

# A Semantics of Dance

Nelson Goodman's and Susanne Langer's Symbol Theory  
Applied to Dance,  
with Four Case Studies

Dissertation submitted at the Faculty of Humanities  
at the University of Bern to obtain the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by

Kristina Maria Agnes  
Soldati  
Mannheim  
Germany

Accepted by Prof. Dr. Christina Thurner and Prof. Dr. Roger Pouivet  
on behalf of the Faculty of Humanities  
Dean: Prof. Dr. Virginia Richter

Bern, 03 November 2014

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## Acknowledgements

I am above all grateful to the Swiss National Funds, which provide encouragement to academics to continue their research projects after raising their children. It was thanks to the generous Marie-Heim-Vögtlin Contribution that this unorthodox project was judged to be worthy of funding. Unorthodox, as it combines the least discussed genre of art, the dance, which I know 'from the inside', with the least sensuous philosophical approach, namely analytic philosophy.

I owe much thanks to the expert in aesthetics and on Goodman, Roger Pouivet, University of Lorraine, who took on the role of external reviewer of the philosophical part of my interdisciplinary work. Due to his continuous corrections and feedback, the Institute of Theater Studies in Bern could maintain my project, even though the subject lies beyond its core competence. Robert Hopkins provided me with many valuable insights, and helped me in applying Goodman's *Structure of Appearance* to dance.

The Swiss National Funds enabled me to pursue the divergent paths in countries where the philosophy of art and dance studies are established by tradition. First, I cannot stress enough how important it has been to have had the opportunity to meet a former collaborator of Nelson Goodman, Catherine Elgin. She is acknowledged to be the most profound connoisseur and authority of his work, and she herself has made recent contributions to the philosophy of dance. During my stay at Harvard University, she was extremely generous with her time, discussed with me my arguments, and the 'goodmanian' points, and was pleased to see his notions work out as well for dance.

An important bridge, converging my research paths, is the philosophical stance of Jonathan Clark. His demand for a kinesthetic sense enabled me to combine the outer-perceptual aesthetic features of dance art works (in the goodmanian tradition) with the sensed inner features, such as dynamic qualities or space sensing. More than a mere combination, the kinesthetic sense is the cue, the 'joint' of the two perspectives. As the head of research at the Laban Center, the Trinity Conservatoire of Music and Dance in London, Jonathan Clark gave me access to a workshop, conference and interview with Wayne McGregor, which were very helpful in my case studies. I would also like to mention here the help of Melanie Clark, a teacher at the Laban Center, an expert on Yvonne Rainer, who gave her comments on my analysis of Yvonne Rainer's *Trio A*.

It has been a long cherished endeavor of mine to be able to work with the reknowned scientist Claudia Jeschke. Her finely-grained elaboration of a dance analytical method is

particularly well suited to my semantic approach: first, her method gives an account of graduation in movement which corresponds to Goodman's claim for density. Second, her method is explicitly heterogenous. Thus, it is open to a broad range of different movement aspects. This corresponds to Goodman's demand for an art work's repleteness. As her quite demanding method is not widely established, I am particularly grateful to her for having revisited her early work with me just before her retirement from Salzburg University.

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## Introduction

The scope of this work seems, on one hand, (arbitrarily) limited, while on the other it seems too broad: too limited because it treats artworks as symbols; apparently arbitrary, because symbol theory is 'passé' and has supposedly been 'deconstructed' by postmodern and contemporary performance art and the poststructuralists. And too wide, given that the issue of '*semantics of artistic dance*' extends all the way from ontological concerns to a microscopic look at the neat and formalizable structural features of the syntax of dance.

However, this extended scope is in the tradition of and due to the symbol theoretician Nelson Goodman.

I will divide the investigation of the first part of my work into two topics: (a) the semantic features and their ontological commitments, and (b) the syntactic features and their ontological range.

Part (a) is necessary in order to clarify the spectrum of the meaning of artworks. It will differ – even inside symbol theory – from the accounts of Susanne Langer and Nelson Goodman. Susanne Langer opts for feelings as meaning, as abstract or complex as they may be in a specific branch of art. Goodman is known for being liberal about the content of meaning. It can be a denoted object or person, a feeling or a property such as ferocity (Goodman's example from dance is *A Hockey Seen: A Nightmare in Three Periods and Sudden Death*<sup>1</sup>), or all of these at once. Goodman's philosophical standpoint as a nominalist (not having properties as such in his ontology) does however complicate the generosity of his liberal position. It will be necessary to clarify how a dance succeeds in expressing aspects of conflict or ferocity without pointing to them as platonic ideals. The solution will lead to the term 'exemplification', which in my view plays an eminent role in the art theory of Goodman. I am convinced that if the predominance of exemplification over denomination in the symbol theory of art had been acknowledged more broadly, the following deconstructionist and performative theories in art would have had less to fight against. Their program of de-semiotization<sup>2</sup> in theatre and dance science is in my eyes a correction of a shortage in

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<sup>1</sup> Goodman, "Afterword".82.

<sup>2</sup> "In theatre the sign is open to a process of 'desemiotisation' [...] based on ambiguity, excess and negation of meaning" (Preston-Dunlop 104).

understandings of ‘exemplification’ from *Languages of Art (LA)* (1968), and ‘open symbols’<sup>3</sup> already present in Susanne Langer’s *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942). The one-sided reception of Goodman's aesthetics is however wide-spread in philosophy, too. That is why I elaborate in my thesis the role of exemplification extensively.<sup>4</sup>

Part (b) searches for the features which are responsible for the meaning of an artwork at the syntactic level. Goodman emphasizes in *LA* the characteristics (symptoms) of art which help to distinguish works of art from other representing or exemplifying symbols. These are density and repleteness.<sup>5</sup> Repleteness is the multitude and diversity of a dance piece' dance-specific aspects. Density is the characteristic feature of them being graded. In the case of dynamics, illustrated on Laban’s so-called *effort*, it is a gradual increase in timing for instance. On the syntactic level we find the most distinctive symptom, the exemplification, mentioned above. Exemplification is the artwork’s presenting a feature it owns.

The result of (b) – the question what can count as an aspect of dance – has considerable importance to the science of dance. After decades of partialization in the science of dance (see Jeschke 36) a theory which takes into account the breadth of all the various aspects of dance could be helpful. The decisive term describing this broad spectrum is ‘repleteness’.

It is not explicit but becomes evident that some characteristics, or ‘symptoms’, are features of an artwork as a whole (like repleteness), while others are of its parts (like syntactic density). This particularity leads to a tacit question which needs separate treatment: How is the interrelation of these features to be understood? Is the semantics of an artwork a function of its parts? Is – in that case – the functioning of an artwork understandable without clarifying the ontology of the artwork as a whole?<sup>6</sup> Though beyond my topic, one option should briefly be sketched: Mereology is an ontological option for Goodman. Nevertheless alternative ontological options, like art as process or art as interaction, will have to be taken into consideration. Though Goodman did want to free art from the grips of communication theory and concentrate on the non-psychological, non-intentional and non-pragmatic aspects, he can

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<sup>3</sup> The term used by Langer is "unconsummated symbol" (Langer, *FF* 31, *New Key* 240).

<sup>4</sup> I owe my thanks to Jonathan Clark, head of research at the Trinity Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance, for his encouragement during my stay in spring 2014 to take up a "revisionist" stance.

<sup>5</sup> Density on the a) semantical and b) syntactical levels as well as repleteness of syntax constitute, along with exemplification, the four symptoms of artworks Goodman talks about in *LA*. Though they are severally neither necessary nor sufficient, “They may be *conjunctively* sufficient criteria and *disjunctively* necessary” (*LA* 255). In “Reconception” Goodman adds a fifth symptom, the multiple and mediated reference.

<sup>6</sup> The tacit ontologies in different philosophies of art are treated in Pouivet, 1999.

still give an account of processual and interactive performative art, as well. I want to show why exemplification is central hereby.

To understand better the notions of the symptoms of the aesthetics it is useful to consult Goodman's early book *The Structure of Appearance (SA)*. His constructivist account of phenomena like colour, which is paradigmatically analysed, offers three important insights which I can transfer to *Languages of Arts (LA)*. By doing so the terminology and so-called symptoms of the aesthetic become more precise and specific :

- (1) The elements of a category belong to it by being graded and joining one another through a chain of matching elements. This leads to the criterion of matching (= necessary criterion).
- (2) The aspects of a category which order the chains of graded elements are so-called dimensions.
- (3) The number of dimensions exhausts and specifies the category (three in the case of colour) (= sufficient criterion).

By transferring these insights to artworks as understood in *LA*, we have the following:

- (i) The notion 'matching' of *SA* corresponds to 'dense' in *LA*. A chain of matching pairs is in fact dense. Fulfilling the criterion of density, pictorial aspects can be seen as categories.
- (ii) The notion of dimension has been transferred by Goodman himself.

Thesis of Repleteness in *LA* : Repleteness is the (for art) symptomatic high number of pictorial aspects.

- (iii) The specifying number of dimensions corresponds to the dense ordering of pictorial aspects in *LA*. Notwithstanding the inner structure of each, its dense order, several aspects present in a work of art constitute due to the repleteness thesis the 'so-to-speak' dimensions of the artwork as a whole.<sup>7</sup>

The artwork used as an example of repleteness in *Languages of Art* is a picture. So his (unsystematically) presented aspects are pictorial. My thesis is that these aspects are what account for the specificity of an artistic genre (like painting or dance). So for my purpose it is

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<sup>7</sup> "Relative syntactic repleteness in a syntactically dense system demands such effort at discrimination along, so to speak, *more dimensions*" (*LA*, p.253, my italic).

essential to elaborate and specify the aspects of dance. Ideally, a systematic account would serve best. It could build the basis for a non-normative 'taxonomy', a kind of map. Obviously, such a taxonomy would never be complete; just as new species evolve, new dance aspects also emerge. It would collect and systematize technical and observable dance-aspects. Each given dance piece has dominant aspects. These prevalently applied technical and observable aspects could be called 'choice of preference', effectuated out of the range of this taxonomy. The term 'choice of preference' has no psychological implication and is not meant to reflect the creative process. It should rather be understood as a collection of dance properties, aspects, which are prevalently instantiated in the dance piece in question. Such a taxonomy would have both theoretical and practical potential: it could serve to identify and name relevant properties, aspects, of the dance piece (syntax). And beyond being an analytic and descriptive tool, it could provide terms useful in justifying an interpretation (semantics) and aesthetic judgements, and furnish the necessary elements for defining a style. This dissertation does not undertake the task to assemble systematically such a taxonomy but to provide the theoretical framework for it. It does so by showing the applicability of the two aesthetic symptoms to dance: repleteness and density. Repleteness grants the wide spectrum available syntactically for a dance piece, and density grants the fine grained category which is specific for dance. The philosophical part of the work opens thus up the field for an ambitious project of taxonomy or, as in my case, to analyze art.

To apply syntactic density to dance I elaborate one category which can be considered as the most dominant for the genre of dance: bodily movement. Phenomenal bodily motion can safely count as a category, in Goodman's sense. Analogously to the category of colour, in order to find the characteristic structure, I will have to examine the dimensions involved. I'm doing this by investigating other existing systematic and schematic works, such as Laban-systems, MIP, and Sheets-Johnstone's kinetic sensorial mode. Three important and intricate steps have to be done: first, I argue that in order to understand bodily movement entirely there is a new sensorial mode to be established, kinesthesia. This mode is more than proprioception, as we sense through movement more than our body. Second, it involves more than one sense. Movement informs us in a cross-modal way. All these sensations may become relevant in a dance piece. None should be precluded in principle. Up to here, as I will argue, bodily movement meets Goodman's conditions for a category. However, when we add for our aesthetic purpose the outer perspective of movement, its appearance, my category bodily movement obtains some merely related categories. These categories together, as a sum, build

in Goodman's terminology a *kind*. All the bodily motional phenomena ensemble create therefore the kinesthetic realm. Why is it necessary to include the vast kinesthetic realm in the repleteness of dance? Because every single motional phenomenon may be shown forth (exemplified). And our epistemic capacity assures that the exemplified phenomenon is in principle not shown in vain, because we are able to sense it – empathically.

The replete field is well prepared for my case studies by now, however, before addressing them, one similar position in dance science needs to be considered: the one of Susan Leigh Foster. In fact, it turns out that the convergencies we share are overcast by unremovable divergencies. The capital divergency is a methodological one. She states to first gather the frame and context of a dance piece before analyzing it. This procedure is justified by her communication theoretical premises. My procedure in the case studies is diametrically opposed to hers. A disadvantage perhaps for the reader who will not be equipped with background knowledge. I try to lead him, instead, closer to fine grained nuances, and ask the big questions from there.

The second part of the doctoral thesis presents four contemporary dance pieces belonging to three different styles. The two dances of a futuristic style will be in addition to an analysis subsequently compared. MIP (Movement Inventory Procedure, Jeschke 45), a recent movement analytic tool, does not only serve as an inventory and notational device but claims to serve as an instrument in search for *typical* 'motoric' (that means motional and mechanical) characteristics of a given piece. The criteria employed in doing so will be made explicit. There is good reason to believe that those characteristics which are considered to be typical are also meaning-relevant syntactic features and so central for my topic. The criteria involved in MIP have to be loose enough to allow for the detection of upcoming motorical specificities in contemporary dance forms. The four case studies of contemporary dance will accordingly challenge MIP.

The underlying criteria for my choice of cases are the following: 1) the contemporary dance (and performance) aesthetics based on mediality and materiality among others, 2) the absence of (dominant) narrative, representational or expressive features, 3) the (complex) use of movement as a material for choreographic procedure instead of habitual "vocabulary".

The first case study, *Trio A* by Yvonne Rainer, is the earliest work among the chronologically presented cases. Originating from the United States its style is commonly called postmodern, however it meets the above mentioned requirements to count as contemporary. The application of Goodman's symptoms and the analysis of MIP will result in

two dominant yet contrasting features. It will be Susanne Langer's emphasis on the structure of artworks which supports my claim that this tension is part of the meaning. *Trio A* being the earliest work of the case studies has a considerable amount of literature in dance philosophy and dance studies. It will be worthwhile to expose my results to this secondary literature.

The second case study, *Rosas danst Rosas* by Anne Teresa de Keersmaeker, exceeds the fame of the first. Consequently it disposes of an excellent, artistic film documentation and a detailed written documentation of the choreographic composition. True to Goodman's aesthetics to consider only perceptual aspects for a meaning of dance, the documentation (predominantly choreographic procedural aspects) will not lead my analysis, yet support it where needed.

The third and fourth case study is a strong contrast to the first two pieces. Wayne McGregor's *Entity* and Pablo Ventura's *MADGOD 2.001* with their (virtuoso) articulation exemplify a high muscular tonus, and a 'de-humanized' movement material. It will be a challenging task to elaborate the "motoric identity" (Jeschke 152) of an emerging dance style, I call 'futuristic'. A comparison will highlight the differences and thus display the available spectrum for a semantics.

## Proceeding first Part

As I want to show the syntactical as well as semantical range of Goodman's theory of symbols, be they danced or painted, I will begin with a survey of Goodman's system and its ontological implications (1. "The Fundamentals of a (Not So Nominalistic) System"). If such different things as perceived physical properties, like, in the case of pictures, painted colour or more derivative properties like contrast, may be syntactically relevant, this system has to account for both. The system in *The Structure Of Appearance* shows the ontological range available for syntax.

The second chapter, *Constructing Categories*, presents Goodman's constructionist method. The criteria for a category are discussed, using the example of colour. (2.1 "Grades Serve to Construct Categories"). Matching is not sufficient as a criterion, in my eyes, for Goodman's claim of distinctness (2.2 and 2.3 being on external and internal distinctness). So I offer structural specificity as an additional criterion. 2.4 "Means to Find the Structure of a Category" shows the way Goodman construes – and the successor-in-spirit in this domain Austen Clark accomplishes (2.5 "Distance in Space") – the structure of the category colour. The construction will reveal important insights relevant to aesthetic symptoms (see above insights i) to iii) like dense-ordering dimensions. The colour category is considered to be only a paradigm for other categories (in other sense realms, too), so Austen Clark offers criteria to decide the necessary and sufficient number of dimensions for phenomenal categories in general (2.6 "Necessary Dimension: How Many at Least?" and 2.7 "Sufficient Dimensions: What is the Maximum Number of Dimensions?"). I reflect on the applicability of these criteria to categories of a different level, like phenomenal bodily motion (2.8 "Conclusion And Outlook For a New Category: Bodily Movement").

The third chapter, *Derivative Qualia Size and Shape*, shows how derivative qualia like shape differ from sensorial qualia which come prior in Goodman's system. One particularity is that a derivative quale is a property we attribute to more comprehensive individuals, so-called compounds, where e.g. more than one colour is possible. The second particularity is that it is a relational property. So Goodman can give an account for syntactical aspects of an artwork such as 'being contrastive'. I will call this understanding of shape, derived from a category, 'structural shape'. Shape can combine more than one category (3.2 "Syncategorematic Shape"). Already in *SA* Goodman mentioned the import of relational derivative qualia for the description of artworks. To illustrate this I present Laban's Effort Cube (3.4 "Examples of

Derivative or Relational Qualia in Dance: Laban's Category 'Effort') which leads to 3.5 "Outlook For a New Category: Bodily Movement".

Chapter 4 "Syntactical and Semantic Aspects" is subdivided in two parts. 4A "Syntactical Aspects in *LA*. Dense versus Relational Aspects" will treat the mentioned transfer of our three insights onto artworks. It will deepen our understanding of as cardinal notions of *LA* as density, schema (4A.1) dense-ordering (4A.2), and repleteness (4A.3). 4A.4 "Seeing Aspect" elaborates with the help of Budd and Wittgenstein, that perception of syntactically identical properties may be interpreted in cases at will. As a consequence repleteness seems, so far and without additional restraints, to be open to endless varieties of groupings of dance-specific aspects.

The second part, 4B. "Semantics in *Languages of Art*" treats the ways artwork generate meaning: the three functions of aesthetic symbols (4B.1) are representation (4B.2), exemplification (4B.3) and expression (4B.10). Representation and expression can be deduced from exemplification. This is why the latter plays a dominant role in the arts (4B.6). This is why exemplification is a symptom of art. Successively, I introduce all notions of *LA* which are decisive for the semantics. 4B.10 "Which is The Relevant Schema?" raises epistemological doubt how ever we could be certain which schema, and thus which system, is in use.

Chapter 5. "Susanne Langer and Nelson Goodman Compared" points out differences between Goodman and Langer which will be relevant for my work: The structure (5.1,5.2 and 5.6) and the genre-specific features of artworks (5.4) and of dance in particular (5.5 "Dance-Specific Virtual Powers"). The claim of virtual powers lead me to see in dynamics the fundamental category of dance.

Chapter 6 prepares the theoretic frame to construct the basic category, the bodily movement, which comprises dynamics. It is dynamics which grants the category to be dense. I begin with a helpful overview presented by Sheets-Johnstone 6.1. "State of Affairs". My shift to a phenomenological account (6.2. "Kinesthesia") is to be explained by my claim that a full comprehension of bodily movement has to consider the movement being an interface between inner and outer perspective (6.5). This comprehension is aesthetically relevant in so far as proprioceptive features are available to the observer – via empathy. If we want to construct a bodily movement category useful for aesthetic concern it must include visual perception of movement as well as features which are due to its motoric or proprioceptive specificity (6.7

"Necessary Dimensions"). To grant repleteness of a dance symbol in aesthetic context my theoretical framework to construct a bodily movement category must provide additional dimensions (6.8). Given that a body can move according to different referential systems (kinesphere or general space) my category will have 'rifts' (a goodmanian term). I reconsider the possibility that my category is rather to be understood as a *kind* (6.9).

The seventh chapter presents Susan Leigh Foster's Semantics of Dance (7). The premises of her communicational theory are discussed in (7.1 and 7.2). Notwithstanding fundamental divergencies (7.8) some of Foster's distinctions (7.3 "Basic Referential Relations", 7.4 "Vocabulary and Syntax", 7.5 "Mimesis, Pathos, and Parataxis") might be useful.

## Part II

The second part of my work applies the semantics developed so far to dance pieces. The (heterogenous) methodology is presented in the preliminary "MIP and its Role in my Semantics".

*Trio A* by Yvonne Rainer is introduced (1.I.1) and analysed in detail (1.I.2). Two motoric features emerge: II. "The Constancy in the Dynamic" and III. "The Constructionistic Movement Composition". IV. "Philosophical Results" provide justification for instantiated features to count as exemplified. (V.) is a semantic account of the different formal features. I compare my results with scientific literature (VI.) and round the chapter up with VII. "A Brief Historical Excursion".

*Rosas danst Rosas* by Anne Teresa Keersmaeker is introduced (2.I and II) and analysed alongside the four movements of the piece, framed by an introduction and a coda (2.II.1-6). The varied features constitute the semantics (III). My use of work-external knowledge is reflected in (IV).

*Entity* by Wayne McGregor is the first of two futuristic dance pieces to be compared. It is introduced and its structure explained (3a.I). A detailed analysis concentrates on the ensemble dances as – with one exception – purely formally composed (3a.III-VI). (VII) sums up the main formal features together with syncategorematic and expressiv ones. (VIII) places the young choreographer's piece in a historical background (VIII).

*MADGOD 2.001* by Pablo Ventura is the second piece to be compared in the futuristic style. Introduced (I-II) the piece demands for semantic attempts all along analysis due to

recurring representational symbols. Only so can questions to a 3b.IV "Problematic Causal Reading" emerge. My interpretation on behalf of perceptual replete aspects will be completed by contextual information (3b.V).

Subsequently I compare the two latter pieces first with regard to their respective motoric identity (3b.VI.1) then to their 'choice of preference' which is to be understood as the piece's style including expressive, syncategorematic, musical etc. elements (3b.VI.4). VII reports shortly the underlying choreographic procedure leading to the question if it has explanatory power for the respective motoric identity.

## 1. Foundations of the (not so Nominalistic) System

Scholars in the tradition of Goodman's aesthetic often begin by distancing themselves from his nominalism.<sup>8</sup> My intention is to show briefly what led the Goodman's generation to flee from nominalistic positions, and locate the Goodmanian way out.

Those who are interested in the ontological basis of his theory only insofar as it affects the functioning of art will find the relevant summary in the paragraph *Conclusion and Outlook For Constructionist Steps*. They can proceed to the second chapter as the final paragraphs treat 'only' the historical conditioning of Goodman's position without finding a reason for disqualifying it.

### 1.1 Goodman's Nominalism

By no means is Goodman avoiding abstract elements in his ontology.<sup>9</sup> This reflex of avoidance is normally attributed as essential to nominalists, due to Ockham's razor. On the contrary, abstract elements constitute the foundation of Goodman's constructivist system.<sup>10</sup> Heuristically, they are derived from concrete observable phenomena. In Goodman's system all concrete objects are built out of qualities ('qualia') like colours etc., necessarily together with the quality of (a specific moment in) time and (a specific) place. Let's take as an example a concrete green colour-spot in front of our eyes at this moment. It possesses the green-quality, the actual moment in time and the place as combined qualities. Being abstract, the green-quality may also appear, so to speak, in other concrete things. So what is nominalistic about Goodman's position? It is the fact that his quale is an 'individual' and neither a platonic universal nor a class. Not to strain our imagination of the notion unduly, let's clarify here that 'individual' was by Goodman "freed of restrictive associations arising from popular usage" (*SA* 33), no longer depending on indivisibility, homogeneity, continuity,

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<sup>8</sup> See Fricke "Aesthetic Ways", n. pag.

<sup>9</sup> I use the term ontology in the "new sense" established in Anglo-American philosophy since W. Quine (see Gosselin 16).

<sup>10</sup> Goodman considers himself to be a realist, insofar as he stipulates the existence of abstract entities – in opposition to the particularistic position. This position is, furthermore, compatible with a nominalistic position, (see *SA* 104).

compactness, or regularity.<sup>11</sup> So the abstract green-individual is, without being homogeneous or continuous, *participating*<sup>12</sup> in different particulars (in Goodman's words), which we can formulate equivalently: it is *possessed* by different particulars. In terms of logic: greenness (the green-quality) means the abstract quality's *overlapping* of all the particulars identical in that colour respect. Which still can be expressed by an equivalent logical function: the green-quality-individual is the product<sup>13</sup> of all coloured particulars identical in that green colour respect. The particulars may have three different ontological complexities called (a) complexes, (b) concreta, or (c) compounds. The complex is not one simple qualia but an amalgam – a sum – of two, ex.g. of a colour and a place, a colour-spot. Given the fact that it instantiates our green-qualia, it is hybrid in its ontological status: a 'bit more particular'<sup>14</sup> than the purely abstract green-qualia itself. A colour-spot *in a given time* is a thoroughly particular (non-abstract) and concrete individual. We could say it exists in concreto (even if in the future). The third state, the compound, consists of more than one concretum.

## 1.2 Results: Relevancy to the Spectrum of the Artworks' Syntax, and Exemplification

It is an important result to see that Goodman offers ontological variety: abstract qualia, mixed individuals (not being entirely concrete), concrete individuals and compounds with (many) particulars as parts. This range guarantees the diversity on the syntactic level of artworks suggested by Goodman's examples. As was mentioned in the introduction, if such different things as perceivable physical properties like colour as well as derivative and relational properties like contrast may become syntactically relevant for an artwork, Goodman's system gives an account of both. Relational properties are considered as derivative ones and will be treated after we discuss the specifying categories of qualia (see chapter 3).

A second important result is that his account of qualia explains exemplification. His way of conceiving a property (qualia) explains the characteristic feature of artworks to *exemplify*. This notion is described in *LA* as follows: an artwork's greenness "partakes of neighbouring pastures and the exotic atmospheres of farther shores" (*LA*, p.93). When a qualia is understood

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<sup>11</sup> "As I have already explained, an individual need not be organized or uniform need not be continuous or have regular boundaries." "If the Arctic Sea and a speck of dust in the Sahara are individuals, then their sum is an individual." (*SA* 36)

<sup>12</sup> To 'participate' and 'possess' are terms Goodman uses in *LA*.

<sup>13</sup> see the Definition D2.047 (*SA* 36). In German the overlapping product is called "Schnittmenge".

<sup>14</sup> but "not fully concrete" (*SA* 145)

as the participation in different particulars, the artwork can render this participation conscious. In doing so, we can experience it as similarity, or a contextual property. We should keep in mind for later investigations that Goodman has laid the grounds for contextual properties of an artwork.

### 1.3 Goodman's Nominalistic Realistic Position as an Answer to Prevailing Tendencies

In the elaborate logical work *The Structure Of Appearance (SA)*, Goodman evolves his ontology as a reaction to some prevailing tendencies. The tendency he was confronted with is the Vienna Circle which tried to prove that (philosophy of) science could be done without ontological commitment. The fear of committing oneself to dubious entities like intensions, platonic ideas or mental states was the distinction of that circle<sup>15</sup>. The proof failed. Goodman showed how a representative of this Circle, Rudolf Carnap, failed to build a system which could derive properties simply from particulars. In Carnap's major work *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928), the concrete particulars – our smallest perceived events, called atoms of experience or 'erlebs' – should be grouped with respect to a property (quality). Taking our example, Carnap failed to succeed in furnishing a criterion for the green-quality which could account for green 'erlebs' to be identical or at least similar.<sup>16</sup> The logical systematization at hand was called the 'calculus of classes' and it couldn't solve the problem. Goodman shared the Vienna Circle's fears as well as their aim of reducing ontological commitments to a minimum. So after demonstrating Carnap's failure, Goodman turned the logical theory upside down by construing particular things as concreta out of abstract individuals (in the broad sense mentioned), naming his system the 'calculus of individuals' (*SA* 150):

These individuals are repeatable universals. Each has many instances. We shall in our system have to reconcile the identity of such a quale with the multiplicity of its instances. In a particularistic system, this problem took the form: given particulars, define qualities – each of which may be common to many particulars. In a realistic system, conversely, it takes the form: given qualities, define particulars – many of which may be instances of a single quality. (*SA*143)

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<sup>15</sup> "Intentions have been identified with ontologically obscure entities, such as mental entities, Platonic ideas, images, imaginations, representations, possibilities. Generally it is believed that in contrast with intensions extensions are clear, they can be determined empirically, according to behaviouristic criteria" (Gosselin 53).

