Hence, it has to be implemented by following "true Islam". Prominent Muslim Americans lead the way in renouncing "unIslamic" teachings on race on behalf of "real Islam". Finally, Islam and the paradigmatic Muslim American behavior are able to lead American society towards colorblindness.

RACIALIZING MUSLIMS

More recently, race has become part of an additional narrative. From a diachronic perspective, the IH corpus has increasingly constructed Muslim Americans as victims of "racial profiling". This nominational practice has emerged progressively since 9/11. The table below displays the concordance lines of the search word *profiling*. It shows that the attribute *racial* to *profiling* surfaces increasingly in the aftermath of 9/11:

401 IH 1998/2/35.

402 IH 1997/2/28-30.

403 IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 1999/1/21-22; IH 1999/3/16-19; IH 2001/6/72; 2002/3/62.

404 IH 1998/4/61-67

Concordance	Reference
ls to deal with concerns such as secret evidence, profiling and Muslim hiring. AMA National Chair Dr. Agha Sa	IH 1999/5/56-57
uslim American delegation concerned about airline profiling, secret evidence, and the need for greater inclus	IH 2000/1/34-35
e. Defending Basic rights During 1999, airline profiling and secret evidence topped the Muslim American po	IH 2000/1/34-35
and presidential campaigns to voice concerns over profiling and secret evidence. Muslim Anlericans called at	IH 2000/1/34-35
i.“ The Columbus incident is closely tied to the profiling being employed by American airlines, a discrimina	IH 2000/1/36-37
t. He told The Baltimore Sun (Nov. 24, 1999) that profiling “seems well worth it in order to keep would-be te	IH 2000/1/36-37
be at a disadvantage and be subjected to. racial profiling at airports, secret evidence laws, discrimination	IH 2000/5/54
Secret Evidence Act (HR 2121) and the practice of profiling, among others. A SPECIAL TREAT The wishes of	IH 2000/6/26-50
or ending discriminatory practices such as racial profiling and the use of secret evidence. Yet, perhaps a f	IH 2001/5/50
e Anti-Defamation League on issues such as racial profiling and election reform. When Muslim groups are wil	IH 2001/5/50
d the Muslim American viewpoint on issues such as profiling, the war on terrorism, and the government action	IH 2002/6/10
es of law enforcement and civil rights, including profiling, harassment, detentions, visa delays, and registr	IH 2004/2/31-34
eports of hate crimes, discrimination, and racial profiling. (CAIR, “Stereotypes and Civil Liberties: The Sta	IH 2004/4/16-39
or harassment; and 191 reported cases of airport profiling. Law and Politics. Although much of the discrim	IH 2004/4/16-39
Liberties Union (ACLU), „Sanctioned Bias: Racial Profiling Since 9/11”, February 2004) The list was comprise	IH 2004/4/16-39
victims of secret evidence, PATRIOT Acts, racial profiling, and job discrimination. It’s enough to make a Mu	IH 2005/2/36-42
ce workplace discrimination, racial and religious profiling, challenging businesses environments, and travel	IH 2005/3/36-37
. They have achieved a limited degree of success: profiling Muslims in airports, smearing the good name of ma	IH 2006/6/18-31
t in a series of overzealous ethnic and religious profiling, and of targeting law, abiding American Muslims i	IH 2006/6/18-31
ention and de, portation of Muslim immigrants, to profiling the predominantly lawabiding Muslim Americans, to	IH 2006/6/18-31
more reports of ‚flying while Muslim‘ and racial profiling incidents from members of the Islamic community n	IH 2007/2/18-21
d an apology from US Airways and an end to racial profiling. The far-right “Washington Times,” owned by Rev.	IH 2007/2/18-21
iot Act and see no problem with racially targeted profiling. Shared Lessons. As for Muslim Americans, especi	IH 2007/5/52-54
ell have been called „A Dummy‘s Guide to Racially Profiling Muslims.” It is inflammatory, confused, and, at	IH 2007/6/32-40
eligion defines susceptibility-a prescription for profiling if ever we’ve heard one. And it puts judgments ab	IH 2008/1/14-15
is illegal and unethical. Racial and Religious Profiling. Prior to 9/11, a national consensus outlawing r	IH 2008/1/32-33
or to 9/11, a national consensus outlawing racial profiling was emerging. After 9/11, public calls for racial	IH 2008/1/32-33
premise that it is „a matter of survival.“ Racial profiling is not only unethical, because it brands someone	IH 2008/1/32-33
erminological simplicity, we use the term „racial profiling” here to avoid unnecessary confusion. Racial prof	IH 2008/1/32-33
ling“ here to avoid unnecessary confusion. Racial profiling is “the practice oftargeting individuals for poli	IH 2008/1/32-33
r.“ The ineffectiveness and difficulty of racial profiling is highlighted by the Muslim American community’s	IH 2008/1/32-33
maneuvers its way around the clumsiness of racial profiling by trying to recruit inconspicuous White converts	IH 2008/1/32-33
metro/news/features/10559/). In addition, racial profiling can undermine critical sources of intelligence, “	IH 2008/1/32-33
however, by the Islamophobia manifested in racial profiling and hate crimes that she has encountered in Ameri	IH 2008/1/9

Figure 17: Concordance lines of profiling.

While some accounts differentiate between “racial and religious profiling”[405], others link the discrimination of Muslims directly to “racial profiling”, as for example in the following statement:

> Nihad Awad, executive director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), said: “CAIR is receiving more reports of ‘flying while Muslim’ and racial profiling incidents from members of the Islamic community nationwide.” “Pray-in” demonstrations at various airports demanded an apology from US Airways and an end to racial profiling.[406]

405 IH 2005/3/36-37.

406 IH 2007/2/18-21.

A query of the CAIR corpus revealed that Muslim discrimination is emploted along the narrative repertoire framing race as well. Of 215 times the word *profiling* occurs in the corpus it is attributed as *racial* in 83 and as *religious* in 70 instances. This is particularly interesting, because CAIR is a Muslim American organization promoting civil rights issues and therefore an important voice in the fight against discriminatory practice.

In the extract above, CAIR's executive director does not only characterize reports from "the Islamic community" as "racial profiling incidents". His reference to "flying while Muslim" is furthermore an analogy to the expression "driving while black". "Driving while black" refers to what potentially happens to African Americans while driving, namely: "police officers stopping, questioning, and even searching black drivers who have committed no crime, based on the excuse of a traffic offense." (Harris, 1999, p. 265) Harris, a leading scholar on racial profiling has argued that thereby, "suspicion is not focused on individuals who have committed crimes, but on a whole racial group. Skin color becomes evidence, and race becomes a proxy for general criminal propensity." (p. 268)

The results above suggest that the narrative repertoire accompanying the discrimination of African Americans has recently been adapted by Muslim Americans. Accordingly, incidents of racial profiling are explained as depending on the rise of "public calls for racial profiling of Muslims and others who 'look Muslim'"[407] after 9/11. The thus connected suggestion that Muslimness is visible and hence a marker evoking *racial* discrimination is amplified by what has been called *Islamophobia*. Islamophobia is constructed in the IH corpus as being "manifested in racial profiling"[408]. Thus, the argument goes, "Islamophobia is a growing manifestation of racism around the world."[409] These statements directly associate Muslims and Islam with the concept of race. However, the associations are sometimes put into perspective if further co-text is considered, which in the example just cited extends to: "Islamophobia is a growing manifestation of racism around the world. The only way to stop it is by embracing this country's greatness and respecting its religious diversity."[410] In this case, patriotism and the respect for religious diversity are presented as remedies against Islamophobia, which is attributed as racist. Other statements associate Islamophobia in similar ways, such as: "Rev. Jesse Jackson condemned Islamophobia, adding that phobias based on race and religion threaten the great American promise."[411]

407 IH 2008/1/32-33.
408 IH 2008/1/9.
409 IH 2007/2/18-21.
410 IH 2007/2/18-21.
411 IH 2007/6/43-50.

As a passing remark, it is interesting to note that Jesse Jackson is not the only prominent figure closely tied to the African American struggle of recognition that is referred to in the corpora. The IH, as well as the CAIR corpus, both attribute great significance among others to Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks for Muslim Americans.

However, the results described in this section show that Muslim American narrative practice increasingly draws on the concept of race to construct Muslimness and Islamicity. Muslims are emploted as victims of *racial* profiling and Islamophopia as a *racist* attitude. Racial profiling in the US has so far predominantly been associated with the African American community. Since 9/11, it is increasingly connected with Muslim and Arab Americans, because dominant discourse has constructed Muslims as looking "Middle Eastern"[412]. This stereotype visualization of Muslims has been criticized by Muslim American organizations such as ISNA. Disney – one of the major narrative producer worldwide – for example, has been requested again and again to dissociate from depicting Muslims and Arabs in an Orientalist manner.[413] Recent studies have revealed that the aftermath of 9/11 has given rise to the impression that "Arabs (or Muslims) became 'the new blacks'". (Bayoumi, 2010) The claim that Muslims are discursively configured with reference to the narrative repertoire on race is backed by the findings described above.

With reference to these findings, it is interesting to anticipate the results that will be discussed in chapter 8. The chapter will show that Islam serves as an integrative paradigm inherent to a narrative that emplots the diversity of the Muslim American community as a potential. Accordingly, the diversity of Muslim Americans is transcended but not absorbed by Islam. Nevertheless, the narrative challenges the association of Muslims with a stereotypical view of Arabs. If the ethnical marker is dropped, categories are transcended in favor of a more inclusive narrative. This consequentially leads to peculiar statements about Muslims and others who "look Muslim" being victims of discrimination. The inclusive narrative is likely to give rise to stereotyping Muslims along certain criteria of visualization. Thus, even though the question whether "Muslims are the new Blacks?" carries a critique on profiling, it might amplify the perception of Muslims on the basis of the stereotypical visualization of Arabs or particular religious attire.

412 IH 1996/2/38-39. On the discrimination of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans see among others (Cainkar, 2009; Peek, 2005).

413 IH 1996/2/38-39; IH 1996/6/26-27; IH 1999/6/12; IH 2007/3/18-20.

DISCUSSION

This chapter has shown that since 9/11 Muslim American narratives have constructed the Muslim American community increasingly inclusive. However, the analysis on key figures, as well as on important concepts and categories, presented in the first part of this chapter, has also shown the ambiguity of boundaries within narratives emplotting the Muslim community. Overall, those findings call into question the typology research continues to apply as an explanatory framework to Muslim American collective adherence on the basis of origin, i.e. the division between *autochthonous/indigenous* and *immigrant* Muslims. The main argument for dropping common typology is that – as corpus analysis has revealed – Muslims only marginally draw on it to describe themselves. Although there are boundaries narratively imposed, for example on the basis of differing doctrinal positions, Muslim Americans increasingly find common ground on the basis of the experience with discrimination.

The narrative repertoire that has framed discriminatory practices in the US encompasses a long historical span. The reference point of this repertoire is the concept of race and the thus connected historical and ongoing experience of African Americans. My analysis here has suggested that Muslims increasingly draw on this particular repertoire to emplot their own experience in the aftermath of 9/11. This has led to boundary shifts within the narrative of the Muslim American community. Jackson's (2005) previously mentioned call on "immigrant and Blackamerican Muslims" to unite on the basis of being "objects of the West" (p. 92) seems to be fulfilled insofar as Muslim Americans are increasingly emploted as objects of discrimination. Consequentially, narrative constructions have begun to fuse and overlap the category building markers deriving from skin color and religious adherence. At the same time, the community is aligned on the basis of victimhood, Islam is emploted as the key to overcome discrimination. The narrative of a colorblind Islam, again, is connected to the narratives of the heritage of American racism.

To conclude, the narrative repertoire on discrimination provides a common ground for the Muslim American community. This common ground is likely to be fostered, as the discriminatory practice against Muslims continues to be a part of the American life world and as the Muslim response to it becomes increasingly integrated and organized.

A MUSLIM AMERICAN DIVERSITY NARRATIVE

The previous chapter has focused on different aspects of boundary drawing within the Muslim American community. This chapter builds on one aspect thereof, namely on the argument that boundaries have been narratively redrawn after 9/11. Therefore, the previous finding should be kept in mind while following the arguments of this chapter. As the analytical focus is gradually narrowed to particular aspects of Muslim American narratives, the results discussed below were obtained solely on the basis of the IH corpus. In what follows, I will concentrate on how Muslim American communal ties are constructed in the IH corpus. Based on the argument made in the previous chapter that the Muslim American community has been constructed increasingly inclusive by narrative, this chapter will show how an according community is imagined. This chapter's findings, as I will show, can be related to the general American discussion on social coherence, which has meandered between liberal and communitarian paradigms. Thus, subsequent to their (re)construction, the narratives emerging from the IH corpus will be compared to American societal models that lay out different paradigms on how to cope with social manyness.

Let me begin this chapter by describing the impetus for the following analysis: At the 46th ISNA annual convention, I conducted an interview with Ingrid Mattson, the

president of the organization at the time.[414] When I asked her to describe the Muslim American community in comparison with the Muslim communities in Europe, she pinpointed diversity as the central concept of "difference". Interesting about Mattson's answer was her description of how Muslim Americans had to develop what she called a "theory of diversity". Mattson delineated how Muslim Americans had to learn to live with diversity: As they came to the United States from different countries, adhering to different schools of thought, they had "to figure out how they could pray and live together", particularly in small towns, Mattson emphasized. She explained further that this "de facto situation" had brought forward a reflection on diversity, which gradually developed into a "theory of diversity". By qualifying it to be "our strength", Mattson clearly indicated that she considered diversity to be a positive potential for the Muslim American community. According to her, most Muslim Americans have thought the same way, believing "that diversity is a good thing". Therefore, she claimed that Muslim Americans were willing to give up "particularities of their practices for the sake of unity, and the common good". Finally, she stressed the need to engage in an ongoing discussion, without sparing the "hard issues" and to prevent Muslims from "just slamming the door and locking away".

Based on the interview with Mattson, I singled out the notion of *diversity* as starting point for analysis. The underlying rationale was that such a focus would reveal Muslim American positions on social manyness, be it with respect to the Muslim American community or American society at large. However, it was not my intention to simply reproduce the claim of diversity being a central feature of the Muslim American community. Diversity has often been the starting point of descriptions on Muslim Americans. Scholars have advanced different typologies to grasp the community's diversity as chapter 2 has shown. Analysis here rather intended to (re)construct what Mattson depicted as a Muslim American reflection on diversity. In order to approach the proposed reflection, analysis proceeded as follows: A thorough contextualization of the word diversity in the IH corpus made it possible to (re)construct strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation connected to it. Although the strategies often intermingle in texts, they will be discussed in what follows in three different paragraphs.

To begin with, the table below shows the lexical words co-occuring with the word diversity within a span of +/- five words to the left and to the right. The list of words on the left side displays the fifteen most frequent collocates (lexical words) sorted according to the t-score. The list on the right side shows the fifteen most frequent collocates sorted according to the MI-score[415].

414 The following quotes are extracts from the interview recorded on July 5th 2009 at the 46th ISNA annual convention taking place in Washington DC.

415 The minimal collocate frequency was adjusted to 3.

Frequency	t-score	Collocate	Frequency	MI-score	Collocate
29	5.37774	Unity	10	10.70134	Genetic
24	4.58663	Muslim	29	9.50269	Unity
22	4.47662	Muslims	6	8.81463	Pluralism
18	4.06016	Islam	16	8.69994	Ethnic
16	3.99038	Ethnic	6	8.16996	Tolerance
16	3.97729	Cultural	3	8.1064	Doctrine
16	3.93553	Religious	3	8.1064	Celebrate
16	3.87754	Community	3	7.85585	Integrated
14	3.63632	America	3	7.8351	Equality
14	3.48067	Islamic	3	7.75493	Teaches
11	3.16089	American	16	7.46055	Cultural
10	3.16038	Genetic	9	7.32534	Respect
9	2.98129	Respect	4	7.22967	Speakers
7	2.61333	African	3	6.9871	Strength
6	2.44405	Pluralism	4	6.80199	Religions

Figure 18: Significant collocates of diversity.

The listed collocates are parts of the discursive strategies framing diversity, as the next three paragraphs will show. Together, the strategies described below are the matrix that constitutes the Muslim American diversity narrative emerging from the IH corpus. The findings of analysis will at the end of this chapter be compared with the COCA, the reference corpus, and American societal models.

NOMINATION – BACKGROUND PLURIBUS & ISLAMIC UNUM

Particularly relevant for the construction of diversity were frequent adjectives among the collocates displayed in the table above, that is: *Muslim*, *ethnic*, *cultural*, *religious*, *Islamic*, and *American*. Below I will show why the collocates *genetic* and *African* were less important.

As a first step to contextualize these collocates as important features of diversity analysis took into account co-text. Accordingly, concordance lines, where the respective collocations surface, were extracted from the corpus. The table below shows concordance lines of diversity where the attributing collocates mentioned above appear:

Concordance	Reference
might rage, depending on the community's cultural diversity, the larger society's political climate, and the	IH 1996/4/32-34
slims leaders and the community. Considering the diversity within the Muslim community and given the technic	
based upon brotherhood, peace, justice, cultural diversity, charity and discipline has buttressed the inspir	IH 1996/5/15-16
standing of the phenomenon. They are aware of the diversity in Islamic groups, in their character and their o	IH 1996/5/52-53
mbrace a breathtaking ethnic, social and economic diversity, showcasing the multiplicity of communities and c	IH 1998/1/20-21
celebrate the rich cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of New York City through architecture. During the	
hopes to accomplish this, first, by exploring the diversity of Muslim peoples and Islamic cultures that form	
, Islamic law; hadiths; ethics, Abbasid Society, Diversity in early Islam: Sunni & Shi'ites, Sufism, Literat	IH 1998/2/26-28
, emerging universal themes such as multinational diversity; cultural veracity and Islamic integrity are of p	IH 1998/4/34-35
and centers have emerged to address the cultural diversity issues and to respond to the growing needs of psy	IH 1998/4/61-67
chool to deal with issues of ethnic and religious diversity. The board oversees many schools that permit Musl	IH 1999/1/24-25
for religious accommodations (holidays, days off, diversity policy, etc.) Along with this, information such	IH 1999/2/58-59
eneration Arab American Muslim, best explains the diversity within American Muslims: "If Islam was just one l	IH 1999/3/50
mer concluded: „As America's religious and ethnic diversity increases, it behooves Republican leaders to repu	IH 1999/5/56-57
ched and unfamiliar with Islamic movements. This diversity is also reflected on campuses. The campus scene t	IH 2000/5/12
ad Mujkic, and Imam Sebkhoui, who spoke on Ethnic Diversity: Challenges and Opportunities. Dr. Qamar Abbasi	IH 2000/5/60/62
an effort to build programs that will benefit the diversity of the Muslim community to represent the Islamic	IH 2000/6/26-42/48/50
practical aspects of forging unity out of ethnic diversity, Dr. Nyang on relations between immigrant and ind	IH 2001/5/12/14/16
practical lessons on „Forging Unity Out of Ethnic Diversity." Dr. Nyang spoke about "Relations between Immigr	
with the injuctions of the Qur'an, Muslims regard diversity within the Muslim Ummah, and within their surroun	IH 2001/5/27-40/48
cteristics. The following articles will focus on diversity within the Muslim Ummah and how it contributes to	
bles Islamic civilization to accommodate cultural diversity. Islam provides us with a short list of what is u	
, Islamabad, Pakistan. (Condensed from „Unity and Diversity in the Muslim Ummah: Some Reflections of Hajjat a	
ights, social harmony, and religious and cultural diversity," the measure narrowly passed, with 15 against an	
ly good Muslims, not? The answer is that cultural diversity plays an important role. One family lived in a s	
ty, our leaders should move beyond lip-service to diversity and religious tolerance and work to bring the uni	
ousands of Muslim Americans demonstrate how their diversity becomes a source of strength, cooperation, and	IH 2001/6/26-35
al, gender, ethnic, nationalistic and ideological diversity. Imam Hassan Qazwini discussed "Ethics of Disagr	
non-Muslim lands in relation to pluralism and the diversity of ideas and identities. They focused on what Mus	
society. In the past, Muslim history integrated diversity through both doctrine and practice. The doctrine	IH 2002/3/62
of Islam and Arabic on different areas of Muslim diversity. Diversity, like unity, can be a source of streng	
nd Arabic on different areas of Muslim diversity. Diversity, like unity, can be a source of strength if it is	
NY. Condensed from ‚American Pluralism & Islamic Diversity: Comparative Desegregation" presented at the 38th	
0 and 30, and female. Although a mosque's ethnic diversity does not coincide with high reversion rates, the	IH 2002/4/22-30
in America „The strength of America is in its diversity, and this diversity includes the Islamic componen	IH 2002/5/10/12
strength of America is in its diversity, and this diversity includes the Islamic component which is part of t	
opening reflected the Muslim community's emerging diversity: Haji Benjamin Perez translated the opening du 'a	IH 2002/6/18-35
etic chaplain, drew a parallel between the ethnic diversity of Jerusalem and America where Muslims, Christian	
rse American society. American life is fined with diversity, and that is very positive. However, children mus	IH 2002/6/38-44/52-61
nd benefit and not the bureaucracy's, and nurture diversity. Currently one Islamic school, Milwaukee's Assal	IH 2002/6/72-81
lieved that Muslim Americans would overcome their diversity to share his story and thus promote acceptance an	IH 2003/3/38-41
utiful Sunday afternoon in midtown Manhattan, the diversity of some 5,500 Muslim attendees of all ages and ba	IH 2003/4/56-58
, Women in Islam) and Debbie Almontaser (cultural diversity trainer and consultant for the New York Departmen	
an spoke in the workshop on „Presenting ‚Cultural Diversity' Training About Muslims to Corporations and Law E	IH 2003/6/20-30/34/36
ng task, but much of the challenge comes from the diversity of the students. "Muslim students come to colleg	IH 2003/6/38-45
compassion, cooperation, and respect of religious diversity in ways that relate to the issues and concerns of	IH 2004/2/18-24
chool towards the future. They celebrate cultural diversity, but prepare a Muslim child for success as a citi	IH 2004/3/18-25
ethnic, cultural, socioeconomic and gender-based diversity. "As an organization built on grassroots support	IH 2004/5/12(1)
to model is the acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity among Muslims, as well as valid differences in in	IH 2004/5/26-29
sh all at the same time." „Also refreshing is the diversity of religious belief within Islam that's represent	IH 2004/5/40/41

y strengthened by truly embracing intra-community diversity, including white American Muslims. The Muslim Ame IH 2005/1/36-45
nd ideological backgrounds meet and interact. The diversity of interpretations of Islamic sources and practic IH 2005/3/18-21
Islamic principles, while recognizing acceptable diversity. Without an in depth understanding and appreciati IH 2005/3/38-52
lete, but is intended to give a sense of both the diversity of African American Muslim life today and some of IH 2005/4/16-30/36/37
ment of the movement," Altaf says. _ Genetic Diversity One Muslim scientist has reshaped the understand
ientist has reshaped the understanding of genetic diversity. BY SARAH AHMED At home in a Maryland suburb, t
inking projects, specifically the African Genetic Diversity and Health Research Study. The project aims to c
humanity is recognized to be a subset of African diversity," she said. In fact, for African Americans in pa
ackson first became interested in African genetic diversity in 1972 when she noticed differences between East
l in changing this perspective to include genetic diversity as a necessary and simultaneous component of the
immediate impetus for her current African Genetic Diversity and Health Research Study. Designed initially as
ank in Africa (Cameroon), and the African Genetic Diversity and Health Research Study was developed.
is will help to provide a richer sense of African diversity, genetically and socio-culturally. Dr. Jackson's
rtant message in Islam, and research into genetic diversity is a scientific form of self-analysis. For Dr. Ja
holarship," says Ahmed about her article „Genetic Diversity". Ahmed is a freelance writer with an MA in Inter
ed her at The University of Maryland for „Genetic Diversity". Wardrick has written for "Beat Premier", "Jubil
orth American Muslim community can manage its own diversity without falling into schism and sectarianism. E IH 2005/6/32-44
etuating divisions and neglecting the benefits of diversity. Ultimately, Muslim Americans, who consider thems IH 2006/2/18-30
y is to seek a unity that celebrates and respects diversity. We must marshal positive energy as religious peo IH 2006/5/62
s being antithetical to world peace and religious diversity. To ensure that the academic community does not IH 2006/6/18-31
t the oppression of Muslim women is to ignore the diversity of practices of a vast faith and to represent all IH 2006/6/32-36
ddings throughout North America often reflect the diversity of the Muslim population. In the United States, o IH 2007/1/24-36
sing, for it can be expected to lead to a healthy diversity of perspectives among American Muslims. For examp IH 2007/1/54/55
re realized by celebrating religious and cultural diversity. Evicting Imams from a US Airways flight will no IH 2007/2/18-21
country's greatness and respecting its religious diversity. The Pragers, Goodes, and Becks of America certai
, equality, and tolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, and should embrace those who are committed to de IH 2007/2/46-48
ax dollars to pay for a Catholic chaplain. As the diversity of American troops grew (black and Jewish chaplai IH 2007/4/32-42
Muslim chaplains and help them bridge the current diversity of their approaches. The bridge will be the struc
n the Islamic world's cultural and other types of diversity: samples of calligraphic art, clothing, and Islam IH 2007/5/44-46
e report, which recommends a first-ever „American Diversity Dialogue," calls for accelerating the Muslim Amer IH 2007/5/46/47
religious expressions found in the colonies, that diversity , persisted not because it was encouraged, but be IH 2007/5/52-54
y. For instance, it has been found that religious diversity within a community is actually more conducive to IH 2007/5/76
cial, ethnic, immigrant/nativeborn, and religious diversity. The two Atlanta sessions comprised separate wome IH 2007/6/32-40
from 2 to 9 million. Based on the Muslim world's diversity, one would expect the immigrant population to be
The opening session, „A Conversation on Religious Diversity and Accommodations in Chaplaincy," featured Dr. IH 2007/6/43-50
is highlighted by the Muslim American community's diversity. Knowing the diversity of Muslims worldwide, al-Q IH 2008/1/32/33
a religious person to promote or seek to destroy diversity. The American doctrine of separation of church an IH 2008/1/9
ust, a British think tank for ethnic and cultural diversity that identified eight distinctions between closed IH 2008/2/46-49
niversal Islamic problem, Islamophobes ignore the diversity of Islamic thought and peoples and lend credibili
eport on the Latino community's growing religious diversity. Americans love stories about diversity, and Lati IH 2008/4/26-30
religious diversity. Americans love stories about diversity, and Latino Muslims, who are often asked to comme
d appreciation of the American Muslim community's diversity, with an emphasis on developing a cohesive leader IH 2008/4/48/49
participants represented the Muslim world's true diversity. They discussed the legitimacy of dialogue; its n IH 2008/5/24
ng new, since the Islamic Community brings so much diversity." First-time attendee Samir R Elneser, who came IH 2008/6/32-42
ursing home visits. Students learn to respect the diversity within Islam because Islamic schools usually serv IH 2009/2/32-43
an Islamic setting, for it provides students with diversity, quality socialization, a strong identity, a soli
mmunities that embrace not only racial and ethnic diversity, but also economic diversity, so that we can see IH 2009/3/17
ly racial and ethnic diversity, but also economic diversity, so that we can see each other. Another obstac
le with Islamic lessons of inclusion and unity in diversity. The deaf Muslims manned their own booth in the IH 2009/5/42-50

Figure 19: Concordances displaying frequent diversity features.

From this table, the following tendencies can be deduced:

- The intertextual distribution of significant diversity collocates varies. The collocates *genetic* and *African* appear only in one text; whereas the other collocates have a higher rate of distribution. *Genetic* and *African* are therefore not further discussed below. Those collocates, however, exemplary point out the importance of contextualizing quantitative findings.
- The collocations nominate the diversity of various social groups: Most importantly, American society and the Muslim American community but also historical Muslim communities as well as the Muslim world at large.
- If diversity is attributed as religious, it mainly refers to a pluralistic interfaith reality, being actualized in the American or in a broader context. Important for descriptions on the American religious diversity is the inclusion of "the Islamic component"[416]. To a much smaller extent, descriptions also refer to a Muslim intrafaith reality, or in other words "the diversity of religious beliefs within Islam"[417].
- The diversity of the Muslim American community is often stated without further attribution or closer described with the collocates *cultural* and *ethnic*.
- Worth mentioning in this context is what the nominations lack. The categories used elsewhere to define different Muslim (American) groups on the basis of their adherence to a particular tradition of thought are employed only very scarcely or not at all as diversity aspects. Common categories that scholars have used to grasp the diversity of Muslim (American) groups are, for example, *Sunni*, *Shi'i*, *Ahmadi*, *Sufi*, *Salafi*, *Wahhabi*, and *Islamist*. (Cesari, 2007; Curtis, 2010) The same holds true for the categorization along a particular orientation of thought, such as *moderate*, *fundamentalist*, *liberal*, and *conservative*. Scholars have used such terms to describe Muslim (American) groups. (See for example Esposito & Mogahed, 2008: 2f) These latter categorizations are entirely absent from the IH corpus as features of diversity.

Having depicted the main findings resulting from the concordance lines, I will now focus on how the IH corpus contextualizes the Muslim American community. Referring to the Muslim American community, the corpus mainly frames diversity in the sense of what I suggest to call *background pluralism*. If collocates of *diverse* were queried in the corpus, the word *backgrounds* turned up significantly strong in terms of t-score (3.46150) and MI-score (10.37831). Background pluralism points not only to *ethnicity* and *culture* but aspects, such as *language*, *nationality*, and *race*, plus specifications thereof, such as *Arab*, *Latino*, *Pakistani*, *African-American*, and so forth. The IH corpus nominates the diverse heritage of the Muslim American community with such fea-

416 IH 2002/5/10/12.

417 IH 2004/5/40/41.

tures. Accordingly, findings suggest, that background pluralism is a prominent aspect of Muslim American self-identification. An example thereof reads as follows:

> In community dinners in over 1100 Islamic centers all over the nation, Whites, Blacks, Pakistanis, Indians, Arabs, Indonesians and Hispanics meet to consciously build a sense of community in their children and to renew the same in adults. To one who is sensitive to issues of diversity the proliferation of inter-racial marriages and the prevalent camaraderie at these gatherings is symbolic of what a truly cosmopolitan America can be like.[418]

This is just one of many statements and it is reproduced here in order to lead over to another strategy of nomination framing diversity. The statement above illustrates the background pluralism vividly. However, what it leaves open is the question on what basis such a diverse community connects. After giving another text example, dominant trends regarding alleged common ground will be elaborated more closely.

> Religions Have Unity in Diversity
>
> We live in a global village, a neighborhood of unity within diversity. Often, our neighbors differ in color, habits, and religion. In America, many people are trying to develop a multifaith and multicultural society characterized by peace and harmony. American democracy is built on the principle of unity in diversity (E Pluribus Unum), and presents a good example of such pluralism. Islam teaches that diversity is natural and beautifies nature. Allah, Who created the universe with diversity, says: "Do you not see that Allah sends down rain from the sky? With it, We bring out produce of various colors. In the mountains are tracts of white and red, of various shades of color, and black, intense in hue. And among humanity and crawling creatures and cattle are those of various colors. Those truly fear Allah, among His Servants, who have knowledge. Allah is Exalted in Might, Oft-Forgiving" (35:27-28).[419]

Although this extract displays intermingling strategies of nomination and argumentation, I will focus on nomination here. The extract associates efforts of finding American society's common ground by „many people" with teachings of Islam, depicted here as Qur'anic verses. Hence, diversity is not only nominated as characteristic for American society but as created by God. This argument legitimates the idea that Islam transcends diversity – an idea, which frequently surfaces in the corpus. Statements accordingly nominate Islam as "the most flexible thing", which "can never break" because "it stretches and stretches like a rubber band."[420]; or as "a common language", whose "key terms" have yet to be agreed on.[421]

418 IH 1997/2/28-30.

419 IH 2001/5/27-40/48.

420 IH 1999/3/50.

421 IH 1999/4/46-51.

Thus, just as the diverse American society is able to find common ground on the basis of certain principles, the argument goes, Muslim Americans find common ground in Islam. Thereby, the above-mentioned American motto *E pluribus unum*[422] is adapted to the Muslim American narrative, as the title of the quote above implies.

So, lets introduce the American motto into the discussion on Muslim American nominational strategies surrounding diversity. *E pluribus unum* points to the two central concepts that demarcate the spectrum of the discussion on American society's social manyness: Unity and diversity. American societal models have related the two concepts in various ways. Before going into this broad discussion a bit more, lets turn again to the IH corpus. In the IH corpus, the words diversity and unity are closely connected. Unity is a highly significant collocate of diversity, as the table at the beginning of this chapter has shown. Below, concordance lines of diversity where the collocate unity appears are displayed:

Unity as a collocate of diversity	**Reference**
Together, they present the unity of Islam and the diversity of those who embrace it. Design sophistication an	IH 1997/2/42-44
on where impartial justice, equality and unity in diversity would be realized by conceding autonomy to units	IH 1999/4/44/45
practical aspects of forging unity out of ethnic diversity, Dr. Nyang on relations between immigrant and ind	IH 2001/5/12/14/16
practical lessons on „Forging unity Out of Ethnic Diversity." Dr. Nyang spoke about "Relations between Immigr	
fe always has contained a unique mix of unity and diversity. Unity is provided by having a common worldview,	IH 2001/5/27-40/48
, Islamabad, Pakistan. (Condensed from „Unity and Diversity in the Muslim Ummah: Some Reflections of Hajjat a	
) Muzammil H. Siddiqi Religions Have Unity in Diversity WE LIVE IN a global village, a neighborhood of u	
a global village, a neighborhood of unity within diversity. Often, our neighbors differ in color, habits, an	
n democracy is built on the principle of unity in diversity (E Pluribus Unum), and presents a good example of	
is no compulsion in religion" (2:256). Unity in Diversity Unity, although a human need, does not negate di	
ty Unity, although a human need, does not negate diversity. Unity in diversity means to explore and enhance	
a human need, does not negate diversity. Unity in diversity means to explore and enhance common values	
peaceful pluralism, multiculturalism, or unity in diversity be achieved? UNESCO's principles on tolerance sa	
will help!" (4:75). In order to promote unity in diversity: 1. Other cultures and religions should not be m	
welcoming environment. The principle of unity in diversity cannot exist in a climate of stereotyping and mis	
is simplistic and naive. There is both unity and diversity among religions. While there are common beliefs,	
of God's plan (5:48). This doctrine of unity in diversity did not prevent Ottoman military campaigus into c	IH 2002/2/44/46
of Islam and Arabic on different areas of Muslim diversity. Diversity, like unity, can be a source of streng	IH 2002/3/62
devotion and discipline ... the tolerance ... the diversity and unity." This conversation stayed with me as t	IH 2003/3/38/40/41
t causes for division. It is also a reminder that diversity in unity and unity within diversity are possible.	IH 2006/5/11/12
y is to seek a unity that celebrates and respects diversity. We must marshal positive energy as religious peo	IH 2006/5/62
(CIOGC) expounded upon „Finding Unity within Our Diversity," pointing out that diversity of opinion has been	IH 2007/6/43/-50
ng Unity within Our Diversity," pointing out that diversity of opinion has been the cornerstone of our rich i	
le with Islamic lessons of inclusion and unity in diversity. The deaf Muslims manned their own booth in the	IH 2009/5/42-50

Figure 20: The diversity collocate unity.

422 The motto was originally employed to describe the colonies' merging into one but is now part of the discussion on American social manyness.

Figure 20 displays the words unity and diversity in context. If contextualized by means of taking into account further co-text, the patterns are not only but often connected to what has been (re)constructed as background pluralism. Just as background pluralism figures as the *pluribus* within the Muslim American theory of diversity, Islam is often associated with the *unum*. The corpus displays various forms of *background pluribus* and *Islamic unum* separately, but often in connection to each other. Whereas background descriptions are mostly specific, the Islamic unum often remains vague, drawing its significance mainly from the ability to transcend and integrate the pluribus. The following table shows how the unum is constructed dialectically vis-à-vis the pluribus by employing various degrees of specification. Following this pattern, the unum draws its significance largely from the reference to the more concrete pluribus. The table below arranges the relationship from general to specific descriptions of the two concepts.

Unum	**Pluribus**
Islam	Diverse cultures[423]
Unity of Islam	Diversity of those who embrace it[424]
The integrative power of Islam	Different areas of Muslim diversity[425]
Core Islamic values and teachings	Divisions[426]
Embrace Islam	Reject racial considerations[427]
Strictly Islamic requirements	Ethno-national taste[428]
Islamic egalitarianism based on an ideology guided by free choice of every individual, and capable of encompassing the entire humanity in the universe	Tribalism based on birth or land[429]
Unity is provided by having a common worldview, moral values, and rules of right and wrong. However, the Shari'ah accommodates...	...diversity based on natural characteristics[430]
Islamic principles of moral integrity, justice, compassion, cooperation, and respect of religious diversity in ways that relate to the issues and concerns of the time	Cultural heritages of the Arab, African, European, East and South East Asia, Indo-Pakistani, Persian, Latino, Turkic and Slav[431]

Figure 21: Relations between unum and pluribus.