<sup>16</sup> Goodman gives a systematic reason for this failure, namely the "companionship difficulty" (*SA* 117) or the "difficulty of imperfect community" (*SA* 119) – i.e. the fact that a big majority of our experienced colours appear in shades and are therefore not separable for distinction nor identifiable by the technical means of Carnap's so called *quasi-analysis*. If he could have succeeded in doing so, a non-intensional account for creating properties could have been given (by assembling them into "classes" - *SA* 117-119).

## 1.4 Mereology as an Advantage

If the calculus of classes fails to regroup green elements in the class “green elements” *as such* because it fails to differentiate them from other colours using an impeccable criterion, what would be the goodmanian way – upside down – out of the problem? As we have seen, instead of deriving properties, Goodman presupposes them individually as the foundation of his system. Goodman turned to mereology in order to compose his ontology. Instead of classes, we are left with parts, wholes and sums. Disregarding the logical-formal implications of this system (which I am not in the position to judge<sup>17</sup>), the question arises: what is the advantage of doing it this way? Goodman has no problems with considering the Arctic Sea and a speck of dust in the Sahara (his example) as a single individual, being a sum of the two. I do. But are his compositional rules as simple? Is a complex, a concretum or a compound a simple sum of its parts (analogous to the calculus of classes, where a class is the sum of its elements)<sup>18</sup>?

No, Goodman favors in my eyes some specificity of wholes and parts: they have one or another structural peculiarity which distinguishes them from one another. E.g. a least-discernible visual concretum is a necessary ‘together’ of its colour, time, place, and is exhausted by this ‘tricomplex’-relation. The “all-togetherness-relation”<sup>19</sup> is essentially more than the sum of three pairs built out of the parts. An auditory quality, by contrast, is not exhausted by a tricomplex ; it is not restricted in this sense, since multiple tones can occur at once in the same place, as Goodman points out). And we will soon see that a family of qualia, a *category*, has its specific structure, too.

## 1.5 Conclusion and Outlook for Constructionist Steps

The goodmanian way out of obscure (platonian, intensional) ontology is not so nominalistic. Not bothering anymore with the process of abstraction, Goodman stipulates from the start that

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<sup>17</sup> Mereology is defended by Varzi n. pag.

<sup>18</sup> Mia Gosselin seems to be of this opinion: “The building blocks must be individuals that are sums of their parts and nothing else” (Gosselin 1). Considering Goodman’s care to analyze the specificity of this building block, which finally gave the influential work its name “*Structure of Appearance*” (my emphasis), I doubt that Gosselin does justice with her simplification remark. Though one can find definitions in *SA* in favor of Mia Gosselin’s position: “Any familiar ‘kind’, whether there are rifts in it or not, may be defined as a sum of certain specified categories. Likewise any sense *realm*, such as that of the visual qualities [...], is then to be defined as a sum of certain categories; and ‘realm’ as a general term may be defined by enumeration of the several realms” (*SA* 209). But the categories themselves are decisively, per definitionem, a structured entity. See 2. “Constructing Categories”.

<sup>19</sup> *SA* 150: “An individual composed of three qualia, even if each of the three is with every other, will not be a complex *unless* each is also with the sum of the other two.”

abstract things like qualia exist. How we might differentiate or individuate them will be explained in the following steps. Once we accept, as a first step, the large amount of qualia, we can use these 'constructs' to explain the objects of our experiences in the second step. If we want to understand the different sorts of qualia, we need to understand the relation of the concerned qualia to one another in a third step, which will yield eventually the structure of a given sort. To identify a single quale will as a fourth step amount to finding its place in that structure. An (in my eyes) non-extensional account of perceptual properties, the qualia, is given. We should keep in mind this structured and non-extensional account, described in the upcoming chapter, until 4B.14 "Critique of Goodman's Theory of Expression", where it will serve as an argument against Christel Fricke's critique of Goodman's metaphorical exemplification (in other words 'expression') and will defend by this a highly important feature of artworks in general and thus of dance works, too (see *LA* 64).

## 2. Constructing Categories

This chapter treats the structure of the individual category. It discusses its criteria and provides a heuristic procedure to construct a category by mapping or making perceivable its specificity. This procedure will reveal important insights into basic notions of *LA* which are presupposed there whilst determining art and its symptoms (such as density, dimension and dense ordering). I will present here the origins of these notions and their transfer from *SA* to *LA* calling them ‘three insights’. This is the first concern of this chapter.

The second is to explain the usefulness of such structures. A structure makes perceivable the necessary and sufficient conditions of a category and shows the relatedness of its elements. This utility had been discovered by Rudolf von Laban for his category of dynamics. Both the previous heuristic and this second pragmatic concern over category structure will be indispensable for my project to consider a construction of bodily movement as a category. Decisive for my dance-specific use of Goodman’s art theory is the question of whether I can consider bodily movement as one – indeed, in my eyes, the predominant – category of the genre of dance, or only a *kind* (a sum of categories). This will be discussed on the basis of criteria proposed by Goodman and Clark in the final paragraphs of the chapter.

A third concern of the chapter, finally, is to prepare the ground to the notion of artistic expression. Artistic expression will be conceived as based on a (transferred) structure in Chapter 4.10 where this point will be illustrated using the example of colour. The following analysis of the category colour is therefore paradigmatic in the three mentioned ways.

### 2.1 Grades Serve to Construct Categories

Before going into the depth of the colour category I would like to avert the reader that the mentioned three insights (together with their transfer to *LA*), in the form they are printed in the introduction will be repeated literally at the bottom of this chapter.

Following Goodman’s meticulous proceeding in *SA* to characterize the phenomenon of colour in the visual realm, we are confronted with a puzzling effect which he describes in the chapter *Choice Of a Basic Predicate* (*SA* 199):

Two individual coloured disks (A and B) can appear on direct visual comparison ‘the same’ (not distinguishable). By exchanging one element of this pair (A) through a similarly indistinguishable yet *different* (C) the new pair appears again matching. Only the moment when we directly compare the exchanged disk (A) with the replacing one (C) do we realize

that there is a difference. Austen Clark, a philosopher who specializes in sensory modalities, explains: “Two differences below threshold may sum to one above threshold”<sup>20</sup> (A. Clark 57). This is due to the graduation of phenomena: graduation between visual ‘atoms’ of a (not yet specified) sort of phenomenon. Goodman’s most elementary experience-particles, these atoms, are ‘finer grained’ than our detecting sensory capacity. So you can trace a path between any two shades, conjoining them by a sequence of a more or less long but finite row of such matching pairs, as in the disk example above. The result: these sequences yield the *sort* of qualia we look for: the colour. It is for Goodman a *category*, and matching is a criterion for category.

This criterion is valid for categories in other sense realms, too: we do have a chain of matching auditory, tactile and olfactory sensations as well. In my eyes the chain of matching sensations corresponds to the density of phenomena Goodman talks about in *Languages of Art*. It is of no import that the phenomena in *LA* have the function of symbols. We should keep this correspondence in mind as the first case of transferable notions from *SA* onto *LA*.

Two remarks by Goodman, taken together, give a necessary and to Goodman’s eyes sufficient criterion for a category.

(1) “Given any two qualia belonging to the same category, we can trace a path from one to the other by a series of steps, each to a quale matching the preceding one” (*SA* 206).

(2) “When two qualia belong to different categories, there is no such path joining them” (*ibid.*).

To ease our perception of these two statements’ interrelatedness I abbreviate the two phrases in a formula, using  $x$  and  $y$  for two discrete qualia.  $M$  means ‘being tracable by a path of matching pairs’ and  $C$  means ‘belonging to the same category’.

(1)  $C_{x,y} \rightarrow M_{x,y}$

(2)  $\neg C_{x,y} \rightarrow \neg M_{x,y}$ <sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Consequently the indistinguishability is not transitive, a result which corresponds to the remark of Goodman in his preface to the third edition (*SA* XIII): “Several elements may not all be alike even though each two are.” I owe Robert Hopkins my thanks for having drawn my attention to this “intransitivity of indistinguishability.”

<sup>21</sup> A well formed logical formulae would have to begin with a Quantifier:  $\exists (x,y)$ . After mentioning this Goodman, too, simplified formulae in *SA*.

The formulae (1) and (2) together reveal that ‘being traceable by a path of matching pairs’ (M) is a criterion for ‘belonging to the same category’ (C). This I would like to call the **first insight** of *SA*, which is relevant and transferable to *LA*. Matching becomes density in *LA*. So-called pictorial aspects in *LA* which are dense can be considered as categories in this sense.

But does the matching criterion make the colour distinct from, say, the sound?

## 2.2 Distinctness among categories

My concern is that this criterion cannot be sufficient. Matching may be specific for categories in general and only for them, given that we talk of perception categories, we do need, though, a supplementary criterion in order to distinguish one category from another. Otherwise, all sequences of matching pairs should find a place in one and the same category, acoustic as well as visual pairs. If this is to be done by extensional means, a paradigmatic example (here a colour-token) had to serve to determine the kind of similarity wanted.<sup>22</sup> Nelson Goodman prefers, in my eyes, to count on a structural feature for distinction.

## 2.3 Distinctness upon internal features

Matching alone will not reveal distinctive features inside the category. By matching alone you cannot distinguish brightness from saturation. We can construe between any two darkish (not known as such) colourshades a path joining matching pairs *with* or *without* an excursion into the variety of light colours. Not knowing the specificity of lightness, we wouldn’t be able to say why our journey of tracing a matching path took longer. So matching alone does not provide us with an account of the specificity of colour’s three aspects, saturation, brightness and chroma, nor of their relation to one another. Goodman was however persuaded of the threefold peculiarity.<sup>23</sup> Matching was probably meant as a heuristic device: “Qualia may be sorted into categories by means of “M” *before* qualia are ordered within the categories.” (*SA*

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<sup>22</sup> This includes the so-called Paradigm-Problem: “The Paradigm Specification problem is to decide what to use as a paradigm. To identify a paradigm successfully, it seems that one must employ the very term to be analysed. Otherwise one could not ensure that the paradigm is an instance of the intended quality. The problem was first identified by Bradley (1963)” (A. Clark 173).

<sup>23</sup> “Hues and brightness are not discrete from chroma as they three exhaust together the category color” (*SA* 209). I decided to read ‘hue’ in this and all following quotations in the sense of saturation. As Goodman sees them as the three aspects every colour has, it would not be in Goodman’s sense to reduce the notion ‘hue’ to certain colours of the chroma, as we do today. The notions in *SA* concerning vision science were established in the 1930s as he worked on his dissertation *A Study in Qualities*. Further etymological research into the subject could be helpful.

206, my emphasis). Accordingly, in the conclusion to chapter 1, *Foundations Of a (Not So Nominalistic) System*, this ‘sorting’ is implicit in our first step. I mentioned there the step only as ‘accepting a large amount of qualia’. We remember the second step was the possibility of constructing out of these types of qualia all our coloured particulars: complexes, concreta, and compounds. The third step, the search for an order, provides immense advantages. On the one hand, the identification of each colour by their place in the structure becomes possible. In the words of Goodman: “When we ask what colour a presentation has, we are asking what the name of the colour is; and this is to ask what position it has in the order” (SA 201). On the other hand, this advantage of internal distinction is at the same time an external distinction. Again in Goodman’s formulation: “Once a category is ordered it can ordinarily be distinguished from the others by some structural peculiarity” (SA 244). The only question is how to find the structure?

It is in general open for us to choose on which level we should look for categories in a system. Goodman is quite liberal about the choice of a system<sup>24</sup>. As long as the system meets the high demands of accuracy, adequacy and coherence, it is its capacity to treat the relevant matter at stake which decides the choice. Saturation, chroma or brightness could each figure as categories as well. Though I do not see how condition (2) of a category (see 2.1 "Grades Serve to Build Categories") could be kept valid, as there is a matching path between e.g. dark and saturated shades. Goodman takes the alternative, with three categories instead of one colour category, seriously into consideration, but rejects this finally for reasons of economy:

“[...] Our official choice of atoms for our system follows consistently what may be called the *Principle of Fewest Categories*. For an obvious reason, a choice of less concrete atoms would seem to give us more categories – e.g. the three categories of hues, chromas, and brightnesses, instead of the category of colors.” (ibid. 246)

Evidently, his ‘official’ choice of level for atoms has the consequence that the category colour has a threefold inner structure conditioned by the three now so-called aspects or components (both terms of Goodman).

This methodological tolerance I do want to spell out for my concerns : In respect to our bodily movement category, this shows that there is an alternative option to construe categories of a

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<sup>24</sup> In the eyes of Goodman the only possibility for science is to provide multiple versions of the world expressed in divergent symbol systems (see “multiplicity”, SA xxvi). Accordingly there is no option for a reductionistic position and to ‘translate’ all knowledge into one, let’s say physicalistic, system – nor is there an option for expecting completeness in one scientific system.

lesser complexity. As we could simply decide that chroma is a category to start with, so likewise in the case of bodily movement its component, e.g. speed, may be taken as a category of its own. It would constitute (with others) bodily movement, just as chroma does (with others) colour. In that case bodily movement would be a kind, a sum of categories.

#### 2.4 Means to Find the Structure of a Category

By the time he writes *SA*, Goodman complains that the science of vision is still very much ‘in dispute’. As far as I see he does not have a systematic or coherent picture of how the threefold structure may be. An intermediary goal for him is the representation of the similarity of colours. Very typically for Goodman this will be done by a ‘map’. “The central problem is to construct, for each category of qualia, a map that will assign to each quale in the category a unique position and that will represent relative likeness of qualia by relative nearness in position” (*SA*194). To represent a sequence a linear array could serve.

So while he reflects on the possibility in principle of representing a – not yet found – structure, he offers a system of arrays, and in order to account for the defiance of multidimensionality of a sort of qualia like colour he adds:

“The presence of ‘multi-dimensional’ units among our atoms calls for the development of a theory of quality order applicable to arrays of any complexity; and a more adequate understanding of the whole problem of order is thus achieved than would be the case if we had to deal with linear arrays only” (*SA* 141). “The qualities of an atom are represented in the system by lines or planes (etc.) passing through the atom” (*SA* 246).

These qualities of an atom are what Goodman called dimensions. To be explicit: if we take a rainbow as an example for a linear sequence of chroma, and can distinguish elements of it (‘atoms’), then a line crossing the rainbow sequence rectangularly through one of the elements would yield a neighbour to the left in a lighter shade and to the right in a darker. The rainbow sequence and the crossing line constitute two dimensions. With two dimensions we have a plane. In our case : Since we can find a lighter neighbour for each chroma of the rainbow sequence, piling them nicely up in a line, the ‘lighter’ line of neighbours is parallel to the rainbow. The two parallels create a plane. A lot of parallels with even lighter colours can be added. And symmetrically to the rainbow, we can add the parallels with darker colours as the chroma of the rainbow. This net-like two-dimensional structure, a ‘map’, is specific and telling: telling of the order of matching and so of our colour category. The third dimension is accordingly to be added, accounting for the saturation. I described this category in such a

detail because it will serve us paradigmatically to understand the category of dynamics proposed by Rudolf Laban which happens to be three-dimensional.

As a relevant notion for artworks I do want to emphasize our **second transferable insight**: The aspects of a category which order (the chains of) graded elements are called *dimensions*. Dimensions play a significant role in *LA*. Goodman used the term unchanged. Due to the new symboltheoretic framework of *LA* notions like categories became schemes, its elements became characters and the structure the outcome of the function when “the scheme provides for a dense set of characters“ (*LA* 227). Interestingly the German translation describes this function explicitly with the word « dichteordnend »<sup>25</sup>.

Austen Clark developed the system proposed by Goodman for the visual realm. Out of his remarkable psycho-medical professional background he feeds the system with the latest results in neurology and vision science, thus adding explanatory value.

Clark calls the physical objects which stimulate the retina ‘stimuli’ and the reactive function which yields discrimination of certain properties of the object (not all being detectable for us) ‘encodings’<sup>26</sup>. “Some properties are differentiative properties simply because the mechanisms of discriminations are sensitive to them” (A. Clark 77). Whichever part of our perceptual system is responsible for the encoding process – and however different the processes may be in each case that carries out this discriminating function of the mechanism – , Clark calls them *differentiators* (see Clark 70). A ‘differentiative feature’ of an encoding is the one that senses a difference in the stimuli. “ We need some way to identify the attributes to which the differentiator is sensitive.” (ibid.) The recommended way, a technique, is to “isolate the number of differentiative features found in a given modality and identify those features in terms of matching data” (ibid., 78). The next step is for him to create a system which reflects the structure of the sense modality along these lines:

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<sup>25</sup> "Solange das Schema eine dichte Menge von Charakteren vorsieht, bedarf es nicht wirklich irgendwelcher Bilder oder Bildnisse, deren Höhe schwer zu unterscheiden ist. Erforderlich ist hier für ein dichtes Schema nur, daß es ein dichtes Ordnen für Charaktere vorschreibt - daß seine Spezifikationen der Charaktere dichteordnend(sic!) sind." (Sprachen der Kunst 210f).

<sup>26</sup> This term is no metaphor and refers to the ‘channel’ between the retina and our mental consciousness: “Retina rods related to later events in retinal bipolar cells by generalizable functions, and hence to events in retinal ganglion cells. At each stage there is some function, determined by the biophysics of the cells, mapping earlier events to subsequent ones. I shall call the function mapping stimulus events to properties of subsequent internal states an *encoding* function” (Clark 68).

The key idea is to use matching to construct an order. The various differentiative features are dimensions of that order. A space is just a multidimensional order, and so for each sensory modality we will have a distinct quality space.<sup>27</sup> A phenomenal property is a location within such a space. (ibid., 79).

## 2.5 Distance in Space

Clark accepts how Goodman handles distance in the mapped quality order, or as Clark puts it, in the ‘quality space’. In short, a technical procedure yields an order of matching qualia due to the fact that different, very fine shades are indistinguishable ; their range<sup>28</sup> is called ‘manor’: "Goodman calls the sum of atoms that match *x* the *manor* of *x*. The overlap of manors determines the order of atoms" (Clark 81). Once an order is constructed, the relative similarities among its elements will correspond to their relative ‘distances’ in the order (see ibid., 83). The distance is not interpretable independently, nor is it necessarily regular. Perhaps we can discern more shades in the saturated e.g. reddish area than in the very dark ones. The span (size of a manor) can accordingly vary, which would be an important characteristic for the type of qualia in question.

## 2.6 Necessary Dimensions: How Many Dimensions at the Least?

Clark gives a reasonable necessary condition: “By definition stimuli whose encodings match in all differentiative features are indiscriminable. If we find stimuli that match in the first two respects yet are nevertheless discriminable, there must be at least three differentiative attributes of encodings.” (Clark 88). If we have for instance an orange which matches another orange in respect of chroma and light, but we find an orange matching both of them in these two respects and is yet still different – e.g. somehow more intense – there must be a feature not yet considered: saturation.

The dimensions of a quality space have no such ready interpretation. The axes provided by multidimensional scaling (MDS) have no intrinsic meaning; rotating the ‘shape’ has no effect on the structure of inter-point distances. Indeed, after one discovers a stable MDS ‘shape’, one


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<sup>27</sup> Later I will come back to Clark’s restriction of sensory modality to a single quality space. If the sensory modality is identical with Goodman’s realm and the quality space with a category the restriction is immense. We remember that Goodman understood a realm as a sum of categories.

<sup>28</sup> If we come back to our disk-example a range (that is a *manor*) amounts to the number of similar shade disks which still remain underneath our threshold and capacity to discover a difference. If we can exchange, say, four disks always in comparison to disk B and still consider them matching, the size of the manor called span would be 4.

purposefully rotates the axes in the attempt to find interpretable ones. The number of dimensions of the MDS space correspond to the number of independent ways in which stimuli in that modality can be sensed to resemble or differ, but the dimensions per se have no meaning. Indeed, it will be seen that a key step in explaining a quality space is to find interpretable axes. (Clark 124).

Goodman was probably delighted to notice vision science offering along with the so-called colour solid (see fig. 1) a structure which reflects the correlation of chroma, brightness, and saturation. This specific correlation makes the category peculiar and distinguishable from others. It is astonishing how vision science achieved with the solid what Goodman aimed for: the three features are represented as a dimension each.<sup>29</sup>



(fig. 1, Palmer 138-139, plate 3.2.)

Looking towards bodily movement : if in the sixth chapter I will consider bodily movement as a category (or alternatively as a sum of categories), Clark's necessary condition will lead me. If in my case the stimulus is a movement<sup>30</sup> the corresponding question is: In how many

<sup>29</sup> The matter of fact that the solid has a form of symmetrical volume, whose points represent the extreme light and the opposite dark, the white and black, is due to the possibility that one dimension, the chroma, has a circularity. So this axis can be represented as 'rounded', using the inner plane for the second dimension, the degrees of saturation. The height and depth is as mentioned the 3rd dimension of brightness. The neurophysiology can explain why colours, their wavelength mixture and our three types of visual receptors with their opponent processes yield this circle (Clark 157). This particular (two-pointed) volume, the double-cone, reflects the diminishing amount of distinguishable colours at the very light and very dark spheres respectively.

<sup>30</sup> For simplicity's sake, a movement should be understood as a reasonable short phrase, though see the debate on finding a unit in Scott deLahunta, 2005.

respects may it vary? If I am convinced of the number 99 and I still find a way to vary it, I have to complete the category and the number of constituting aspects, its dimensions, accordingly to one hundred. It is not the number of possible movements that is at stake – just as it wasn't the number of colours – but rather the ways in which movement can essentially vary.

## 2.7 Sufficient Dimensions: What is the Maximum Number of Dimensions?

This paragraph tries to distinguish between dimensions of a category and additional aspects which may well become relevant syntactically and aesthetically, such as relational aspects. For the simple category of colour, we can clarify the difference between necessary or structure-forming aspects, and those which depend on them and add some additional complexity or reflect psychological features.

Some modalities suggest psychologically that there are some pure qualia out of which the others can be mixed: “*Psychological primaries* for a given domain are the members of the smallest set of qualities a) whose mixtures can match every sensed quality in the domain, b) each of which cannot be matched by combinations of the others” (Clark, 128). In the domain of colour these are the phenomenologically ‘pure’ or ‘unique’ hues red, green, blue and yellow. They do not add a dimension to the structure. “Psychological primaries in a given modality are not indicated by any obvious structural features of the transducer space or the quality space.” (Clark, 127). What do these primaries contribute then to the structure? If we are of the opinion that the structure (quality space) has to take into account all particularities of a sense modality, we would better find a contribution. “Modalities that contain ‘psychological primaries’ present some new complexities” (Clark, 126). If we can represent a felt colour mixture by a pair of directions, one could call these vectors.

“Psychological primaries, if they exist in that modality, correspond to distinguishable vectors. If there are psychological primaries, any quality in the order can be matched by a mixture of those primaries, and a vector representation of the gamut of qualities is possible” (Clark, 130).

Do relations like these vectors belong to the structure itself? If not, what are they? If we add vectors as a supplement to dimensions, we are in conflict with our third insight considering the dimensions as necessary and sufficient criteria for a category. The addition of vectors would conflict with Clark's method for avoiding redundancy:

“Which properties are discriminated? It is best to think of the differentiative features of encodings as gamut or ranges of variation. [...] Each sensory modality has some finite number of distinct ranges of variation among encodings that can make a difference to discriminations. We can discover their number. Suppose we have some tentative list of the different ‘dimensions’ along which encodings in that modality vary. Our list is incomplete if two things can appear the same in all those respects, yet present differing appearances (and so be discriminable). In that case we must add an additional dimension along which encodings can differ. If we add some aspect to the list *rt*, then our list of the differentiative attributes in that modality is redundant. The list is correct if it is neither redundant nor incomplete” (Clark 72).

Vectors do not vary independently of the involved dimensions. Therefore I suggest that we consider vectors, like the mentioned mixing-relation, as no necessary property of colour. They do not constitute the structure ; they rather reflect additional aspects. Nevertheless, these may play a decisive role when an artist chooses a colour. Let’s assume he wants to combine colours related in this way, colours which have a felt mixing relation like yellow and orange. In that case to mention – as a critic – the described vectors could be important. Not because artists’ intentions are important – they aren’t – but rather because this type of relation between colours may become syntactically relevant (see chapter 4). With this syntactic potential in mind we will come back on vectors whilst treating bodily movement as a category in chapt. 6.

So let’s resume: we preclude vectors as relational aspects from the structure. Yet we acknowledge their attributing ‘additional complexity’ and their possible aesthetic relevance. Being a relational property, vectors can be treated like derivative qualia, as size and shape (see chapter 3), which Goodman considered likewise as relevant aesthetic aspects.

What is important to fix now is the **third insight**. The number of dimensions exhaust and specify the category (in the case of colour, three). Adding this to our first insight, according to which pictorial aspects are an analogy to categories, or in fact are categories (as far as they are likewise graded and fulfill thus the necessary criterion), we have: the dimensions order *both* the perception category as well as the pictorial aspects. And they do it in the same manner. Just as they exhaust and specify the (sensory) categories of *SA*, so do they the dense pictorial aspects of *LA*. Result for the aesthetic: If we transfer the third insight to *LA*, where Nelson Goodman talks of dense ordering, we know by now how specifically this is meant to be. Colour being one of several pictorial aspects of a painting, its dense ordering – even in the case of a monochrome painting by Rothko – is three-dimensional.

Summary of the three insights deduced from *SA* and transferred to *LA*:

- (1) The elements of a category belong to it by being graded and joining one another through a chain of matching elements. This leads to the criterion of matching (= necessary criterion).
- (2) The aspects of a category which order the chains of graded elements are so-called dimensions.
- (3) The number of dimensions exhausts and specifies the category (three in the case of colour) (= sufficient criterion).

By transferring these insights to artworks as understood in *LA*, we have the following:

- (i) The notion ‘matching’ of *SA* corresponds to ‘dense’ in *LA*. A chain of matching pairs is in fact dense. Fulfilling the criterion of density, (some) pictorial aspects can be seen as categories.
- (ii) The notion of dimension has been transferred by Goodman himself.

Thesis of Repleteness in *LA*: Repleteness is the (for art) symptomatic high number of pictorial aspects.

- (iii) The specifying number of dimensions corresponds to the dense ordering of pictorial aspects in *LA*. Notwithstanding the inner structure of each, its dense order, the kinds of aspects present in a work of art constitute due to the repleteness thesis the ‘so-to-speak’ dimensions of the artwork as a whole.<sup>31</sup> They vary according to genres considerably. Only ‘so-to-speak’ as the artwork is no category.

Before proceeding with a conclusion and an outlook that will lead to the next chapter, I would like to draw attention to an interesting side-effect of our third insight: the structure, by guaranteeing the specific number of dimensions of a category, contributes in my eyes a kind of intensionality to Goodman’s system. In my eyes the provision (supported by Clark) of a necessary and sufficient criterion for a category, the paradigmatic *structure* of colour, is the goodmanian way out of a mere extensionalistic nominalism. This will save Goodman from critics like Christel Fricke, as we will see in chapter 4B.14 "Critique of Goodman's Theory of Expression".

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<sup>31</sup> “Relative syntactic repleteness in a syntactically dense system demands such effort at discrimination along, so to speak, *more dimensions*” (*LA* 253, my italic).

## 2.8 Conclusion and Outlook for a New Category, Bodily Movement

I have presented Goodman's construction of a category using the example of colour for three reasons. First, it reflects the heuristic procedure to find a category and its structure. Second, it shows its usefulness: its structure gives an account of its peculiarity, clarifying relations of its parts and being a device for detecting and illustrating additional complexity (like vectors). This structural account is by no means self-explanatory for what is to be the category in question (i.e. a colour or a bodily movement). It needs interpretations of the axes, which – first tentatively and intuitively constructed – gain explicative power when provided with the results of independent scientific research from various fields (as Clark furnished using neurophysiology). If I want to understand bodily movement phenomenologically I need to check whether it is a category on its own (or rather a *kind*, a sum of categories), and if so, what its structure and interpretable axes, in Goodman's term dimensions, are. A third reason for having presented the colour category is that its understanding will be useful to my discussion of Goodman's central thesis of artwork's expression. Expression is there understood as metaphorical exemplification, meaning the transfer of a structure of a given schema to a new sphere (*LA* 9). To illustrate this, the colour order will serve as a paradigm in the chapter to follow.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> For Fricke this paradigm is crucial in the debate of artistic expression. Fricke doubts that Goodman's system can accomplish his claim of artistic expression as a transfer of structure, being himself an extensionalist (Fricke 234). My defense will point out once again that Goodman himself considers structure as a decisive distinction of categories and schemas which I see as an intensionalistic concession (see chap. 4.10 "Expression: Metaphorical Exemplification").

### 3. Derivative Qualia: Size and Shape

This chapter will investigate a sort of qualia which is not a category. As this sort will appear in *LA* as an aesthetic (in the picture example: pictorial) aspect and in my case dance-specific aspect, its nature and spectrum are of great importance.

The chapter will reveal that the nature of this sort is on one hand derivative and on the other – potentially – syncategorematic. The structure of the involved categories elaborated in the preceding chapter is still relevant: shape turns out to be a relation of atoms in that structure. The paragraph titled *syncategorematic shape* will add a complexity to this relation which is very useful for dance work analysis<sup>33</sup>.

The last paragraphs illustrate how a derivative shape, a certain structural relation of colour, is implicated in artworks. As a term it can be applied literally as well as metaphorically to works of art. The paragraph 3.4 *Examples of Derivative or Relational Qualia in Dance* illustrates a structural shape in dance derived from Laban's dynamic category. *Outlook* will finally explain what problems have to be solved in the second part of my work if Laban's category is to be valid or useful today.

#### 3.1 Derivative Qualia in *SA*

Given the presystematic decision of Goodman to choose qualia like colour(shades), sounds, place(slices), and time(slices) as atoms and to choose as individuals either atoms, complexes, concreta or their compounds, shape – just as size – is neither an atom nor an individual.

The pertinent difference between shapes and sizes on the one hand and the qualities we take as atoms on the other lies in the way shapes and sizes are related to those other qualities and thus to concrete individuals. Every place, time, and color is a quality of some concretum, but no concretum is oblong, for ex.; only more comprehensive concrete individuals can be oblong. And whereas a comprehensive concrete individual may still be uniform in color or place or time in that all concrete phenomenal parts of it have the same color or place or time, no individual can be uniformly square. (*SA*142.)

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<sup>33</sup> Peter Boenisch tabulated them implicitly in his dance analysis as synchronic and diachronic relations of bodysigns (Boenisch 156).

And here the mereology of Goodman gives an account: whereas a compound accomplishing certain requirements can be a square, its proper parts cannot. There is no transitivity in the property “being square”.<sup>34</sup> That is why we will not find “being square” or any other shape term among the initial qualia.

Not only is a size or shape no atom, it is no individual of the system at all:

“Every individual of a system must be a sum of one or more atoms of the system (II,5). Obviously, shapes and sizes are not to be construed as sums of the chosen atoms (colors, paces, times, etc.) of our system; [...] Thus we must look for some other way of construing size terms and shape terms.” (SA 181).

So Goodman considers them rather as properties of the compound, as qualia of a special kind. To use the term “to be square” means that the places involved in the compound fulfill certain requirements. If the term is more general, as in the case of “is four-sided,” the requirements are less stringent. It is evident therefore that “shape” arranges the qualia atoms in a certain way which makes it a relational property. For Nelson Goodman the required arrangement of places are configurations that these places mark out in the visual field. Given that in his system the quale place, the category, is construed as an array of visual field he says: “spatial shape thus *derives* from the order of all places in the array we call the visual field” (SA 185, my emphasis).

I do wish to make a remark at this point which affects the category of bodily movement. The phenomenological account of shape in the framework ‘visual field’ has to cope in my eyes – in order to avoid solipsism – with the fact that the same round object may appear to us as either elliptical or circular, according to the angle of perspective. This problem will not improve if we choose bigger atoms for our system to start with. If we choose compounds as a basis, like body parts, their relation (shape) will vary quite in the same way due to a changed angle of perspective (either by its movement or by ours). In the course of my treating and categorizing properties of artworks in general or bodily movement in particular, this problem will recur: shape will be at stake as a property of phenomenal appearance as well as a property we ‘deduce and objectivize’ before we attribute it to the perceived object. Goodman is well aware of this problem in SA though it is not his issue (his issue there being appearances). In SA he says that it is probable enough that physical objects may not be

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<sup>34</sup> On transitivity, see the chapter “Parthood as a Partial Ordering” (Varzi, n.pag.).

deduced from the sum of its appearances, but that “this [problem] will not affect the question of the nature of identity at different moments” (*SA* 94). He gives a hint, nevertheless, by stating that a colour predicate which we assign to an object’s surface is the function of its parts:

As the self-identical object is a function of its parts, so the single unchanging color of the object is a function of the colors of its parts. The nature and interrelation of the lesser elements that make up the whole determine what kind of thing the whole is; the kind and arrangement of the colors exhibited by these various parts determine what color the whole is said to have. (*SA* 95)

That means, as I take it, that we deduce additionally perceived information of lighter parts, shadows etc. before we pronounce an object “uniformly green”. An analogy, as I will discuss in 6.2 Kinesthesia, is the additional information we perceive by watching movement. Empathic (some philosophers and dance scientists say kinaesthetic<sup>35</sup>) perception will contribute to that additional information. So to anticipate our concern with bodily movement as far as it constitutes a basic category for an artistic genre, namely dance, I emphasize here :

a) to objectivize and ‘derive’ an object behind our experienced appearances lies outside the problem adressed in *SA* but not necessarily of *LA*, where the aspects of a picture are at stake. Yet, as my critic on Goodman goes, the differences in appearances to different times or perspectives do not enter the (repleteness) of syntactical aspects. b) that our category to be constructed is beyond the appearance in one sensorial modality (the visual one) c) that the cooperation between the sensorial modalities, synaesthesia, do the work of objectivizing and deriving or synthesizing an object (a movement). d) that the immanent co-operational work of these modalities does not exclude conflicting processes. Hence it does not preclude the feature of artworks (particularly of contemporary art) to challenge this synthesizing act and to enhance conflicting processes. My outline of a bodily movement category will have to include different modalities. Inducing by that the question if I have to abandon to talk of one category due to the premiss of Goodman that there is no matching (density) passing beyond one sensorial mode.

Which qualia are concerned by a derivative relational ‘quale’ like shape? From which qualia is shape derived? The answer is: potentially from all. Besides the ‘square’ example in which place qualia are concerned, Goodman gives a second example of shape. Take a blue-yellow

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<sup>35</sup> see Hartewig 24-25.

flag experience: we have a compound of two colour qualia distributed in stripes over a place at a certain moment. For Goodman the occurring colours stand in a specific relation to one another. Disregarding their spatial distribution or rectangular form, it is the *relation between the two colours* that counts in this example. As Goodman puts it: “the configuration, that the colors of that individual mark out in the total array of colors” (SA 185). Unlike the graded nextness of shades in the overall family, the actual colours present in the flag are complementary ones. So the ‘colour shape’ reflects this aspect. That is, the aspect of a particular structural relation among the vast number of graded elements. (We recall how Clark proposed blue and yellow as well as red and green on opposite points of a rounded chroma axis, and being thus complementary; see footnote 31). The actual structural shape is derived in this case from the colour qualia. A complementary-colour-shape fulfills certain constraints, as does the spatial shape ‘square’.

Goodman considers the term ‘shape’ to also arrange time. His example of morse-code neglects pitch or loudness as sound aspects but spots out the marked time slices. A Morse signal

“may differ in temporal shape, i.e., in the pattern marked out in the array of time qualia by those times at which the sound occurs. [...] By the position of these times relative to one another.” (SA 185)

I would like to sum up: the shape as a derivative quale, which is to be applied to compounds only, may be derived from different initial qualia as sound, place and so forth. The structure of the latter (category place, colour etc.) serves as a background in comparison to which the specific qualia involved (blue and yellow) display a characteristic relation (‘pattern’). A Morse sign displays a pattern as does ‘complementary colour’ or ‘square’. In order to emphasize the dependence of this shape on the category structure discussed in the previous chapter, I call it ‘structural shape’.

Before I turn to syncategorematic shape I would like to mention shortly the second derivative quale: size. (A specific) size attributes the amount of qualia of a category to an object, as Goodman would say to a compound: e.g. *monochrome* pictures. As we will repeatedly talk about an analogy in dance, namely of monodynamic dance (see case study 1 and 3b) these derivative qualia are of equal interest in aesthetic analysis as structural shape.

### 3.2 Syncategorematic shape

Goodman pointed out rightly that such structural shapes as ‘complementary’ and ‘contrastive’ are very relevant for aesthetic contexts. I would now like to elaborate on the syncategorematic feature.

For Goodman “derivative quality terms [size and shape] are construed as *syncategorematic*” (SA187, my emphasis). Unfortunately he does not precisely indicate how exactly shape is construed as syncategorematic. Is a derivative quale necessarily syncategorematic or only syncategorematic in so far as it is instantiated by compounds? The complementary colour-shape (blue-yellow) on its own, in my eyes, is not yet syncategorematic. And why should a compound instantiating a shape render it syncategorematic if the same compound instantiating green doesn’t do it with green? The ‘structural shape’ can, as pointed out, be a pattern in one category only (the place, the time or colour).

My suggestion for what a syncategorematic shape might be, though not indicated in SA, is the following. A syncategorematic shape is just a supplementary complication in the pattern: not only blue-yellow, but ‘blue-here-yellow-there’, for instance. A second category, the place, is involved. There is a hint in an early publication of Goodman, in his dissertation at Harvard University in 1932, *A Study in Qualities*, that justifies my interpretation: “the same color-spot-shape” occurs when “two units exhibit the same colors in the same spatial arrangement” (Goodman, *Qualities* 375). To give an example: such a specific color-spot-shape turns up in the national flag of every nation.

Later, when we come to analyze exemplification, it will be very useful to come back to this relational property (shape). Then concrete compounds as artworks will instantiate the shape. For the performing arts such as dance, syncategorematic derivative properties can be significant. If a certain (aspect of) movement appears consequently in the same place (at different times) or at the same time but different places, both constitute a syncategorematic shape, yet are explicably different (this distinction might be implicit in "synchronous" and "diachronous relations of corporeal symbols", Boenisch 155-156).

### 3.3 Does the Derivative Quale Build a Category?

One could suspect that syncategorematic qualia fulfill the criterion of categories. Let’s stick for a moment to only one category of the derivative quale shape: the spatial one. It does seem unlikely that the family members of this shape like ‘square’ or ‘round’ come as close to one

another as to match (our necessary condition for a category). Though we could admit some – indeed potentially endless – brothers and sisters in between, bridging the gap by increasingly angular polygons. But how to bridge spatial terms like ‘angle’ and ‘parallel’? We assume that derivative qualia do not fulfill the criterion of categorial ones. A reason for this will be offered in the paragraph *Seeing Aspects*. The consequence is important. Goodman does not warn us in *LA* that there are pictorial aspects which do not conform to the aesthetic symptom of density.

Resumee. Not being a category, structural shapes are nevertheless a sort of, namely derivative, qualia which are highly relevant for aesthetics. His theory of shape as actual structural shapes gives precisely an account of what is often at stake when we describe features of an artwork without simply enumerating the colors or dance steps involved. “Although ordinary language supplies rather few such predicates” as “is harmoniously colored” (*SA* 185), art critics for instance are continuously searching for or inventing them.

Illustrations. The actual structural shape of an artwork is not only to be found by literal description but also metaphorical description. This is not due to the critic’s need for luxurious verbal ornaments, but rather to the need for supplementary information a metaphor may deliver. When we come to treat Goodman’s notion of artistic expression (chapter 4), by definition a metaphorical exemplification, it will become clear what it means to transfer a structural shape. Without going into too much detail here let me give an example: To describe a painting as literally pale or a music or dance as metaphorically pale, in each case the object will have to have the actual structural shape of missing strong and contrastive elements in regard to one of its aspects – be they shades or sounds or dynamics.

Knowing the structure of color by now – the double cone<sup>36</sup> illustrated the relations well – we know where to look for the pale colors: at the top of the cone. The structure tells which area is excluded: the saturated and dark ones. Accordingly the chroma are less strong, bright or contrastive (as if dissolved in water).

A pale artwork would lack strong contrasts in some respect, for instance strong red, yellow or blue in the chroma, or light-and-dark. This can be transferred (metaphorically) to music and dance: for instance, a work may lack loud-and-quiet, high-and-low, or strong or contrastive dynamics.

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<sup>36</sup> see footnote 28 and 29.

### 3.4 Examples of Derivative or Relational Qualia In Dance: Laban's Category 'Effort'


Perhaps not coincidentally, the theoretician of dance Rudolf von Laban tried to systematize the various aspects of dance during the early analytical period of phenomenology, the beginning of the 20th century. Choreutics is his systematization of movement in space, which I sketch here very briefly. Laban tried to offer a representation of the body's direct movement radius. Given the specific proportions of the length of the arm and leg extremities at the sides of the torso (and not circling around one centerpoint), the Vetruvian circle, appreciated by Leonardo da Vinci, was not considered to be accurate. Laban placed the body in the geometrical form of an icosagon with twenty edges.

Here instead I would like to present rather the so called 'effort cube' resulting from his effort studies, known as Eukinetics. Just as Clark explored how to construe a category, Laban tried to discover in how many different respects the effort of movements vary generally. Until 1948 he was convinced to have found three fundamental respects: gravity, time and space.<sup>37</sup> Each may be present from a minimal up to a maximal amount in a movement. As they are three fundamental respects, it was obvious to represent the system as a three-dimensional one, having each respects as one axis (see fig. 2).

Let's take the six extremes of the axis and have them end in the center of the six faces of a die. In that case we can locate the combination of the six extremes of movement aspects whose number is eight (Laban 1947, 24): they are to be found in the angles of the cube (see fig. 2).

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<sup>37</sup> After 1948 he added flux as a fourth aspect.



(fig. 2)

We can consider, like Goodman did, the aspects as dimensions, depicted as axis: gravity, time, space. Each axis has minimal and maximal extrem (g, G; t,T; s,S). The combination of their extremes is a specific structural shape of Laban's dynamic category called 'effort'. We saw there are eight of them. In the figure above an exemplary action is attributed to each of the eight joint extremes (Laban, 1947, 24). These eight structural shapes are examples of the derivative and relational quale of this chapter. They can be used to describe and characterize dance literally, though only in respect of one category – the dynamic – which means not yet syncategorematically.

An Outlook to Part II of my work. In the second part of this work, I will show, how this Laban model can serve to analyse characteristic dynamics of dance pieces.

I will ask how far this system can be developed concerning contemporary dynamics such the recent *release* style. Laban himself added a forth dimension in 1948: the flux.

But more fundamentally, I will discuss in chapt. 6.3 "Slight Divergencies Between Laban and Sheets-Johnstone" the axiomatics of this system. What is the justification for defining the minimal and maximal points of these dimensions as Laban did? E.g. why is maximal space (S) understood as 'achieving directly' and minimal space (s) as 'addressing flexibly' by diversifying the movement in multiple directions? A physicalistic alternative would obviously be in the contrary sense to see 'maximal space' as a certain quantity of space involved in a movement. In combination with the quantity of time it could result derivatively in a certain speed and acceleration. Speed and acceleration are features I would consider as due parts of any analysis of dynamics. Speed and acceleration are due parts of dynamics disregarding whether they are used in service of expression and effort categorization or not. Laban, as a representative of the *Ausdruckstanz*, scrutinized the aspects of dynamics primarily for expression.

A last question concerning the effort-category (originally a cube) is more and more urgent: Given that dance movements have become more and more complex, how can such compound entities – to use a goodmanian term – of contemporary dance be placed unambiguously at some point in the cube?

Rudolf von Laban's examples of movement were mostly daily actions. As most of our actions are executed by extremities of our body, arms and hands (see the examples attributed to the corner of the cube), his system for categorizing the efforts involved is heavily constrained by this fact. How exactly this constraint limits a general analysis of the dynamics of dance movement – as in the case of Laban – must be reflected upon in detail. The recognized limits will lead to the alternative tool for dance analysis called *Inventory of Movement* evolved from Laban's system.

## 4. Syntactical And Semantical Aspects

This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 4A treats the syntactical, and 4B the semantical aspects of a work of art understood as a symbol.

Both parts will apply the insights and notions elaborated in the previous chapter to the art theory of *LA*.

In the course of the paragraph titled *Exemplification*, it turns out that the properties an artwork exemplifies become – in its possession – syntactical ones. So the subdivision of semantical and syntactical aspects become less elementary than suspected.

### 4.A Syntactical Aspects in *LA*. Dense versus Relational Aspects

Syntactical aspects of a painting or design are pictorial. Syntactical aspects of literature are poetic. Syntactical aspects of dance therefore are dance-specific. The main feature of syntactical aspects is their density. That's why density becomes a syntactical symptom of artworks. However, not more than a symptom, as Goodman's enumerative examples of pictorial aspects show: some are not-dense, but rather relational and derivative aspects.

An elementary pictorial characterization [describing pictorial aspects] states what color a picture has at a given place on its face. Other pictorial characterizations in effect combine many such elementary ones by conjunction, alternation, quantification, etc. (*LA* 42.)

Section A of this chapter will find illuminating interpretational help in Wittgenstein's and Budd's investigations on the breadth of syntactical aspects, including dense versus nondense ones. Section A will end with two results that will carry my thoughts further: the first concerning why not all pictorial and, by analogy, other artistic genre-specific aspects are not dense; and second, why the amount of not-dense is especially high and why the spectrum is relevant for semantics.

#### 4A.1 Density/Schema

Matching was the criterion for a category in *SA*. The graded order of its matching elements is what Goodman calls *density* in *LA*. This equivalence I titled 'the first insight'. What Goodman called a category in *SA* is a *schema* in *LA*: a (structured) family of related qualia. Qualia are replaced in *LA* by 'characters'.<sup>38</sup> This is understandable as Goodman considers in

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<sup>38</sup> But see also *R* 124.

*LA* symbol systems like notations and their qualia. One schema in the notational context would be, for instance, the alphabet or a musical scale.<sup>39</sup> Typically these schema are not dense. The order of the schema is in the case of the alphabet a conventionalized sequence, or in the case of the scale a conventionally restricted choice of following sounds. The schema in our example in the chapter *categories* was color. Color is in Goodman's eye the elementary pictorial aspect and, due to its graded elements (qualia or characters), a dense one.

#### 4A.2 Dense ordering

The order of the schema is what was called the structure of the category in *SA*. If schema are dense, their order is called dense ordering. In *SA* we saw that an order was built on dimensions (second insight) and its specificity on their amount (third insight). In the words of Goodman the order of a schema 'provides for a dense set of characters'.<sup>40</sup>

NG's example of a dense ordering in chapter VI, *Art And Understanding. Pictures and Paragraphs* (*LA*, p. 226), belongs to representational pictures: a set of images of upright men. The higher the image of the man in a picture, the taller or closer he is. An upright stroke or figure image in a naturalistic representation is a syntactic element, the upright man is its semantical equivalent. The height of the former is a syntactical (dense) aspect, the height of the latter a semantical (dense) aspect.

The dense ordering of height does not depend on actual or existing instances:

Moreover, so long as the scheme provides for a dense set of characters, we need not actually have any pictures or images that are difficult to discriminate in height. We still have syntactic density here even if there are only two actual images and they differ conspicuously in height. Indeed, with only a single image, any character it belongs to will lack syntactic differentiation from others provided for by the scheme. (*ibid.*, 227)

Later Goodman explicitly states that not only representation but exemplification in general is syntactically dense: "In painting and sculpture, exemplification is syntactically and semantically dense. Neither the pictorial characters nor the exemplified properties are differentiated ; (...) Pictures may exemplify colors, shapes, sounds, feelings, etc." (*ibid.*, 234)

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<sup>39</sup> That not all schema are dense – unlike the perceptual categories in *SA* – had been discussed in the chapter *Derivative Qualia*. But it is worthwhile to point out that characters of a notation like the one of music may be voluntarily differentiated (and the system 'digitalized' – see the chapter *Representation Re-presented*, in *R* 126) though their perceptual realm is dense.

<sup>40</sup> The German logician Bernd Philipp translated a "scheme's providing for density" as "dichteordnende Spezifikation" (*Sprachen der Kunst* 211).

Here it might seem that properties are (proportionately) dense in artworks as they are semantically dense ‘in the world’, so to speak. They might share identical dense ordering. But here I would be cautious. In an epoch where painting material was limited in terms of color variety, that was not the case.

#### 4A.3 Repleteness

The artwork as a whole, in Goodman’s example usually a picture (or ‘pictorial schema’), has many specifying aspects. Only on this level does Goodman speak of dimensions in *LA*, and only on this level does he talk of repleteness. The number of dimensions – in opposition to the numbers in the case of categories in *SA* – he leaves wisely unmentioned. But he points out that its number is symptomatically high. In the following he contrasts a diagram with a painted sketch:

The thickness of the line, its color and intensity, the absolute size of the diagram, etc., do not matter [...] For the sketch, this is not true. Any thickening or thinning of the line, its color, its contrast with the background, its size, even the qualities of the paper – none of these is ruled out, none can be ignored (*LA*, p.229).

The spectrum of pictorial aspects is vast. Among the syntactical aspects of an artwork, he mentions in the quotation size, he could also mention shape. In which senses shapes might or might not be dense I discussed in relation to derivative qualia. In the following I add some helpful literature.

Before turning to this literature I need to stress that it is this repleteness of the genre-specific aspects (here pictorial) which makes them analogous to the genre of dance.

#### 4A.4 Seeing Aspects

In this paragraph I want to explore the range of pictorial syntactical aspects. Some are dense and some aren’t.

Some reflections show that by changing our focus to aspects, one can ‘add meaning’ to a perceived (syntactical) object in various ways. Though nothing changes in the object (syntactically), nevertheless the seen aspects seem to lose their density at a more conceptual level.

Wittgenstein/Budd on Seeing Aspects. At least since Wittgenstein, there has been an acknowledged kinship between semantics and perception, or more precisely between experiencing meaning and seeing aspects.<sup>41</sup>

For our concerns, the most relevant result of Wittgenstein's and Budd's investigation is that "there are *significantly different kinds* of aspects, in which the sensory is joined with the intellectual in different ways and in different proportions" (Budd 2, my emphasis). One kind would be when we recognize only the colors of a painting or analogously the speed of a passing body. The pictorial aspect recognized, the color, belongs to a dense category, quite as Goodman proposed. So does the speed aspect. In that simple perception not much intellectual recognition seems to be involved. Proportionately more is involved if we recognize a contrast. Let's take Goodman's third example for pictorial aspects in the above quotation: "the contrast to the background."

I wish to suggest two readings. (a) Background is meant as the opposite of a central entity, the less meaningful surrounding of this entity. This surrounding may not represent anything at all and be merely a syntactic device, in extremis serving to fill the paper, to highlight (ex negativo) the entity. Or, in the case of a representational picture, (b) background is to be understood as a semantical device, an interpreted perspective of a scene (representation). We see a foreground, a middle and a distant part of the scene. This is grossomodo, a threefold concept of scene. Seeing a picture through this concept (seeing something on it *as background*) involves proportionately more intellectual or conceptual perception and recognition. The latter two understandings of 'being a contrast to the background', (a) as well as (b), both show a pictorial aspect *not* belonging to a dense schema. The background belongs to a dualistic (background/highlighted foreground) or to the described threefold schema.

A thesis could be that the more intellectual and conceptual schemas play a role in seeing an aspect, the less density will matter. But I doubt this; as we have seen, when syntactical aspects like height are combined with semantical ones like tallness, we do have a case of density (syntactical and semantical).

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<sup>41</sup> "The experience of meaning owes its philosophical importance to its kinship with the perception of an aspect" (Budd 1). The examples of Wittgenstein are all pictorial, but I try throughout to add movement- and perception-related examples.

There is still a role for density to play in the perception of that contrast-aspect. Being a case of perception and being produced by using color (or grey shades), the contrast can be more or less strong. The graduation between the strong and weak makes the contrast aspect dense. It can disappear altogether if fore- and background color are identical. The property ‘contrastive’ is equivalent to the two relational properties ‘lighter than’ and ‘darker than’ and corresponds to the vertical axis in our color solid. Therefore it can be considered as one dimension. Alongside this dimension, the chain of matching color pairs is ordered. The strongest contrast is between two pairs at the opposite ends, with the most possible pairs inbetween. (Being so, contrast is a structural shape, to use my terms from chapter 3. It is in principle applicable to different dimensions. Applied as light-contrast, the structural shape itself seems dense, within limits).

The density of the contrast aspect diminishes, on the other hand, if we assume that the normal usage of ‘contrasting’ means eo ipso that it is strong in this described light-dark-sense. In that case ‘contrasting to the background’ means in variation (a) that an entity is highlighted by being much lighter or darker than its (syntactical) surrounding, and in variation (b) that something in the front *or* in the middle scene is much lighter or darker than the background. This gives us three possibilities all together.

The derivative pictorial aspect ‘contrasting’ or the involved schema ‘background’ are responsible in that the involved density is thinned out. Nevertheless, in so far as the fore- and the background are painted they obviously belong to a dense pictorial schema.

First result. Let’s point out the first important result considering aspects like *seeing-as*: If we do see simply in a sensory manner without any intellectual schema involved, the perception will be dense (not even having enough terms to name the graduation). As soon as there are intellectual schemata involved *their* (dualistic or other) structure will dominate ‘what we see’.

Second result. A second result of Wittgenstein’s and Budd’s investigations is important for our stated high number (repleteness) of pictorial aspects. Both philosophers pointed out that by watching the same (syntactically identical) picture, we can change our state of perception by seeing different aspects. Wittgenstein and Budd systematized seven possible changes. Some are changes in interpretation – so in my eyes semantical aspects. But three changes concern syntactical aspects: (a) “Seeing one part of an area as figure and the other as ground to seeing the second part as figure and the first as ground,” (b) “Seeing something without seeing a likeness between it and another object to seeing a likeness between the two,” (c)

“Seeing a collection of items as grouped one way to seeing the collection as grouped another way” (Budd 2). I consider these objects as syntactical and not as represented, semantical objects. None of the three aspects belong to dense schemata. (a) is similar to the background distinction we discussed above. (b) whether grouped in one way or in a different way, seems to be a relational property analogous to some I discussed in the chapter on derivative and relational qualia.<sup>42</sup> The third kind, (c), involves recognizing common aspects. This change in perception is the result of comparisons of objects in the picture in different respects. To discover an aspect in common is – in the words of Goodman – to find the respect in which the perceived objects overlap. None of these three changes involve density in my eyes.

An important feature of these more conceptual than sensory (or optical) aspects is that they can be subject to will:

Another important consideration in favor of the view that what is seen is merely interpreted differently when there is a switch in the interpretation in accordance with which it is seen, is that seeing an aspect is subject to, or dependent on, the will (Budd 14).

This feature of intellectual aspects is in opposition to the purely "informative" one (Budd 15) of sensorial or optical aspects not subject to will.

For my investigation into the spectrum of syntactical aspects this feature has the following result. Besides the dense sensory aspects there exist conceptual aspects which can be switched according to one's will. We cannot decide at will against the greenness of our artwork. But we can decide how to group it, with similar colors, contrasting ones or gradually darkening ones, for example. The number of these organisational, relational aspects is innumerable. As a *kind*, however, they are important for aesthetics.<sup>43</sup> It is in my eyes exactly that which we do when we try out the (syntactical) aspects of an artwork. Our variations in classifying and grouping amount to experimentations in hope of finding the relevant syntactical aspects, typified, shown forth or highlighted. With no limit – in principle – of complexity, I would add. The spectrum of possible aspects enables the variety of combinations to reveal a semantic import.

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<sup>42</sup> To this change in grouping Budd comments: “ 'One *kind* of aspect,' wrote Wittgenstein, 'might be called aspects of organization' ” (Budd 5).

<sup>43</sup> See ‘relations’ in the following enumeration where Catherine Elgin shows the spectrum of exemplifiable properties, considering art works : “Bien que je parle de l'exemplification comme se rapportant aux propriétés, dans mon usage le terme ‘propriétés’ est un terme quelconque, neutre, qui comprend des conditions, des états, des relations, des actions, des processus, des traits, des caractéristiques et ainsi de suite” (Elgin 84).

To conclude: syntactical schema that are predominantly not perceptual but conceptual are not necessarily dense. All groupings, the kind of classificatory and intellectual aspects, in Goodman's terms relational and derivative properties, are still pictorial aspects as they are based on dense sensorial ones. This is the case with pictures as with dance.<sup>44</sup>

Thus a pictorial characterization may name the colors at several places, or state that the color at one place lies within a certain range, or state that the colors at two places are complementary, and so on... And the properties correctly ascribed to a picture by pictorial characterization are its pictorial properties. (*LA* 42.)