423 IH 1999/4/44-45.
424 IH 1997/2/42-44.
425 IH 2002/3/62.
426 IH 2002/6/38-61.
427 IH 1997/2/28-30.
428 IH 1998/1/23-28.
429 IH 1999/4/44-45.
430 IH 2001/5/27-40/48.
431 IH 2004/2/18-24.

The table shows that Islam is often juxtaposed against a background pluribus. Sometimes it is associated with the word *unity*; sometimes it stands alone or is described as a set of rules, principles, or values. The following extract further interrelates the two concepts:

> ISNA strives to be an exemplary organization for Muslims in America, and one of the important Islamic values we aim to model is the acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity among Muslims, as well as valid differences in interpretations of Islamic norms. Unity is the result, not of uniformity, but of kinship despite our differences. Muslims across the world and across America represent great diversity in cultures, customs and tastes, within the boundaries of what is permissible in Islam.[432]

The next step involves the qualification of diversity in order to assess the evaluation of the background pluribus and the Islamic unum.

PREDICATION – ATTRIBUTING QUALITY

Above, I have synthesized different diversity features into a building brick of a Muslim American diversity narrative by (re)constructing it as background pluralism. As stated, background pluralism figures as an important component of the Muslim American self-description. This paragraph highlights how diversity is qualified in the IH corpus and how this qualification fits into the Muslim American diversity narrative. Ingrid Mattson implied in the above-cited interview-answer that most Muslim Americans see diversity as "a good thing". An analysis of the corpus on diversity supports Mattson's claim that diversity carries positive connotations.

Although many texts recognize diversity in a matter of fact manner, some qualify it in a positive way. Of the most significant collocates listed at the beginning of this chapter two collocates show the predication of diversity particularly well: *celebrate* and *strength*. A significant expression refers to diversity as a „source of strength", as different corpus extracts show:

> In keeping with the injuctions of the Qur'an, Muslims regard diversity within the Muslim Ummah, and within their surrounding society, as a source of strength and recognize it their duty and responsibility to build mutual bonds. (...)[433]

> (...) Muslims, despite their diversity, have much in common and that their diversity should be a source of strength, (...)[434]

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432 IH 2004/5/26-29.

433 IH 2001/5/27-40/48.

434 IH 2001/6/26-35.

> There is little doubt about the integrative power of Islam and Arabic on different areas of Muslim diversity. Diversity, like unity, can be a source of strength if it is an integrative rather than a segregated diversity. (...)[435]

The statements describing it as a source of strength qualify diversity positively. However, the examples above leave it somewhat open whether Muslims have recognized diversity as a source of strength. The two latter extracts stress the potential of diversity for the Muslim community, whereas the first one claims that Muslim Americans have already internalized this idea. These examples are illustrative for showing how discursive strategies take on advisory character. How Muslim diversity should be dealt with emanates clearly from the text samples.

Fewer statements connect the idea of diversity being a source of strength to the American context, such as for example: „The strength of America is in its diversity, and this diversity includes the Islamic component which is part of the American mainstream now.“[436] Here, the recognition of a Muslim collective identity, as one among many in American society is emphasized. At this point, it can be argued, that a positive handling of the Muslim American diversity is the precondition for Muslim Americans identifying collectively. And thus, the negotiation of Muslim American diversity finally affects how the community is embedded within American society at large.

Diversity is even stronger positively attributed by the collocate *celebrate*. Respective text extracts describe diversity as a reason for celebration:

> „Islam teaches diversity; no other religion is more tolerant or celebrates difference more than Islam.“[437]

> “As a Muslim, and as an American, I am commanded to stand up for the protection of life and liberty, to serve the poor and the weak, to celebrate the diversity of humankind.”[438]

The second statement is further an example of how being Muslim and being American is aligned by advancing the same guidelines. The alignment of an American and an Islamic imperative mirrored in diversity constructions can further be shown by the following example:

> The President, quoting from the Qur‘an, said that Muslim Americans are „a living proof that people of different backgrounds can live peacefully in a diverse

435 IH 2002/3/62.

436 IH 2002/5/10-11.

437 IH 2002/6/38-58/61.

438 IH 2002/5/40-42/44.

> world as one community. We must learn to celebrate, not just tolerate, our diversity. No one should have to feel discrimination or fear violence because of the way they speak, they way they look, or the way they worship God. (...)"[439]

Surprisingly, this statement was not made by the president of a Muslim association but by the president of the United States, Bill Clinton, on the occasion of ISNA's annual convention in the year 2000. So, once again, an analogy between Muslim Americans and American society is made, this time it is the Qur'anic message and Muslim Americans that are turned into paradigmatic examples regarding the handling of diversity. However, mostly the corpus displays similar predication strategies the other way around: Positively qualified diversity is used to describe a driving force of the American strength. This strategy serves to establish Islam and Muslims as parts of the „American fabric"[440]. An example of this type is the above quoted extract stating "American mainstream" includes "the Islamic component". Such argumentation often adapts to the Muslim American intrafaith context in an appellative manner. The urge to strengthen the Muslim American community results in the appeal to "truly embrace intra-community diversity"[441].

Apparently, diversity as a feature of American contexts challenges Muslims in different ways. It is positively qualified to describe the broader American context. As a Muslim American reality, its assessment as a strength is still argued to be a necessity. Thus, by means of discursive predication strategies the positive potential of diversity is attributed as recognized feature of the American context at large. However, with respect to the Muslim American context it is an attributed feature yet to be thoroughly recognized. The concluding quote displays this tendency once again and transfers the argument towards the justification of diversity, which will be discussed in the next paragraph:

> We cannot prepare Muslim-American children for their multiethnic American futures as politicians, media executives, journalists, lawyers, engineers, and more unless we value diversity ourselves. Islam teaches diversity; no other religion is more tolerant or celebrates differences more than Islam. As parents and educators, we should strive to put aside our divisions so that we can create meaningful curricula for our children. If we focus on core Islamic values and teachings, we can do this. (…) Failure to recognize the difference in needs results in a failure to provide Muslim-American teens with the curricular-based spiritual support and education they need to develop an Islamic identity sufficiently strong to exist in our diverse American society. American life is filled with diversity, and that is very positive.[442]

439 IH 2000/6/26-42/48/50.

440 Examples of this expression can be found in IH 2001/6/76-79; IH 2002/1/56; or IH 2007/5/52-54.

441 IH 2005/1/36-45.

442 IH 2002/6/38-58/61.

ARGUMENTATION – ENGAGING SOURCES

The text extracts quoted at the end of the previous section and others before hinted at how the corpus frequently legitimates diversity. It is often *Islam* that is referred to as legitimating diversity and instructing Muslims on how to overcome divisions and benefiting from it. The principal source for sanctioning diversity is the Qur'an.[443] Verse 49:13 and also verses around 30:22 are particularly popular in this context. The ISNA editorial emphatically cites Qur'anic verses from Abdullah Yusuf Ali's translation (Amana edition). Verse 49:13 from this edition reads as follows:

> O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things). (49:13)

As a short digression, it is interesting to note that despite the ISNA directive this verse is cited in different ways in the analyzed corpus. For example, one difference is that an extract replaces "nations and tribes" with "races and tribes"[444]. As regards a theory of diversity, the particular use made of different Qur'an translations would be another point. However, I will not pursue this further here, because it is not reflected on in the corpus.

Verse 49:13 is not only employed to legitimate diversity, but also to stress the resulting need for dialogue.[445] Verses 30:20-23 are interpreted similarly, namely, that it is God's will that diversity is benefitted from, which explains why he created it.[446] Other texts refer to Qur'an 35:27-28, 25:20, 5:48, 4:135 and 2:256 in order to justify diversity to be "God's plan"[447] and therefore "natural", "healthy", and to be dealt with in a "constructive" manner.[448]

Another authorative source of legitimating diversity is the prophetic example, particularly his struggle to unite the Ummah by transcending tribal ties.[449] The following passage illustrates how the prophetic example is drawn on as an argument for an integrative model:

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443 IH 1996/1/24; IH 2001/5/27-40/48; IH 2001/6/72; IH 2001/6/26-35; IH 2001/6/72; IH 2002/2/44/46; IH 2006/5/11-12; IH 2007/5/52-54; IH 2008/1/54-55.

444 IH 2001/5/27-40/48.

445 IH 2001/5/27-40/48; IH 2007/5/52-54.

446 IH 2001/5/27-40/48.

447 IH 2002/2/44/46.

448 IH 2001/5/27-40/48.

449 IH 1999/4/44-45; IH 2001/5/27-40/48; IH 2000/4/24/26/30; IH 2003/3/38-41; IH 2003/5/62/64-65/67.

> The Prophet stressed factors that strengthened Muslim unity, urged them to develop attitudes and qualities that would bind them closer together, and discouraged and denounced attitudes that would undermine kinship (e.g., backbiting, ridicule, and pride). The Prophet, by personal example, prevented tribalism and inspired people to reach a higher level of humanness.

Besides extracts that simply refer to *Islam* to justify diversity[450], there is another legitimating concept that is described to symbolize unity in diversity – Hajj, the Muslim pilgrimage.[451] Actually, the reference to Hajj often encompasses and fuses discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation. Hajj is said to symbolize unity in diversity because it brings together people of diverse backgrounds. It is thus a symbolic representation of a widely recognized Islamic unum that transcends the background pluralism of Muslims. Chapter 7 on the relations between Muslim Americans has already revealed the significance of Hajj. Considering this, the recourse to Hajj can be viewed further as a positive predication as well as a justification for diversity. Hajj symbolizes the paradigmatic behavior of Muslims and thus is an important feature of the diversity narrative.

COMPARISON – INTERACTING NARRATIVES OBSERVED

One tendency resulting from the findings above is that diversity is often depicted as an analogy between the American context and Islam or American society and Muslim Americans. Therefore, I argue that the American diversity narratives influenced the configuration of the Muslim American diversity narrative. This argument was thus taken as point of departure for further analysis: Its validity was tested by comparing linguistic patterns with which the IH corpus constructed diversity to those displayed by the COCA, the reference corpus.[452] For this comparative analysis, the COCA represented a narrative repertoire the Muslim American diversity narrative was checked against in order to establish similarities between core linguistic patterns.

The nomination of diversity by adjectives such as *ethnic*, *cultural* and *religious* surfaced in the COCA as well, *cultural* being the most frequent collocating adjective (MI-score 6.68), *ethnic* ranking on place 3 (MI-score 6.72) of all adjectives and *religious* on place 7 (MI-score 4.33). The COCA further attributed diversity most frequently with the adjectives *biological*, *genetic*, and *racial*. Of the most frequent nouns collocating with diversity, *unity* occupied rank 5 with an MI-score of 6.51.

450 IH 1998/5/18-20; IH 2001/5/27-40/48; IH 2001/6/72; IH 2001/6/26-35; IH 2002/6/38-58/61; IH 2005/3/18-21; IH 2006/4/42-43.

451 IH 2001/5/27-40/48; IH 2001/6/26-35; IH 2005/6/32-44; IH 2006/1/51-52.

452 The COCA was queried along the restrictions outlined in chapter 4 in May 2011.

With respect to the linguistic patterns used to predicate diversity, *celebrate* turned up in the COCA query as one of the most frequently collocating verbs with an MI-score of 5.33. *Strength* however was not a high frequent collocate (rank 38 of all nouns) but was still significant with respect to its MI-score (3.46).

Overall, these findings show, that important linguistic patterns constructing diversity in the IH corpus also turn up in the COCA. Thus, in terms of linguistic patterns, the nomination and predication of diversity is not particularly Muslim American but a particularity of the American negotiation of diversity at large. We can thus conclude, that the narrative of Muslim American diversity draws on the narrative repertoire that constitutes American diversity in general.

The COCA has its limits in terms of further contextualization. Because no further textual surrounding beyond concordance lines is available, the findings above were contextualized with respect to other theories of diversity. Comparing the results of the present analysis with American societal models of diversity is feasible, because they provide a contextual frame for the narrative (re)constructed here. The explicit recourse of the Muslim American narrative to the American motto *E pluribus unum* points to the importance of this context. However, the comparison below is by no means comprehensive, since analysis concentrated heavily on text surface and does not take into account the more subtle meaning of a particular text. Therefore, comparison naturally stays superficial and its significance should not be overestimated. Considering these restrictions, the proposed comparison is of experimental character. Nevertheless, as a cautious interpretational approach, it serves well to highlight certain points.

If compared to the American societal models that have briefly been touched on in chapter 1, the above (re)constructed Muslim American diversity narrative clearly rejects the idea of the melting pot. The Islamic unum is not intended to melt down the background pluribus of the community. Rather, it is intended to transcend and integrate the differences but not to absorb them, because they are regarded as a „source of strength". According to the findings above, difference is emploted as a „natural" reality deriving from „God's plan" and thus a „reason for celebration". Just as Muslims are seen as a part of the diversity of American society, the diverse Muslim American community is regarded as a part of the Islamic unum.

The recommendation on how to handle diversity deriving from the corpus makes it possible to further contextualize the narrative. The collocates *tolerance* and *respect* point to how diversity should be approached. They complement discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation. However, the Muslim American diversity narrative does not suggest to passively tolerate diversity but to actively

benefit from it. This recommendation on how to handle diversity can be compared to the discussion on social pluralism. Eck (2006) for example has described pluralism not being "diversity alone" but "the energetic engagement" thereof. Noticeable are further the similarities of figures of speech that result from the above (re)constructed narrative and their circulation in scholarly work on pluralism, as for example diversity being or becoming a source of strength:

> As the new century dawns, we Americans are challenged to make good on the promise of religious freedom so basic to the very idea and image of America. Religious freedom has always given rise to religious diversity, and never has our diversity been more dramatic than it is today. This will require us to reclaim the deepest meaning of the very principles we cherish and so create a truly pluralist American society in which this great diversity is not simple tolerated but becomes the very source of our strength. (D. Eck, 2001: 6)

Although the legitimation of diversity is not the same in the quote above and the Muslim American diversity narrative, its qualification is. Both predicate diversity in the same linguistic manner, namely as „a source of strength".

However, this qualification of diversity emerging from the Muslim American diversity narrative does not bestow primacy on the pluribus. The narrative can be contextualized further for example with Hollinger's (2000) differentiation between *cosmopolitanism*, *universalism,* and *pluralism*. (pp. 84-86)
With regards to cosmopolitanism and universalism, Hollinger has argued: „For cosmopolitans, the diversity of humankind is a fact; for universalists, it is a potential problem." (p. 84) Thus, the Muslim American diversity narrative clearly corresponds with the cosmopolitan position by framing diversity as an opportunity. Regarding the comparison between cosmopolitanism and pluralism, the narrative cannot be associated clearly, as it displays components of both. Hollinger has ascribed similarities to cosmopolitanism and pluralism as both promote „tolerance and diversity". (p. 85) However, he has differentiated between them with regards to their group orientation:

> If cosmopolitanism can be casual about community building and community maintenance and tends to seek voluntary affiliations of wide compass, pluralism promotes affiliations on the narrower grounds of shared history and is more quick to see reasons for drawing boundaries between communities. (p. 85f)

The Muslim American diversity narrative promotes diversity and tolerance as both, cosmopolitanism and pluralism do. The Islamic unum emerging from the (re)constructed Muslim American diversity narrative is rather cosmopolitan as it is meant to transcend pluralism (without absorbing it). However, the diversity narrative can be

considered as leaning towards pluralism insofar as the background pluralism emphasizes inherited diversity aspects. The appeal to "celebrate diversity" refers to background pluralism and not to the cosmopolitan emphasis on multiple identities. (Ibid., p. 3f) Thus regarding, the diversity narrative diverges from cosmopolitanism.

With respect to its construction as transcending boundaries, the Islamic unum has much in common with Hollinger's description of a postethnic perspective. By differentiating between postethnic affiliation and multicultural identity he argues:

> Moreover, the word identity implies fixity and givenness, while the word affiliation suggests a greater measure of flexibility consistent with a postethnic eagerness to promote communities of consent. Affiliation is more performative, while identity suggests something that simply is. To be sure, one can construe the achievement of identity as an action, but „affiliation" calls attention to the social dynamics of this action. (p. 7)

With this, I argue that whereas the background pluribus harbors a multicultural perspective, the Islamic unum is postethnic. The Islamic unum is a metaphor for a community of consent, which is not simply there but has to be built. This realization is articulated repeatedly, for example in connection with questions relating to how young Muslims can be supported to "develop an Islamic identity"[453]. Although the quote uses the notion of identity instead of affiliation, identity is not considered as given but as developable. If considered as such, the awareness of the social dynamics of affiliation is inherent to the idea of the Islamic unum. Thus, drawing on Hollinger again, I argue that the postethnic perspective inherent to the Islamic unum "brings to moral and epistemic communities a disposition to stretch the 'we' (...)". (p. 115)

To conclude, on the basis of the comparison above the Muslim American diversity narrative can be characterized as multifaceted. Most clearly, it can be differentiated from assimilationist and universalist societal models. Instead, it comprises, on the one hand, features that remind of pluralist or multiculturalist ideas. On the other hand, it contains ideas that are also found in cosmopolitan and postethnic thought.

453 IH 2002/6/38-58/61.

DISCUSSION

This chapter has (re)constructed a Muslim American diversity narrative emploted by discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation. The cluster of collocates around the notion of diversity has pointed to the variety of its features and to their fields of reference. The consideration of co-text has led to the adaption of the American motto *E pluribus unum* into a Muslim American diversity narrative, comprising two constituent elements: background pluralism and the Islamic unum. Another major finding was that diversity carries positive connotations, pointing to how it can be situated with regards to American societal models. Further, analysis has shown that the legitimation of diversity largely rests on Islamic authoritative sources.

Thus, we now have a clear picture of diversity and its nomination, qualification, and legitimation. However, the task remains to describe the unum more clearly. Based on the present findings, it would not be productive to (re)construct the Islamic unum similarly. Although it is sometimes described as a value-based concept, its description mostly remains vague. Its characteristics derive mainly from its dialectical stance towards the pluribus. Thus, the Islamic unum draws its significance from its ability to integrate and transcend boundaries without melting down diversity. Diversity is conceptualized as a potential of the Islamic unum. Therefore, rather than a concept possessing certain features, the Islamic unum will be analyzed more closely in the next chapter with respect to its functionality.

Here, a claim for a new typology can be made once again. Research to date has focused on the Islamic unum by trying to establish typologies of its features. However, since the self-referential categorization of Muslim Americans differs from the analytical categories applied by scholars, this is an illustrative example of how the struggle over denotational power proceeds. I have already argued that a rigid categorization blocks the view onto potentially fluid processes of narrativization. Analysis so far has shown that it is illuminating to focus on such processes and establish the various influences on them.