Groupings, i.e. relational and derivative properties, will constitute a large part of the dance-specific aspects and thus repleteness. So far, without additional restraints, repleteness seems to cover endless possibilities to group dance-specific aspects. Some possibilities will be listed in chapter 6.7-6.9. That our semantics is not subject to arbitrary will is owed to the artworks capacity of showing forth (see 4B.2 "Exemplification").

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<sup>44</sup> For Goodman, not all artistic genres are based on dense elementary properties. This is why he considers density as a symptom only: "As we have seen, syntactic density is characteristic of nonlinguistic systems" (*LA* 252).

## 4 B Semantics in *Languages of Art*: Precision and Application of the Ontological Results to Artworks

Despite the title of the book, Nelson Goodman does not argue that art has or functions like a language. Quite the opposite: he is eager to show in which respects art differs from language and other conventional symbol systems like graphics, diagrams, or notations. The differences are revelatory and give a hint as to what could count as art.

Exclusively on the basis of syntactical and semantical elements, we cannot understand either all sentences or all pictures. What is needed in addition is independent knowledge of classifications (schema) and their relations as well as contexts<sup>45</sup>. The book title misleads and could affirm those who assume

[...] that understanding a symbol is an all-or-nothing affair ; the second, that a symbol has a single, uniquely correct interpretation. Ascertaining that interpretation is then necessary and sufficient for understanding the symbol. Nothing less will do, and nothing more is needed to understand what a symbol represents.

But understanding admits of degrees. A little knowledge of a symbol and its context can yield some small understanding of what the symbol represents. [...] No rules or relations guarantee that a correct interpretation will be achieved. There are no recipes. (R 119.)

The reason for this understanding by degrees lies not only in the mentioned pragmatic and contextual reasons put forth by Catherine Elgin, but also by the very nature of exemplification.

### 4B.1 Functions

In the eyes of symbol theoreticians, artworks have to reveal their functioning. The crucial question, a revolutionary one in the traditionally metaphysical philosophy of art, is: when is art (as opposed to what)?<sup>46</sup> Nelson Goodman sees art as accomplishing three possible functions: representation, exemplification and expression. Each may prevail, a question of taste (of the artist, the epoch and/or the theory prevalent at the time) favors one or the other.

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<sup>45</sup> R 177.

<sup>46</sup> See Pouivet 90.

As each function can be found also in non-artistic contexts we look for some accompanying symptoms showing up when in aesthetic use. They will be called aesthetic symptoms.

I first concentrate on describing the different functions. My description will involve the insights of Structure of Appearance and precisely describe their impact on artworks.

I consider the denotational function of symbols as unproblematic and widely accepted. Symbols in a musical notation or an alphabet refer by convention, denotationally to a specific pitch or a phoneme. Artworks use denotation only in the case of representation. Exemplification however seems involved in each artwork. If I understand *LA* correctly, exemplification underlies representation as well as expression. So I will focus on exemplification after having treated representation in brief. I explicitly will not dwell on representation. It has been discussed abundantly from Gombrich (1960) and Goodman up till the present time. Whether some sort of similarity is at stake in representation or not is still debated. Goodman, contesting the possibility of specifying the criteria of similarity, puts forward a theory without it. Goodman simply doesn't consider it as crucial<sup>47</sup>. My strategy will be to consider representation altogether as not decisive for a theory of art and to see it as only one *kind* of exemplification: "Description-as and representation-as, though pertaining to labels, are likewise matters of exemplification rather than of denotation." (*LA* 66.)

#### 4B.2 Representation

Representation is for Goodman the only denotational reference artworks employ. By denotation a work (as a whole or in part) refers to an individual existing or nonexisting object. So it has an object to comply with it or in case of fictive objects an empty compliance class. There is no unicorn, to take Goodman's example, who could do us the favor of complying. In specific contexts a symbol can refer by denotation to several objects of a kind. An encyclopedia is such a context, where a picture of an eagle is a denoting label for *all* specimens of this natural kind and stands 'in short' for the natural kind itself.

Let's assume we want to make sure that an artwork denotes, say, the main gate of a city. What is necessary for it to do so? Is it sufficient for our picture to represent it when – let's assume – in a commandeered museum, a briefing officer places all pictures around the floor to illustrate strategic positions of the city, positioning our picture accordingly to represent the mentioned main gate? Certainly not. Here the genre-specific aspects of the artwork come into

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<sup>47</sup> see *LA* 40.

play. A picture has to denote the portal by pictorial aspects, literature by its poetic, and dance by its dance-specific aspects in order to create representations.

But representation is not only a denotational reference. Goodman pointed out that each Churchill-representation is also a Churchill-as-X-representation (X being a predicate, a “so-and-so”).

In other words, nothing is ever represented either shorn of or in the fullness of its properties. A picture never merely represents *x*, but rather represents *x as* a man or represents *x to be* a mountain, or represents *the fact that x is* a melon.” (LA 9, emphasis i. orig)

By using these genre-specific aspects each representing work circumscribes or paraphrases its object with selected properties. This supplementary ‘information’ Goodman calls description. Representing pictures just cannot avoid to function as descriptions<sup>48</sup>. The question is: how do artworks carry out the function of description? As they do it by the means of exemplification, we now turn to this concept to have a closer look.

#### 4B.3 Exemplification

“Let us, then, take exemplification of *predicates* and other labels as elementary.” (LA 54). Despite Goodman declaring exemplification as primordial and basic, which means irreducible to other notions in his system, he does not leave us without explanation. I follow Goodman’s argumentation: exemplification consists according to him of a double reference. He begins with the familiar one, the *denotation*, where a word (or label, or gesture) refers to the artwork as an element of its compliance-class. The word “green” refers to all objects with that color. So also to our, let’s say, dance in green costumes. The compliance class is also called the extension class. If one could point to it or enumerate its elements, it would be enough to explain what “green” is. This explanation would be merely extensional, lacking any intensional characteristics. The second relation in the double reference of exemplifications goes in the opposite direction of denotation. As an exemplifying symbol, our green dressed dance refers to the property or its label “green.”

Yet expression, like representation, is a mode of symbolization; and a picture must stand for, symbolize, refer to, what it expresses. The symbolization or reference here runs, as we have seen, in the opposite direction from denotation – runs up from rather than down to what is

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<sup>48</sup> “Representations, then, are pictures that function in somewhat the same way as descriptions. Just as objects are classified by means of, or under, various verbal labels, so also are objects classified by or under various pictorial labels” (LA 30).

denoted. An object that is literally or metaphorically denoted by a predicate, and refers to that predicate or the corresponding property, may be said to exemplify that predicate or property. (LA 52.)

Let me give an everyday symbol as an example: a tailor's sample. A sample 'shows' aspects. That means, the tissues of the tailor's collection of samples refer to three aspects: their color, materiality, and pattern. A sample possesses all three aspects. So it can "show them off." A green swatch in this collection refers to its color and is denoted by "green" – this we called double reference. So does it go with pattern and texture. Note carefully that the two reference-relations are asymmetric: While the artwork constitutes one element among others in the extensional compliance-class, it complies with the predicate "green." The latter however does not comply. No predicate complies for artworks given that exemplifications don't denote.

But how comes that the swatch does not refer to the form of its tissue? The answer: it is convention that fixes where to look upon. It fixes the number of relevant features exemplified. In our case tradition or convention, and the habits of the tailor's guild (and their clients), have fixed three aspects to look at.

#### 4B.4 Convention Versus Highlighting

But what about "unconventional" symbols?<sup>49</sup> What about artworks where no conventions govern? There are plenty of properties a symbol has: e.g. a *pas de deux* "having four legs." But no *pas de deux* would refer to that. Exemplification is more than possession: we said it is possession plus convention in everyday life. But what replaces the selecting convention in the art world?<sup>50</sup> It is a highlighted reference: the exemplified properties are "exhibited, typified, shown forth" (LA 86) ; highlighted by means of the symbol alone.<sup>51</sup> I'll come back to this point later (see 4B.7 "Relevance in Exemplification").

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<sup>49</sup> Unconventional means rather 'unconventionalized' and I follow here Goodman's and Langer's concept of art as *open* symbols (see FF 31) which stay close to the one of Immanuel Kant who saw art as by definition 'without rules' (see Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Urteilskraft*, §§45-46).

<sup>50</sup> Though evidently there are conventions in the art world. But I follow Goodman by considering aspects first independently of dominant customs so as to be sure not to deprive artworks of essential aspects out of practical, conventional considerations.

<sup>51</sup> Elgin calls the highlighting exemplification "selective" (Elgin 84): "Il [l'exemplaire] doit isoler cette propriété pour attirer l'attention sur elle. Il le fait en minimisant, en écartant, en éclipsant ou en marginalisant." Goodman calls it selective in R 69 and adds: "To exemplify is to bring out, call attention to."

#### 4B.5 Critique: Exemplifying Predicates or Properties ?

Here I want to suggest a general critique. Is a sample's referring to a label truly essential for its functioning? We can agree that a tailor's sample of a green fabric does not point to any particular nor general object (a platonic 'greenness'). It simply draws our attention to a specific aspect, here its color. By doing so the specific color can be gripped by a term, a verbal label "green", but in my eyes not necessarily. The denotation of the word "green" to our sample (or artwork) is only optional. My point becomes clear when we replace "green" by the nominalistic account of Goodman given in *SA*. If the property 'green' is merely the qualia overlap<sup>52</sup> of all colored objects in respect of green, then the sample itself being only a part of this overlap is not doing more than call our attention to this very fact – and consequently to several elements of the overlap. This can function without (anybody) ever inventing a label, a predicate, for the specification in question. So I contest Goodman's constraint on exemplification:

The constraint upon exemplification as compared with denotation derives from the status of exemplification as a subrelation of the converse of denotation (*LA* 59).<sup>53</sup>

I repeat: in my eyes the existence of predicates is contingent on the existence of properties (no matter whether understood as qualia, as shown in the previous chapters, or otherwise). Whether we name a property or not, if there is a label or gesture for it or not, the property itself may exist independently, in my view. It may be possessed by different things, so by symbols, too. (They may be swatches or artworks). Therefore I would rather stress the independence of exemplification from every denotation. Interestingly, it is a dance-related example that makes Goodman consider for a moment this independence of symbols from denotation. He gives the example of movements which lack antecedently fixed labels. In addition he points out the extreme difficulty in ever finding an appropriate verbal term denoting it, even *a posteriori*.

To regard these movements as illustrating verbal descriptions would of course be absurd; seldom can the just wording be found. Rather, the label a movement exemplifies may be itself; such a movement, having no antecedent denotation, takes on the duties of a label denoting

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<sup>52</sup> In German: 'Schnittmenge'. See my footnote 14 in 1.2 "Results: Relevancy to the Spectrum of the Artwork's Syntax and Exemplification".

<sup>53</sup> Goodman relativizes the constraint shortly after: "Exemplification is restricted only insofar as the denotation of the label in question is regarded as having been antecedently fixed" (*LA* 59).

certain actions including itself. Here, as often elsewhere in the arts, the vocabulary evolves along with what it is used to convey. (*LA* 65)

So the movement of a (later so-called) “passé” can serve as a label as soon as it has been invented. This means, not yet having a name, it can be shown and demonstrated to call for imitation in teaching or rehearsals. This performed movement functions as a label and the imitating ones executed by pupils or the company would comply with it. Nevertheless, and I would like to stress this fact once again, in either case denotation is *not a constitutive part* of the exemplification. It is not a condition.

To conclude, I want to quote another dance example where Goodman actually lets dance exemplify rather properties, (musical or spatial) relations, than predicates:

But other movements, especially in the modern dance, primarily exemplify rather than denote. What they exemplify, however, are not standard or familiar activities, but rather rhythms and dynamic shapes. (*LA* 64)

Two footnotes<sup>54</sup> explain this seemingly unproblematic exchangeability of properties and predicates or labels. Goodman wants to keep his art theory out of the heated debates in prevalent philosophical circles, showing himself to be ‘indifferent’, and refusing to take positions explicitly either for or against the existence of ‘properties’ during the linguistic turn.

#### 4B.6 Exemplification as the Main Symptom of the Aesthetic

It will be only after the introduction of expression (metaphorical exemplification) that Goodman emancipates exemplification explicitly from denotation and representation:

To exemplify or express is to display rather than depict or describe. (*LA* 93)

Denotation not being essential, I shall put it aside from now on. And not accidentally, it is exemplification, not denotation or representation, which becomes a symptom of art.

“Exemplification is a central mode of symbolizing in the arts.” (*R* 20). Not believing in the definability of art or the aesthetic, Goodman offers only symptoms and exemplifications constituting the fourth symptom of the aesthetic in *LA* (*LA* 253).

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<sup>54</sup> see footnotes 8 and 33 of chapter II (*LA* 57, 87).

#### 4B.7 Relevance in exemplification

We know by now that artworks can put forward aspects either for the sake of representation or simply for exemplificatory sake, just as samples do. In opposition to samples, however, looking onto an artwork does not suffice to show which exact aspect to look at. Goodman admits that he gives little help in determining this in a concrete case.<sup>55</sup> No conventions or rules guide. There are a lot of pitfalls to avoid.

[...] to exemplify is to bring out, call attention to but not necessarily to stress a feature ; a significant feature of the theme may be quite subtle, or somewhat hidden by changes made in a variation, so that exemplification emerges only after repeated listening. (*R* 69-70)

Let's say we figured out an aspect. How do we know if that aspect is an exemplified one?

Goodman gives us an example: If a sample has the ability to show toxicity (Goodman here turns away from artwork and considers a sample of sea water), then the color may or may not be relevant. It is so only if the connection of the color to the chemical character of the consistency can be made evident.<sup>56</sup> Let's call the poisoning character a semantical aspect, while the different analyzable physical characters like molecules and color are syntactical aspects. So the color may function syntactically if it contributes to the semantic. And only if it does.

Correspondingly, by watching a dance work and noticing, say, loud breathing, we must decide whether this is relevant or not. It will be so if the proper connection to a semantical aspect of the dance is made evident. The connection to the demanding technique of the dance in question is not the right answer, as we seek to connect it to semantic aspects of the piece. If we come to know that, say, a heroic action or a breathtaking feeling is going to be performed (or alternatively, in the case of a formal work, rhythm and phrase are going to be accentuated by loud breath), this noticed feature is justified and becomes a syntactical aspect. In the first case it purports representation, in the second expression, and in the last a formal aspect.

#### 4B.8 Can a Syntactical Aspect be Incorrect?

Goodman says that a sample can be correct in some ways and incorrect in others. If the peculiarly luminous green water extract, analysed due to fear of health risks, is deemed safe, it

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<sup>55</sup> See *LA* 236.

<sup>56</sup> *R* 22.

would be false to consider its color as an indicator.<sup>57</sup> The sample would be in this respect ‘incorrect’. In reality, the unhealthy green color ‘has nothing to say’. So do our breathless dancers in a slow or quiet piece. On closer examination breath stops being syntactic.

#### 4B.9 Misexemplification

Irrelevant aspects as a *pas-de-deux*’s ‘being four-legged’ are in this sense evidently not syntactical.<sup>58</sup> Their evidence safely keeps them out of reach of incorrect use. Then there are aspects which only upon a second look turn out to be inappropriate. Aspects that potentially are syntactical, like breath, can in cases mislead – just like the unhealthy color. I would call these *syntactically ambivalent aspects* and avoidable. If avoided and corrected, they are not too bad. But if not, if you are not granted a second chance for avoidance – a look at the water sample’s chemical results or a step back from the pitiful breath – the case gets more severe. If the strong indication can’t help but indicate: too bad. If the well trained dancer can’t prevent the noise, nor the spectator avoid noticing it, it is a *fault*. The breath’s noise in an intimate auditorium where no music nor orchestra pit remedy an otherwise tender expression is an artistic mistake: an incorrect aspect of the symbol. An aspect not willing to cede to ‘highlight’. An apparent exemplification not suiting the overall (semantical) aspect. Just as misrepresentation exists, there does in my eyes misexemplification. The contrary to such a misleading aspect is the enhancing one Goodman intends by the following passage:

Exemplification by works of art is like sampling from the sea. A work is right to the extent that the features it exemplifies can be projected to enhance our understanding of the work itself and of other aspects of our experience. Successful works transform perception and transfigure its objects by bringing us to recognize aspects, objects, and orders which we had previously underrated or overlooked (WW, 133-137). (R 22.)

To sum up: exemplification has two conditions in order to execute its semantical role. First, it needs a *syntactic* aspect to exemplify ; not just any aspect possessed by the artwork will do. Second, it needs to show forth this very aspect. If one of the two conditions is missing, there is no exemplification. If the first is missing, the simple highlighting is misleading and I called

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<sup>57</sup> R 23.

<sup>58</sup> An exception should confirm the rule: the dance company Pilobolus used to stick half-naked dancers together in animalistic ways. In this case a couple twisted closely together does seem to exemplify (one organic unity with) four legs. In that case the apparent unity prohibits us from describing it as a *pas de deux*.

it misexemplification. If the second is missing, the syntactical aspect is overlooked. The symbol cannot function properly.

#### 4B.10 Expression: Metaphorical Exemplification

Before we can turn to expression and specify what sort of exemplification it is, three additional terms need to be defined along with schema: range, realm, and system.

Schema. A schema we defined already as the ordered family of qualia, the structured category of *SA*. In *LA* it is repeatedly pointed out that the alternative labels (the family members of qualia or their denoting predicates) are what account for a schema.

Range. Our predicate ‘green’ has all green objects as its range. We can imagine this range as the predicate’s extension. It is worthwhile to note that this range includes past as well as future existing objects.

Realm. The realm is now the entirety of objects of all the different ranges of that family. This means that, besides the green range, the realm covers all other colored objects.<sup>59</sup>

System. System is the application of a schema to a realm.

This seemingly simple definition hides very delicate problems, in my eyes. I propose not to understand application as a temporary act. It is rather a function, a disposition of a label and a schema to be applied to a realm. Least troublesome would be an ontological relation. But ‘application’ and ‘categorization’ do have epistemological features:

[...] A label functions not in isolation but as belonging to a family. We categorize by sets of alternatives. [...] What counts as red, for example, will vary somewhat depending upon whether objects are being classified as red or nonred, or as red or orange or yellow or green or blue or violet. (*LA* 71)

And he continues by adding the cultural-historical aspect of schemata:

What the admitted alternatives are is of course less often determined by declaration than by custom and context. (*ibid.*)

#### 4B.11 Which is the Relevant Schema?

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<sup>59</sup> *LA* 72: “The aggregate of the ranges of extension of the labels in a schema may be called a *realm*. It consists of the objects sorted by the schema – that is, of the objects denoted by at least one of the alternative labels.”

A schema is constituted by its elements, which are the alternatives when we want to ascribe a predicate to an artwork. A dense schema – let’s stick to our category-example color – may be thinned out. ‘Red/nonred’, in Goodman’s example above, is one extreme. Another is the schema ‘primary colors’ which offers three alternatives.

Let’s make the problem explicit on an example: When we say ‘red’, are we about to apply the schema ‘color’ to the object in question, or ‘primary color’? Our problem is that by applying “red” it is not unambiguous which of the schemata we apply and therefore which of the systems we are about to activate. The family of which ‘red’ is a member does not become transcendent; the family relation is not transparent to the listener. Likewise a red picture does not necessarily make obvious which schema it is exemplifying.

As Goodman and Elgin pointed out in *Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences*, the narrower the (extension of a) chosen label, the more precise our description gets. But the greater the risk of failure becomes, too. If we use the general label ‘colored’ we won’t ever fail in describing visible objects. By choosing a label of the family and even narrowing the spectrum of the family members by choosing the red ‘vermillion’, we render our description vulnerable to failure – but also more precise and often more precious, too. Which to choose is, as Goodman mentioned, subject not only to our capacity for differentiation but also to expectations – in short: to custom and context.

Let’s illustrate this choice of systems on two examples, a pictorial and a dance-specific one.

To choose a system means we decide which alternative labels we exclude and accordingly which schema we apply. By saying ‘red’, do we exclude everything (purple and green, too), or rather only blue and yellow – given that the primary colors are only three? By excluding the latter two qualia we apply the ‘primary color’ schema. To do this to a Mondrian picture we probably are more accurate than if we were to exclude a whole set of rainbow alternatives. And probably even more accurate than by naming it vermillion, and precluding by this mainly the other kinds of red.

Correspondingly in dance, if we apply ‘light’ to a movement dynamic we should know the alternatives. Do we dispose only of ‘light’ versus ‘heavy’ alternatives (as critics of romantic ballets in the 19th century might have had), or do we have as many alternative terms as Laban offered in his dynamics category? In this case we might want to preclude, in judging a movement ‘light’, not only all heavy movements but also all alternatives, like ‘light-sudden-

sustained'. That means we might want to preclude movement alternatives *which combine light with other dimensional factors* represented in the corners of the cube (see fig. 2). In that case by doing so and judging a movement 'light', we might want to stress '*purely light*' and thus be very accurate.<sup>60</sup> To clear which system is in use, a declaration may help – or the speaker's background may yield assumptions. Knowing the dispositions of 19th century critics or current movement analysts' – that means custom and context – could suffice therefore.

Analogously, it is custom and context which help to decide what property the picture and dance exemplify. If the alternative Mondrian pictures usually use primary colors, this red one won't exemplify vermilion. If 19th century dance 'floats', it won't exemplify pure light, as it lacked the alternative to be heavy-sudden-direct. But it might exemplify etheric (i.e. detached from earth), being a Wili and on point-shoes.

Result. What property is exemplified – which schema is the relevant one for an artwork – is therefore not at all evident. We need to weigh carefully, or as Goodman puts it, we need 'endless search'<sup>61</sup>. That's why exemplification by its nature allows (not less than representation) for understanding in degrees.

#### 4.B 12 Metaphors as a Transfer of Structure

Metaphors are for Goodman the transfer of a schema's structure. So not only an isolated label or predicate is transferred from its literal range of objects to an alien object. The whole realm is exchanged. The original realm is no longer the target of application. New objects in a new realm are to be considered to carry *metaphorically* the freshly attributed labels:

A label along with others constituting a schema is in effect detached from the home realm of that schema and applied for the sorting and organizing of an alien realm. [...] The shifts in range that occur in metaphor, then, usually amount to no mere distribution of family goods but to an expedition abroad. A whole set of alternative labels, a whole apparatus of organization,

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<sup>60</sup> In the middle of a gradually sorted scale of a quality, e.g. of time, so between the extremes of "sustained" and "sudden" Claude Perrottet calls the movements "neither-nor" movements (Perrottet 44). "Purely light" I understand therefore as neutral in respect of time.

<sup>61</sup> "In any such system with a dense symbol scheme and a dense or unlimited set of reference-classes, the search for accurate adjustment between symbol and symbolized calls for maximal sensitivity, and is unending" (LA 236).

takes over new territory. What occurs is a transfer of a schema, a migration of concepts, an alienation of categories. » (LA 72)

Expression corresponds accordingly to an artwork's acquired property *in consequence of*, that means due to, its literally possessed and exemplified properties. An artwork imports the capacity to 'carry' emotions from the realm of higher order organisms with psychological states. And it does so because it can excel the inherent logic of emotions, their degrees and oppositions, in short their structure, by pictorial or dance-specific means.

It is not only psychological properties that may be expressed; this is a very important consequence of Goodman's theory. Any property whatsoever, as an element of a schema, transferred to the artistic realm in any way, can be expressed. Thus is the enormous width of the semantical spectrum. The only condition for success is that appropriate (structural) genre-specific aspects are exemplified in the artwork in question (see the supervenience paragraph below).

Music and dance alike may exemplify rhythmic patterns, for example, and express peace or pomp or passion; and music may express properties of movement while dance may express properties of sound (LA 91).

I wish to illustrate how dance can express genre-external properties. But let's dance express color rather than sound: having presented the structure of color abundantly it is now the time to show how illuminating its metaphorical transfer may be.

Let's say a dance work expresses faintness. If a dance work said to be pale or faint it will have to reveal some structural conformity with the according property of the schema color. As we saw in the three-dimensional structure of color (see fig. 1), the pale ones are to be found on the top of the double con: the diameter of the round con is small. The reason is firstly that the dimension of saturation (represented by a horizontal axis passing through the center of the double con) is minimal. Secondly, the higher we get in the con the lighter the colors are. Due to the missing saturation and overdose of luminosity, we are less able to differentiate the colors. The number of chroma phenomenologically available to us in that extreme region is restrained. So the circle lining up the different chroma is minimal.

A dance work is replete and so we might precisely delineate in which respect it is metaphorically faint. For the sake of argument let us assume Laban's cube to be a valid and unproblematic representation of dynamics. The respect in question could be therefore the

dance dynamics. Faintness could describe a movement's dynamic in the following way: The light-dark dimension corresponds to the light-heavy dimension of dynamics. If we take light movement (see Laban's effort cube) as the suggested extreme region we will find that the combination with factors of two other dimensions are restrained. The possibility of combining a light movement with 'direct' and 'quick' characteristics is restricted. A paradigmatic movement for the latter combination is 'to dab' (Perrottet 55). How restrained is this sort of movement? The reason seems to be, that for most of the movements you need to use weight at some point or another; to be quick; to accelerate or prepare a jump. If the dynamic of 'heavy' is excluded from an entire dance, a lot of movements will be missing. So the second feature of faintness, the restriction in the second dimension, saturation, and even the third, chroma, is valid for dance, too. The graded scale on the two other dimensions towards their extremes – 'direct' and 'quick' – is restricted, too. There is perhaps an even more important characteristic of faintness: the phenomenological consequence, that differentiation gets difficult in that restricted area, due to missing – fully developed – contrasts. And as a proof for the success of transfer, both artworks, the literally faint one and the metaphorically faint one, expressing it, have this consequence in common: just as a pastel painting will not offer easy distinction between its colors, nor will an overall faint dance work provide easy to distinguish movement qualities. The only fast, direct motions being extreme light are (in the examples given by Laban) those 'dabs' with fingertips and toes.

One could encounter that the double con being symmetrical could apply in two ways. We need a supplementary argument as to why the colors at the opposite end of the double con cannot migrate to the same light movement region? Why suit light colors better? Is there an analogy between energy invested in a movement and pigments in a color mixture? In general how far a metaphor can go varies. The more dimensional relations it migrates, the better and more illuminating it is. And the same metaphor can migrate to more than one artistic realm. We are not safe from facing once 'pale' or 'faint' music, either.

#### 4B. 13 Supervenience

A picture literally exemplifies only pictorial properties and metaphorically exemplifies only properties that are constant relative to pictorial properties. (86)

Today we would call this constant relation between two properties *supervenience*. There is strong and weak supervenience. The stronger a supervenience, the more likely it is that only the very identical pictorial property configuration may guarantee the related metaphorical property, the expression. In our case only the very same pictorial features express the ‘bulldoggedness’ of Churchill. The weaker supervenience would allow some alteration to the pictorial configuration and still the same bulldog-like expression may follow.

In footnote 32 of *LA*, Goodman explains this constant relation we called supervenience. As a conclusion, he declares that he is prepared to call every constant property exemplified *pictorial property*. It is this conclusion which I take as legitimation for my wide interpretation of syntactic properties:

A property is thus constant only if, although it may or may not remain constant where the pictorial properties vary, it never varies where the pictorial properties remain constant. In other words, if it occurs anywhere, it also occurs whenever the pictorial properties are the same. The constancy here in question obtains between the metaphorical extension of the expressed property and the literal extension of the basic pictorial properties; *but a property thus constant also itself qualifies as a pictorial property* (*LA* 86, my italics).

To be explicit, two sorts of properties are justified in being called syntactic properties (in this case pictorial). First is the ‘basic’ syntactic property in the sense of *LA* chapter I.9, where the distribution of color is a very fundamental syntactic property in the case of pictures. Second is every constant property supervening the fundamental one. ‘Being complementary’ or ‘contrastive’ is an example of this. This is the reason why I count (in accordance to Goodman’s list of pictorial aspects) derivative relational aspects among the pictorial ones.<sup>62</sup>

#### 4.13 Critique of Goodman’s Theory of Expression

Christel Fricke sympathizes with understanding the concept of expression as a transfer of a schema, yet wonders how an extensionalist could guarantee a successful transfer. In order to

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<sup>62</sup> See ‘relations’ in the following enumeration, where Catherine Elgin shows the spectrum of exemplifiable properties : “Bien que je parle de l’exemplification comme se rapportant aux propriétés, dans mon usage le terme ‘propriétés’ est un terme quelconque, neutre, qui comprend des conditions, des états, des relations, des actions, des processus, des traits, des caractéristiques et ainsi de suite” (Elgin 84).

illustrate her doubts she turns to the philosophy of language, where the meaning of a property is nothing but the extension of its predicate..