Connecting this chapter's findings to previous chapters' findings, I consider the above (re)constructed diversity narrative as a complement to the inclusive narrative of the Muslim American community the IH corpus increasingly displays from 9/11 onwards. In chapter 7, I have argued that the Muslim American community has been narratively consolidated in light of discriminatory practice. This chapter has shown, that consolidation is not only achieved on the basis of evoking a joint discriminatory experience. The diversity narrative is a proposition for a broader integration of the community. An according emplotment can be interpreted as intent to consolidate the community, which is essential for establishing Muslim Americans as a part of "the American fabric".

Hollinger has argued that "the blurring of the line between religious and ethno-racial affiliations serves to make over religious groups in the contemporary image of ethno-racial minorities." (p. 122) The underlying rationale of this has been that ethno-racial groups are entitled to opportunities and support religious groups are not. Hollinger has considered the Amish communities as such an example. The Muslim American narrative adaption to the concept of race established in chapter 7 could be evaluated as pointing into the direction of Hollinger's argument. Analysis has demonstrated that the discussion on discrimination displayed in the IH corpus blurs category-building markers such as race, ethnicity, and religion. Additionally, if the Muslim American diversity narrative develops towards emphasizing the Islamic unum over the background pluribus, the category Muslim turns out as a postethnic or a quasi-ethnic construct. Whether this tendency is fueled by the aim to frame religion "in terms of an ethnic model of affiliations" (Ibid.) has yet to be substantiated further. The next chapter on the functionality of Islam for Muslim American narratives will shed some more light on this aspect.

FUNCTIONS OF ISLAM IN AMERICA

FUNCTIONS OF ISLAM IN AMERICA

This chapter finally aims to discuss the function of Islam as it results from Muslim American narrative. At several points in this study, I have already hinted at what will be discussed now: I have argued in the chapter on the state of research that the compilation of issues that have been identified 'Islamic' lack theory. An according compilation has fostered the impression that anything could be labeled 'Islamic'. In what follows, I do not intended to refute this position. I intend to approach the matter from a slightly different perspective by asking about the functionality that is attributed to Islam by narrative. The advantage of an according approach is that it enables us to explore different fields of 'Islamic' intervention. On the basis of the different fields (re)constructed, the functionality of Islam can then be compared to existing theory, without falling back solely on a discussion as regards particular issues. By focusing on functionality, I thus argue, we are able to analyze Islam from a perspective that is easier to theorize than the descriptive accounts of Islamic particularities, which are indubitably fascinating and illustrative.

At this point, I will revert to the findings of the previous chapters more closely. I will draw on narratives already (re)constructed to discuss functional aspects of Islam into further detail. However, additional analysis will complement these observations. As

the leading research questions of this study closely intermingle, it makes sense to synthesize previous and new results at this point.

A quick word shall be given now to how new results were obtained for the purpose of this chapter: The empirical basis for analysis was once more the IH corpus. As the focus lies on functionality here, the corpus was queried for verbs collocating with the search word *Muslims*. The underlying assumption of this procedure was that the focus on Muslim action or ideal status – descriptions on how Muslims (ideally) act *as* Muslims – would display fields of Islamic intervention. The following table displays the verbs that collocated most frequently with the search word *Muslims*:

Rank	Frequency	Freq(L)	Freq(R)	MI score	t-score	Collocate
10	648	178	470	4.32286	24.18388	are
11	565	295	270	3.10841	21.01360	is
13	424	66	358	4.36861	19.59448	have
23	296	142	154	3.37464	15.54591	be
31	225	54	171	4.02480	14.07848	can
34	198	40	158	4.34367	13.37821	should
35	198	20	178	4.78434	13.56062	must
44	143	47	96	3.88375	11.14815	were
46	132	61	71	3.21144	10.24877	will
47	132	48	84	3.82985	10.68117	do
49	125	20	105	4.65047	10.73517	need

Figure 22: Verbs collocating with the search word Muslims.

As the table shows, the search turned up a variety of auxiliary verbs. The verbs *should*, *must,* and *need* were chosen for further analysis on the basis of the following criteria:

- They are highly significant in terms of both t- and MI-score.
- Their distribution (mainly on the right side of the search word), as well as their high MI-score, allude to a high amount of immediate collocations, i.e. Muslims *should*, Muslims *must*, Muslims *need*.
- As modal verbs, they indicate ideal behavior, obligations, and necessities. Hence, they presumably reveal how narrative constructs the category Muslim as moral category.

If referring to new results in what follows, those results were all obtained by closely analyzing the co-text of the three modal verbs. Co-text analysis not only gave refer-

ence to the discursively constructed issues of desired Muslim intervention but to the function of Islam with reference to those fields. This chapter is organized by distinguishing three areas of Islamic intervention: The Muslim American self, the Muslim community, and American society. The graph below provides an overview of what will be discussed into detail in what follows.

Figure 23: Fields of 'Islamic' intervention.

In what follows, I will closely examine the function of Islam with respect to the three distinguished areas. In order to embed and interpret the findings of analysis, I refer to different theories, among them on recent contributions to the negotiation of religion. So, the following paragraphs are organized by firstly describing the (re)

constructions from the corpus with respect to the three areas and, secondly, by providing an interpretation of the (re)constructions by means of theoretical contextualization.

Before I begin, some preliminary remarks have to be made as regards this theoretical orientation: Framing Islam as religion is not a necessity but an option and often a concession to dominant discourse. In the US, Islam is legally incorporated as religion and framed as such by academia. (Ernst & Martin, 2010b) Thereby, Islam is often explored with reference to the conceptual dual of religion and secularity. Recently, Schulze (2010) has shown into detail that framing Islam accordingly is the result of a historical process that has more recently been dominated by a protestant paradigm. Although concepts such as religion and secularity have been described as resulting from particular historical processes (Casanova, 1994), they have been used as general analytical categories. As the normativity inherent to those categories has been incorporated into a general theory of religion and secularity, Schulze has shown how they accordingly have set the default for analyzing Islam. Hence, a typical claim has been that processes of secularization are absent from Islam. (p. 189f) It is not intended here to expand this argument. However, I want to raise awareness that categories, such as religion and secularity, originate with respect to particular historical contexts. I agree with Somers (1996) that:

> (...) less attention should be directed to the claim that all data is theory laden and more to the claim that theory is history laden, and we need a new way of rethinking our conceptual frameworks based on the epistemological centrality of temporality; (Somers, 1996, p. 68)

Recent initiatives to reframe concepts such as religion (De Vries, 2008) and secularity (Warner, VanAntwerpen, & Calhoun, 2010) respond to this need.

In this study I have tried not to force given categories onto my empirical field. Instead, I have tried to (re)construct Muslim American narratives as inductively as possible. The underlying rationale has been to deduce the Muslimness and Islamicity constructed by these narratives in order to discuss those concepts in the light of existing theory in a second step. Here, I will therefore turn to theories on religion and secularity (among others) in order to interpret my findings. This approach enables us to critically look at theories on religion (and other concepts) from the perspective of this study's (re)construction of Muslimness and Islamicity.

ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM AMERICAN SELF

Scholars have argued that what they have called religiosity has become increasingly individualized. This tendency has been especially emphasized in the case of the US. (Joas, 2007) Individualized religiosity has often been referred to as *spirituality*. (Joas, p. 370f; Taylor, 2007, p. 508) In his recent essay, *Spirituality in Modern Society* (2008), van der Veer has drawn attention to the "vagueness" of the term and, at the same time, to spirituality's centrality "to understand modern society". (p. 789f) This has left us with the uneasy situation to grasp a central feature of our societies with a term, "bridging (...) several conceptual universes". (Ibid., p. 790)
A constructionist perspective therefore has to closely examine how selves understand their religiosity or spirituality in certain contexts. In what follows, the narrative construction of Muslim American selves, as it results from the IH corpus, will be established. This (re)construction will then be discussed with respect to theories on religiosity or spirituality.

The co-text of the above selected verbs reveals a model narrative of the Muslim American self. The results of co-text analysis can be grouped according to three dimensions: The first dimension refers to the overall aim the Muslim American self is to achieve. The second dimension refers to the means considered necessary to reach the aim. The third dimension refers to the qualities attributed to the Muslim American self.

Aim: The overall aim of Muslim American selves, as it is expressed in the corpus, is to lead an Islamic Way of life or a life of taqwa. An explicit expression thereof is: "Muslims must be the people of Taqwa."[454] Taqwa is defined in the corpus mostly as God-consciousness[455] or piety[456]. In order to know how such a God-conscious life is to be achieved, we have to turn to the means.

Means: In order to obtain a life of taqwa, the IH corpus encourages Muslims to become what I would call *Islamically literate*. Islamic literacy refers to the ability of Muslim American selves to handle the authoritative source texts. Correspondingly, an *Islamically literate* Muslim American self turns to the Qur'an and the Sunna to assess life. The IH corpus advises the Muslim American self to interpret the Islamic sources of authority "in the context of the present world"[457]. It is further advised to "understand the relevant Islamic principles"[458] for making decisions and deduce if it

454 IH 2000/6/52/53.

455 IH 1999/1/21/22; IH 2000/6/52/53; IH 2000/6/56/58; IH 2001/6/64; IH 2002/2/22/24/26; IH 2005/6/60/61(2); IH 2006/4/44-46; IH 2007/5/22-24; IH 2009/1/26-29.

456 IH 2008/6/54/55; IH 2009/1/26-29; IH 1996/1/14.

457 IH 1996/4/18/19.

458 IH 2002/1/26/28; IH 2007/1/24/26-36.

does "anything that displeases God"[459] there from. Thus, Muslim American selves are encouraged to "rely on their own reasoning to understand Islam"[460]. Based on these findings, I argue that the corpus constructs what I suggest calling *Islamic literacy* as an ability, empowering Muslim American selves to successfully navigate within their life worldly surroundings.

Besides recommending Muslims to become Islamically literate, the corpus points out particular fields, where Islamic intervention is desired, such as prenuptial agreements[461] or financial relationships[462]. Only marginally, it provides explicit positions on desired Muslim behavior, mainly by discouraging particular practices, such as polygamy[463] or dating[464]. Besides the recommendations on how to become Islamically literate, some, although little advice is given on how the Muslim American self is supposed to approach its internal dimension, for example by "seeking spiritual renewal"[465] or by doing "some soul searching"[466].

Thus, the corpus does not provide the means to reach an Islamic way of life by prescribing a particular behavioral matrix. It is explicit on where Muslims have to turn to for guidance – to the Qur'an and the Sunna. The recourse envisioned is largely unmediated and a matter of self-responsibility. It is interesting to note that, as opposed to the rather unspecific means to become a model Muslim American self, the qualities ascribed to this very self are quite explicit.

Qualities: The qualities (re)constructed from the corpus refer, on the one hand, to Muslim conduct towards others and, on the other hand, to Muslim conduct towards the self. Towards others, the Muslim American self is encouraged to be tolerant[467], receptive[468], and open-minded[469]. With respect to itself, it is encouraged to pursue an attitude of self-pride[470] and self-criticism[471]. Further, it is encouraged to strive towards excellence.[472]

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459 IH 2009/4/56/57.
460 IH 2002/5/10/12.
461 IH 2001/2/38-40.
462 IH 2001/6/82/84/85.
463 IH 1996/2/22.
464 IH 2005/3/38-44/46-48/50-52.
465 IH 1996/2/18-20.
466 IH 1998/6/66/67.
467 IH 1997/3/56/58; IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-32/34/35.
468 IH 1998/2/44-47/51; IH 2000/4/32-34.
469 IH 1998/2/44-47/51; IH 2002/4/46/48/49.
470 IH 2005/6/32-42/44; IH 2009/3/54/55.
471 IH 2006/4/44-46; IH 2007/1/52/53; IH 2009/3/46-53; IH 2009/3/46-53.
472 IH 2005/2/26-30; IH 2005/6/60/61(2).

The results of corpus analysis show that with regards to the Muslim American self, Islam functions as reference for lifestyle formation. As Islam is largely equated with the Qur'an and the Sunna, the means to obtain a Muslim lifestyle are held to be contained in those sources. However, instead of providing a reading thereof, the corpus assigns source interpretation largely to the Muslim American self. The means to reach a life of taqwa thus equate to the Muslim self's ability to become Islamically literate.

Interpretation

In what follows, I will interpret the construction of the Muslim American self, as it results from the IH corpus, by drawing on two theories: With Eickelman and Piscatori (1996), we can argue that the construction of an ideal Muslim American self is the result of processes of *objectification*. (p. 37-45) The general tendency of the rising self-consciousness found among Muslims living in different contexts all over the world since the late twentieth century has been particularly constitutive for Muslim Americans: As they live in a minority situation and in a climate of increased political tension, they are constantly required to reflect and negotiate their Muslimness and Islamicity – not only with respect to their surroundings but also for themselves. The corpus' appeal to become Islamically literate can be interpreted as an attempt to empower Muslims with respect to an according situation.
With Eickelman and Piscatori we can further consider the call on Muslim selves' to approach the authoritative sources unmediated as a concession to objectification, as it changes traditional authority patterns of Islamic knowledge production. In line with this argument, the findings of chapter 6 have shown that traditional Islamic authorities of the broader Muslim world do not hold a prominent place within Muslim American narrative. However, the development of American institutions replacing those authorities is still in an initial phase. This situation, I argue, contributes to foster processes of objectification.

With Taylor (2007) we can complement this interpretation and suggest that as objectification crucially affects the construction of Muslim American selves, it keeps those selves from moving towards a *post-Durkheimian* disposition to Islam. Let me expand this argument a bit further: As I have outlined above, scholars have argued that we are witnessing a time of individualization of religiosity and spirituality. Taylor has grasped this tendency with the notion of post-Durkheimian in order to describe situations "in which the spiritual dimension of existence is quite unhooked from the political". (Ibid., p. 455) He has distinguished the paleo-[473] and the neo-Durkheimian

473 The paleo-Durkheimian situation is not relevant for the discussion here and is only mentioned for the sake of completeness. Taylor characterizes it as a situation, "in which the ontic dependence of the state on God and higher times is still alive, even though it may be weakened by disenchantment and an instrumental spirit; (...)". (p. 455)

situation there from, whereas in the neo-Durkeimian situation, "God is present because it is his Design around which society is organized". (Ibid.) As paleo-, neo-, and post-Durkheimian situations describe historical ideal types, Taylor has argued that our history moved through them and that we are now witnessing an increased shift towards the post-Durkheimian type. (Ibid., pp. 487-489) The model Muslim American self reconstructed from the IH corpus, however, rather exhibits a neo-Durkheimian disposition. The IH corpus makes a strong case to obtain Islamic literacy as a precondition to lead a God conscious life. The present world is regarded as the context of this life and excellence the quality attributed to the estate for Muslim American selves to achieve. In turn, the post-Durkheimian emphasis lies on spiritual inspiration – on personal experience, passion, emotion, or feeling – which "is no longer intrinsically related to society". (Ibid., 490)

I argue here that the neo-Durkheimian disposition of the Muslim American self is a consequence of the above-introduced concept of objectification. Repeated request to voice a Muslim or Islamic position on x, y, and z strengthens the self-consciousness of the Muslim American self. Let me preliminarily conclude here by arguing that the construction of the Muslim American self, as it emerges from the IH corpus, promotes a neo-Durkheimian disposition of Muslim Americans.

Let's now turn to the function of Islam with respect to the Muslim American community.

ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM AMERICAN COMMUNITY

In the preface of *Cosmopolitanism and Solidarity* (2006) Hollinger states:

> Just who belongs together with whom, and for what purposes, and on what authority? The answers to these basic issues in affiliation are not as obvious as they once seemed. Ascribed and taken-for-granted identities are being disrupted by a multitude of social transformations throughout the world, especially in the United States. (p. ix)

In what follows, I argue that this disruption has affected the construction of Muslim American communal ties in a crucial way. As an intro to this paragraph, I would like to shortly recollect the findings of the previous chapter. My central conclusion there has been that the Muslim American community is constructed by means of a narrative transcending Muslim diversity on the basis of an Islamic unum. As diversity is constructed as a positive potential of the unum, I have argued that the latter carries features of cosmopolitanism. However, the corpus does neither furnish Islam as a fixed behavioral matrix for the Muslim self nor does it bestow fixed features on the Islamic unum. As I will show below, the function of Islam for the Muslim American

community derives from it constituting the reference point for Muslim communal identity. Again, by distinguishing its aim from the means and the techniques to achieve it, let's now assess the construction of this communal identity.

Aim: The aim to foster a communal identity among Muslim Americans on the basis of an Islamic unum translates into enhancing Muslim American representation. The corpus mentions various fields of aspired Muslim representation. First and foremost, it stresses the necessity to cultivate the public image of Islam[474], one example reading as follows: "instead of waiting for and then complaining about attacks on Islam, Muslims should do more to share Islam with others and define (...) our belief before someone does it for us."[475] Further, the corpus repeatedly encourages fostering Muslim representation in American politics.[476] Muslim political participation is strongly encouraged, for example on the basis of the claim that "without that we cannot be a viable part of this country"[477]. Besides political representation, the corpus mentions other American institutions, in which Muslim representation is desired, such as the health care system[478], the media[479], the educational system[480], the entertainment industry[481], language[482], the foreign service[483], etc. The aim to advance Muslim American representation has been approved of from the 1990s onwards as research has shown and as Chapter 5 of this study has demonstrated. As a typical expression thereof, Muslim Americans have been asked to take an active part in becoming components of the "American fabric".[484] At the same time, the corpus expresses the expectation of American society to accept Muslims as natural parts of this very "American fabric".

The aim put forth by the IH corpus entails a particular condition, namely a positive attitude towards fostering Muslim communal ground. This attitude is reflected also by the means.

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474 IH 1996/5/20-22; IH 1996/6/38-40; IH 1998/4/25; IH 1998/5/18-20; IH 1999/1/21/22; IH 2000/2/10/11; IH 2000/6/26-30/32-34/36/38/40/42/48/50; IH 2000/6/52/53; IH 2001/6/8/9; IH 2001/6/62/63; IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-32/34/35; IH 2002/3/14/15; IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-32/34/35.

475 IH 2007/6/43/44/46-50.

476 IH 1996/2/18-20; IH 1996/4/32-34; IH 1996/5/20-22; IH 1996/6/58-60; IH 1998/2/18/19; IH 1998/2/38/39; IH 2001/5/22; IH 2001/5/50; IH 2008/6/32-42; IH 2009/1/26-29.