Mein zentraler Einwand gegen Goodmans Metapherntheorie ist jedoch ein anderer: In einer nur extensional interpretierten Sprache lassen sich Schemata von Prädikatausdrücken bilden, und es lassen sich zur Not auch semantische Ordnungen der Prädikatausdrücke eines solchen Schemas erstellen ; aber sobald ein Prädikatausdruck eines solchen Schemas zusammen mit den anderen Ausdrücken dieses Schemas von der Gegenstandssphäre gelöst wird, auf die er seiner buchstäblichen, extensionalen Interpretation gemäß bezogen ist, sobald der Versuch eines Transfers dieses Ausdrucks und des zugehörigen Schemas zu einer anderen Gegenstandssphäre, in bezug auf die er metaphorisch verwendet werden soll, unternommen wird, verliert dieser Ausdruck seine Bedeutung, ebenso wie alle anderen Ausdrücke des Schemas ihre Bedeutung verlieren. Wo er auf neue Gegenstände angewendet wird, erhält er eine neue extensionale Bedeutung, die aber mit seiner alten Bedeutung gar nichts zu tun hat: Weder kann die neue Verwendung eines Prädikatausdrucks, die die metaphorische sein soll, unter Beachtung seiner alten Verwendung erfolgen, noch kann dieser Ausdruck aufgrund seiner alten Bedeutung von den Gegenständen, die seine neue Bedeutung bilden sollen, angezogen werden. Ohne seine alte Bedeutung und bevor er eine neue Bedeutung erlangt hat, ist ein solcher Prädikatausdruck bestenfalls ein bedeutungsloses Zeichen, wenn er nicht zum bloßen Einzelding wird und auch seinen Zeichencharakter verliert. Mit anderen Worten: Ein nur extensional interpretierter Prädikatausdruck verliert im Moment seines Transfers von einer Gegenstandssphäre zu einer anderen seine Bedeutung und damit die Grundlage für seine metaphorische Verwendung. (Fricke 238)

To give the gist of the quotation: If we consider properties as predicative expressions, and we understand (in the manner of extensionalists) their meaning by enumerating and listing the elements which comply with the predicate, then a transfer cannot preserve an internal structure. I would like to respond in two steps. First, I already declared my retreat from interchanging properties with predicates, and by this I hope to avoid the consequent problems illustrated by Fricke above. Second, if we alternatively consider schemas as a structure of properties between its elements – what I called a not-so-extensionalist position – we obtain the possibility of transfer: we need a function which projects the elements of the first onto those of a second realm. Maybe the function is not isomorphic. Maybe the elements of the schema colour are more differentiated than that of, let's take as a second realm, emotions. Maybe we have half the number of emotions that we have colours – then two emotions have to share 'green'. I take for the sake of argument the emotion theory of Brentano who

considers all emotions as gradual variations between two extremes, love and hate (Brentano 90). The question of whether metaphors are illuminating and useful or not does not depend on the number of elements in each realm. However, as Goodman notes, a metaphor is illuminating if it reveals relations in the new realm we did not notice previously. If emotions are graded and we can discover an aspect of colour which suits, then the metaphor is useful: we can say e.g. that the intensification of each emotion is like the saturation of the colours.

In my eyes a metaphor is already illuminating if a structure has been transferred without ever explicitly identifying the coordinated members one by one. And as I mentioned before, the more aspects of a metaphor are to be transferred in the projection, the more telling it is. Accordingly, if we could add to the intensifiable emotions a dimension grading them between loveful and hateful then we could validly project onto this dimension the light-dark one of the colour's other two dimensions. But often only a restricted structure is transferred and the chosen aspect is declared or contextually obvious. If Romeo compares Juliet to the sun, to take the example of Fricke and Elgin on behalf of Goodman (Fricke 241), then the aspects 'light' and 'warmth' are the dimensions alongside which the alternative planets are ordered. Romeo is surely capable – *grosso modo* – of ordering the human beings around him accordingly.

## 5. Susanne Langer And Nelson Goodman Compared

In this chapter I compare the symbol theory of Susanne Langer with Goodman's symbol theory of art. The main difference relevant for the genre of dance is that in Langer's account dance has a specific semantic realm. It will serve me to find the necessary and perhaps essential dance-specific syntactical aspects I aim for.

Any theory of art based on symbol theory seeks to show the distinction of the aesthetic : like Nelson Goodman, Susanne Langer tries to distinguish artwork symbols from conventional ones. We saw that in absence of a clear-cut definition, Goodman offers only symptoms for the artistic ones. In effect, Goodman does not believe in a clear-cut difference between them.<sup>63</sup>

Susanne Langer instead states an insurmountable difference. Facing the similarity of functional (discursive) and aesthetic texts, she holds: "Now I maintain that the difference is radical, that poetry is not genuine discourse at all, but is the creating of an illusory 'experience' [...] by means of discursive language" (*FF* 252). For Susanne Langer artworks can present and make experienceable something which is in a strict sense not communicable through discursive language alone. The surplus capacity of *aesthetic* symbols is to be, as she puts it, "articulate form" (*FF* 31). It is articulate form specifically for otherwise incommunicable experiences.

So for Langer, art excels a typical semantic domain as well as a formal (syntactical) particularity.

### 5.1 Analogies concerning syntax and semantics

According to Langer, in discursive language a convention of sentence structure (formulas of syntax, grammar) yields meaning through well-formed sentences. In art the articulate form yields meaning *without* conventionalized formulae. So far Goodman agrees. The distinction lies in the fact that Langer reserves the term 'meaning' for discursive language and the weaker term 'import' for art: a fine distinction which we can keep in mind but which is not translatable into all languages. As long as we point out that reasoning is understood in a wide sense, we can hold onto the term 'meaning' as covering artistic symbols as well. Langer affirms: "But in a broader sense any appreciation of form, any awareness of patterns in experience, is 'reason'" (*FF* 29).

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<sup>63</sup> See chapter 5, Symptoms of the Aesthetics, and chapter 7 *Art And Understanding* (*LA* 264).

## 5.2 Structure as Syntactic Specificity

In Langer's opinion, a prevalent feature of aesthetic symbols on the syntactic level is the interrelatedness of the elements. Whatever the meaning of an artwork, all the elements contribute to it. That is why the overall meaning of an artwork often seems to be omnipresent in the symbol. Yet this interrelation is neither hidden nor mystical.

Music like language is an articulate form. Its parts not only fuse together to yield a greater entity, but in so doing they maintain some degree of separate existence, and the sensuous character of each element is affected by its function in the complex whole. This means that the greater entity we call a composition is not merely produced by mixture, like a new color made by mixing paints, but is articulated, i.e. its internal structure is given to our perception.

Why, then, is it not a language of feeling, as it has often been called? Because its elements are not words – independent associative symbols with a reference fixed by convention. [...] It is not a language, because it has no vocabulary. (*FF* 31)

Langer's prevailing ambition is to reveal this interrelation, or in other words, the structure of the artwork. Langer provides various examples (or analysis) of the structural complexity of artworks belonging to different genres. Dance was obviously the least familiar to her and so remains unanalyzed.

## 5.3 Subjective Experience as Semantic Specificity

Art covers a semantic domain no discursive language succeeds in covering. It is the domain of subjective experience.

Non-discursive form in art has a different office, namely to articulate knowledge that cannot be rendered discursively because it concerns experiences that are not formally amenable to the discursive projection. Such experiences are the rhythms of life, organic, emotional and mental (the rhythm of attention is an interesting link among them all), which are not simply periodic, but endlessly complex, and sensitive to every sort of influence. Altogether they compose the dynamic pattern of feeling. It is this pattern that only non-discursive symbolic forms can present, and that is the point and purpose of artistic construction. (*FF* 240f)

Goodman emphasizes in *LA* (8), following Gombrich in his theory of art, that no representation (of an object, person, event, landscape) is possible ever without accompanying properties. Goodman calls them attributes of the representation. Inevitably a person is

depicted with attributed properties. There is no innocent eye of the artist, nor – as Goodman puts it – an object or model bare of attributes.<sup>64</sup>

Langer's point is stronger: not only is the choice of the selected attributes subjective, but 'comment' upon it even more so. Goodman illustrates his point with the example of Churchill portrayed by the attribute of a bulldog (a bulldog may signify aggressiveness; Goodman even says "bulldoggedness" (*LA* 89). Langer would add, if *FF* could anachronistically count as an answer, that the whole picture, each particle and aspect of it, comments upon the choice of Churchill being represented as – or similar to – a bulldog.<sup>65</sup> A comment may be manifold: It may be serious, pretending to serve as an objective portrait, or on the contrary it may be ironic or even disrespectful. She concludes that it is the comment that excels the particularity of art: art exhibits essentially this subjective eye.

Now, just like Goodman, Langer considers non-representational art. Their theories of art need to cover non-representational art as well. Langer's criterion – the semantic particularity to articulate subjective felt experience – has to be valid for abstract, formal art, too. Given that all syntactical aspects, in particular relations between them, excel this subjectivity, one could conclude that no object, person, landscape, or event is required. Subjective experience may be expressed entirely by a choice of colours and their distribution. But one question remains: if we called the subjective touch of representational artworks the 'comment' on their *sujet* (object, landscape, or other), what then is the subjective touch without it? It may not be a comment. It may be an atmosphere, an impression, or, in the case of Goodman's expressive artworks, feelings.

Goodman's liberal position on the semantic diversity of art may extend to cover subjective experience in the form of a felt atmosphere or impression as well. Maybe he could consider some rhythm-of-attention (*FF* 240) as a property like others that an artwork can express. But for Langer they are not like other properties. They can be expressed by artistic means only.

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<sup>64</sup> "It (the eye) does not so much mirror as take and make; and what it takes and makes it sees not bare, as items without attributes, but as things, as food, as people, as enemies, as stars, as weapons. Nothing is seen nakedly or naked. The myth of the innocent eye and of the absolute given are unholy accomplices." We have seen that insofar as a representation not only denotes its object but depicts it with properties, this representation (even if pictorial or musical) functions as a *description*. " (*LA* 8)

<sup>65</sup> Langer uses the words "omnipresent" and "mingled" to locate expressed feelings or subjective comment in artwork (*FF* 21).

But what if Goodman were right to claim that neither necessary nor sufficient features determine art? What if he counters by saying that in everyday discourse we often are asked to do just what Langer thinks only art does: to give an account of our subjective experience. How else is the question “how are you?” meant? If not asked by a doctor, Goodman might argue that the question usually means ‘what does your life-experience feel like today?’ or the like. Langer could respond by pointing out that we could answer by repeating the question (“How do you do?”, “How do you do?”), or by using conventions like ‘fine’. If we try to do otherwise, if we stop evaluating our state using ready-at-hand idioms and try to describe, give a real hint of our emotions or mental state, are we not going to use metaphors? By perfecting our report are we not coming quite close to artistic meaning? Goodman would smile mildly. Not seeing clear borders, he could finally even accept this. When we add to rich description, phonetic expressiveness, poetic figures, significant phrasing, accentuated breathing, our report comes close to replete artworks.

But his smile does not dismiss Langer’s point. There may be specificity without a clear borderline.

#### 5.4 Two Paradigmatic Syntactical Principles: Ambiguity and Condensation

And what is the “articulate form” of art above and beyond the forms of other symbols? Its intentionally implied ambiguity, the “principle of ambiguity”<sup>66</sup>, is one particularity. The other is the ‘principle of condensation’. It has nothing to do with Goodman’s density. He uses the term for one aspect of art only (it may be syntactic or semantic, though I paradigmatically analysed the syntactic). Langer describes the syntactic interrelation of the elements of the principle as follows:

Condensation is not the same thing as over-determination. It is essentially a fusion of forms themselves by intersection, contraction, elision, suppression, and many other devices. The effect is usually to intensify the created image, heighten the “emotional quality”. (*FF* 244)

Langer spells out how artworks intensify or highlight aspects. Her various analyses and interpretations give evidence for this. Goodman offered instead an account of interaction between the elementary references (representation, exemplification, expression) through a

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<sup>66</sup> Langer attributes this principle to Sigmund Freud (see *FF* 242). “Alternatives are simply co-present as ‘the import’ in art. This makes it possible to fuse even two contradictory affects in one expression. [...] I believe the power of artistic forms to be emotionally ambivalent springs from the fact that emotional opposites – joy and grief, desire and fear, and so forth – are often very similar in their dynamic structure, and reminiscent of each other. Small shifts of expression can bring them together, and show their intimate relations to each other, whereas literal description can only emphasize their separateness” (*ibid.*).

chain of links. He illustrates the chain offering an interpretation of the dance piece *A Hockey Seen: A Nightmare in Three Periods and Sudden Death*:

For example, the work represents hockey, which in itself exemplifies ferocity of competition. Thus the representation of hockey refers via hockey to such ferocity. This *indirect reference* is not itself denotation or exemplification or expression but *a complex* of the first two and is altogether different from the direct expression of the same ferocity. (Goodman, 1983, 82, my emphasis)

We will not learn more about the interrelation of highlighting aspects by Goodman. A reason which leads to my chapt. 5.7 "Critique of Goodman's Art Theory Without 'Structure' ".

### 5.5 Genre-specific Distinctions

Ernst Cassirer's account of symbols forms the background of Langer's aesthetics. Symbols being *the* distinctively human device, art is even more distinctive (humanistically speaking). Her bioaesthetic position, which attempts to distinguish the organic world from the anorganic, is nevertheless not decisive in her enterprise of theory of art: art is, in her eyes, an artifact of human beings expressing subjective experience in an "articulate form" (FF 31). That may be by creating an illusion of experience.

Each genre of art articulates its form differently. Painting creates virtual space through its form, music creates virtual time, and poetry creates virtual history. These are the "primary illusions" (FF 85) of each genre, as she puts it. One may find it *dépassé* to define a distinct genre in the present time; it is widely accepted that there are no (more) and not necessarily pure genres of art.<sup>67</sup> Mixed forms in epic or theatre are common. The existence of mixed forms shows that the boundaries are unclear, but does not demonstrate the impossibility of finding symptomatic features of each.

The symptomatic features are the primary illusion of the genre. It might seem strange to define the genre over its semantic realm. But if we consider that the form is articulated with regard to its semantic content, a certain affinity or adequacy between form and realm is not so far-fetched a thought. Nevertheless, a genre succeeds in adopting, to a certain degree, a realm of another. Langer calls this adopted primary illusion from a fellow genre a secondary illusion. Dance can therefore depict felt time, attributed primarily to music, just as Burt

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<sup>67</sup> See Kotte 140-145.

suggests in his paper “History, Memory, and the Virtual in Current European Dance Practice” (Burt, 449).<sup>68</sup>

### 5.6 Dance-specific Virtual Powers

Just like the other artistic genres, dance has its specific primary illusion: the virtual powers.

The primary illusion of dance is a virtual realm of power – not actual, physically exerted power, but appearances of influence and agency created by virtual gesture. [...] In a *pas de deux* the two dancers appear to magnetize each other; the relation between them is more than a spatial one, it is a relation of forces; but the forces they exercise, that seem to be as physical as those which orient the compass needle toward its pole, really do not exist physically at all. They are dance forces, virtual powers. (Langer 175f.)

The forces and powers made apparent by the dance are virtual and not physical. This means that gestures and forces of the virtual realm distinguish themselves by being multiply exemplifiable, as Goodman would say, in opposition to real signals that are not symbolic but are caused. Signal-gestures rise spontaneously from actual emotions etc. By the use of symbolic gestures, however, dancers can manifest forces and vital power. They can manifest forces and vital power which in literal context are evoked causally and physically, like the compass-needle.

The most important issue for my purpose is what Susanne Langer considers essential for dance: the dynamics. They bring about the virtual powers – not only the power of one body but rather, as the quotation shows, of interrelated ones, too. These will have to be spelled out in 6.6-6.9. The subjective experience aspect of the (virtual) forces, “the play of such ‘felt’ energies” (FF 175), will have its import. It justifies my consideration of the category of body movement dynamics in a way different to that of physics. In the next chapter I will treat dynamics as conceived by Laban and show this subjective aspect integrated there. The involved axes correspond to *attitudes* towards (see Laban 1947) space, time, gravity, and flow.

### 5.7 Critique of Goodman’s Art Theory Without “Structure”

Whilst Goodman gave us an account of the aesthetic functioning of art works and its parts and aspects, he avoids giving an account of how we come to evaluate the aesthetic or semantic

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<sup>68</sup> Note that Burt, in his remark on the same page, doubts that he conforms to Langer in this suggestion (ibid.).

relevance of art works. How do we decide which of the qualities of an artwork are more relevant aesthetically or semantically? Is a quale belonging to a dimension of the work more relevant if and only if it is shown forth in a *stronger* or *more intense* way?<sup>69</sup> In *Reconceptions* he rejects this solution by acknowledging the subtlety of artworks. Or does a quale become relevant if it lends itself to numerous revelatory and interesting relations among its other syntactic properties?

Let me reformulate this point in a theatre-specific context: Goodman showed us how we recognize category-internal relations in an artwork as well as syncategorematic ones. To recognize them is eminently important in the semiotics of theatre as here diverse so-called symbol systems<sup>70</sup> are common. Lighting, sound, music, movement as well as text etc. have to be constantly related to one another. Yet beside the mentioned 'showing forth', nothing tells us what artworks as samples are capable of, what shows forth more strongly than something else. Goodman affirms:

I am by no means claiming that the details of the pictorial systems are before us for easy discover; and I have offered no aid in deciding whether a given picture exemplifies a given property, or expresses a given feeling, but only an analysis of the symbolic relations of pictorial exemplification and expression wherever they may obtain. (*LA* 236)

The reason is probably that no general rule can be given. We cannot but analyse artworks piece by piece, performed drama by performed drama, and relate the parts and aspects of each to find out. Kant showed in *the Critique of Judgement* that we have to content ourselves with this and so did Roman Ingarden in *From the Understanding of Literature Artworks* (Ingarden 94).

The only, though important difference is that Kant, Ingarden, and Langer proclaimed that there are hierarchical<sup>71</sup> differences between the art work's parts and features, which Goodman never did. As a nominalist he could not admit essential features. For Ingarden as for

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<sup>69</sup> As Goodman wanted to keep out psychological components this term should be explained by him in non-psychological terms.

<sup>70</sup> To be noted that theatre studies use symbol-system differently than Goodman. For latter a system is an application of a schema to a sphere/realm, whilst for the semiotics of theatre a system is a category of signs e.g. lightening, costumes, sounds (Fischer-Lichte, *Semiotik* 13).

<sup>71</sup> A hierarchical structure was central for the European Structuralists around the Prague Circle, which has been attended by E. Husserl, R. Ingarden, R. Jakobson etc. As the latter moved to the U.S after the Second World War Goodman could have been acquainted with the position, though nothing in his theory seems to suggest it.

Kant there exists in (good) artworks an underlying main property all other properties serve: the 'aesthetic Idea'. Elsewhere Ingarden calls it "center of crystallization" (95-96). This may be something non-propositional, only circumscribable, as in the case of – to take Ingarden's example (having in mind probably Proust or Joyce) – "peculiar moments of the dynamic of time perspective" (96). Here he seems to refer to what Susanne Langer called subjective time experience which she attributed primarily to music (see her discussion of "primary illusion" in the chapter on "Genre-Specific Aspects"). Analysing the structure of an artwork we may, Ingarden admits, discover multiple centers of crystallization, which do not serve a higher one. In that case the tension between them disables a single hierarchical structure, a unity<sup>72</sup>, which may have its own appeal, as he acknowledges (Ingarden 97).

By retracing the interrelatedness between the different aesthetic qualities (properties)<sup>73</sup> Ingarden believes it is possible to sense the varied weight of these qualities. Though all conscious of the historical and contextual relativity of the perceiver's perspective, neither Kant, nor Ingarden, nor Langer would have contented themselves with the notion that all aesthetic properties are equivalent in relevance.<sup>74</sup>

Nevertheless, not admitting different importance among the features, which means not considering artworks as (hierarchically) structured, Goodman's theory cannot account for evaluative judgements. He does not offer a ground for a synthetical value<sup>75</sup> only for a collection.

As he saw in his time the prevailing tendency of art theory to concentrate on values instead of its underlying founding features it was a necessary step for Goodman to concentrate on syntactical analysis and art works functioning. By understanding these relational (derivative and syncategorematic) aspects of artworks we come closer to understand art rather than by judgemental evaluations: "Estimates of excellence are among the minor aids to insight" (262). Such estimations in aesthetic experience of art theoreticians prevalent in his day worried him: "In short, conceiving of aesthetic experience as a form of understanding

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<sup>72</sup> Ingarden's term reflecting his thesis of structure is "organic unity" (Ingarden 97).

<sup>73</sup> Ingarden explicitly considers aesthetic qualities on the syntactic as well as semantic level.

<sup>74</sup> In Goodman's art interpretations of the eighties we see a shift in Ingarden's sense. Goodman recognizes dominant features (see his interpretation of the dance piece *A Hockey Seen: A Nightmare in Three Periods and Sudden Death* in: Copeland 80-85) and contrasting parts in architecture (*R 42*, see also Part Two 1.III.6 Meaning as Network of Exemplified Aspects).

<sup>75</sup> Ingarden treats this topic in *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks*, IV. «Urteile über den ästhetischen Gegenstand» (369ff).

results both in resolving and in devaluing the question of aesthetic value.” (ibid.) That's why Goodman prefers to equip us with analytical tools. It is up to us, now, to use them in an evaluative sense, too.

A second critique is to be made: by excluding deliberately intentional features of artworks, Goodman also excluded all reception related intentional features like creating suspense or deception. Though ontologically artworks in his understanding are not prevented from doing so. They are not prevented – as an aesthetic feature – from creating suspense or deception. No doubt, exemplification makes it possible. The artworks just exemplify suspense or 'triggering deception' in those cases. Accordingly, contemporary artworks predominantly exemplify spectator interaction. It is another matter that undoubtedly one does not learn by that why interaction should be different from being green. We could be well off by showing simply all interactive artworks. (We remember this was an extensionalist's account). But if that won't do, if we pushed Goodman to be more explicative, he could add:

We better get to know the alternatives of the 'family members' of the schema 'interactive' belongs to. Or is interaction a schema on its own? Then we better show – just as in the case of colour – how many different dimensions order it: Is the audience just one added element on the (cooperating) participators' dimension or is it an entirely new dimension? Can we define the amount of parameters which open up the field of possible interactions? Perhaps interactivity is rather a family member itself as suggested. In that case Goodman would, if pushed, distinguish whether interaction is exemplified as a family member of a creative process or an element of the performativity schema, showing forth the mediality characteristics of performance. It is up to other syntactical features to reveal which of the schema a concrete interaction is an element of.

## 6. Bodily Movement as a Category

Here is the moment to turn to bodily movement in detail. We have so far presented the symptoms one by one which indicate a symbol's being most probably artistic: syntactic and semantic density and repleteness, as well as exemplification. Very basic categories, like colour in painting or tone in music, are responsible for density. In the case of dance my thesis is that it is bodily movement. Laban's so-called effort cube proved the category of felt dynamics to be dense (see Chapter. 2, "Conclusion and Outlook For a New Category : Bodily Movement").

I proceed in this chapter as follows: I) In the paragraph *State Of Affairs* an overview of the bodily movement category demonstrates a major neglect of bodily movement in philosophy and cognitive science in the past. Sheets-Johnstone seeks to alleviate these deficiencies and emphasizes the impact of bodily movement in epistemology by its 'transcendental clue' following Husserl's precedent. She adds ontogenetic and phylogenetic import to it. II) In the paragraph *Kinesthesia* I examine her account of the category as a distinct sensorial mode which she calls kinesthesia. The paragraph III. "Slight Divergencies between Laban and Sheets-Johnstone" compares her account with Laban's system of felt dynamics, the effort cube. The next two paragraphs open up the repleteness of artistic dance based on kinesthesia: on the one side I add interactive and collective dynamics (IV. "*Spontaneous Exchange*") on the other – given that my topic lies in aesthetics – visual (or otherwise perceived) *appearing* movement (V. "Inner and Outer Bodily Movement"). Chapter IV shows how the peculiarity of the kinetic sense as an interface between a perceiving sense and a reactional sense, just as the tactile sense is both passive and potentially active, leads to several consequences which are crucial for my topic: the enlarged repleteness comprises felt dynamics of all sorts, active movement as well as passive motion. In addition, by anticipating a forthcoming movement (Husserl's term is "protention") around us we can interfere with it spontaneously. This is the case in improvisational artistic dance. Sheets-Johnstone reports on it and I question. V) "Inner and Outer Bodily Movement". It is our capacity of empathy, another neglected topic in philosophy and reestablished only recently, that enables us, on the basis of kinesthesia, to perceive bodily movement of others fully. It enables us to sense and even to anticipate them. Kinesthesia and empathy make us spectators discover 'hidden' aspects and thus enlarge the range of repleteness of artistic dance. The 'outer' perspective comprises the traditionally acknowledged formal aspects of the dance. Finally, in VI. "Construction of the Category Bodily Movement" I assemble the aspects which

we considered so far to be indispensable for felt movement in a category and name it proprioceptive bodily movement. I add some optional distinctions which we found that movement theorists had left out. For aesthetic purpose we need to complete the bodily movement category by the outer perspective. I show how in principle continuously new movement aspects may be added.

### 6.1 State of Affairs

Bodily movement has not been in the centre of philosophical interest for a long time. Bodily awareness, mostly called proprioception, meant not much more than the spatial localization of the body. The range of the content of this corporeal knowledge – as far as sensations were accepted to be part of knowledge – was considered to be limited in comparison to the visual, auditory, tactile and other sensorial modes.<sup>76</sup> In 1981 Sheets-Johnstone placed bodily movement not only amidst epistemology fighting thus against cognitivist and linguistic positions. She ascribed a foundational status to kinesthesia. She needed not more than to take up the path of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The former constituted phenomenological objects by the means of (imagined) movement in order to find its different aspects (approaching a red cube from various angles). Obviously, Husserl's interest lay in movement as far as it altered visual apprehension.<sup>77</sup> Merleau-Ponty focused on the body (*Leib*) itself. Fact is that movement turns out to be a necessary *sine qua non* of knowledge of objects. Another line of argument for this precondition of knowledge comes from developmental and evolutionary science. Sheets-Johnstone shows how ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of human (in fact in general *animate*) knowledge is built upon movement. Movement allows exchange: acquisition of information and adaptation to the environment. Despite her achievement in strengthening the import of bodily movement for epistemology, it is disappointing how superficial the philosophical account of the bodily movement category called kinesthesia remains in her work. In the following I discuss the contribution of Sheets-Johnstone on this particular matter.

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<sup>76</sup> D. Chalmers lists in *The Conscious Mind* "a catalog of conscious experience". There proprioception is understood in the narrow (localizational) sense and is mentioned under 'other bodily experiences'. Proprioceptive experience is listed in one line after seventy-nine lines experiences of the five acknowledged senses. Pain, mental imagery, conscious thought, emotions and the sense of self complete the list of conscious experience in further fifty lines as points out (Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy* 140).

<sup>77</sup> see the detailed analysis by J. Clark, "Dance and Intrinsic" 206-217.

## 6.2 Kinesthesia

It was one of Sheets-Johnstone's attempts as a phenomenologist "to elucidate cardinal structures of kinesthetic consciousness." (Sheets-Johnstone 121) Similar to Husserl's eidetic variations to find the essence of a thing she proceeds in executing a movement and altering it consciously in as many ways as possible. Up to here her procedure resembles to the one offered by A. Clark in search of a sensorial space (see Chapter 2. "Constructing Categories"). But then the question for Husserl and Sheets-Johnstone diverges from Clark's: what is the underlying *prevailing* aspect to all of the variations (see Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy* 122)? This will be *the* distinctive feature of that sensorial mode. Remember in contrast that Clark asked for the necessary *variety* of the category as seen in a structural feature, much in the tradition of Goodman.