477 IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-32/34/35.

478 IH 1996/5/36.

479 IH 2001/6/62/63; IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-32/34/35.

480 IH 1996/2/18-20; IH 2001/6/62/63; IH 2005/5/54/56.

481 IH 1996/2/38/39; IH 1998/2/30/31; IH 1999/1/21/22; IH 2006/3/52.

482 IH 2001/1/14(2).

483 IH 1999/6/26/28.

484 For an illustration of these arguments see for example IH 2002/1/56, an article with the heading: Muslim American Challenges Ahead. A viable Muslim community forms part of the American fabric.

Means: The means to reach communal ground concentrate, on the one hand, on aspects of community building and service and, on the other hand, on community consolidation. One aspect the corpus strongly emphasizes is the necessity to cater to the needs of the Muslim youth.[485] Contained therein is the conviction that only a joint Muslim community will be able to provide for the Muslim youth. Thus, the prospering of the Muslim youth is considered a responsibility of the Muslim American community:

> If we want to see a generation of confident, proud, and effective Muslims, we need to roll up our sleeves, gather our strength, trust in God and our community, and start the project as soon as we are realistically able to do so.[486]

This quote is unspecific on how "a generation of confident, proud, and effective Muslims" is to be built. However, other passages are more specific: Islamic education is considered the key to the future of the Muslim youth and consequentially the one of the community.[487]

Besides the focus on Muslim youth, the corpus mentions other aspects of community building, such as training individuals for leadership positions[488] as well as fostering the institution of the family[489].
The corpus describes community service as needed in various fields. Examples are, among others, the need for " literature based on the standard sources of Islamic religion and civilization"[490], for a "Fiqh relevant to our time, place, and non-Muslim environment"[491] or "a madhhab for dhimmi Muslims"[492], for a "Zakat Investment Fund"[493], and also for "Islamically guided expressions of popular culture"[494].

Finally, the corpus makes a strong case for fostering common ground among Muslim Americans. This is not surprising, since we are looking at a publication of an organization that is active in community building. The previous chapter has already substantiated this tendency. Besides what I have already discussed there, it is inter-

485 IH 1996/4/32-34; IH 1998/2/44-47/51; IH 2006/2/18-26/28/30; IH 2006/1/32-40/42; IH 2008/3/12.

486 IH 2008/2/18-26/28.

487 IH 1997/3/61; IH 1999/2/51; IH 2000/6/52/53; IH 2001/3/52; IH 2001/6/64; IH 2001/6/64; IH 2002/6/62-64/66-68/70; IH 2002/6/72-78/80/81; IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-35; IH 2002/6/38-40/42/44/52/54-56/58/61.

488 IH 1996/4/28/29/31; IH 1996/4/32-34; 1998/4/56; IH 1998/4/61-67; IH 2002/2/22/24/26; IH 1996/1/22/23.

489 IH 1998/2/52-54; IH 2000/4/48/50; IH 2005/3/38-44/46-48/50-52; IH 2009/3/32-36; IH 2009/3/38-44.

490 IH 1998/2/29.

491 IH 2000/6/26-30/32-34/36/38/40/42/48/50.

492 IH 2003/5/62/64/65/67.

493 IH 2006/5/46-48.

494 IH 2004/4/48/49.

esting to mention here the areas of aspired common ground fostering: An important issue that is extensively discussed in the corpus are Muslim holidays.[495] The corpus emphasizes the importance of Muslim Americans' joint celebration of holidays – first and foremost at the beginning of Ramadan. This is not considered as a matter of course, as Muslims around the globe have used different methods to deduce holiday dates on the basis of moon sighting. The following quotes points to this controversy:

> Some people think all Muslims should follow moon sightings in Makkah for the sake of unity. This position confirms to neither Ittihad al-Matali nor 'Ikhtilaf al-Matali. Adopting one place as a standard is unknown in the fiqh literature on Ittihad al-Matali. This new fiqhi position of following the moon sighting in Makkah has been rejected by all Muslim scholars in North America, including the Fiqh Council, as well as others not associated with the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) or the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA).[496]

The quote is interesting as regards aspects of the construction of the Muslim American community discussed earlier. It points to an authority shift: Muslim Americans are encouraged to follow the guidelines issued in North America instead of the ones issued in the Muslim world. The North American position attempts to foster common ground among Muslim Americans based on the argument that joint Muslim holidays are easier to institutionalize.
Similar to the joint holidays, other issues are considered as important for the construction of a communal Muslim American identity, such as the celebration of "an Islamic History Day"[497] or the organization of a "Muslim vote"[498], strategy[499], or vision[500]. The aim to establish a Muslim communal identity by means of fostering common ground is also reflected by the proposed techniques to achieve this.

Techniques: As in the previous chapter, the results of analysis here display the call on Muslim Americans to unite.[501] As I have already discussed the discursive strategies connected with this, I will not repeat those findings here. Besides the call to unite, some techniques, however, can be added here, such as the need for dialogue[502] and

495 IH 1996/1/10/11; IH 1997/2/26/27; IH 1999/4/20; IH 1999/6/30-32/40; IH 2001/1/78-81; IH 2001/6/40.

496 IH 2001/6/40.

497 IH 2001/3/10.

498 IH 1996/5/26-26.

499 IH 1998/2/40-43.

500 IH 2009/2/56/57.

501 IH 1999/1/21/22: IH 1999/5/33/34; IH 2000/6/52/53; IH 2003/5/16-18/19; IH 1996/5/15/16; IH 1996/5/20-22; IH 2004/6/16-22/24-30; IH 1997/4/s2/s6-s17.

502 IH 1996/1/22-23; IH 1996/2/18-20.

coordination[503]. Some extracts further encourage Muslims to regulate Muslim conduct if it is not appropriate, in the sense of:

> North American Muslims must not be complacent and remain silent when fellow Muslims violate Islamic values or are implicated in actions that distort Islam's humane and noble principles. Religious solidarity must not be allowed to trump our moral and legal commitments. Justice and good judgment, rather than sympathy, must guide Muslim positions and actions.[504]

Those techniques once again give reference to how the common ground or what I have called the Islamic unum is constructed. It is not considered to be simply there. Rather, it is regarded as a point of reference lacking fixed features to be reached by the quest of Muslims.

Interpretation

Based on these findings, I refer once more to David Hollinger in order to offer an interpretation of how the IH corpus constructs the communal ties between Muslim Americans and the role of Islam connected with it. In the previous chapter, I have argued that the Islamic unum can be considered to some extent as postethnic or cosmopolitan. More recently, Hollinger has expanded his argument and stressed that cosmopolitanism is the response to "the problem of solidarity". (p. xvii) At this point, it is important to note, that I draw here on Hollinger's definition of solidarity to use it analytically for purposes of interpretation.[505] I do not intend to discuss the concept in relation to positions of communitarianism and liberalism here but with respect to my previous argument made concerning the cosmopolitan aspects of the Islamic unum's construction.

Resuming Hollinger's argument, the problem of solidarity, "has a political-economic structure as well as a social-psychological one. We can speak of a 'political economy of solidarity' because solidarity is a commodity distributed by authority." (p. xvi) With this, the findings above can be connected to the broader socio-political context of Muslim American narrative construction. However, before doing so, let's focus more closely on Hollinger's conceptualization of solidarity: Accordingly, solidarity can be distinguished from the notion of community, as it designates "an experience of willed affiliation". (p. xi) Whereas *community* has often described "a

503 IH 1999/1/21/22.

504 IH 2005/5/20-22/24-26.

505 I use the concept as an abstraction from data, as the concept does not play a dominant role in the IH corpus. The word *solidarity* is not widely distributed in the corpus (38 hits) and apparently less important for Muslim American relational constructions compared to concepts such as for example *respect* (299 hits), *tolerance* (111 hits), or *justice* (545 hits).

group defined by one or more characteristics shared by its members whether or not those members are disposed to act together", *solidarity* describes:

> (...) a state of social existence achieved only when parties to an affiliation are understood to exercise at least some measure of agency, if only in consciously affirming an affiliation into which they were born. The experience of solidarity is more active than the membership in a community. (...) Solidarity is more performative than is community. It implies, even in modest dimensions, a special claim that individuals have on each other's energies and compassion. (p. xi)

Taking into account the results of analysis above in the light of this definition, I argue here that the construction of ideal Muslim American behavior creates a state of solidarity.[506] Muslim Americans are encouraged to foster common ground and to proactively represent. Thereby, community building figures as success criteria for Muslim representation. With Hollinger, we can thus claim that being Muslim by descent is not solidarity, but the affirmation of affiliating and acting on the basis of an – however undefined – Islamic unum is. Furthermore, I argue here that the Islamic unum functioning as impetus for Muslim Americans to negotiate common ground is connected to the disposition of the Muslim American self described above. I agree with Hollinger that:

> The problem of solidarity is inevitably located within one or another set of historical constraints, including the way in which power is distributed in any particular social setting. Some people have much more authority over their own affiliations than others do." (Ibid., p. xv)

This statement can be connected to what has been said above: I have argued that objectification processes have been caused by the increased pressure put on Muslims to justify their Muslimness and Islamicity and have thereby fostered a neo-Durkheimian construction of the Muslim self. Here, I argue that objectification processes are constitutive not only for the neo-Durkheimian construction of Muslim American selves but also for the construction of Muslim American solidarity. Chapter 7 has demonstrated that a tendency towards narratively racializing Muslims has been set in motion on the basis of a joint experience of discrimination, increasingly articulated since 9/11. The construction of Muslim American solidarity can be interpreted in the light of a post-9/11 environment as well, namely, as an attempt to make the

506 However, it is interesting to note that the few corpus extracts where the word *solidarity* surfaces, are formulated cautiously. This is probably due to the concept's centrality in the debate between communitarian and liberal positions, as the following corpus extract suggest: "Qur'an 8:72 urges Muslims to seek a political order based on peaceful cooperation and mutual respect, and warns against placing religious solidarity over covenanted rights and justice." (IH 2002/5/24-30) Or, at another instance: "Muslim Americans must not be complacent, nor silent, when fellow Muslims commit acts of which they disapprove. Religious solidarity must not be allowed to trump our moral and legal commitments. Justice and good judgment, rather than sympathy, must guide Muslim positions and actions." IH 2004/2/18-24.

Muslim voice heard – and thus, an attempt to claim authority over self-definition. This has also affected the functionality of Islam with respect to American society, as I will show now.

ISLAM AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

Let's briefly turn back to the narratives (re)constructed in the previous chapters: This study has defined narratives as constructed by discursive strategies of nomination, predication, and argumentation. Therefore, the function of Islam can be first of all deduced with respect to those different strategies. Analysis has revealed that Islam often partakes in strategies of argumentation. As such, its function has mainly been to provide normative rightness to narrative. Analysis has ascertained this particular construction of narrative at various points already.

Chapter 7, for example, has demonstrated that the legitimation for claiming a color-blind American society, as constructed in the IH corpus, rests on arguments deduced from the Qur'an and the Sunna of the prophet. The corpuses negotiation of race has accordingly differentiated "unIslamic" teachings and proponents thereof from "real Islam".

In the previous chapter, I have shown that the IH corpus displays the recourse to the Qur'an and the prophetic example in order to sanction social diversity as a God given, positive potential of the Muslim American community. Analysis has revealed that the Muslim American diversity narrative is closely related to the broader negotiation on American social manyness. Nomination as well as predication strategies found in the IH corpus are similar to those circulating within the broader American context. The repertoire pulled up to ground and legitimate nominations and predications, however, can be identified as Islamic – Islamic in this case denoting predominantly the recourse to the Qur'an and the Sunna.

With this, we can argue that Islam as a building brick of narrative functions to legitimate certain positions emanating from the American social fabric. However, it is important to note, that these positions are not meant to apply to Muslim Americans in particular – although some of them are – but to American society at large. Thus, Islam functions in those narratives, on the one hand, as a legitimation for Muslim Americans within a particular social context, by sanctioning the context. On the other hand, it empowers Muslim Americans by legitimating them as (potential) paradigmatic examples within this context. The fruitful alignment of Islam and the American context works the other way around as well, as chapter 6 has shown: In this case, it is the American context that sanctions Muslim Americans ability to approach Islam uncorrupted, in contrast to their co-religionists in the Muslim world. The consequence thereof is that Muslim Americans are encouraged to approach the Qur'an and the Sunna directly and unmediated.

Before describing the consequences arising from accordingly framing the function of Islam, I will now discuss the results of the modal verbs' co-text analysis to expand observations. To discuss Islam with regards to American society at large, I distinguish again between aim, dominant issues, as well as means, or what I call here techniques.

Aim: For the negotiation of an American common good Islam serves as discursive strategy of Muslim argumentation. Muslims thus partake in a larger societal discussion basing their arguments on normative Islamic ground. Let's focus on popular issues for Muslim intervention.

Issues: The corpus encourages Muslim Americans to provide an Islamic argumentation to issues that we can best subsume under the generic terms *social ills* or *societal problems*. More specifically, the corpus calls on Muslims to become active by helping people in need[507] or by taking part in the struggle against poverty[508], homelessness[509], HIV/AIDS[510], terrorism and extremism[511], racism and discrimination[512], gambling[513], drugs[514], violence[515], etc. One example reads as follows:

> Muslims should point out the enormous contribution of Islam in fighting racism, drug addiction, promiscuity and AIDS, the breakdown of the family, the cooling of human relations, abortion, stress without recourse to a shrink, obesity, and cholesterol.[516]

This extract depicts Islam as the solution for solving a wide array of societal problems. Another extract is worth citing at length, because it shows, once more, how Muslim Americans are attributed as exceptional, a quality that entails certain responsibilities:

> The US provides a, relatively speaking, free environment for Islam and Muslims to interact with modern society. Herein lies the tremendous responsibility and historical significance of North American Muslims. The community has the capacity and is imbued with the responsibility to reconcile modern practices and institutions with Islamic values and beliefs, and bridge the widening gap between the West and the Muslim world. Americans are faced with tremendous challenges but also have unparalleled

507 IH 2000/6/52/53; IH 2008/1/22-26/28.

508 IH 2000/6/52/53; IH 2005/6/57; IH 2008/1/22-26/28; IH 2009/6/32-39.

509 IH 2000/2/44/45.

510 IH 1996/5/24-26; IH 2002/1/30/38; IH 2005/5/54/56; IH 2005/6/57.

511 IH 2006/5/11/12; IH 2009/3/10(2).

512 IH 1996/5/24-26; IH 2002/5/10/12; IH 2005/1/12; IH 2006/1/54/55; IH 2006/6/18-26/28-31; IH 2009/3/10(2).

513 IH 2009/6/32-39.

514 IH 1996/5/24-26.

515 IH 1996/5/24-26.

516 IH 1996/5/18-20.

> opportunities. They have the opportunity to give Islam a new expression, suitable to our age. They also have the opportunity to rescue modern society from its current predicaments. North American Muslims need to contribute towards society's betterment by advancing the values of family, community, compassion, and justice.[517]

Besides the social ills in need of Islamic intervention, the corpus depicts, it also relates the betterment of society to the means of advancing political justice, civil as well as human rights[518], ethical values provided by religion[519], peace[520], and also issues such as environmentalism[521]. With this, let's consider the techniques, on the basis of which an Islam based argumentation is advanced.

Techniques: The techniques Muslims are recommended to employ in order to advance Islamic argumentation can be subsumed under the notion of da'wah. The meaning of the Arabic notion of da'wah, as it is used in the IH corpus, is seldom translated explicitly but mostly obtains meaning by being aligned with certain activities. One of the rare explicit translations of da'wah reads as: " the calling of new brothers and sisters to the faith."[522] Instead, the corpus frequently displays less explicit calls on Muslim Americans to put "knowledge and faith"[523], "believes and values"[524], "Qur'anic teachings"[525], or simply "words"[526] into action by means of various techniques. The main instruments the corpus encourages Muslims to employ vis-à-vis their neighbors are to reach out[527], to build coalitions[528], and to engage in (interfaith) dialogue[529]. Further instruments are to live by example[530] and to engage in social or charitable work[531]. Hence, the corpus depicts certain instruments that serve to promote Islam – and thus can be considered as instruments of da'wah.

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517 IH 2005/5/20-22/24-26.

518 IH 1996/6/58-60; IH 2001/5/50; IH 2000/1/48/51/53; IH 2004/2/18-20/22/24; IH 2004/6/16-22/24-30; IH 2005/6/57.

519 IH 2002/2/44/46.

520 IH 2002/5/32.

521 IH 2005/6/64/65.

522 IH 1996/2/18-20.

523 IH 2003/5/28/30.

524 IH 2003/5/28/30.

525 IH 2005/5/54/56.

526 IH 2008/6/14(3).

527 IH 2001/2/46/49; IH 2002/1/30/38; IH 2002/4/22-26/28-30; IH 2005/6/32-42/44; IH 2006/3/52; IH 2006/6/10/11; IH 2009/1/44; IH 2009/3/46-53.

528 IH 1999/5/33/34; IH 2001/5/50; IH 2002/5/24/26-28/30; IH 2002/5/32; IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-32/34/35; IH 2007/3/54/55; IH 2008/1/46; IH 2009/1/44; IH 2009/3/10(2); IH 2009/6/32-39.

529 IH 1998/2/44-47/51; IH 1999/4/10; IH 2002/4/22-30; IH 2002/5/10/12; IH 2006/5/62; IH 2008/4/26-30.

530 IH 1998/2/40-43; IH 2002/6/18-22/24/26-28/30-32/34/35.

531 IH 1998/2/30/31; IH 2000/6/52/53; IH 2005/6/32-42/44; IH 2006/3/38-49; IH 2009/1/44; IH 2009/6/30/31.

EXAMPLE - INTERFAITH DIALOGUE

In order to show the effects deriving from the described outreach techniques, it is worth to analyze one of them more closely: interfaith dialogue. If looked at from a diachronic perspective, the aim of interfaith dialogue transforms. Corpus extracts of the 1990s diagnose the necessity for interfaith dialogue and encourage coalition building. Since 9/11, the corpus displays an increase of interfaith coalition building efforts. Reports on interfaith activities are more frequently accompanied by calls on Muslim Americans to engage in and support according initiatives. Finally, ISNA's annual convention in 2009 featured the prominent evangelical Protestant pastor, Rick Warren, who stated in the main session: "I am not interested in interfaith dialogue; I am interested in interfaith projects."[532] Let me show now how interfaith dialogue has been gradually developed as an instrument for installing Islam as a discursive strategy of argumentation in the discussion on the American common good. I will reproduce this development on the basis of the IH corpuses reporting on interfaith activities:

In the 1990s interfaith understanding was promoted vis-à-vis the Muslim community as the Qur'anically grounded necessity to respect other religions.[533] The corpus shows that to legitimate this position, leading Islamic institutions such as Al-Azhar University were urged to issue guidelines for interfaith dialogue.[534] Whereas interfaith dialogue itself was frequently the subject of promotion, after 9/11 it was increasingly promoted as an instrument to challenge stereotyping and discrimination.[535] The corpus displays that the emerging coalitions – some built in the first instance to challenge discrimination – gradually developed into coalitions taking positions on various issues. Aligning on the basis of certain issues, again, opened the field for further coalition building with religious as well as non-religious partners. A diachronic perspective on the corpuses description of interfaith activities reveals that the focus of negotiation has been transformed from a particular good, concerning the Muslim community, to the common good of American society at large. The following extract gives reference to the different interests that are pursued by participating in interfaith dialogue:

> Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities launched the "United to Protect" campaign, which is grounded on an interfaith condemnation of terrorism and an affirmation to protect America and Americans.
>
> Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, on 30 Nov. 2007,

532 IH 2009/5/42-50.

533 IH 1996/1/24; IH 1996/2/9; IH 1998/1/11/12; IH 1998/1/46/47; IH 1998/2/35.

534 IH 1998/1/46/47.

535 IH 2001/6/14(1); IH 2002/3/14/15; IH 2003/4/8; IH 2004/2/31-34; IH 2004/4/16-20/22-24/26-28/30/36-39; IH 2004/6/52; IH 2006/5/11/12.

> Dr. Muzammil Siddiqi read aloud the Fiqh Council of North America's (FCNA) fatwa based on Qur'an 5:32: "If anyone kills a person, except for murder or spreading corruption in the land, it would be as if he killed all people; and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all people. " Cardinal Theodore McCarrick (Archbishop Emeritus of Washington, DC), who inaugurated the campaign, called the fatwa "courageous, unprecedented, and historic," and urged Jews, Christians, and Muslims to work together for peace, for ''we all want to be able to live in peace."
>
> "The primary objective of the campaign is to guard Americans from terrorism and its devastating consequences," noted Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed. "The long term gain will be the building of trust among individuals of different religious and ethnic traditions with a focus on the common ground we have in the love of our nation and the desire to protect our people."[536]

The occasion of the article, issued in 2008, was the launch of an interfaith campaign. The central aim of the campaign was neither to establish dialogue between different faith communities nor to challenge the discrimination of Muslims but to protect America and Americans. This aim was legitimated by a fatwa issued by the Fiqh Council of North America, an American grown Islamic authority. Although the condemnation of terrorism figures as the main focus of the campaign, it is additionally promoted as a future tool to reach out, namely not only to "religious" but also to "ethnic traditions". This text extract is one of many examples that show how an Islamic position advocates the general wellbeing of American society. Furthermore, it expresses the willingness to align with other social actors not necessarily based on religious affiliation but on the unifying force of patriotism.

The call to transform interfaith dialogue into "interfaith projects", as encouraged by Rick Warren at ISNA's 46th annual convention, can be traced in the IH corpus as well. The corpus extract below promotes issue-based activism by means of "interfaith programs". Interfaith dialogue is somehow devalued by being described as "just talk about faith":

> But there is also progress elsewhere, such as in our efforts to integrate, for instance. We are now, more than ever before, better skilled to engage in the politics of this country, we have more effective mechanisms in place to protect our civil rights, and we have become fully engaged in interfaith programs. The latter (...) is now more than just talk about faith and practice: It now includes working tirelessly with other faith communities in, for instance, the war against poverty, the reduction of weapons of mass destruction, and in the prevention of genocide and human suffering worldwide.[537]

536 IH 2008/2/8.

537 IH 2007/1/10/11.

Thus, as interfaith dialogue has become an important instrument for Muslim participation, Muslim Americans have become partners in various relationships. A corpus extract of 2008 for example shows that ISNA's interfaith director Sayyid M. Syeed met Pope Benedict XVI and reportedly said to him that „'interfaith dialogue has become a way of life in America' and that the decade long dialogue between American Catholics and Muslims has been successful and productive."[538] And, whereas in 1998, authorities such as Al-Azhar University were asked to issue guidelines concerning interfaith dialogue, ten years later, Muslim Americans participated in the "First International Islamic Conference on Dialogue", held in Mecca, to share their experiences with participants from the Muslim world.[539]

Interpretation

Above, I have listed the issues Muslim Americans are encouraged to address in the light of Islamic argumentation. These issues represent typical platforms, where the interests of American religious and non-religious actors intermingle. (Hollinger, 2008: 151f) The participation in issue based alliances has not only allowed Muslim organizations to challenge discrimination, by displaying themselves as legitimate actors operating within American structures, but to include their views within the process of shaping the common good. The no longer questioned fundamental acceptance of American standards regarding negotiation places them in a better position to introduce their views.

I argue that as processes of objectification have promoted a neo-Durkheimian construction of Muslim American selves, as well as Muslim American solidarity, the increased involvement of Muslims in the negotiation of the American common good can be considered a natural consequence thereof.

As Muslims partake in the negotiation of the American common good as agents of the public sphere, they are incorporated in the category religion. (Drees, 2008) Scholars have argued that we are witnessing an increased involvement of religion in public debate. This process has been described with the concept of *public religion*. (Casanova, 1994) According to Casanova, public religion has emerged from historical *forms* of *deprivatization* – that is, the emergence of religious intervention in the public sphere. (p. 228f) He has distinguished three forms of intervention: Firstly, intervention is manifested as "the religious mobilization in defense of the traditional lifeworld against various forms of state or market penetration"; Secondly, it is represented in "those cases in which religions enter the public sphere of modern societies to ques-

538 IH 2008/4/8.

539 IH 2008/5/24.

tion and contest the claims of the two major societal systems, states and markets". The third form of deprivatization is "connected with the obstinate insistence of traditional religions on maintaining the very principle of a 'common good' against individualist modern liberal theories which would reduce the common good to the aggregated sum of individual choices." (pp. 228-229)

Considering the findings above, the call on Muslim Americans to take action can be considered as a representation of deprivatized religion. However, Casanova's argument has to be challenged in one crucial point. Schulze (2008) has argued that contemporary Islam is predominantly framed by means of the concept of the public sphere. Consequentially, we define Islam on the basis of our understanding of public religion and accordingly as public Islam. He has therefore challenged Casanova's argument that today traditional religions partake in negotiating the common good as they have undergone processes of deprivatization. Schulze has emphasized that we are not witnessing a process of traditional religions entering the public sphere but the fundamental reconfiguration of religion by means of the public sphere. (p. 161) The findings of this and previous chapters, as well as the argument made above that objectification interferes with the construction of Muslim American selves and Muslim American solidarity, support this argument. Muslim intervention on the basis of Islamic argumentation in the public sphere is constraint by how the legitimacy of religious actors taking part in the negotiation of the American common good is constructed. As this sets a very particular frame for the configuration of American public Islam, let me briefly turn to this frame to complement this chapter:

The "non-establishment" and the "free-exercise" clause set the constitutional frame for the discussion on religion in the US. In contrast to Europe, the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights guarantees not only the non-establishment of a state religion or "the genuine neutrality of the secular state" (Casanova, 2004: 8). It also safeguards the "free exercise of religion" in civil society, which means that state interference with religious life is strictly regulated. Within this legal framework, the involvement of religious actors and their arguments is a matter of debate. Thereby, the categories religious and secular are contested and used as dialectical tools of differentiation. This is the backdrop of Casanova's appeal to be suspicious of arguments that confront society with the "binary choice" of, on the one hand, "theoretic political theology" presented as "religious fanaticism", and, on the other hand, "secular political philosophy" presented as "liberal toleration". (Casanova, 2007).

The legitimacy of religious argumentation with reference to the American common good has been discussed controversially. Hollinger (2008) has claimed that the US is witnessing "a striking increase in the number and intensity of demands for a greater

role for religion in public affairs, and for more 'flexible' and 'realistic' approaches to the constitutional separation of church and state" (p. 141). He has argued that religious ideas are not as seriously engaged as non-religious ones, which he believes is a result of the American constitutional tradition and of a past of religious diversity. Hollinger has appealed to challenge the predominant "religion-is-good-for-America narrative" and has advocated the John Rawlsian recommendation of "checking one's religion at the door". (p. 146) He has called for a "renewal" of "civic patriotism" in order to "encourage pride in the church-state separation and celebrate a distinctive civic sphere in which persons of many religious orientations, including persons who count themselves as nonbelievers in any religion, can be full participants in their distinctive capacity as Americans." (p. 148) Hollinger has recognized that religious culture of citizens would still affect what he has called "the secular sphere of public affairs". Because, according to him, the problem is not the advancement of religious ideas per se, but the "absence of sustained, public scrutiny" thereof, which "has created a vacuum filled with easy God talk". (p. 149) Therefore, he considers the issue-based alliance of "political liberals of secular orientation" with "faith-affirming Americans" only as legitimate, if civic patriotism is promoted:

> This continued avoidance of actual debate about religious issues seems to me viable only if religious liberals and secular liberals can advance a civic patriotism that would celebrate a distinctly secular public sphere along the lines advocated by Rawls and Obama. The need to engage religious ideas diminishes somewhat if those ideas are understood, in keeping with modern church-state separationist doctrine, to be inappropriate justifications for public policy. (p. 152)

The perspective deriving from Casanova's (1994) conception of public religion and its thus resulting role in shaping the common good, is different. Casanova is not an advocate of "checking religion at the door". On the contrary, he has ascribed religion an important role within the "process of practical rationalization" and in shaping, what he has called, "the unfinished project of modernity". (p. 234) He has made it clear though that "only a religious tradition which has incorporated as its own the central aspects of the Enlightenment critique of religion is in a position today to play a positive role in furthering processes of practical rationalization." (p. 233) According to Casanova, a religious tradition of this type is able to confront the "differentiated secular spheres, challenging them to face their own obscurantist, ideological, and inauthentic claims" (p. 234). Casanova advocates conceptualizing the contribution of "religions and other normative traditions" by means of a "model of modern social integration" that:

> (...) emerges in and through the discursive and agonic participation of individuals, groups, social movements and institutions in a public yet undifferentiated sphere of civil society where the collective construction and reconstruction,

> contestation, and affirmation of common normative structures – "the common good" – takes place." (p. 230)

Casanova and Hollinger agree that religious cultures are de facto a factor in public debate. However, they have evaluated and framed the legitimacy of this intervention differently and by touching on their positions, I have given a small insight into a major discussion that affects the construction of American (public) Islam.

DISCUSSION

I have shown above that the IH corpus encourages Muslim American selves to aspire a Life of Taqwa by means of becoming Islamically literate. For the Muslim community, Islam functions as reference point of communal identity. And, Islam has gradually been advanced as a discursive strategy of Muslim argumentation, for example in issue based alliances. Thus, findings suggest that we can at least distinguish three functional forms attributed to Islam by narrative. I have argued that these functions result to a large extent from processes of objectification. Objectification-processes have resulted from discursive conditions predominating in all parts of the Muslim world. They have also been at work in the American context, whereby the tense political climate in post 9/11 America towards Muslims can be considered as an amplifier for Muslim American self-consciousness. Thus, this context is significantly formative for the functionality attributed to Islam and accordingly for the construction of *American* Islam. We can conclude here that contemporary American Islam is structurally particular, which comes to no surprise. American Islam owes its particular construction to the American context, as does French Islam to the French context, as I will argue in the conclusion. The (re)constructed function of Islam has provided some insights into what we need to consider, if we want to assess this particularity. It does no longer make sense to rest the explanatory framework for it, say, on a genealogical perspective on Islam, or, maybe even on an assumed essence of Islam.

This thesis has been an attempt to closely reconstruct Muslim American narratives as they have recently emerged. In order to grasp the particularity of these narratives, I think it is necessary to advance comparative approaches. Therefore, we obviously need to look, on the one hand, at constructions of Islam in other contemporary settings. More importantly, however, we need, on the other hand, to search for analytical categories within the American context that enable us to compare American Islam. As findings above suggest, this category need not necessarily be religion. Otherwise we run the risk to impose the concept of (public) religion onto Islam, which might limit our findings considerably. As this chapter and the ones before have hinted to possible comparative fields, let me in the concluding part of this study offer some arguments, future research could build on.

PART III

HERMENEUTICS OF AMERICAN ISLAM: CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER TEN

PUTTING AMERICAN ISLAM INTO PERSPECTIVE

Before taking up the concluding discussion, let me recapitulate what this study has shown so far: I have started out with a description of the historical narratives scholars have advanced with respect to the Muslim presence in North America. Those narratives, I have argued, are part of a multifaceted narrative repertoire available to contemporary Muslim Americans to construct their Muslimness and Islamicity. Additionally, chapter 1 has provided an overview of the heterogeneous contemporary Muslim American organizational landscape and introduced a typology based on distinguishing between the organizations' claims to represent or serve certain groups and to advocate certain issues.

Chapter 2 has provided a discussion of the research perspectives framing Islam in America. Not a research overview in the classical sense, my aim was to point out the different ways Islam has been described with respect to the American context depending on scholarly perspectives. This angle of view prepared the ground to introduce my own perspective in chapter 3.

There, I have suggested to take up a constructivist approach in order to explore aspects of Muslimness and Islamicity on the basis of Muslim American narratives. The focus on narratives provided the theoretical frame to consider Muslimness and

Islamicity as co-constructions; Muslim American organizations, their supporters, as well as the public sphere being partakers.
With the notion of narrative, I defined an analytical category and a tailor-made perspective for this study, from which empirical data could be looked at selectively. Accordingly, I have used the notion of narrative as a kind of metaphor to designate linguistic patterns in data. Building on this, a methodological procedure combining corpus linguistic tools with a discourse analytical approach has been introduced. This approach was chosen in line with the data basis singled out for the study, consisting of Muslim American organizations' output compiled in different corpora.
Chapter 4 has provided a detailed description of the data providers and the four different corpora built for the purpose of this study. The different corpora served the study in different ways, and analysis was predominantly carried out on the basis of the IH corpus, a corpus encompassing articles that appeared between 1996 and 2009 in *Islamic Horizons*, the flagship publication of the *Islamic Society of North America*.

As a prelude to the analytical part, chapter 5 has demonstrated the selectivity characteristic for narrative constructions by comparing them to the backdrop of a broader narrative repertoire. Additionally, chapter 5 has shown how processes of integration can be traced on the basis of narrative.
Chapters 6 to 9 all dealt with the leading research interests of this study by gradually narrowing the focus of analysis. Chapter 6 concentrated on narratives constructing Muslim American relations to the broader Muslim world. On the basis of two corpora, analysis has comparatively brought forth different conceptualizations of the Muslim world. Overall, however, the conceptualizations displayed similarities regarding their negative predication of the Muslim world. Both have largely constructed the Muslim world in differentiation from Muslim Americans. Despite the negative predication, analysis has exposed that the Muslim world is still a locus Muslim American scholars and leaders partly turn to for their educational training. A typology that distinguished Muslim American scholars' and leaders' relationships to institutionalized knowledge gave reference to their entanglement with the Muslim world.
In chapter 7, the focus was adjusted to the Muslim American community. By narrowing the analytical focus, new boundaries, narratively drawn and redrawn came into sight. The chapter has shown that common typology to characterize different Muslim American groups applied by scholars does not correspond to boundaries drawn by Muslim American narratives. Furthermore, findings indicated, that the concept of *race* has been crucial for the configuration of narrative boundary drawing in the aftermath of 9/11. Thereby, Muslim American narratives have increasingly drawn on an African American (Muslim) narrative repertoire.
Chapter 8 additionally pointed out, how the redrawn boundaries have affected the narrativization of Muslim American communal ties. The chapter concentrated on

the adaption and configuration of the American motto *E pluribus unum* by Muslim American narratives. Based on the (re)construction of a Muslim American diversity narrative, I have argued that the thus emerging Muslim American communal constructions bear characteristics of postethnicism and cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, the chapter has indicated that Muslim American narratives are closely interwoven with narratives of a larger American narrative repertoire.
Finally, chapter 9 has shown into further detail how the American context has affected constructions of Muslimness and Islamicity. By analyzing the functions of Islam for the narrative construction of Muslim selves, the Muslim American community, and American society, the chapter has demonstrated that the construction of American Islam heavily depends on the conditions prevailing in the context. In order to place those findings into a wider context and to deduce what is American about American Islam, let me now turn to an overall discussion of the obtained results.

The overall aim of the following concluding remarks is to discuss the implications this study's findings could have for future research perspectives. In four steps, I will put forth arguments on how the particularity of American Islam – as this study has (re)constructed it[540] – can be interpreted. Firstly, I will discuss approaches put forth by Islamic studies and *Islamwissenschaft* that I think fall short in assessing how contemporary Islam is configured in Western societies today. Secondly, I will propose an explanatory framework I think is suitable to interpret the findings. Thirdly, within this explanatory framework, some suggestions will be made on how the particularity of American Islam can be established by means of comparison. And fourthly, I will outline how future research could generally build on the findings of this study.

SHORTCOMINGS OF RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY ISLAM'S PARTICULARITIES

In what follows, my critique is directed against certain perspectives recently put forth by two compendiums of *Islamwissenschaft* and Islamic studies: *Das Unbehagen in der Islamwissenschaft : ein klassisches Fach im Scheinwerferlicht der Politik und der Medien* (Poya & Reinkowski, 2008b) and *Rethinking Islamic Studies. From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism* (Ernst & Martin, 2010b). I chose to discuss those two publications, because the first one represents perspectives of European, mostly German, *Islamwissenschaft*, the tradition formative for my own academic socialization. The second publication represents perspectives of American Islamic studies and thus those that will probably most affect future research on American Islam and Muslim Americans.

540 It is important to keep in mind that the (re)constructions were obtained predominantly on the basis of the IH corpus.

My reservations towards the European compendium concern the spatial and temporal conceptual frameworks dominating *Islamwissenschaft* until today. With regards to the spatial aspect, *Islamwissenschaft* has traditionally been occupied with a specific region, the so-called Muslim world, whereby the focus has lain on the Middle East. Connected with this has been a strong philological commitment to "Islamic languages", such as Arabic, Turkish, or Persian. (Reinkowski, 2008) As a consequence of higher mobility and modern communications technology, the relation between the "Muslim world" and the "Western world" has been perceived in terms of "shrinking distance". (Jokisch, 2008, p. 40) I argue that an according perception reveals that the orientalist dichotomies of "the here" and "the there" still underlie conceptual presumptions, if they are are applied as the framework to study contemporary Western Islam.
As regards the temporal aspect, representatives of *Islamwissenschaft* have considered it crucial to bridge the gap between philological-historical (classical) approaches and the socio-political (contemporary) approaches in order for *Islamwissenschaft* "to make sense". (Sing, 2008, p. 178) Sing, among others, has argued that *Islamwissenschaft* should provide insights into interdependencies of early Islam and contemporary Islam and explain the change of philological, religious, social, political, and economic phenomena. (Ibid.) Again, I argue that othering contemporary Islam in terms of temporal reference to a "classical" time frame "back there" alludes to an orientalist bias.