Here follows the movement experiment: as a start, an arm is lifted above the head from a relaxed sitting position, beginning with the elbow and ending with fingers stretched out towards the ceiling. Subsequently, one reverses the movement before restarting. The variations are effectuated as follows: the author changes the 'temporal aspect' (speed and/or acceleration), the 'spatial aspect' (line/curve, magnitude) the 'tensional aspect' (force/energy), the flow (interruption/continuity/projection by an initial impuls). After executing this introspective exercise Sheets-Johnstone claims that the prevailing feature is the felt dynamics.

What is invariantly there is in each case an overall quality. Whatever the variation, the movement has a distinctive felt qualitative character coincident with that of that variation. (Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy*122).

What distinguishes the variations is the specific 'pattern' of their felt dynamics, "a felt physiognomic aspect which is in fact a constellation of qualitative aspects", as she goes on (ibid.). The constellations of the qualitative aspects of acoustic sensations are displayed quite differently, e.g. as fading in and out of something, sudden appearance, etc.

## 6.3 Slight divergences between Laban and Sheets-Johnstone

There is no major difference between the aspects alongside which Sheets-Johnstone varied the movement and the ones which constitute Laban's effort cube (if we consider that Laban added in 1948 a forth dimension, the flow): the spatial, temporal, energetic and flow-aspect.

There are slight divergences between Sheets-Johnstone's and Laban's models due to their differing approaches. The fact that Sheets-Johnstone approach to kinesthesia is from a

movement of a certain length allows her to discern changing dynamics *within* a movement unit, including acceleration and deceleration, stop-and-goes, and above all – what I miss in Laban’s effort cube – impulse driven propulsion.<sup>78</sup> Yet besides enumerating some variations and applying to them the four aspects (space, time, force, flow) she is not offering a systematic elaboration. In my eyes the “cardinal structures” (Primacy 139) she envisaged are not entirely elucidated. In contrast, Laban’s approach comes from a collection, a variety, of characteristically different *basic* movements in order to deduce the *range* of variety of qualities inherent to movement. Unlike Sheets-Johnstone, the underlying common feature was not interesting to Laban– and let’s admit, *felt* dynamics as a common feature is for a dance theorist a platitude, worthwhile only as a starting point. The result, Laban’s structural representation of these qualities in the effort cube, is in consequence more analytic than Sheets-Johnstone’s account: it can explain which quality is closer to another and therefore easier to switch among (Maletic 243).

The decisive weakness of his system is in my eyes that it considers only *basic* movements. In the annexes of *Mastery of Movement* Laban completed the eight basic dynamics by "mutation, variation, and grades of intensity" (Laban 155-175). The weak point of Laban's system is so far as I can see the simultaneous combination of the dynamics. Therefore what needs to be completed are aspects which appear only when a body combines dynamics simultaneously (like opposing tensions).<sup>79</sup> According to Vera Maletic Laban has provided for the possibility that "different qualities are performed at the same time by different body parts" (Maletic 104). Disappointingly, she does not give a reference, and in the *Master of Movement* I find only "shadow movements" mentioned (Laban, 173). Yet a completion is also required in Sheets-Johnstone’s model. In her rather unsystematic enumeration of variations the simultaneous dynamics of varied body part are missing as well. In both cases, these missing elements will be treated at the end of the chapter, when I try to complete the category of bodily movement by adding its capacity to sense other bodies.

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<sup>78</sup> This mainly from the torso initiated impulse seems to lack altogether in the effort cube if we are not willing simply to subsume it under the quality fast and direct (or fast and multidirectional, in case of explosiveness).

<sup>79</sup> Goodman called, as we remember, aspects derived from a basic category "derivative aspects". Typically they are relational, in this case relational between synchronous basic aspects or successive ones.

### 6.3.1 Spatial aspect

Under spatial aspect fall directional aspects in the model of Sheets-Johnstone as well as of Laban's effort cube. Yet in the case of the former size and shape are also subsumed : "the felt linear contour of our moving body [...] and the felt expansiveness or contractiveness of our moving body" (Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy* 123). She claims not only the size and shape of the body but also the ones of the movement itself as felt. "The linear paths we sense ourselves describing in the process of moving; the amplitudinal quality with [...] the spatial extensiveness or constrictedness of our movement" (ibid).

In my eyes, this is a daring claim given the potential complexity of movement. We get a glimpse of the complexity of *paths* the moment we imagine the different limbs simultaneously tracing paths through space. We get a glimpse of the complexity of their contours when we imagine their continually changing contour lines as they trace their paths through space. Despite this potential complexity Sheets-Johnstone states in general: "Any movement has a certain felt tensional quality, linear quality, amplitudinal quality, and projectional quality" (Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy* 123, my emphasis). Unless she succeeds in proving that the so-called linear and amplitudinal aspects enter indeed generally our consciousness she risks misconceiving the category by including both as necessary conditions in the definition of the proprioceptive category.

More safely Laban treats the amplitudinal aspect of the moving body apart from the effort cube in a separate shape category. The "scope and span" (Primacy 124) as Sheets-Johnstone calls the linear contours and amplitude/magnitude, correspond to Laban's "shape or path" (Maletic 64)<sup>80</sup>. Here he does not ask if the movement trace enters our proprioceptive consciousness. Why doesn't Laban integrate this aspect in his effort cube? I suspect that Laban as a choreographer knew that the movement path (be it the contour of the body whilst moving or its four-dimensional shape), with its potentially unlimited complexity, is not part of the *felt* dynamics. He accepted though the proprioception of space usage so long as we distinguish movement with minimal versus movement with maximal space-use, or monodirectional versus pluri-directional space-use. This corresponds to the space axis in his coordinate system of the effort cube (see the chapter "Conclusion & Outlook For a New Category: Bodily Movement"). Here contour lines are not relevant. I suggest that the question of whether we can sense spatial form, and if so, up to what complexity, should not to be

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<sup>80</sup> "Laban refers to shape or path as one of the most salient structural aspects of movement in dance" (ibid.).

decided from the sketch pad, but requires empirical research. We should however be aware whilst we construct kinesthesia as a bodily sense: in simpler cases these linear and magnitudinal spatial aspects may be part of our sensations and may therefore contribute to the constitution of the "quality space" (A. Clark 79, see also chapter 2.4). Probably as dimensions just as Clark suggested. If, however, it turns out that they are not necessary but optional aspects (e.g. because they are an acquired capacity), how are they to be included? And are they to be included if only *rudimentary* sizes and shapes enter our sensations?

### 6.3.2 Energetic Aspect

Sheets-Johnstone's energetic aspect could approximately correspond to Laban's weight aspect. Though both are incomplete. Claudia Jeschke and Cary Rick recognized our capacity to modulate the two by relating them.<sup>81</sup> A persuasive example of an alternating modulation are the bounds where increase of energy and use of weight alternate with their release. I find it quite problematic that Sheets-Johnstone does not even mention weight. It is difficult to explain the felt dynamics of centrifugal forces without weight, and even more so to explain sensed balance.

A major omission in both accounts, Sheets-Johnstone's as well as Laban's, is the fact that felt dynamics or kinesthesia is also at work when we aren't. I previously called movement without intention *motion*. The phenomenon in artistic dance to be moved (e.g. carried), underlies quite similar kinesthetic sentience as movement, though certainly with some characteristic differences. Not omitted in the philosophy of dance and certainly not in dance studies, partnering and collective movement as well as motion aspects are of exceptional importance in artistic dance. I'll come back to this in "IV. Spontaneous Exchange".

As there is no dimension of felt dynamics added by Sheets-Johnstone to the dimensions of Rudolf Laban I take her work not as a deeper understanding of bodily movement but rather – just as my present work – only as a basic research, with the main goal to justify the significance of bodily movement, in order to encourage further research. My conviction is that empirical research with movement analysis is needed. It is not up to philosophers nor theorists alone to decide – and not through phenomenological introspection alone – what the range of content of kinesthesia factually or potentially is. Systematic studies and enduring experiments with control groups must be conducted. Kinesthesia as a field of research sport

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<sup>81</sup> see Jeschke 57 and supplement 19-21.

science (should) contribute, too. I hope that multidisciplinary collaboration will provide further insight.

Result: A distinct ‘family’ of qualia, different from other sensorial modes, constitutes the kinesthesia. Not yet widely acknowledged, Sheets-Johnstone tries to establish kinesthesia and to grant him a firm place in epistemology.

If, whilst constructing the kinetic sense kinesthesia, at some point spatial shapes are left out (when they cease to be proprioceived) they still remain aspects that belong to bodily movement. Features that might not be discerned by kinesthesia alone, but by visual, acoustic or tactile means, still belong to the movement category, the principal category of the genre of artistic dance. If therefore (some of) the “linear contours and linear paths we create in moving” (Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy* 124) fall out of felt dynamics they still may be artistically relevant. I will treat them in paragraph V under ‘outer’ perspective.

#### 6. 4 Spontaneous Exchange

Let us turn to the particular feature of bodily movement namely that it is at the same time a sense modality and an action. I called this ‘interface’ in the introduction of chapter 6. It is improvisational artistic dance which serves as Sheets-Johnstone’s paradigm. She demonstrates the particular feature of that art form in a phenomenological description:

I am actively exploring [...] a density or fluidity of other dancers about me, for example, or a sharpness and angularity in their movement. [...] Qualities and presences are enfolded into my own ongoing kinetic presence and quality. They are absorbed by my movement, as when I become a part of the swirl of dancers sweeping by me or am propelled outward, away from their tumultuous energies, or when I quicken to the sharpness of their movement and accentuate its angularity or break out of its jaggedness by a sudden turn and stillness. (*Primacy* 422)

In order “to capture, the essential character of dance improvisation” (421) Sheets-Johnstone describes the “experienced kinetic reality of these events” (422). She claims that this essential character makes improvisational dance paradigmatic for the art form dance in general. To underpin her claim she emphasizes the dominant and foundational category of dynamics for improvisation and artistic dance:

The qualitative dynamics of movement are obviously central and foundational to the aesthetic creation and realization of a dance. As a formed and performed art, dance is grounded in the qualitative intricacies, complexities, and possibilities of human movement. Kinesthesia is in

turn a sensory modality basic to the art of choreography and the art of dancing. An important fact attaches to this truth. Kinesthetic experience is not a matter of sensations, but a matter precisely of dynamics. (Sheets-Johnstone, "Mirror Neurons", 11)

However plausible her claim in general is there is an implicit claim she does not argue for: she presents the improvisational dance as *artistic* (429). For this thesis to be held something more is needed. What makes a spontaneous collective dance artistic? It cannot be spontaneity as such, nor creativity as such, because we find both in non-artistic everyday life. Is the mutual exchange of a collectivity relevant? This is a feature that is also shared by games of sport. The three features together may be distinct enough to count as a symptom in Goodman's sense. An additional one. But we do not understand (syntactically) why this produces art. The triple character is so far just a symptom for a very challenging social activity. She needs to describe more specifically what aspects (or what reactions) are artistically relevant. What aspects does Sheets-Johnstone consider worthwhile to react to? She enumerates some and is quite precise about them, but then she does not give us any clues as to *what* makes them worthwhile and what makes the reactions artistic. As this is not her main topic of concern, we cannot reproach her the lack of definition (or symptoms) for the artistic. Again her term "bodily logos" seems to stand for a certain coherence. In order for it to be more than suggestive, we need an answer to the question of what make some reactions in improvisation more appropriate and coherent artistically than others? An analysis will have to answer arguing case by case. However, her description does not argue as she admits: "I should emphasize in advance that the account is basically descriptive, not theoretical" (421). Or should we just add Goodman's five symptoms as 'criteria' in order to distinguish simple improvisational dance from artistic improvisational dance? In view of the lack of alternatives I propose to do just that. We will consider the dance artistic if we recognize replete aspects the dancers react upon and they react in a similarly diverse way and with a dense dynamics. It would fail to be artistic if the dancers knew only two sorts of reaction in a confrontation and carried out both in the same tense or very sloppy way (i.e. not dense). Sheets-Johnstone's description meets therefore at least an important point: the aspects mentioned are varied enough to fulfil a symptom of the artistic. Sheets-Johnstone affirms Goodman's claim for repleteness. To judge density we need to see.

Now let's have a closer look at the aspects Sheets-Johnstone mentions in the above-quoted description. The three last lines describe four ways of reacting to the group's movement : a) becoming a part of it ("of the swirl of the dancers sweeping by me" (422) b)

carried away as an object of their force (“propelled outward, away from their tumultuous energies” (ibid.) c) acting upon it (“I quicken to sharpness of their movement and accentuate its angularity” (ibid.), d) actively withdraw of its influence (“break out of its jaggedness by a sudden turn and stillness” (ibid.)). I do not know if all possibilities are open to each participant at any time. What becomes evident is that the first two ways are group behaviour. The group’s movement (described by the author in the singular form) is of a certain quality of group dynamic. The third example is a relation between a group and an active individual. The fourth is an example of an individual apart from a group. For my concern – repleteness – group dynamics as well as the relation between the dynamics of an individual and a group are of importance. The latter could also be called cooperation, a preverbal exchange. They belong to the repleteness. They can be exemplified but, I will not stop mentioning it, they may appear without relevance, too, as a simple instantiation. To become aesthetically relevant, the dance piece has to put this property forward in one way or another. Without mentioning this constraint, without distinguishing between instantiation and exemplification, Sheets-Johnstone’s enumeration does not explain the artistic side of the improvisational dance convincingly.

So let’s recapitulate: we can sense movement as acting, acted upon, as group action with its specific group dynamic, as collaboration and exchange. The twofoldedness of our bodily movement, kinesthesia and empathy, makes it possible for us to perceive each one of them. To be explicit: by including group dynamics in the repleteness of dance we expand it considerably. This step is by no means innovative: Susanne Langer considered group dynamics, and dynamics in general, decisive for the genre dance (see 'primary illusion' of dance in Chapter 5). Following Sheets-Johnstone’s description, according to whom group dynamic is kinesthetically accessible to the individual, group dynamic will form part of my proprioceptive category of bodily movement just as partnering will (see paragraph VII. "Bodily Movement as a Category").

### 6.5 Inner and Outer Perspective on Bodily Movement

Before we turn to visual aspects of movement I would like to spell out the continuous character of the shift from the inner kinesthetic perspective to the outer perspective. The key to this shift is the cross-modality of our bodily awareness.<sup>82</sup> By moving we gather information

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<sup>82</sup> See "cross-modal congruency effect", "The importance of vision for bodily experiences" (de Vignemont, n. pag.).

about our surroundings, including the floor. The tactile sense makes us feel the surface of the floor, the sense of balance together with the position and level of the feet tells us its inclination, and vision informs about the amount of space around us and its limits. Mostly subconsciously we collect cross-modal data and evaluate our options for action (we could say subconsciously we represent the surroundings and our options). As our senses evolved due to regularities in the world in order to cope with it, we successfully refine our motoric capacity. We can safely count on persisting regularities. The different senses correlate: dropping the head means seeing the world upside down, and so on. The multiple interrelation of our senses in perception help to prove their reliability. As we can (partly) see ourselves moving, we also do not have problems inferring, given that nature's laws are valid for everybody, how movements of others work – how, for example, the movement of our neighbour will change given the steep slope in front of him. Having learnt the correlation between the feel of climb and climbing, we can also imagine another's sensation of tiredness. Kinesthesia and empathy help us to apply certain laws to animate nature and thus anticipate (Husserl's term was 'protention'): we can foresee his sweat from our own personal experience and, seeing him climbing, even sense his effort to a degree. The cognitivists finally delivered with the findings of the mirror neurons the 'proof' to what early (and forgotten) phenomenologist like Lipps and Scheler stated: empathy founds intersubjectivity (see Zahavi 2001). Sheets-Johnstone points out how crucial empathy is in phylogenetic and ontogenetic evolution: humankind mimics its fellow's movement to learn and learns using imaginative mimicry, by empathically following the kinetic sense of others just by watching.<sup>83</sup> This capacity of empathic perception accompanies us in the proclaimed (perceptual) shift we have to undertake for aesthetic

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<sup>83</sup> Not only does Jonathan Clark anchor the kinetic empathy carefully in the phenomenology of Husserl, he extends his theory and explicitly claims that the artform of dance distinctively excels this capacity of ours. The stage becomes in a sense the playground of the imaginative exploration of our own capacities: "in dance, and in place of the usual two-foldedness of the kinesthetic feeling and perception of our own body, we become aware of a certain three-foldedness. The introduction of another body (or bodies) into our perceptual field triangulates the relationship we have with our own bodies, and in doing so, introduces two crucial new (and related) phenomenological factors. The first is that perception of dance involves both an extension and heightening of the kinesthetic relationship we have to ourselves: we can perceive the body of another visually with much greater determination than we can visually perceive our own; the occluded parts of our own bodies are now, in some sense, visible. In addition, by perceiving the body of another, we become aware, and no more so than in the case of dance, of the potential extension of the repertoire of kinetic "I cans". And this intrigues us. But the crucial point is this. The triangulation just mentioned does not result in the estrangement of our kinesthetic link with self. Through the processes of mimetic (re)enactment and pairing described in the last section, or the "making oneself similar to" of kinesthetic empathy, the triangulation both extends and consolidates this link with self. It preserves something of the inner link at the same time as extending it outwards. We understand and appreciate the movements of others through our own self-understanding of our own movement; it is only on this basis that we are aware of the triangulation as an extension at all" (Clark 216).

purposes, namely to perceive and understand art: if we shift away from ourselves as moving bodies and look at others moving in search for aesthetic aspects there is no reason to exclude kinesthetic ones. It would be arbitrary to stop our perception of movement on the 'border' of our visual sense and look only at movement's mere appearance. We would deprive seen movement of being understood by corporeal means, be they innate or acquired. I would like to argue that we are not entitled to preclude any phenomenalist aspect from the artistic genre dance in principle – with whatever sense modality we are apt to sense it. We might miss some semantically relevant ones. Attempts to disqualify kinesthesia for aesthetic evaluation are common. But this might be due to a meager (only formal) artistic dance theory, and to its restricted dance-specific aspects:

Moreover, even acknowledging a kinaesthetic 'sense', as thus far described, leaves unclear its possible relation to the meaning of dances. Since our knowledge of meaning for art works depends centrally on the recognition of formal significance for features of those works – and hence on the recognition of the features as formal features [...] – one might well wonder if a kinaesthetic sense, once established, could make much of a contribution to our knowledge or understanding of meaning for dances. (McFee 269)

Guided by corporeal ongoing sensations, we subconsciously apply kinetic laws of animate nature to the dancers and proceed with protentions, just as we 'foresee' a climber's exertion and sweating. Obviously, given the amount of 'I cannots' in observing professional dance pieces, the protentions remain somewhat limited in scope. Yet it is beyond doubt that (disappointed) protention is at stake if someone falls. As Jonathan Clark convincingly explains:

In dance perception, we do the same. The movements of the dancers that we see are internally mimetically (re)enacted. In doing so we create protentions as to how the path-dependent movement is to be continued. And this creates expectations as to whether the movement that is subsequently perceived "matches" our own felt protention. Again, dance both heightens and consolidates our own imaginative kinesthetic faculty. Hagendoorn (2003) has written about dance in similar terms, but strangely never mentions kinesthesia at all. At one point, Hagendoorn claims that the shock of an audience on seeing a dancer fall is based on a visual expectation being violated. Would it not be more accurate to say that the shock is also a felt kinesthetic shock that occurs due to the disruption of our own internal kinesthetic protention? (J. Clark 217)

The shock of violated expectation is also at stake in some provocative art, or less extremely, in surprising wit. The description in the quotation above shows how some aspects which supposedly are ruled out in an intention-neglecting analysis of art, like the one of Goodman, can be explained in non-psychological terms. The shock is neither an artist's (effectuated) intention, nor the psychological state of a spectator, but rather in the non-matching of a tendentious sequence with a subsequent sudden 'turn in its logic' (the absence of Husserl's so-called '*Erfüllungsakte*').<sup>84</sup> The term 'logic' might sound too metaphorical, born out of the need to formulate a generalization which gives an account of an artistic coherence. 'Logic' means the conclusive or compelling constellation of artistic features which lead the perceiver in a certain way in its protention activity. Sheets-Johnstone called this in dance "kinetic bodily logos" but assumed its existence also in music.

Recapitulation: Through kinesthesia and empathy our perception of dancers' movement and motion detects non-formal aspects. Felt dynamics of active movement, as of passive motion alike, enter thus the repleteness of artistic dance. Even a 'shock', a disrupted kinetic bodily logos, can be subsumed there if it is heightened and presented (and thus a mistake ruled out).

The outer perspective corresponds to exteroception,<sup>85</sup> in our case, to the observer's use of the performance's visual and auditory sense data. This perspective not only leads to the traditionally accepted aesthetic formal features like geometric or organic patterns, but also to musical, rhythmical ones, too. Pattern can be perceived as made up through group work and partnering (constellations, configurations),<sup>86</sup> but also through movement trace along the floor (floor pattern), or against a background (silhouette). Laban introduced the notion of movement "shape or path" (Maletic 65): a trace of a three-dimensional figure in space through a time interval, a so-to-speak four-dimensional volume. This four-dimensional volume is a

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<sup>84</sup> Goodman would accept this account as inherent in any symboltheory. The fact that symbols are used in the light how they may be read explain the symbols' attention and expectation guiding function. This underlines the universally valid capacity to read the symbols without the need to refer to particular psychological (mental) states. It is conform with Goodman's stance to explain surprise as any other artistic aspect by syntactic means. I owe this confirmation to Catherine Elgin who discussed this point with me as an external advisor for my PhD in september 2014 in Boston.

<sup>85</sup> Exteroception and proprioception are notions introduced by Charles Scott Sherrington in 1906 (cf. de Vignemont n.p.). The first is based on exteroceptors, outer sense organs, whilst the role of proprioceptors were assumed to be taken over by muscle, tendon and articular sources. Recent research includes however other senses (ibid.), so I count to kinesthesia also haptic, skin information. The inconvenient consequence is that my proprioceptive bodily movement category includes more dimensions than strictly movement constitutive ones.

<sup>86</sup> I make a terminological distinction in the part II, the case study of *Entity* (see 3a.III.1"1st Ensemble Dance").

derivative aspect in the sense of Goodman (see Chapter 3.2 “Syncategorematic Shape”). Derived from one or another dimension of the bodily movement category.<sup>87</sup> A formal aspect we ought not skip is that of omissions or in-between aspects. Music creates syncopes, omitting tones on a bar's accent, or by creating meaningful silence. The dance's rhythm can follow syncopes by omitting an expected accent or even through the omission of a simultaneous acoustic accent. Figures may create holes e.g. as space in-between each other. Omissions are clearly relational aspects, relating a dance rhythm to strong beats of bars or to the rhythm exemplified by the music. In the spatial case omissions relate silhouettes of two dancers to one another, enabling us to see in the space in-between a form.<sup>88</sup> Derived or relational aspects I consider - following Goodman (see Chapter 3 “Derivative Qualia”) - as composing part of repleteness.

Obviously outer perspective reveals non-formal aspects of dance, too. Though not my main concern, my semantics is not intended to preclude them. I have argued in Chapter 4, “Exemplification”, for exemplified properties to be basic and constitutive of representational aspects, just as for the expressive ones. So by seeing certain aspects exemplified – like heavy steps, combined perhaps with the syncategorematic aspect 'to hit the ground a glimpse behind the musical accents' – we are led to the semantic expressive property ‘sad’ or ‘tired’, and together with some other means (e.g. a crown or black colours), to the representation of a grieving old king.

To give the necessary subtlety to the formal aspects I will break the movement category down into its parts. For this purpose I will use in the II.nd part of the dissertation the movement inventory procedure (MIP) which gives us the means to observe and describe the slightest movement. It does not prescribe which level of detail we should consider. So if we are about to explain what constituted syntactically ‘grief’ we still have to prove sensibility in order to discern which is a reasonable level of detail to look at.

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<sup>87</sup> A further study should spell out in detail given which categories and dimensions which derivatives are possible. The four-dimensional volume I would derive from the spatial dimension of the effort cube (namely the spatial indicating the amount of space used) and combine it syncategorematically with "general" space (Laban 45) and time, delimiting the volume thus through a rather physicalistic defined procedure. Forsythe's improvisational tools gives an example for it : the so-called ‘U-ing’ traces the letter « U » into the space ex.g. with the shoulders (see Forsythe n.p.).

<sup>88</sup> The gestaltists proved the capacity of our vision to interpret borders ambiguously: we can switch between two options deciding which side of borders to consider as 'content' and which as empty 'beyond' (see "meaningful regions" in the chapt. 6.3.1. "Principles of Figure/Ground organisation" and 6.3.4 "Problems of Holes" in: Palmer 281 and 283).

## 6.6 Constructing Bodily Movement as a Category, Extending and Placing it Among Relatives

My interest in Sheets-Johnstone's establishment of kinesthesia as a new sensorial mode conforms to our task as it was announced in Chapter 2. Namely, I wish to find a similarly basic category for dance as colour was for painting. However, her approach turned out to be less systematic (movement analytic) than historiologic. In this paragraph I address this lack by the construction of the bodily movement category. On the other hand, focusing on aesthetics as the center of interest, it becomes obvious that a movement category has to cover aspects of bodily movement that are inaccessible to proprioception. Notwithstanding the important insight that a spectator has (some) access to felt movement through empathy, there is a need to add the aspects the spectator perceives by seeing and hearing the dance. But how to reconcile the inner and outer perspectives within one category? If we agree with Goodman that there is no way to join a visual to an audible quality in a chain of matching elements, they therefore belong to distinct categories.<sup>89</sup> Consequently there is no way to join outer perception and inner. However, did Goodman consider proprioception? Is this not astonishingly but precisely the phenomenon of sense data "melting" into one another?<sup>90</sup> Couldn't we therefore synaesthetically feel a chain of matching kinetic qualities which are difficult to differentiate, and therefore one category? After a jump we tactilely feel the floor and this is a constitutive part of our sensing the landing (and our feet). The less hard the jump, the less we feel our feet. The synaesthetic sensations seem densely related. I continue to claim therefore that proprioceptive bodily movement, kinesthesia, is one category.<sup>91</sup> I agree however that the extended bodily movement category necessary for our aesthetic concern is better understood as a related sum of categories, just as in Goodman's sense (see Chapter 2.8 "Conclusion and Outlook for a New Category, Bodily Movement"). Besides the arising terminological

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<sup>89</sup> See Goodman *SA* 206, and also 2.1 "Grades Serve to Construct Categories".

<sup>90</sup> See for multimodality de Vignemont n.pag., in particular 3.2 "The importance of vision for bodily experiences".

<sup>91</sup> There are positions which favor dividing the category. "Clearly, one single body representation cannot suffice to account for the variety of bodily disorders and for the variety of aspects of bodily awareness. There needs to be more, but how many? Two? Three? Four?" (Vignemont n.p.). However useful in particular cases a separate representation may be, there is a need - especially when it comes to movement resembling different sorts of awareness in order to move - to give an account of their correlations. Correlations, like two dense dimensions in a mutually enhancing correlation as in the example of a felt jump, are for our purpose more decisive. The involved dimensions are muscular tension and touch.

question how we should name that sum of categories – I maintain 'extended bodily movement category' – there is a more interesting one: what is at stake combining these perspectives? We have on the one side (empathically) access to the sensations of acting as a dancer e.g. in its kinesphere, on the other side we see what it looks like. The figure's kinesphere is given to us as a body center orientated space and in addition we as spectators have visual access to the entire space around the performer, in our field of vision. Both space dimensions add to make up the extended category of bodily movement in artistic dance. Yet there is no matching chain from one to the other. Therefore the outer (perceived) space is, strictly speaking, a new category, yet together they build a *kind*.<sup>92</sup> We feel the hard landing of a folkloric jump in boots *and* we see their proud posture right in the center of the stage.

### 6.7 Necessary Dimensions

What are the different dimensions of the proprioceptive bodily movement category and the ones of the looser family, the relatives? I cannot give a sufficient number, but I would consider as necessary the following:

We have in the proprioceptive category, the kinesthesia, as Laban pointed out, the dimension of felt weight. As elaborated in the Movement Inventory Procedure (MIP) which I will present in the II. Part "Preliminaries" in handling our weight, the point of inertia, there is muscular energy involved. Just as Laban does, the elaborators of MIP, Jeschke in cooperation with Cary Rick, consider the handling of weight to be dense.<sup>93</sup> Consequently this would constitute one dimension. Given that the handling of weight depends on the energetic level of our muscles, the tonus<sup>94</sup>, it does not yet involve necessarily visible movement. It is important to point out that experienced eyes may detect changes of the energetic level of muscles (Jeschke calls them "modulations" (20-21))<sup>95</sup>. Apparently static movement can therefore exemplify a (certain) weight or tension.<sup>96</sup> In the moment of movement the time factor comes

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<sup>92</sup> "any familiar 'kind', whether there are rifts in it or not, may be defined as a sum of certain specified categories. Likewise any sense *realm*, such as that of the visual qualities [...] is then to be defined as a sum of certain categories; and 'realm' as a general term may be defined by enumeration of the several realms" (SA 208). This conforms to Laban's distinction between kinesphere and 'general space' (Laban 45).