The spatial as well as the temporal frame proposed for studies of *Islamwissenschaft* result from the tradition of the field and are crucial for its self-understanding. I argue, however, that they are not suitable for interpreting American Islam. Put bluntly, the two explanatory frameworks that are spanned here advise scholars of *Islamwissenschaft* to study contemporary Islam in the West in relation to early Islam and in relation to the dichotomy "Muslim world" and "Western world". I would hold against this that American Islam *is* Western, and that it has to be interpreted as such. Furthermore, contemporary American Islam is structurally particular as it emerges from the structurally particular contemporary American context. The same argument of course is valid for other contexts as well.
Does a genealogical/historical perspective really serve us well to explain the particularity of constructions of Islam emerging from different Western contexts? A genealogical/historical perspective entails the perception of Islam as a tradition that has traveled to the Western world by means of migration and media. There is no doubt that it is historically illustrative and legitimate to show how Islam has been appropriated and configured in different temporal and spatial contexts. However, I argue here that an orientalist biased Islamwissenschaft can only frame *Western* Islam as *transnational* or *diasporic* (as it is *other*) and thus prevents us from conceiving Islam *as* Western.

This study has shown that the Muslim world is narratively emploted as constitutive for the superiority of Muslim Americans. Therefore, I argue that this should lead to a (re)conceptualization of the Muslim world within our theoretical frameworks. I have shown that the Muslim world is narratively devalued as a place where Islam has been corrupted by culture. Vis-à-vis these shortcomings, Muslim Americans are constructed as role models. According to narrative, they owe this role to the conditions prevalent in the American context – a context, the narrative goes, where pure Islam is able to prosper via the excellence of Islamically literate Muslim American selves. As these narrative constructions emphasize the significance of the American context, I think we have to follow suit in our explanatory frameworks. Accordingly, instead of framing the Muslim world as a locus of homelands or as a reference point for solidarity ties, we could focus on its constitutive function for Muslim American differentiation.

The American compendium of Islamic studies suggests a different approach. There, Islam is framed in the light of the ongoing discussion of the concept religion. Institutionally, Islamic studies, as the compendium presents them, are to a large extent part of Religious Studies Departments. This institutional connection is relatively new, as Islamic studies before predominantly were part of Near and Middle Eastern studies, as I have shown in the introductory chapter. In the afterword of the compendium, Bruce B. Lawrence (2010) has consequentially argued that rethinking Islamic studies has to begin with the question whether the matrix of religious studies with its "Judeo-Christian prejudgments, categories, and expectations" has been reconfigured as far as making "room for Islam, or at least for an Islam recognizable to Muslims". (p. 303) He sees this question related to "the effort to find the core of what is deemed to be authentic and Muslim", i.e. to establish "distinctions between orthodox, normative, and 'folk' Islam" or "the center" and "the peripheries". (Ibid.) According to Lawrence, the endeavor to "make sense of religion" profits from linking it to the concept of cosmopolitanism – a linkage that "confers a special benefit for the study of Islam." (p. 304) Lawrence has argued that adapting the concept of cosmopolitanism could break up the "dyadic logic" that has provided the frame for rethinking Islam in a post 9/11 environment.

As much as I understand Lawrence's frustration with "dyadic logic", I would hold against his argument to rethink Islamic studies that "religion qua cosmopolitanism" represents a particular conceptual matrix, which might foreclose other dimensions of explanatory value for describing contemporary Islam. Instead, I have pleaded throughout this work for a constructionist approach that, in the face of a contingent social world, is able to challenge, engage, and advance different explanatory dimensions. From a constructionist perspective, we cannot make presumptions, such as

defining Islam as a religion. We can neither approach an empirical field as a quest to "redefine Islam apart from both fundamentalists/Islamists and their statist/nationalist opponents" (p. 306), as according to Lawrence, scholars who rethink Islamic studies ideally do. Instead, we can only deduce definitions and categorizations from data based (re)constructions. Such (re)constructions might – and most likely do – challenge existing theory, as the configuration of Islam is in an ongoing flux. However, from the perspective of this study, this challenge should, if ever, emerge from data and not from research policy. Hence, cosmopolitanism might serve well as a concept to interpret the particular constructions of Islam in today's world, as this study has shown. Here, however, this interpretation refers to the outcome of a process of abstraction from data and not to a concept inherent to a frame of research. My main argument here thus is that the endeavor to rethink Islamic studies with respect to a "positive" concept, such as *cosmopolitanism,* instead of "negative" concepts, such as *fundamentalism* and *Islamism* (p. 305), merely replaces one normative conceptual incorporation by another.[541]

Let me now offer some thoughts on an explanatory framework I think is illuminating to further embed the results of this study.

PROPOSED EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK

In what follows, I argue that a comparative perspective serves us well to establish what is particular – or American – about American Islam. Before looking for analytical categories suitable for comparison, we need to closely define what we want to compare. This study has distinguished between three different constructions American Islam takes part in: Muslim argumentation, Muslim communal identity, and Muslim lifestyle. Thus, the main task of a comparative perspective is to find analytical categories that will enable us to deduce the particularity of American Islam.

As suitable comparative categories we could, on the one hand, consider the particular constructions of Islam that have emerged in other contemporary contexts, such as in Europe, France, Germany, the Internet, Cairo, the Middle East, Islamabad, etc. As different regimes of incorporation are at work in these settings, by means of comparison, similarities and differences between the respective constructions of Islam surface.
On the other hand, we also have to find comparative categories within the American context, in order to establish what makes American Islam *American*. The most

541 Incorporation is a concept coined by Yasemin Soysal (1994) to analyze European migration policies. I use the concept here in order to draw attention to the different dimensions potentially affecting the incorporation of Muslimness and Islamicity as it emerges from Muslim American narratives.

obvious comparative categories could be defined by considering other arguments or social groups attributed as religious in the American context. However, as I will show below, it also makes sense to include reference groups that are not attributed as religious. By means of comparison, we are able to deduce aspects of incorporation that affect constructions of American Islam and Muslim Americans in the US context. For example: As they underlie the same legal constraints, we can compare a Christian argument and a Muslim argument and deduce how they differ and how they conform. However, this comparison does not show us, say, why the Christian argument attracts more legitimacy in contemporary America than the Muslim one. In order to show this, we need to bring into focus the regime of incorporation responsible for the construction of difference.

To show what we gain from comparison, let's now turn to some of the many possible approaches.

THE PARTICULARITY OF AMERICAN ISLAM

Since the findings of this study have predominantly highlighted how Islam partakes in the construction of the communal aspect of Muslim identity, I will focus predominantly on this aspect here. The communal construction of Muslim Americans on the basis of Islam serves well to deduce the particularity of American Islam by means of comparison.

THE CATEGORY OF RACE

According to this study's findings, narratives of Muslim American communal ties have become increasingly integrative. Thereby, Muslim diversity has been emploted positively – as a "source of strength" or a "reason for celebration". Let me at this point trespass the nominal level and take up a more interpretative stance in order to discuss the findings of (re)construction in connection to existing theory. We can – as one possibility among others – interpret the increasingly integrative narratives by drawing on Rorty (1989) and argue that we are witnessing a narrative expansion of solidarity among Muslim Americans as – in the light of "pain and humiliation" (p. 192) – similarities have become more important than differences. Based on the findings, I thus argue that the narrative expansion of the "we" is reflected in what I have considered a cosmopolitan or postethnic conceptualization of an *Islamic unum*. Accordingly, narrative has framed Muslim diversity as the potential of willed and conscious affiliation on the basis of this Islamic unum. Despite this postethnic conceptualization, solidarity or communality has been emploted by drawing on a narrative repertoire revolving around the African American experience of racism. Thereby, the experiences of African Americans in general, as well as African American

Muslims in particular, have been narratively connected to the ones of non-African American Muslims. As "pain and humiliation" – or more explicitly the experience of *Islamophobia* – have become focal points of Muslim American solidarity narratives, race does no longer refer to a category attributed to Muslims, such as *African American* or *Black,* but to the category *Muslim* overall. Thus, I argue that the postethnically constructed category Muslim is racialized. In contemporary American society, along with Blacks and Latinos, Muslims consider themselves increasingly as victims of racial profiling as this study has shown. In what follows, I thus refer to the narrative racialization of the category Muslim.

Only few scholars have drawn attention to the racialization of the category Muslim so far – a tendency future research should carefully monitor. This study's findings support the argument that in post-9/11 America the concept of race has been reconfigured. Traditional racial divisions have been altered as the encompassing category of "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" has taken center stage in the discussion on the practice of racial profiling. (Alsultany, 2007; Volpp, 2009) As the "War on Terror" has enforced the differentiation between solidly united American citizens and "Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim" subjects representing the un-American other, the dichotomy between "us" and "them" has fundamentally been changed. Volpp (2009) has argued that alterity has been constructed with respect to the "idea of citizenship as identity". (p. 81f) Thereby, the loyal American citizen is constructed vis-à-vis the "Middle Eastern terrorist". This tendency is well reflected in recent public surveys, in which the approval of restricting civil liberties of Arab and Muslim Americans is proportionally high. (Alsultany, p. 595) It is also reflected by special registration programs affecting immigrants of Muslim majority countries, which, Bayoumi (2009) has argued, have created "a vast, new legal geography of suspicion" and collapsed "citizenship, ethnicity, and religion into race". (p. 103)

Along with suspicion, the pressure on Muslim Americans to prove their loyalty to their home country has increased. Muslim Americans have reacted by publicly pledging allegiance in various forms. This study's (re)construction of narratives has revealed that Islam and America are aligned as a matter of course. Thereby, aspects of the American context, such as for example the constitution or the American motto, are emploted Islamically. Additionally, legitimacy has been bestowed on the American context by constructing it as offering ideal preconditions for an uncorrupted reading of Islam. However, more critical constructions referring to suspicion and discrimination have been constitutive for collective identity narratives as well. Because the Muslim American solidarity narrative has drawn on the concept of race and the narrative repertoire of racism, a comparative approach could benefit from considering other American solidarity groups that identified with the same reper-

toire. Thereby, we could establish aspects of how the category race operates as an incorporation regime in the American context, which now, among others, affects Muslims. There are many possibilities for comparison and they cannot be discussed here comprehensively. Let me suggest one possible approach:

More recently, scholars have argued that post-9/11 racially connoted Muslim American identity constructions remind of how Japanese-Americans constructed themselves as a reaction to their experiences during the Second World War. (Iwamura, 2007; Volpp, 2009) Iwamura for example found that in the historical process of recollection Japanese Americans have constructed "a new brand of civil religion" – a Japanese American civil religion "supported by its own set of sacred texts, sites, and rituals." (p. 942) Japanese Americans have framed their experience by means of drawing on the narrative repertoire of American racism: "Through the framework of racial justice", Iwamura states, Japanese Americans situated their experience "within the broader context of the nation's racist history in which blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans were also victims". (p. 945) The parallels to Muslim American narratives are even more obvious, if we consider the consequences of an according narrativization: "Japanese Americans no longer needed to authenticate their identity vis-à-vis Japan or the United States, but found it imperative to define themselves in relation to their own unique history." (Ibid.) This tendency has surfaced repeatedly in this study as well, and I think it makes a strong case for adjusting explanatory frameworks on Muslim American identity constructions.

Based on the findings of this study, I have argued that the heightened scrutiny towards Muslim Americans in the aftermath of 9/11 has intensified processes of objectification among them, that is, the reflection on their Muslimness and Islamicity. The (re)constructed narratives suggest that this has set in motion a similar reaction as in the case of Japanese Americans: Muslim Americans construct themselves as Americans critical towards America and as Muslims critical towards the Muslim World. Analysis has shown that this multidirectional critique leads to the construction of a Muslim American exceptionalism. An according exceptionalism has been constructed for example with respect to the concept of race, as analysis has revealed. Thereby, Muslim Americans are emploted as exceptional on the basis of their ability to recognize the colorblindness advanced by true Islam – an ability that sets them apart from Muslims of the Muslim world as well as from their fellow Americans. Therefore, the argument goes, both, corrupted Muslims as well as Americans, can overcome their racist attitudes by acknowledging a Muslim American role model.

Another concept affecting the narrativization of Muslim Americans is religion. As a comparative category, that illustrates the dominance of the concept, it is revealing to consider Jewish American identity narratives. Levitt (2007) for example has shown that Jews had to construct their Jewishness as religious difference in order to be accepted as citizens of the US. Hence, in order to conform to American culture, Jews configured "themselves and their Jewishness into something familiar". (p. 808) By "something familiar" Levitt refers to "American middle-class Protestant culture". (Ibid.) She has argued that in order for Jews to obtain recognition as a communal entity in the US, they had to fit themselves and their Jewishness into the category of religion. What the category religion hence "offered to Jews in the liberal West was a Protestant version of religious community that they could apply to themselves as Jews." (p. 811) The "Protestant model" emphasizing "individual, private, and voluntary confessions of faith" set the default for the Jewish reconstruction of "religious faith and voluntary community". (p. 812)

Again, by taking an interpretative stance towards this study's (re)constructed narratives, we could argue that what Levitt has described with reference to the Jewish constructions of Jewishness applies to the Muslim American constructions of Muslimness and Islamicity as well. The narrative construction of a pure Islam, devoid of cultural influence, can be interpreted as a reaction to the incorporative effect the category religion has in the American context. In the American context, Islam is defined as a religion, a categorization that is not only enforced legally but is also backed for example by recent scholarly trends and the institutionalization of Islamic studies. The consequence thereof is that Muslim communal identity anchored in Islam is legally, academically or, in other words, publicly incorporated as religion. The sociopolitical consequence of an according categorization is that American Islam is now part of what has been defined as public religion.

Corpus analysis has suggested that Muslim Americans have become partners of other religious groups. The example of interfaith dialogue has demonstrated that a pragmatic attitude has been advanced as the participation in issue-based alliances has increasingly become important for Muslim Americans.
Findings suggest that ISNA has recently discovered common ground with Evangelicals, represented for example by Rick Warren. Scholars consider Warren to be one of the most influential evangelical leaders after the death of Jerry Falwell in 2007. (Erzen, 2007, p. 1011f) They have argued that Warren and others are responsible for shifting the focus of moral concern for Evangelical Christians away from politically conservative positions on gay rights and abortion towards issues considered more centrist and liberal concerns, such as torture, war, global health, AIDS, and climate change.

(Erzen, 2007; Lindsay, 2007; McCammack, 2007) Hence, issues of liberal Evangelical concern apparently overlap with issues of Muslim American concern. Therefore, some attention should be given to the grounds a potential connection between Muslim Americans and Evangelical Christian Americans could be constructed on. I argue here that aspects of the *Jeremiad*, which Casanova (1994) has called the "subtext" of Evangelical narratives[542], undergirds the construction of American Islam as well. As America is shaken by social ills, such as poverty, AIDS, racism, drugs, and violence, the Muslim adaption of the Jeremiad goes, Muslims need to reach out to their fellow neighbors and show them how Islam could bring about betterment. This is the backdrop, against which Islam as discursive strategy of Muslim argumentation gains legitimacy as corpus analysis has revealed. Therefore, comparing contemporary Muslim American narratives with narratives recently advanced by so called liberal Evangelicals could shed some more light onto contemporary configurations of the Jeremiad.

Let me conclude that the categories of race and religion can be considered to be crucial for the constructions of American Islam discussed in this study. I argue that the two concepts are significantly formative for how Muslim Americans have been integrated in the American context. Hence, they represent conceptual incorporation regimes crucially interfering with the construction of American Muslimness and Islamicity. Therefore, they probably represent potential criteria of difference, and we consequentially have to establish whether they are responsible for distinguishing American Islam from how Islam is constructed elsewhere.

CONSTRUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN ISLAM

Trends set in motion in a post-9/11 world naturally do not only affect Muslim Americans or the construction of American Islam. Mandaville (2009), for example, has recently found that "the styles and symbols of black American urban culture resonate strongly with the British Muslim experience". (p. 166) On the one hand, Mandaville has refered to "the popularity of American hip-hop among young Muslims in the UK" and to the importance of symbolic figures such as Malcolm X. (Ibid.) On the other hand, he has argued that British Muslims "see ever greater parallels between their situation and the racial profiling experienced by black Americans" in the aftermath of 9/11 and "particularly the London bombings of 7/7". (Ibid.) The repertoire coined by the African American experience of racism thus apparently interferes with British Muslims' identity constructions as well.

542 Casanova has argued that: "Revivalists have always been consummate practitioners of the Jeremiad, a style inherited from the Hebrew prophets, turned into an art form by the Puritans, later to become a standard rhetorical form of American public discourse." (151) For a similar argument on the Christian Right's adaption of the Jeremiad see Ostendorf (2005).

A further parallel between this study's findings and Mandaville's analysis of young British Muslims can be drawn with respect to how Islam has recently been configured. Mandaville has found a "trend towards 'pick and mix' or 'cut and paste' Islam", which draws "together various strands and styles of religious knowledge and discourse, some of which may on the surface seem incompatible with one another." (p. 167) This statement is very telling: First of all, it reveals how the methodology behind the configuration of Islam has apparently been fundamentally altered, a trend scholars have acknowledged in general among Muslims living in non-Muslim countries. Secondly, it hints to the uneasiness this altered methodology has brought forth among scholars. If empirical data suggests a construction of Islam by means of various discursive strands seemingly "incompatible", I think this tells us more about the hermeneutic framework of scholars than about a particular construction of Islam. The uneasiness here apparently characterizes rather those who study Islam than those who deliberately reconfigure it. I have made a case for adjusting research perspectives repeatedly and will not pursue this any further here. Let me instead turn to another construction of Islam emanating from the European context.

As regards the comparison to American Islam, it is very illustrative to consider research on Muslims in France that according to Mas (2006) have referred to themselves as *secular* or *cultural*.[543] Mas' analysis shows that the narrative repertoire revolving around France's colonial history interferes with the construction of *secular* and *cultural* Muslims and *secular* Islam in France. Mas has focused on how Muslims acted in relation to how they were acted upon by taking into account three petitions that were put forth as a reaction to the law issued in 2004 banning religious symbols in French public schools. Her analysis shows that the petitions engage the narrative repertoire of colonialism with reference to the French state's recent attempts to manage its colonial history (*colonialisme positif*).