<sup>93</sup> The dimension is divided into 8 subsequent segments, depending on the contribution of the two parameters muscular force (or tonus) and stabilization of the point of inertia (Jeschke 20-21).

<sup>94</sup> Jeschke calls it 'force', (Jeschke, *Bewegungstext*, suppl. 18).

<sup>95</sup> Jeschke, *Bewegungstext*, suppl., 19.

<sup>96</sup> I point this out following Boenisch who criticised the lack of inventorizing static movement in theatre studies (Boenisch 96).

into play. Laban and Jeschke consider this dimension to be dense too. Not only with respect to the speed but to the possibilities of acceleration and deceleration. One can construct acceleration-deceleration as a supplementary dimension, an axis which goes through each element of the speed dimension, indicating the logical possibilities for the movement of any speed to evolve (namely faster or slower). What would a bounce be in this constructed kinesthetic quality space? Surely, as a sequence of qualitatively changing movement it would not mark only one point in our category but mark out a pattern, going through different points in the quality space. Bounces would in their modification of weight and change of speed mark out a certain pattern, a certain path if we take the logical quality space over time. This pattern would characteristically repeat itself in case of continuous bouncing.

In order to capture all the body's options to use these bounces we need to consider the role played by space in our category. Whilst Laban contented himself with a linear dimension representing the involved amount of space, Jeschke elaborates subcategories: axes, planes or so-called "in-between-planes" (10-12) of our kinesphere.<sup>97</sup> To be clear, Jeschke acknowledges with these subcategories precisely in this mentioned order an increase in used space. These subdivisions or groupings in subcategories are an excellent example of how we can attenuate a dense dimension: Jeschke decides hereby that not the option of (continuity in increase) of the amount of used space is of primary interest but the movement's option to create some relevant relations to our body. How can a category incorporate so specific non-linear subcategories in a dimension? Goodman showed in *SA* by introducing notions like "nextness" and "manors" how very similar qualia can be grouped to a "clan". He has chosen the "manors" of blue e.g. (see the section "Distance in Space" in Chapter 2). There is a (hard to discernable) limit where we switch from considering something to be blue to be rather lilac. So in my case, too, we can group movements together to be rather flat in a plane in contrast to those using also the space around the plane so to speak.<sup>98</sup> Ex.g. we would group a walk forward with hanging arms swinging alongside the body forth and back into a (considerably thick) sagittal plane.

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<sup>97</sup> see also "spatial process" in the 2nd category 'coordination' of my preliminary to the II. Part.

<sup>98</sup> Goodman provided non-linear belonging together in his so-called 'baronies'. Instead of matching and nextness here only 'besides' are available (« baronies are defined in terms of besides », *SA* 237). It would be a separate enterprise to test the viability and application of the different terms in my category in detail.

## 6.8 Supplementary Dimensions

So far so good. Up to this point we did not essentially alter the effort-cube. We introduced some subcategories like muscular tonus to the dimension weight, and then planes etc. to the dimension space, and added the dimension speed change to time.<sup>99</sup> Which additional dimensions would I introduce to my account of proprioceptive bodily movement? According to my critique of Laban and Sheets-Johnstone in Chapter 6, "Slight Divergencies Between Laban and Sheet-Johnstone", it was demonstrated that 1) passive motion, 2) simultaneous dynamics, and 3) collective dynamics are to be added to the analysis.

Laban conceived felt dynamics, the effort-cube, as a movement category with different intentional<sup>100</sup> aspects: to "use e.g. the minimum space" or the minimum time etc. Interestingly, however, we perceive these aspects even whilst being in motion (e.g. carried) and not in active movement, with no intentions whatsoever. Unfortunately, here I cannot formulate this otherwise than as a thesis based on own experience.<sup>101</sup> Further empirical research is required to sustain this claim. We sense the aspects of time, space, and weight although something or someone else is moving us. Assuming this, how should we add the feature 'passive' to our category? Goodman's constructionist method permits the addition of a dual 'bifurcation' to each element of the space, indicating that each movement can be active or passive. This is one option. Alternatively, I introduce the dimension of 'impact'. Impact is any force either exercised on us by any device in our kinesphere or, conversely, we exercise upon a device: from pushing heavy furniture, grasping a grip which alters our weight and balance, up to the outer impact of a partner who makes us fly for a moment. Both ends of the dimension 'impact' mark inner or outer force (active versus passive) with the advantage that density is again in place. The advantage of the dense dimension is that it may indicate the extent to which our point of inertia, stability, or balance is affected or counterbalanced by muscular energy.

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<sup>99</sup> It has to be noted that the logical space of proprioceptive bodily movement does not say that any movement can be varied in all the ways. We will never find pirouettes below a certain speed. There may be sections of a dimension which no movement can instantiate: ex.g. the quality tensed (muscularly unelastic) heavyness combined with explosive acceleration. This structural particularity, however, is very telling for the category. It tells of our peculiar anatomical conditions.

<sup>100</sup> Perrottet describes the contrastive 'inner attitude' toward space, time and weight as a) combatting versus b) sensing (Perrottet 60).

<sup>101</sup> I refer here to my experiences of the past as a professional dancer.

The second question is more difficult: how to incorporate 'simultaneity'? Can we simply decide to simultaneously apply our multi-dimensional quality space kinesthesia, i.e. our dimension-enhanced effort cube, to different body parts? To my knowledge, Laban considered only one cube to be valid for the entire body. But this will not do. Forsythe, the renowned choreographer who used some spatial systems of Laban in choreographic procedures, introduced the possibility to use a body-center oriented representational system simultaneously at varied places of the body. Placing them at different joints, the system became "joint center" oriented.<sup>102</sup> I would like to propose the same thing for my logical space, kinesthesia.

The objection may be posed that in some cases, in order to conceive complex movements, it would be helpful to apply two cubes at the same time and say for example that "the legs are heavy and slow whilst the arms light and fast". However, in most cases, complex movement is not easily described as the sum of the dynamics of its parts. Their basis for this argument would be that the counter-tensions of the torso are as important as the apparent contrastive limbs. Luckily, there is a movement analysis, developing Laban further, which takes these tensions into account: Bartenieff.<sup>103</sup> In such cases I would say that an additional dimension is required, and not an additional cube.

The mentioned objection does not preclude that our enhanced cube is in principal applicable to diverse parts of the body. Besides the possible need of additional dimensions we should be aware of the fact that only limited regions of the logical space may be valid. By applying the cube to our fingers it will obviously skip some section of a dimension (very heavy weight)<sup>104</sup>. In SA Goodman showed how structures were to be conceived if in reality not the entire range of a dimension was ever possibly instantiated. He proposes to map characteristic 'rifts'<sup>105</sup>. If the fingers can not instantiate (extreme) heaviness the stunted dimension would mark a 'rift', a break-off in the cube.

Let us address the last aspect I proposed to add: collective dynamics. If we accept the addition of a dimension representing impact or 'exchange with surrounding devices' how

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<sup>102</sup> see Kennedy and Bürkle 372.

<sup>103</sup> see Kennedy 125.

<sup>104</sup> Pianist would perhaps contradict me. This only shows that dimension are relative in their length. In comparing the applied dimension to various body parts there might be very well different length characteristic.

<sup>105</sup> SA, 242, 247.

should we integrate the awareness and interaction with a group? Could we say that a dancer can differentiate between the impact being on a single person (partner) or on a group? I believe we can. Given that we can proprioceptively locate<sup>106</sup> the impact, we can perceive multiply located impact too. Sheets-Johnstone described awareness of group and its dynamics that are not yet effectuating a physical impact on us. As the quality space "bodily movement" allows cross-modal sense data it could cover our sensation of dynamics around us. Through a blowing air behind us we can sense the movement of others in our invisible kinesphere. Before any impact we can sum up the different dynamics around us and feel their sameness. For example, with the help of vision it is not an exaggeration to claim that we can – empathically – sense the point of inertia not only of a partner but of several people too. This enables us to react to it, to add our weight or – being a part of the group – to disentangle and break out. Both movements are actions of collective dynamics. It seems that by diverging or specifying<sup>107</sup> the dimension of impact we can represent collective dynamics. Diverged or specified impact dynamics enrich repleteness.

#### 6.9 Bodily Movement as a Kind of Categories

As announced in Chapter 6.5 “Inner and Outer Perspectives”, there are dance specific aspects which are only detectable by visual and auditory perception. Those narrowly related to bodily movement constitute a kind together with the proprioceptive bodily movement. Gesture, mime, or behaviour and action are part of it, but if movement in an artwork is reduced to these aspects then the involved (attenuated) movement category is not the replete one specifying dance. In that case, the genre would obtain the symptomatic repleteness by some additional aspects like verbal communication, pronunciation and further strongly involved symbol systems like stage setting, requisites, lighting, and their interrelatedness.

The visual and auditory senses detect endless features of the moving body unavailable to proprioception: we see simple aspects like pointed shapes, acute angles (e.g. extremely bent arms and legs), we see complex formal aspects like various patterns. Having a broad field of view, we can interrelate all aspects of movement given onstage: the simple ones to other simple ones (close or further away), the simple ones to complex ones, complex ones among

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<sup>106</sup> "[...] proprioception is not exclusively restricted to one's body. In combination with touch and haptic exploration, proprioception also carries information about location, posture and shape of other bodies." (de Vinmont, n.pag., paragraph 3.1 "Do bodily experiences qualify as perceptual experiences?").

<sup>107</sup> We specify the dimension if we can explain or map the correlation needed for a number of impact devices to become a group (instead of a sum of its individual impacts).

one another, and the rhythm (auditory pattern) as distributed over the space among the dancers. Then we can relate the visual and auditory aspects to proprioceptive movement. Though here are some limits: We cannot have empathy with more than one or two individuals at the same time. Probably neither with more than one to two group's dynamics. However this limitation is bound to reception conditions. All relational aspects contribute to repleteness. It does not depend on the question if a singular reception alone detects them or not. Syntactic features are in the work and are therefore available, they do not supervene on particular epistemic success.

In the upcoming case studies, the formal pattern of a very high abstractional level becomes relevant – the evolution of the bodily movement (as a *kind*) during the piece. Reflecting on the interrelation with other symbol systems like lighting, costumes, music etc., the significance of the evolution gains precision, though by no means unambiguous 'meaning'. I would call this reflection a dramaturgical analysis of the structure of the piece.

## 7. Susan Leigh Foster's semantics of dance

I should present at this stage the position in dance studies<sup>108</sup> which comes the closest to my semiotic approach; that of Susan Foster, presented in her Book *Reading Dancing*. The divergences, however, are due to the fact that she situates her semantic theory in the framework of a sociological communication theory.

This chapter is structured as follows. In 7.1 I present the theoretical framework of her semantics as elaborated in *Reading Dancing*. 7.2 "Artworks as message" explains Foster's view that artworks as symbols are about the world. In 7.3 I summarize the artworks' basic referential relations, the so-called four modes of representation. The mode occurring in abstract formal dance will be discussed in detail. The vocabulary-syntax-relation is subject of the fourth paragraph of this chapter (7.4). Given Foster's heuristic task to determine primordially the artworks' relation to the world (mode of representation) before addressing the vocabulary-syntax relation, a methodological weakness becomes apparent. I present a critique of this method and outline the advantages of an alternative account. Paragraph 7.5 "Mimesis, Pathos, and Parataxis" treats the kinds of syntactic operations Foster proposes. This is followed by a summary (7.6) and an account of divergencies (7.7, 7.8).

### 7.1 Theoretical framework

Foster presents a communication theory as the frame for her semantics in the preface and in the footnotes of *Reading Dancing*.<sup>109</sup> She considers all elements in the chain of message transmission as equally relevant, from the psychological state of the artist – or at least the aesthetic program – up to the messages's final arrival at the receiver. The conventions in aesthetics, in working methods, and in the use of dancers as transmitters, the dancer's bodies, they all contribute to the 'message'. No wonder that the relative shortness of the analyzed dance pieces in her book passes nearly unnoticed. The reader might not miss deeper analysis as the pieces themselves seem to be explained by the contributing circumstances.

### Foster's approach

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<sup>110</sup> The notion "dance studies" is here used for a science and should be distinguished from practical dance studies. The anglosaxon notion "dance studies" is in use in order to be distinguished from rather medical oriented dance science grown out of the field of Sports Medicine in the 1970s and 80s.

<sup>109</sup> See Foster's preface to *Reading Dancing*, particularly her transposition of Jacobson's linguistic schema to dance in footnote 9 (Foster, *Reading* 231).

assumes that the meaning of any dance resides in a series of translations: from choreographer's intention to kinesthetic form, from dancer's sense of mission to performed event, and from the event itself to the viewer's apprehension of it. Underlying and supporting these translations is a tradition of choreographic conventions – a heritage of codes and techniques of representation and principles for organizing movement – that constitutes the very fabric of the dance itself. (Foster *Reading* 56)

At first we might be tempted to consent to Foster's view of manifold contributions to an art work's meaning. Yet if we take all the elements of a series of translations to *constitute* meaning we augment epistemological difficulties. Who is the one to evaluate these ontologically varied elements? Psychological features, intentions, and aesthetic programs *as held by the artist* and prevailing conventions? Experiences of the spectators? Is their entirety to count as constitutive, all equally and without exception? If not, by what means will she convince us which are more relevant than others? I do not want to stand in the way of those who dare to undertake such an enterprise. Yet I draw the attention to the danger of a tendentious evaluation: preconceived judgments about conventions may prevent an artwork from being addressed with the necessary open-mindedness and inquisitiveness an objective analysis affords.<sup>110</sup> To (presumably) understand and present first the communication chain and context may lead an author to find in artworks only what affirms the previously presented elements of the chain.

## 7.2 Artworks as Message

Foster's communication theory is based on the premise that symbols are about the “world”.

The first three conventions allow the dance to refer to events in the world; and the last two, vocabulary and syntax, lend to dance its internal coherence and structure. The dance's meaning is, in part, a product of the tensions created between these two kinds of conventions - between the references that the dance makes to the world and to its own organization. (Foster xviii)

As Foster never explicitly treats the mentioned premise we cannot know what “world” might mean. It depends on the ontology assumed here if only existing things are part of the world. If only concrete existing things are part of the world, then what about art works with abstract

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<sup>110</sup> A Critique is offered by Naomi Jackson that “Foster continually writes as if the choreography of individual artists can ultimately best be understood only in terms of what they say about their own work ; a ‘good’ interpretation will reflect the analyst’s familiarity with the choreographer’s intentions.” (Jackson 7).

entities as topics, e.g. fictions? If the world is concrete then are the concrete elements of the translation chain no part of it – the dancer, the choreographer, the spectator? With the mentioned premise in mind, how does Foster explain solely expressive or abstract, formal dances? The latter question will lead me through this chapter.

In comparison, in Goodman's line of argument, there are symbols that function as expressions which do not refer to anything concretely existent – and thereby are not representing – , but rather share some structural similarity with emotions. Then there are symbols that do not share structural features with emotions but present and highlight some intriguing property of their own. May it be an intricate web of relations and organisational virtuosity (as in Bach's *Die Kunst der Fuge*) or an overwhelming ingenious simplicity (like sculptures by Hans Arp). I called these cases formal artworks.

### 7.3 Basic Referential Relations

If artworks are symbols about the world then there are various ways to achieve that aboutness. According to Foster there are four ways artworks represent the world. She calls these four ways “modes of representation” (Foster 65). These four ways do not occur separately, as artworks can function in various ways simultaneously. The four modes of representation are derived from literature. Time and applied practice will show how useful these distinctions are for dance purposes.<sup>111</sup> Let me present them in a summary abstracting from the literature-specific traits as far as possible. I will subsequently comment upon the mode which comes closest to my topic.

In these four modes the grade of resemblance varies from only one aspect (simple resemblance) to quite a few in the case of imitation, where there is little doubt about the reference, up to replication, which includes the relations of the whole to its parts. is the fourth and particular case of reference in the sense that it “makes exclusive reference to the performance of movement and only tangentially alludes to other events in the world” (Foster 66). In the terminology of Goodman, the latter would therefore be no representation at all, but rather pure exemplification. The former three, however, build up the reference through an increasing number or complexity of exemplifying properties: putting properties forward that are shared by an event, object or person “in the world”.

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<sup>111</sup> In a non-dance-specific symboltheory, the distinctions had been recently integrated, see: Boenisch, P. *körPERformance 1*. For the four modes of presentation see the chapter « Die Signifikation von Körperzeichen » 124-130.

Reflecting. The description of that mode of representation suggests a non-reference to “the world” and corresponds to pure exemplification, as I mentioned. Unfortunately, a detailed examination of an abstract dance is missing from Foster’s examples illustrating the different modes. Therefore we cannot see in how far a non-narrative dance is a case of it. Given that all four modes can occur in one and the same artwork, the focus of an analysis can easily switch to another mode. So her examination of an abstract dance by Balanchine diagnoses ‘replication’: “Mood and message are much less important than the capacity of the music to evidence structure and to support the *replicate* gestures of the dance.” (Foster 21, my emphasis). She illustrates this with the example where a female dancer is turned upside down to execute her footwork. The master, when asked why, refers to the score of Anton Webern who – exactly at this point in the score – inverted the theme.

My question then is: can a close relation to music be so significant as to prevent dance from having a reflecting mode? Or at least to justifiably prevent the analyst from considering it?

Despite Foster’s acclaimed analytical method of working out the “vocabulary” and “syntax” of dance (see below) she unfortunately does not feel the need to apply the method here. She answers without such an analysis far-reaching questions communication theoretical semantics poses. We can read in a schematic table (Foster 43) that: a) The mission of Balanchine is to craft and perfect dance. b) The “meaning of art” is the celebration of that craft and perfection.<sup>112</sup> c) The transmission is effectuated by the dancers’ bodies, considered in the case of Balanchine as merely “the medium for displaying ideal forms”. d) The “viewer’s response” is exhilaration. In the words of Foster circumscribing the table’s result:

Balanchine makes exhilarating and elegant dances to entrance enthusiastic yet discriminating viewers with images of human perfection. The dancers’ confident appeal as they synthesize visual design, musical phrasing, and kinesthetic prowess captivates the audience and sustains their enjoyment. At the same time, viewers who recognize technical competence and apprehend musical and choreographic structure can intensify their understanding of the ideal as the performance embodies it. (Foster 23)

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<sup>112</sup> In the schema we find following alternative responses for the category ‘the meaning of art’: *communion*, *celebration*, *communication*, and *collaboration*. I wonder if not ‘social significance’ would be more appropriate as a name of the category. ‘Meaning’ put in the communication-theoretical frame becomes inevitably a sociological category.

If in the communication theory understanding is the successful transmission of the “mission”, then “understanding the ideal” is – if we look to the table – to recognize the accomplished mission to craft and perfect dance (forms). In my eyes, if understanding means to understand this ideal there is not much to understand in the complex abstract works of Balanchine.<sup>113</sup> The analytic tool of vocabulary and syntax has in that case sadly no role to play in her semantics. No wonder then that the dance philosopher Graham McFee complains reviewing her book: “We may be offered explanations of certain dances; and we may even be offered an explanation for that explanation. But we are never shown how to arrive at such an explanation *ab initio*.” (McFee, “Review” 190).

#### 7.4 Vocabulary and Syntax

Foster presents her analysis of dance based on its vocabulary and syntax a secondary to an acquaintance with the prevailing conventions:

Once the framing conventions have guided viewers into the dance and viewers sense how the dance refers to the world, they can begin to focus on the structural organization of the dance, first by deducing its basic moves and then by learning how these moves are put together. (Foster, Reading 88)

This chronology in the interpretational procedure is — as the case of abstract works of Balanchine with its reduced meaning shows — a major disadvantage in a semantics of dance.

Now let’s turn to the details. The syntax and vocabulary Foster presents is built on structuralist methods as she acknowledges in a footnote (Foster, Reading 13, 247). In the paragraph “Vocabulary” she clearly recognizes the difficulties to “identify basic building blocks” (90). What seems unproblematic with regard to conventionalized vocabulary collected in lexicons of folklore and ballet becomes difficult with free dance, modern dance and others, she admits. Yet she gives some help: a “strong visual design”, a “clear simple rhythm”, and the breath can be an indication for a movement unit, and known gestures or ‘elemental human motion’ like skipping, walking etc. (90). The syntax is a way of combining or generating new moves, so her semantics goes.

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<sup>113</sup> The same reduced ‘meaning’ of abstract dance, namely « moving beautifully » is to be read in a passage where she considers Balanchine’s abstract dance combined with different modes of representation: “The phrases of the dance following this narrative sequence, however, consist largely of abstract forms and shapes. (...) Imitation furthers the plot and provides a rationale for the sequences that *reflectively represent the act of moving beautifully*.” (69, my emphasis).

In the context of communication as well as linguistic or structuralistic theory the categories of vocabulary and syntax are common. It might seduce us to look separately for material and for rules to apply on it just as in linguistics. And this is what the quotation above suggests. Yet with dance matters are different. Where vocabulary is invented during the artistic creation, as is the case of dance, to speak of vocabulary – besides in classical ballet perhaps – misses the point: "Here [in dance], as elsewhere in the arts, the vocabulary evolves along with what it is used to convey." (LA 65). Nevertheless, I agree that a distinction between more basic and more complex motional units is useful. Only there is no clear-cut line: we do not have the distinction between letters and words, no criteria when constellations of letters make up a word. And with this distinction the one between vocabulary and syntax falls, too. Not 'having' letters, nor vocabulary at disposal in order to apply syntax to them the (linguistic) sense of syntax as rules of procedural order and hierarchy fails. In artistic dance building blocks are sometimes ready at hand for an operation, sometimes not – and in that case an operation can invent and construct them. Sometimes operations have a different purpose: they may have neither a combinatorial nor a unit-forming bias. To "express the feeling without considering the look" might be one such operation. Another, to: "Combine successively points in space with different body parts".<sup>114</sup> In both cases it would be strange to analyze the resulting dance over 'units' (vocabulary) and their combination (syntax). If any, 'blocks' were mere unintended by-products. Rather the emotional outburst, a dynamic, is what counts in the former case. In the second case of spatial points-conjunctions by varied body parts their unpredictable sequence and placement in space would matter. Susan Foster herself acknowledges some dance pieces where vocabulary does not seem to occur. *Trio A*, the dance piece I will analyze in the 2<sup>nd</sup> part of my work, she admits to be a counterexample: "[Trio A has not] even a structure whose organization suggested a movement vocabulary, as in Cunningham's. Instead the movement itself came to the foreground as intelligent human activity." (Foster 176)

But this counterexample is far-reaching : if syntaxes are not operating by definition and necessarily on units called vocabulary what is then the sense of having them introduced so?

In my view, Goodman provides a more appropriate semiotic approach in that he accepts *all kinds of properties* as displayed by dance *without the constraint of a hierarchical or procedural order*. Therefore without a need for vocabulary. The only condition for the

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<sup>114</sup> The first case could be a simplified order from somatic dance, and the second is an operation William Forsythe uses in *Improvisational Technologies* (1999 n.pag.).

property to be relevant is to be perceptually displayed and “shown forth”. By acknowledging derivative and syncategorematic properties there is in principal everything we need for a syntax. In the semantics I propose developed on the basis of Goodman they all are of equal interest: structural and relational (i.e. relating) properties together with units or so-called ‘building blocks’ – if existing – on a motoric and mechanical level. We cannot decide in advance what is dominantly at stake in a given dance piece. The syntactic aspects in their entirety constitute the meaning (representations included). Combinatory rules (what Foster called syntax) – if there are any – are left out. If they exist *and* are to be seen than we grasp them as relational properties. By no means does the syntactically constituted meaning stand strangely apart of a predetermined meaning, as Foster posits: “The dance’s meaning is, in part, a product of the tensions created between these two kinds of conventions – between the references that the dance makes to the world and to its own organization.” (*Foster Reading xviii*)

I therefore suggest the following: the more dance aspects we have *unhierarchically* at our scientific disposal the better. The more aspects we generally know, the more varied approaches we can have to the dance. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of a dance is its dynamic (in the case of expressing feelings), whilst in the mentioned example of Forsythe is the choice of body parts to bridge the space. If we would proceed hierarchically collecting ‘vocabulary units’ first, we would be stuck at an early point.<sup>115</sup>

I prefer an analytical method which does not prescribe a procedure but ‘scans’ multiple times the same dance under different angles, focusing on different aspects. There is one aspect we never ought to miss: the movement itself and its dynamics, as they are constitutive for the art of dance. Even if deliberately neglected or chosen by chance, the movement and its dynamics have – as a by-product – an impact just as (randomly chosen) the colours in a painting. Downright because intention (or the lack of it) is not all what matters.

### 7.5 Mimesis, Pathos, and Parataxis

In the paragraph “Syntaxes” (92-97), Foster distinguishes three syntactic principles: a) mimesis, b) pathos, and c) parataxis.

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<sup>115</sup> Foster’s chronological order of the interpretational procedure is mentioned in the quotation above (cf 88). How strictly she follows that order in the course of her different dance studies is not clear.

Ad a), Foster subsumes under mimesis operations that are dance specific – she calls them dance internal – as well as those translating music-specific operations, which she calls dance external. Mimetic dance-internal operations are all sorts of repetitions, on whichever level of the dance piece they may occur (as movement segments, phrases or the entire beginning of a piece, for example). The dance-external “principle of *mimesis* functions whenever the choreography reproduces the structure of the music or even the narrative structure described in the program notes” (93). Foster’s decision to include the reproduction of dance-external structures into the syntax results in the fact that mimesis is partially identical with what she previously called replication (of musical structure). Consequently, there is no clear distinction between representational mode and syntax. And this might in turn result in the fact that by recognizing replication as the representational mode and taking it as an external mimetic syntactical principle she does not feel the need to question syntax further, as was the case with Balanchine’s abstract pieces.

Ad b), according to Foster pathos is the form of syntax based on feeling-driven decision making. In the case of Martha Graham’s psychological works Foster writes:

[...] in Graham’s dances a progression of human feelings unfolds. Decisions informed by emotional life, dream life, or the realm of intuition, inspiration, and impulse guide the sequencing of Graham’s pieces. It can simply ‘feel’ right to place one move after another. (93-94)

Given that according to Foster syntactic operations make dances coherent<sup>116</sup> by subsuming expression of feelings under such a syntactic operation, she seems to claim a certain ‘logic’ behind them. She does not offer, however, a movement analytical device in order to explain our understanding of this logic. Foster’s suggestion that it “feels right” does not even clarify to whom: to the interpreter (dancer) or the choreographer? Or does it feel the same to the spectator? (In that case, how is this being transmitted without “loss”?<sup>117</sup>) In other contexts Foster refers to Susanne Langer, unfortunately here she does not consider her position. According to Langer these expressions of feelings become repeatable symbols on behalf of some formal features.<sup>118</sup> That is why in the process of repeating them in a performance they

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<sup>116</sup> “These syntactic principles give an internal coherence to the dance, one that complements and resonates against the dance’s references to the world” (Foster 92).

<sup>117</sup> see the incongruencies between expressed emotions and the spectator’s ones in *LA* 246.

<sup>118</sup> see *FF* 175-176. It is Janet Adshead and her dance analytic account published just two years after Foster which delivers a convincing explanation covering pure expression in dance very similar to the position of

do not need to “feel right” in the same way as to the person undergoing them in real life. To feel right for Foster perhaps rather means that feelings are appropriate to the context they appear in and to one-another (see “sequencing” in the above quotation). They generate thereby a certain coherence which characterizes in general syntactic operations as mentioned beforehand. However, this understanding of pathos does not explain expressive dance, which is *not* embedded in narrative context.