Two petitions issued by *Le Mouvement laïque des musulmans de France* and *L'Association du manifeste des libertés* construct *secular* or *cultural* Muslims by distancing them from fundamentalist and violent Islam. *Secular* Islam accordingly has been constructed by celebrating the secular values of France in opposition to fundamentalism equated with violence. Hence, Mas has argued that the "accommodation of Islam to *laïcité* implies that the redistribution and management of the continuing pain of colonial violence, produces and disciplines a certain modality of religious subjectivity, secular Islam." (p. 588)

The third petition, issued by *Les indigènes de la république,* invoked the colonial heritage explicitly by challenging the narrative of positive colonialism. Unlike the other

543 As it would be beyond the scope of this chapter, I do not intend to discuss the accuracy of the terminology employed by Mas, although her translation of *laïques* as *secular* could be criticized.

two petitions, Mas has claimed that it resisted "the colonial trap" of "essentializing 'fundamentalist' Islam". (p. 608) Instead, the signatories constituted themselves by appropriating the "stigma of their colonial branding", i.e. *native*, as an attribute referring to the double status of French colonial subjects, who where "neither entirely French" nor "entirely foreign". (p. 607). With this, Mas has argued that the petition has challenged "the narrative framing of a secular Muslim subject position" by confronting "the discontinuities in 'colonial memory'" as well as by invoking "the continuum between France's colonies and its present governance of the métropole". (p. 608)

This study has made a strong case for analyzing contemporary narratives constructing Muslims with respect to narrative repertoires, an argument, we can find in Mas' argumentation as well:

> By paying attention to the public performativity of "Muslim" in relation to "culture" and "secularism" (...) and how these categories are contested, it is clear that the shaping of the emergence of Muslim subjectivity as "secular" (...) can never escape the history of the relationship of violence that its constituents have had in relation to the French state. (...)The "secular Muslim" is thus the product of a historically induced and produced repetition, a performativity of the historical presentness of France's relations to its colonies, which emerges between competing communities. (p. 611)

I argue here that putting forth narratives configured with respect to particular (historical) narrative repertoires can be considered as what Mas has called the "performativity of historical presentness". Thus, if we focus on the narrative repertoires relevant for the constructions of Islam in a given context, we are able to explain what is particular about the respective constructions. Those repertoires are the explanatory ground on the basis of which we can deduce why narratives constructing Islam and Muslims are interconnected to categories and concepts such as *religion* and *race* or *diversity* in contemporary America, whereas in France, the constructions of Muslims rely on concepts such as *culture* and *laïcité*. Different contexts are inherent to the categories and concepts constitutive for constructions of Islam. Hence, as these constructions are complex, we have to consider multiple dimensions in order to explain their particularity in a given context.

It is needless to say that in a globalized world, narratives transcend the boundaries of nation states. This is apparent in the case of British Muslims' appropriation of narratives from the repertoire of the American history of racism. Still, it makes sense to compare constructions of Islam emerging from various nation states, as the differing legal and historical incorporation regimes tied to those entities resonate via constitutive categories and concepts such as race, religion, culture, and laïcité.

In line with this study, the introduced studies on French and British Muslims suggest that the context-sensitive configurations of Islam are mirrored by the adaption of narratives to particular repertoires. Apart from drawing attention to the particularities of those configurations, it is interesting to note what they have in common, namely, their life worldly orientation. An Islamically literate Muslim self navigates within the American life world against the backdrop of the Qur'an and the Sunna, this study has shown. The same orientation is apparently valid for Muslims in France or Great Britain as well. With this, it can be argued that Muslim Islamicity in the American and other Western contexts is de-theologized. This study has shown that Muslim American narrative constructions do not negotiate Islam as normative order per se. Instead, they put the American life world into Muslim perspective. Reference point of negotiation is thus not a single order of truth but a fluid, ambivalent, and multidimensional life worldly context. Throughout this study, I have used the terms Muslimness and Islamicity to stress the constructivist character of Muslim selves and their adaption of Islam. In addition to the analytical implications inherent to those terms, I think they serve well to express the life worldly orientation of Muslims' contemporary constructions of selves and adaptations of Islam. Accordingly, Islamicity, as the quality of a Muslim life led in a particular social surrounding, can be distinguished from Islam, the normative order. Consequentially, the (re)constructed narratives of this study in fact display American Islamicity or more precisely Islamicities rather than American Islam. To conclude, it is important to note that in turn, a large part of the American public comprehends Islam as a fixed entity and single order of truth, mostly functioning as a matrix of difference. Obviously, as the publics' construction of Islam has become part of the narrative repertoire, it crucially interferes with Muslim American Islamicities.

HOW FUTURE RESEARCH CAN BUILD ON THIS STUDY

In accord with what has been said above, I think this study can be built on as follows:

Above all, it provides an additional piece to the overall picture on how religiosity is configured by culturally highly complex societies. Its results can be bridged with results obtained by studies on other constructions of what is considered as religiousness in the American and similarly complex contexts. Important for this analytical field is to expand the empirical bases of according – so far often text-based – studies to visual, audio and audio-visual data. Although not analyzed in this study for practical reasons, those dimensions can be considered as crucial for the configuration of Islamicity and thus religiosity in general in the respective contexts.

Secondly, this study offers a solid basis for comparative studies on narratives emerging from Muslim organizations in Europe. As studies on Muslim religious authorities

in Europe have generally been lacking a supra-individual perspective (Peter, 2006), analyses on European Muslim organizations' narratives could fill more than one gap: They could, similarly to Mas' analysis on the construction of secular Muslims/ Islam in France, reveal other contemporary trends of European Muslims' narrative constructions. Additionally, by comparing the (re)constructed narratives with this and other studies, further light could be shed onto the facets of what today is often lumped together under the category *Western* Islam – a category that is afflicted by problematic connotations, as I have argued above.

Thirdly, it would expand our knowledge on authority constellations if this study's (re)constructed narratives' effects on Muslim Americans' self understanding on an individual level were established. We should thereby ask, if and how these narratives interfere with individual Muslim American understandings of selves. Future studies need to bridge the (re)construction of narratives with ethnographical data. An according approach could be important for establishing possible authority patterns affecting the construction of American Islam. Thereby, a central question to ask is to what extent Muslim American organizations represent Muslim Americans. Furthermore, it is crucial to analyze how the narratives advanced by Muslim organizations affect the social life of Muslims. One case in point made by this study has been that traditional categories that have served to describe Muslim Americans, such as *immigrant* Muslims and *African American* Muslims, are no longer dominantly represented within narrative. Thus, a question to answer by future research could be, for example, whether and how this narrative trend affects the social realities of Muslim Americans.

Overall, one main goal of this study has been to call into question the explanatory regimes that emanate from established categories and concepts that have been used to frame Islam and Muslims. Therefore, I would like to conclude here by stressing once again the need for constantly questioning and adjusting explanatory frameworks in the light of the fluidity characteristic for the narrativization of social realities. We might have to dismiss concepts such as *diaspora,* because they do not necessarily serve us well to grasp solidarity ties among Muslim Americans, whose great grand parents have immigrated into the US. We might, for the same reasons, at least question the explanatory power of categorizing Muslim Americans as *immigrant* and *autochthonous*. And, we might even do without categories such as *Sunni* and *Shi'i* as we witness their decreasing importance in Muslim American narratives that construct Muslims simply as *Muslims*. We need to replace these concepts and categories in the light of narrative reconfigurations. Otherwise, we risk to miss what is particular about our manifold, ever changing social surroundings of which Muslims have been a part for a while now.

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APPENDIX 1:

MUSLIM AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS' WEB ADDRESSES

Name of Organization	Web Address[544]
Ahmadiyya (AC)	http://www.ahmadiyya.us/
Al Fatiha	http://www.al-fatiha.org/
Al Maghrib Institute	http://www.almaghrib.org/
American Islamic Chamber of Commerce (AICC)	http://www.americanislam.org/
American Islamic Congress (AIC)	http://www.aicongress.org/
American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD)	http://www.aifdemocracy.org/about/
American Learning Institute for Muslims (ALIM)	http://www.alimprogram.com/index.shtml
American Muslim Alliance (AMA)	http://www.amaweb.org/
American Muslim Council (AMC)	http://www.amcnational.org/new/index.asp
American Muslim Taskforce (AMT)	http://americanmuslimvoter.net/
American Muslims Intent on Learning and Activism (AMILA)	http://www.amila.org/
American Society for Muslim Advancement (ASMA)	http://www.asmasociety.org/home/
As-Sunnah Foundation of America (ASFA)	http://www.sunnah.org/
Assembly of Muslim Jurists in America (AMJA)	http://www.amjaonline.com/about.php
Association of Muslim Social Scientists of North America (AMSS)	http://208.106.208.252/
Center for Islamic Pluralism (CIP)	http://www.islamicpluralism.org/
Companionships	http://www.companionships.org/
Council of American Muslim Professionals (CAMP)	http://www.campnet.net/
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)	http://www.cair.com/
Council on Islamic Education (CIE)	http://www.cie.org/index.aspx
Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)	http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/
Free Muslims Coalition (Against Terrorism) (FMC)	http://www.freemuslims.org/about/
Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS)	http://www.cordobauniversity.org/gsiss/index.asp
Hilal Sighting Commitee of North America	http://hilalsighting.org/index.php
Inner-City Muslim Action Network (IMAN)	http://www.imancentral.org/
International Association of Sufism (IAS)	http://www.ias.org/
International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)	http://iiit.org/
Internet Islamic University (IIU)	http://www.studyislam.com/iiu/university/main.jsp
IQRA' International Education Foundation (IQRA)	http://www.iqrafoundation.com/
Islamic American University (IAU)	http://www.islamicau.org/static/Default.aspx

544 Addresses colored red were no longer active in 2011.

Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA)	http://www.iananet.org/
Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA)	http://www.icna.org/icna/
Islamic Council on Scouting of North America (ICSN/NICS)	http://www.islamiccouncilonscouting.com/
Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA)	http://www.ifanca.org/index.php
Islamic Medical Association of North America (IMANA)	http://www.imana.org/index.html
Islamic Networks Group (ING)	http://www.ing.org/
Islamic Relief (US branch) (IRUSA)	http://www.islamicreliefusa.org/Page.aspx?pid=183
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)	http://www.isna.net/
Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA)	http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/
Latino American Dawah Organization (LADO)	http://www.latinodawah.org/
Moorish Science Temple (MST)	http://www.moorishsciencetempleofamericainc.com/index.html
Muslim Advocates (MA)	http://www.muslimadvocates.org/latest/charity_update/free_legal_financial_seminar.html
Muslim Alliance in North America (MANA)	http://www.mana-net.org/
Muslim American Society (MAS)	http://www.masnet.org/history.asp?id=1572
Muslim Chaplains Association (MCA)	http://muslimchaplains.org/
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)	http://www.mpac.org/
Muslim Public Service Network (MPSN)	http://www.muslimpublicservice.org/
Muslim Student's Association of the United States and Canada (MSA)	http://www.msanational.org/
Muslim Ummah of North America (MUNA)	http://www.muslimummah.net/
Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights (KARAMAH)	http://www.karamah.org/home.htm
Muslim Women's League (MWL)	http://www.mwlusa.org/
Nation of Islam (Louis Farrakhan) (NOI)	http://www.noi.org/
National Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML)	http://www.namlnet.org/
Nawawi Foundation	http://www.nawawi.org/index.html
North American Imam Federation (NAIF)	http://www.naif-net.org/index.html
North American Islamic Trust (NAIT)	http://www.nait.net/NAIT_about_%20us.htm
North American Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities (NASIMCO)	http://www.nasimco.org/
Peaceful Families Project (PFP)	http://www.peacefulfamilies.org/about.html
Shura of Islamic Family Counselors of America (SIFCA)	http://www.sifca.us/index.html
The 5% Network (5%)	http://www.Allahsnation.net/
The Mosque Cares (Ministry of W.D. Mohammed)	http://www.wdmministry.com/index.html
United Muslims of America (UMA)	http://www.umanet.org/
Young Muslims of North America (YM)	http://www.ymusa.org/
Zaytuna College	http://www.zaytunacollege.org/
Zaytuna Institut	http://www.zaytuna.org/

APPENDIX 2:

TITLES OF ISLAMIC HORIZONS COVER STORIES INCLUDED IN THE IH CORPUS

Issue	Year	Cover Story
25/1	1996	Malaysia: Fulfilling a Vision
25/2	1996	Hajj: Toward a New Beginning
25/3	1996	Muslims for Peace & Justice
25/4	1996	A Monumental Achievement for Malaysia – Petronas Towers, Kuala Lumpur
25/5	1996	Muslims for Peace & Justice – 33rd Annual ISNA Convention
25/6	1996	Muslims Gather for Peace & Justice
26/1	1997	O ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you, that ye may (learn) self-restraint (Qur'an 2:185)
26/2	1997	The Hajj
26/3	1997	Islamic Education Nurturing the Future Generation
26/4	1997	Pakistan's Golden Jubilee: The Making of a Muslim Country
27/1	1998	Mosque Design in North America
27/2	1998	Islam in America. The challenges of community building in the New World
27/3	1998	Tajikstan: A Silent Revolution
27/4	1998	Pakistan: Securing Security
27/5	1998	Muslims for Human Dignity
27/6	1998	Hyderabad: A Legacy of Knowledge
28/1	1999	Muslims Stepping Forward in North America
28/2	1999	Hasan al-Banna – A Martyr of Our Times
28/3	1999	Malcom X: An Islamic Legacy
28/4	1999	Muhammad Hamidullah – A Lifetime of Service to Islamic Scholarship
28/5	1999	Islam – Guidance for Humanity
28/6	1999	Ramadan – The Way to Salvation
29/1	2000	Hajj – A Season of Reawakening
29/2	2000	The Refugee Experience
29/4	2000	The Family – Protecting and Nurturing the Muslim Family Life in North America

29/5	2000	Islam: Faith & Civilization
29/6	2000	A Month of Taqwa
30/1	2001	Jerusalem – A Muslim City
30/2	2001	Dealing with Domestic Disharmony – The Qur'an Admonishes Couples to Live in Harmony and Kindness
30/3	2001	Righteous Ways of Managing & Owning Money
30/5	2001	Islam: Strength Through Diversity
30/6	2001	Everybody Needs Ramadan – Ramadan Helps us Think About Moderation and Being Thankful
31/1	2002	A Muslim Perspective on Healthcare
31/2	2002	Managing Islamic Organizations – How to Utilize Qur'anic and Prophetic Guidance, and Modern Management Techniques
31/3	2002	A Century of Islam in Canada
31/4	2002	Latino Muslims
31/5	2002	Islam: A Call for Peace & Justice
31/6	2002	Trial by Fire – The State of Islamic Schools After the 9/11 Attacks
32/1	2003	The Hajj – A Photographer's Eyeview
32/2	2003	Domestic Violence – An Islamic Response
32/3	2003	Building a Movement – A Woman's Work – The Role of Muslim Women in the Formation and Progress of the Muslim Students Association
32/4	2003	Aiming Higher in Education
32/5	2003	An American Journey Graduating from MSA to ISNA
32/6	2003	Living Islam – More than 30 000 Muslims Gather at the 40th Annual ISNA Convention to Focus on Values that Islam Offers for Every Day Living
33/1	2004	The Final Stages – Living and Dying with Dignity
33/2	2004	Grooming Leaders – Responding to Muslim American Needs
33/3	2004	So You Want to Start an Islamic School?
33/4	2004	Civil Rights – Muslim Americans Join the National Struggle
33/5	2004	The American Madina
33/6	2004	Australia – An Islamic Heritage – Islam and Muslims Have Deep Roots in Australia's History, Dating to the Pre-Colonial Era
34/1	2005	Ijtihad Today – Muslims of America Are in a Unique Position to Contribute to Ijtihad in Our Modern Times
34/2	2005	Iqbal – A Message for Our Times
34/3	2005	Marriage – The Fulcrum of Muslim Family Life
34/4	2005	Return to Roots – African Americans Return to Islam Through Many Paths

34/5	2005	The Road Ahead – Can North American Muslims Contribute Towards Society‘s Betterment by Advancing the Values of Family, Community, Compassion and Justice
34/6	2005	The West Coast Madina – Muslims Create a Unique Community in Southern California
35/1	2006	Custom Made – Developing Programs that Help Young Muslims Navigate Challenges and Create Positive Identities
35/2	2006	Why Islamic Schools? Factors that Motivate Muslim Parents to Choose Full-Time Islamic Schools
35/3	2006	Future Hopes – Muslims Seek to Rebuild Katrina-Ravaged Religious and Community Centers
35/4	2006	Aging Muslim in America – Can Muslim Americans Create a Caring Community for their Seniors?
35/5	2006	Early Start – Developing Community Consciousness Among Muslim Youth
35/6	2006	Islamophobia – Can Muslims Help the West Check this Growing Disease?
36/1	2007	Runaway Weddings – Cultural Influences Oblige Parents to Stage Lavish Weddings, Even at the Risk of Facing Financial Hardship
36/2	2007	Higher Standards – Can Islamic Schools Rise to the Challenges that Accreditation Requires?
36/3	2007	The Vision that Led to the Founding, 25 Years Ago, of America‘s First Muslim Think Tank: The International Institute of Islamic Thought
36/4	2007	Heads on Hijab – Under the Impression that Hijab is All About Wearing a Scarf on the Head? Think Again
36/5	2007	The Rewards of Giving – ISNA Continues to Help Muslim Americans Fulfill Their Religious Obligation to Give in a Post-9/11 Environment
36/6	2007	Montreal Muslims – A Growing and Vibrant Community Spanning Many Cultures and Languages
37/1	2008	Adopting Children – What Are the Islamic Guidelines for Muslim Americans who Wish to Adopt and Foster Children?
37/2	2008	Creative Curricula – Keys to designing Islamic Studies Curricula that Inspire Students to Search for the Truth and Follow its Demands
37/3	2008	Elusive Peace – Sixty Years of Pain and Suffering in the Holy Land: Will Prophetic Principles Ever Triumph Over Prophecies?
37/4	2008	Seeking Tranquility – How to realize the Islamic Marriage Ideal of Tranquility, Love, and Mercy Among the Spouses
37/5	2008	Midwest Muslims – Central Ohio Is a Welcome Home to a Diverse Muslim Community in the Midwest
37/6	2008	Imam W.D. Mohammed (1933-2008) led his people toward mainstream Islam – In Remembrance..
38/1	2009	Barack Obama – Between Race and Civilization
38/2	2009	Coming of Age – Are America‘s Islamic Schools Progressing and Meeting the Community‘s Aspirations and Hopes?
38/3	2009	Zero Tolerance
38/4	2009	A Capital Presence – Greater Washington DC Muslims Assert Their Growth and Civic Engagement
38/5	2009	Twinned with Faith – Dallas/Ft. Worth Muslims Pursue Growth, Eyeing the Future and Beyond
38/6	2009	Lootery! How Lotteries Entice the Vulnerable and Lead to Societal and Mental Health Issues