There is another reason why expressive dance is a weak point in Foster’s semantics. According to Foster’s presumption, a dance creates meaning by referring to the world. Already the reflective mode seemed to be an exception thereof referring exclusively to the performance of the movement. An expressive dance without narration is either a second exception or it requires an explanation of how it refers to the world. As Foster is not explicit on that point we are left to speculate: one solution would be to consider the dancer or choreographer as part of the world and as a “source” of the displayed feeling.<sup>119</sup> This would be analogous to Husserl’s consideration of fire as the source of the indicator smoke. The problem of this causal relation is that it is no case of symbolisation. Yet expressive art is generally – Foster is not an exception – considered to function symbolically rather than through a causal chain. For Foster to defend a causal theory of aesthetic expression she would need to defeat major objections.

Ad c) parataxis subsumes strategies which lead choreographic decision-making over “easily identifiable properties of movement – its shape, its use of body parts, its rhythm – rather than the less tangible feelings” (95). Cunningham’s aleatoric is an example. Another example is variations on a theme. These themes can occur on any structural level of the dance: on the motoric level, an entire phrase, or even parts of the dance piece. The most obvious operation seems to be simple repetition. One wonders why Foster sees the need to attribute to this operation a syntactic principle of its own: the mimetic (see above). One reason could be the application of traditional categories from literature. Yet my principal objection to parataxis is the following: the presence of “easily identifiable properties”, what Foster previously called “building blocks” is an assumption which seems to preclude all properties

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Susanne Langer: expression as based on particular (but repeatable) formal relations of different components, including dynamics. (see Adshead 37-40, 57-59).

<sup>119</sup> There are two passages which sustain the artist’s being a part of the world : “The body can be a voice through which the interior feelings and desires of the subject are made manifest, or it can simply enunciate itself.” (Foster 227) and “Each choreographer’s style helped define a particular artistic mission, a different version of both the world and the artist’s role in it.” (166).

of dance that are difficult to access. This is a devastating implication, especially with regard to contemporary dance, which is increasingly hard to decipher.

### 7.6 Summary

To sum up the last paragraph, the distinction of operational strategies (“syntaxes”) into three groups is problematic. The self-repeating operations of the mimetic do not demonstrate a categorical difference from parataxis. Pathos does not show how far it grants the condition of coherence (leaving out movement analytic features and structural similarities with emotions); Foster's conception of parataxis is not convincing because operations on behalf of easily identifiable units are unsatisfactory in contemporary art practice. Just as Goodman had to give up the traditional threefold distinction of representation, expression, and exemplification as specifically aesthetic after having shown the first two to be deducible from the latter, the most fundamental aesthetic symptom. For that reason, I am convinced Foster could (and should) also give up representation as the most fundamental function of aesthetic symbols.

### 7.7 Surmountable Divergences Concerning ‘Syntaxes’

Analysing syntactic aspects of dance, Foster could admit a larger variety of relational as well as basic aspects if she would avoid restrictions due to the linguistic-specific distinction between vocabulary and syntax on the one side, and literature-specific distinctions like mimesis, pathos, and parataxis on the other. My proposition would be to turn to an analytical method which had been elaborated ten years after *Reading Dancing* and which Foster could accept as a tool to identify them: the Movement Inventory Procedure (MIP).

On a more fundamental level, however, I cannot reconcile my position with Susan Foster's: if neither reflective dance nor expressive dance refer “to the world”, why then maintain this reference as a general condition of artworks and as a premise in Foster's semantics? Indubitably, here her communicational theory sets the frame. This raises the more basic question of how appropriate communication theory is for discussing aesthetics.

### 7.8 Remaining Divergences

I recapitulate: besides the axiomatic disadvantage of Foster's semantics and the mentioned methodological problems concerning the vocabulary-syntax distinction, there is a further difference between my approach and Foster's. Foster's priority is to consider and understand prevailing conventions, intentions, etc. *before* analysing a concrete dance. This in my eyes hides the risk of a tendentious examination. E.g. if her ambition is – as it seems to be – to find

out the spectrum of viable political art practice<sup>120</sup> we understand why abstract and formal art is of less interest to her. In this light she judges Balanchine's abstract art as "affirmative" and "discriminating viewers" (see quotation above) exhilarating them towards its prowess. In this light she judges Cunningham's experimental abstract dances as "reactionist" given that "it is not concerned with the ideological encoding of the body: it 'never unmask[s] human movement as a signifying practice'."<sup>121</sup> In contrast, the appearance of the postmodern dance of her time adds some particularity to dance history: "Foster argues that the postmodern choreographic episteme includes the spectator as an equal partner in the composition of the dance" (Auslander 9).<sup>122</sup> We remember the communication theoretical framework of Foster's semantics. We remember the artwork's meaning being constituted by all the elements in the communicational chain. Now, however little the impact of the spectator on the creative procedure may be (she calls them "relatively immobile gathering of performers" [Foster, Reading 224]) the impact on the chain of contributors to the dance piece's meaning is shifted, a communitarian semantics established – at least postulated. Yet precisely the rigour and validity of this postulated theory in which her dance criticism and analysis are rooted is, as the British philosopher McFee admonishes, banned in the footnotes (McFee, "Review" 191). Due to that and to "the inadequacies of that account of meaning" the book of Foster "is not, I suspect, one they [those interested in dance] will refer to for its theorizing." (McFee, "Review" 192).

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<sup>120</sup> see Auslander 8.

<sup>121</sup> see Auslander 13, and Auslander 21 quoting Foster ("Signifying", 46).

<sup>122</sup> Auslander concludes from the dance historical evolution Foster's suggests which reaches from "affirmative" (Balanchine), "reactionist" (Cunningham) to the postmodern episteme: "I have already implied here (and shall imply again) that Foster's history [of dance] is teleological" (Auslander 22).

Part II:  
Four Case Studies Illustrating Symbol-Theoretic Semantics  
in the Tradition of Goodman and Langer

Preliminary: The Movement Inventory Procedure (MIP) and its Role in  
Semantics

In this chapter I first describe the heterogeneous system of MIP (i), then its role in my semantics of dance (ii). Before I apply MIP to my case studies I declare in how far I go beyond MIP (iii) and what the role of the case studies and the criteria for their choice are (iv).

i. Description of MIP

The movement inventory procedure (MIP) looks for the movement characteristics of a dance in question. In the course of history, movement has been described by culture-historical methods first (in dance studies), then lately under various partial angles (in dance science): its spatial use, its anatomical implicature, its dynamics, its sequencing. In the course of time different interest lead to different perspectives. However, the perspective of motoric process seems to be neglected (Jeschke 6).

Focusing on the motoric process, MIP aims at the most characteristic features, so not all perspectives are notated. Yet, in the heuristic procedure, all perspectives are considered. Critically speaking, MIP is not a systematic procedure, making an inventory of all movement particles from all perspectives, which gives after careful comparison as a conclusive result the characteristic features. However, the perspectives which MIP finally judges to be decisive it can justify and argue for.

The novelty to focus on the mechanical procedure leads MIP to record the so-called ‘motoric’ aspects of the movement. It does so by taking the angle of the dancer and from this viewpoint e.g. inward or outward rotations are to be understood. The dancer being the point of reference does not mean that the motoric aspects were proprioceptual. However, they are in part.<sup>123</sup> The symbols MIP uses to represent the aspects are to a large extent deduced from Laban’s different notational systems.

To the anatomic perspective: MIP splits the body up in its anatomical parts, limbs and joints. It offers systematically developed symbols for each. More importantly, it offers

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<sup>123</sup> Consequently, MIP does not focus on only a part of my bodily movement category.

categories which group them conveniently in so-called sectors: Upper body, lower body, but also the right half of the entire body etc. MIP collects and lists these anatomically identified body parts and sectors in a table under the label (anatomical) *selection*. They are itemized on a vertical axis of the table, so that on the horizontal axis motoric categories are listed. Each body part or sector is in principal apt to effectuate one of the motoric procedures listed horizontally. Where the two categories meet, in the field of their crossing, you enter the specifying symbol.

The first motoric category of MIP is *mobilising*, offering three symbols how body parts can proceed hereby: a) to move b) to stop/to pause c) to combine both. The combination can result c1) a phrase with a stop at the end. It can result also c2) a still at the beginning and a successive mobilizing of the involved limbs to start off a phrase. These three are the sorts of “delegation” (Jeschke Leaflet 5) of the task of mobilising.

The second category is *coordinating*. Joints can be bent and straightened, sometimes twisted or turned. Consequently MIP offers different graphical symbols for these mechanical movements too. They are listed in the table under the subcategory “articulation”. The amount of distance the articulation achieves constitutes the “range” and finds a column next to the mentioned bending, straightening, or twisting mechanical procedures. This range is symbolized by points (one to four) and is an attempt to account for the aspect of density, which is indicated by the dimension “distance”. In cases where it needs to be determined which path the articulation takes, MIP offers a body-oriented spatial category for that which constitutes the second subcategory of coordinating: the “spatial proceeding”. Deduced from the Effort-Graph of Rudolf von Laban the symbols mark a) directions, b) axis, and c) expanse surfaces. All these are related to the body center of the dancer and do not constitute a "general" (Laban 45) or stage/audience related category. If for an analysis of a dance piece this stage/audience related feature matters, additional signs or verbal explanation need to be added. Articulation, its range, and its spatial path constitute the second category “coordinating”.

The third category *supporting*<sup>124</sup> describes the relation of the body to the floor. If the body does not displace itself: a) it can maintain its support on the spot or b) change it whilst not leaving the spot (pivots, turn on the standing foot). The body can displace itself by

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<sup>124</sup> ibid. 15 ("*Belasten*").

changing the support through a) a new distribution of the weight or by b) leaving the floor altogether (jump).

The fourth category is *regulating*. It describes the dynamics of movement. It is to the best of my knowledge the most differentiated system of graphics to represent the complexity of dynamics. “Regulating” distinguishes between (I) *energy expenditure* and (II) *energy distribution* through the body over time. I) The first, the expenditure, is divided into a) force, b) stability, and c) modulation. Force is the expenditure of muscular energy in a movement. It can remain even, increase, or decrease. Stability describes the relation of body weight to gravity. A dancer can decide to work against gravity by lifting the center of inertia (like in ballet), or as another extreme, to totally give in (and sink). Modulation bespeaks the body’s possibility to play with these factors: bounds for instance are a regular alternation of muscular force, points of inertia. MIP calls it “elasticity” and it is a typical case for modulation. II) The second case of regulating, the *distribution of energy*, describes the changes an expenditure may undergo in time. It may undergo a change in time through an even, increasing, or decreasing energy phrasing (may the latter two be steady or sudden). This subdivision is called *phrasing*. The distribution of energy may also change in time even without phrasing change, namely in case of a different speed. That’s why the second subdivision is called *tempo*.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, MIP provides graphical tools for characteristic movement. It does not aim for reconstructible precision or completeness. Knowing the complexity of movement MIP is open for heterogeneous (including verbal) description and does not exclusively use graphics to identify the motoric identity of a piece.

## ii. The Role of MIP in My Semantics

I consider MIP a very helpful utility to construct an inventory of the characteristics of a movement texture of a given piece. What is considered as characteristic is a good candidate for being exemplified.<sup>125</sup> Characteristics and emphasis depend heavily on the relations among various aspects and categories: on the movement characteristics of other figures, their relations, as well as non-movement aspects of the piece. The music, lightening, media, costumes, and structural order, may all be decisive, as is the case in the performing arts in

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<sup>125</sup> The fact that a characteristics is due to an overall characteristic of the artist’s style, ex.g. contractions of Martha Graham, does not necessarily affect its relevance or meaning for the particular dance piece. The overall style may be considered as a ‘default set of expectations’, a background, to which we relate some more particular ‘foreground’ aspects.

general. As they can make a movement feature relevant which otherwise would not have been accounted for in the inventory, I do not opt for a unique heuristic procedure prescribing the scientific proceeding. As I argued in Chapter 7, “Susan Leigh Foster’s Semantics of Dance”, ideally a numerous repeated scanning and inventory-making under different aspects is required. In order to deepen our understanding we may add the historical context, which however, as I am not tired to point out, cannot stand in the foreground of a semantic analysis. Last but not least, the characteristics noted in our inventory furnish in a graphical mode justification for the analytical results, and its further interpretational use: to support our interpretations and analysis we can use the graphics, just as we would use notations of musical partition, to identify syntactic aspects and add them as ‘quotations’. For this purpose, however, the graphics requires a time index. Our semantic conclusion becomes thus verifiable.

Obviously, a neglect to take account of some feature in our inventory is therefore decisive for the outcome of a semantical interpretation. Such a neglect, if we assume a functioning and vivid scientific discourse, will evoke a scientific counterproposal and a subsequent discourse.

### iii. Added Aspects in my Case Studies

As mentioned above, the meaning of a given motoric identity depends on the context. I therefore add structural descriptions of the piece to my case studies. These structural descriptions consider the number of figures present and their mode of interaction, as well as quite complex schemata in the case of group dance (see fig. 8). In abstract dances the meaning may very well lie in the way the figures and the ensemble work together, relate to one another, and how they distribute leitmotifs among each other. The outcome may however become constitutive part of the motoric identity, even if only for a segment of the piece, as Claudia Jeschke admits.<sup>126</sup> The motoric identity is not limited to the movement texture of one dancer or a couple, nor necessarily to the piece as a whole.

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<sup>126</sup> I owe many clarifications and – as in this case – affirmations for possible extentions of MIP to Claudia Jeschke, an external supervisor. The exchanges were from january to september 2014 at Salzburg University.

#### iv. The Role of the Case Studies

The case studies which follow my symbol-theoretic semantics of dance have the function to illustrate the practicability of my semantics and test its efficiency. This is best tested in the most difficult cases where no representation or narration dominates the meaning. In these so-called abstract dance cases we have to concentrate on the exemplifications.

Exemplification defined as the symbol's property shown forth, I understand the properties to be found as either characteristic or otherwise remarkable. If a property is not characteristic by its own means, it may be shown forth by means of another performative tool (light, sound, and so forth): thus related properties interweave with less remarkable features.

An additional challenge to test the efficiency of my semantical approach is to include more or less recent choreographies. The freshly evolving movement features of their style might be a real challenge for MIP.

The underlying criteria for my choice of case studies can be summed up as follows: 1) they belong to contemporary dance (and performance) aesthetics reflecting upon mediality or materiality, 2) the absence of (dominant) narrative, representational or expressive features, 3) the (complex) use of movement as a material for choreographic procedure instead of habitual<sup>127</sup> “vocabulary”.

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<sup>127</sup> Habitual movement comprises on the one side dance movement based on one or another convention and on the other on ‘daily’ movement used in Tanztheater (e.g. by Pina Bausch). I owe my thanks for this distinction (as for many others) to Claudia Jeschke during her supervision in 2014.

## 1. *Trio A* by Yvonne Rainer

### 1.1.1 Introduction and General Structure

*Trio A* is a dance piece by Yvonne Rainer, one of the artist collective of the Judson Church in New York. The piece premiered the 10th of January 1966 danced by Steve Paxton, David Gordon, and Yvonne Rainer. Conceived as a solo, the three dancers performed it simultaneously but not in unison. The avantgard artists of the sixties became famous for their experimental reflections on mediality and materiality. Not all of their works being dance pieces I have chosen a piece which complies with the second and third criteria, namely being abstract and a complex choreography based on unhabitual movement material. I have chosen a film documentation of *Trio A* as a solo performed in 1978 by the choreographer in the Merce Cunningham Studio. The advantage of this choice is its free online-availability.<sup>128</sup>

As to the general structure of the piece of approximately five minutes length it is striking that it has *no* structural characteristics whatsoever. It finishes as it starts, in a relaxed pose turned away from the audience. The ongoing movement sequences have no phrasing, no development neither in respect of a story, expressions or form.

### 1.1.2 Dance Analysis

I proceed in this chapter in two steps. First I analyse the various motoric aspects of the movements (II.1 "constancy in the dynamics", II.2 "constructionist movement composition" treating autonomous body sectors, isolation and montage). I take care to include arguments for the relevance of the observed aspects. In a second step I reconsider the results under a philosophical viewpoint (IV). The prepared arguments serve to justify why the observed aspects may safely count as syntactic and meaningful. Given that this piece is the oldest of my case studies there is a debate in dance studies and philosophy of dance worthwhile to mention (IV). "V. A Brief Historical Excursion" will round up the chapter.

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<sup>128</sup> Film recorded under the direction of Sally Banes the 14th August 1978 in the Merce Cunningham Studio, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aggv4jybdaY>.

## 1.II. The Constancy in the Dynamic

The dynamic is a complex category in the movement inventory procedure (MIP) that corresponds to activities of regulation, be they with respect to the use of energy or time.

The most dominant feature of the piece is probably its constant energetic level. As we are not in the position to attribute hereby a medico-physiological fact to the dancer, we remain rather in the phenomenological descriptive mode. The descriptions, however, are based on Claudia Jeschke's analytic inventory procedure, MIP. MIP distinguishes between increasing or diminishing energetic levels during movement. A perceivably changing tension in the muscles, one would say nowadays muscle tone, would be a sign thereof. Yet, Yvonne Rainer is not delivering one. Another sign would be a specific cooperation ("modulation") of force and stability, what Claudia Jeschke and Cary Rick call elasticity. An obvious example is the bouncing and swinging. The contrary is the case in *Trio A*. No play between stable and unstable or increasing and decreasing energetic sequences ever happens. Movements appear to be of a constant dynamic quality, which prevents elasticity. Given the multitude of movements applied in the piece (floor work, standing, kneeling, jumping, pivoting) to maintain such an impression is remarkable.

Let me describe a concrete example which discloses that this evenness is obtained at the expense of a dynamic suggesting itself organically. Such an abstention is to be observed in the 57th second of the filmed version (1984) of *Trio A*, when Rainer rotates her head. Circling the head freely would accelerate it on the way down and attenuate upwards, as our limbs are connected to ball-and-socket joints. The head would generate a swinging energy - and use it. If you rotate it with control as for the warming up exercises in dance classes the dynamic momentum does not come into existence. In *Trio A* the circling of the head is similar to the warm up. Yet, paradoxically, the legs are running. And they do it sideways. Not to use dynamics here makes matters worse. The sharpened difficulty to coordinate head and legs due to the omission of any organic dynamics does perhaps not catch your eye. What you can see, however, is the challenging task to rotate evenly whilst the legs unevenly have to pass. A swinging head would help, though it would sacrifice the second important feature of the work: the rhythmless timing. As mentioned, the MIP's dynamics distinguishes between use of energy and time. The modulation of the latter concerns phrasing and speed.<sup>129</sup> In *Trio A* such

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<sup>129</sup> See Jeschke accompanying leaflet (22). See also Doris Humphrey's definitions: "Dynamics is (...) the varying degrees of tension" and rhythm is "the accents that occur to definite intervals" (Maynard 131).

modulation is missing. Wendy Perron, editor of the Dance Magazine remarked that: “Both Trisha and Yvonne favor the uninflected, non-dynamic phrasing that you see in Rainer’s *Trio A*.” (Perron n.p.) The movement sequences seem to follow a more or less pertinent even timing without visible accents or rhythm. The impression of a metronomic timing appears right at the beginning, when already the first “bars” are filled with one movement per beat. Movement repetitions in-a row confirm that impression. Many repeated movements appear four at a time, which alludes to dance class exercises. Though you find many other movements three or five at a time, still, their number is expressive. I shall enumerate them in their chronological order: four sideways running accompanying the two circlings of the head mentioned above (0:56’’-1:00’’), four subsequent movements of the thorax (concave-convex alternations) (1:10’’-1:15’’). Four pelvis push-pull alternations in minute 1:50 - 1:55, followed by 16 wipes with both palms of the hands (1:55’’-2:06’’). Another four running steps with chin dropped and lifted occur at 3:33’’ till 3:38’’. In a sidefall position the parallel arms above the head are “lengthened” four times successively reminding much of morning gymnastics. Finally, quite at the end of the piece in minute 5:23 till 5:24, four childish skips turn into a handstand. Dispersed in the course of the piece, they disclose a continuously inherent metronome-like feature and render the unchanged speed conscious.<sup>130</sup>

To sum up: The energetic evenness in respect to the time and phrasing is as much conspicuous as the one in respect to force and gravity.

The energetic evenness is what prevents any *momentum* from appearing. The momentum, a temporary suspension at the top of swings or bounds, is at one or another point part of organic or “natural” movement, be it animal or human. A constantly equal dosage of energy, a perpetual uniformly guided movement, reminds us of machine controlled motion. A machine would not be sensible for dynamically usable opportunities which might occur. It is in this sense that Yvonne Rainer’s movement looks mechanical. The movement seems strangely lifeless or soulless, which is not meant metaphorically. It means that no psychological interpretation is possible. That probably no emotions are artistically at stake and accordingly none for the spectator empathically to feel.<sup>131</sup> The most to read

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<sup>130</sup> This is not the case without exception. Nevertheless, a look at the time the repetitions last, namely four seconds, is quite striking.

<sup>131</sup> see I.VI "A Brief Historical Excursion".

psychologically “into” the dance is that its uninvolved movements suggest to be about — casualness.<sup>132</sup>

### 1.III. Constructionist Movement Composition

A second relevant aspect of the motoric identity<sup>133</sup> of *Trio A* is its constructionist movement composition. It shows up on the one hand in the relations of the sectors of the body. On the other hand it shows up in isolations of limbs and their surprising combination.

#### 1.III.1 Body Sectors and their Temporal Autonomy

I would like to begin by discussing an example where movements belong to different segments of the body and different timing:


After five minutes (5:11’’) the dancer pivots (360°) on the right leg in an *attitude à la seconde*. Her upper body is slightly tilted over the standing leg which corresponds to an attitude *penché*. Importantly: the arms hang parallel aside the upper body and rotate continuously in the shoulder joint (in-out). This activity persists even if she leaves the *penché* position, steps forward in order to effectuate a *grand-rond-de-jambe en dedans* with the right leg (5:18-19’). The autonomy of the arm activity and the autonomy of the legs is a symptom of the separation of corporeal sectors.

The upper body frees itself from “dependence” on the lower one. The hanging arms keep on rotating even if the *rond-de-jambe* leg passes its limits: it does not stop in the front of the dancer but crosses her body axis and draws her body in a new direction (5:20’’) drawing her from room position 3 to 7, which means a turn of 180<sup>134</sup> degrees. The leg does not succeed to draw her entire body: the focus is well directed to point 7, yet the torso follows only half-way, 90 degrees. The result is a surprisingly flat (two-dimensional) creature. For a moment the two body sectors build together one *gestalt*, which apparently is built into a frame of a flat plane like a Greek frieze “facing” the audience: whilst the legs - just as the head -are

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<sup>132</sup> see I.V. "Results Compared to Scientific Publications". Not to introduce in the course of the chapter scientific literature is a methodological decision of my part. The movement analysis should convince upon syntactic aspects, only. At a later state, when semantic interpretation comes into play I will discuss dance literature.

<sup>133</sup> see II. Part Preliminary.



<sup>134</sup> room positions are distributed in a square space by a change of 45° angles each:

in profile (facing room position 7) the upper body is twisted towards the audience, and the (continuously) hanging arms at the side widen the plane. Even the palms fit into the plane as from this moment on the rotation ceases. This vertical plane is called *Tiefenflaeche* in the MIP. The twisted relation between the sectors which creates the flatness is maintained even in the following movement sequence: whilst the legs are waltzing the 90° twist between pelvis (and lower body) on the one hand and the upper body on the other is kept. A final argument for the highly constructed movement is the fact that the created two-dimensional plane is maintained despite the on-going turn of a waltz (5:21-22''). Deprived from any roundness the waltz follows exactly a line – the one of the freeze. This deprived, flattened waltz, without any organic movement, emphasises the two-dimensionality.

For me these three aspects, a) separation into autonomous corporeal segments, b) creating from time to time together a *gestalt*, c) keeping it even whilst moving – quite awkwardly – onward, prove that this constructional feature is of significance.

Without any perceivable motivation this sequence ends suddenly in minute 5:23''. Interrupted by the whole body, the arms loose their straightness, the palms their flatness, the upper body regains its natural front as if stepping out of the Greek frieze. The dancer lets herself be caught by a childish skipping which I will come back onto later.

Results:

1. The dancing body is divided in autonomously moving segments
2. Alternating pausing or beginning of phrases make segments perceivable as such.
3. From time to time they create a related *gestalt*. These contrasts highlight the constructional approach.

Summary: The autonomy of bodily sectors is the first of two constructionist characteristics of the piece. Their movement sequences are in their duration not coordinated. They overlap each other temporarily. This leads to an other characteristic feature of the piece: that it is uncoordinated.

We should clarify here that uncoordination does not mean the consciousness or proprioceptive phenomenology of the executing dancer. Nor the possible intention of the choreographer. It might be the case that some relatedness is felt or intended. Uncoordination means that a movement sequence of one sector has its “inner logic”, its “justification for

being”, independent of the one of another sector: it proceeds autonomously without cooperation or being a complement. Where this constructionist feature prevails, a connected pose or interconnected movement is missing.

### 1.III.2. Isolation and ‘Montage’

The described autonomous functioning of corporeal sectors could be called isolation, too. I decided to call it “segmentation” in order to retain the notion of isolation for *limbs*. I show in the following what distinguishes isolation and how it becomes part of ‘Montage’.

#### 1.III.2.1 Isolation

Immediately following the analyzed waltz in minute five the dancer suddenly takes off in childish skips on which I promised to come back. Skips, which overcome children, could justifiably be considered as *the* locomotion of happy children. Well, in the case of Yvonne Rainer, the skips undergo some impact: the arms have to remain stiff and still, nicely placed alongside the body. The head dropped in the neck with eyes fixing the sealing. The legs, however, keep on skipping joyfully in half a circle. Rainer isolates arms and legs, bracketing them off the ongoing movement.

Besides omitting limbs from motion a second use of ‘isolation’ for limbs implies their previous unity, their belonging together. Such unity is most obvious in natural<sup>135</sup> movements. In conventionalized movements we notice a connectedness only if we know the conventions or task. Therefore, if an alternating swing of arms does or does not belong to walking is easier to decide than if a body wave belongs to butterfly-swimming.

Back to our skips: quite organically they usually evoke accompanying arms. The corporeal ergonomics combines a human step with its opposite arm. Adapted in time and direction they constitute an entity and do not appear separated without reason. In case they do we recognize them *as parts*<sup>136</sup>: we see an isolated arm swing in *Trio A* in minute 2:50. Here the legs stick to the floor. If separated parts appear at different places of a dance I will call

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<sup>135</sup> This notion is certainly problematic. In this context it would be sufficient to understand “natural” in opposition to civilisational. Complex, task-driven movement, as well as elaborate culture-specific ones should be distinguished therefore from basic, partly innate ones. (There is neurologic evidence for some very basic ones, e.g. the pattern of alternating movement like walking). “It is also necessary to coordinate the movements of upper and lower limbs during walking or running and, to a certain extent, this also appears to be mediated at the spinal cord level” (Mann, n.p.) Admittedly, a clear borderline is impossible to draw.


<sup>136</sup> Pantomime takes advantage of this capacity of ours: ‘*pars pro toto*’ either legs’ motion or the swinging arms can stand for, i.e. represent, walking.

that artistic procedure isolation. If the parts concerned are combined with other ones I will call that combination “montage”.

### 1.III.2.2 Montage

Montage is a common artistic tool in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Möbius 139). It is easily recognized if it combines well-known elements. That is why natural movements are a welcome starting point for the procedure, as is the case with skipping and walking in *Trio A*. Conventionalized movement entities are only recognizable for adepts. Through conventions and habit we get used to them and if they become familiar, we surely notice them seeing them only partly. That is why Rainer can use ballet for montage, too. We see occasionally *ronds-de-jambe*, we see a twisted arabesque arm. *Rond-de-jambe* is usually a half circle of the leg on the floor or in the air. It may begin in the front (*endehors*) or back (*endedans*). Yvonne Rainer shows in 1':21'' three *endedans* ones (alternating each time the legs) and finishes by an *endehors* one. In ballet, where arms accompany the legs, they always adapt the musical phrasing to the one of the leg. Most commonly legs and arms end in a coordinated pose which will be maintained for a moment. In *Trio A* quite the opposite happens: the arms, which have already been paddling for a while (since 1:18''), are joined by the *ronds-de-jambe* later (see fig. 3). And the arms happily would continue to paddle if only the legs wouldn't kneel down and hit the floor.

But both don't fit together in any respect: the arms are motorically and functionally useless for the execution of the *rond-de-jambe*. This for three reasons: first, the continuous paddling disregards which leg is at stake. Second, it does not take into account in which sense the leg moves (*endedans* or *endehors*). Third, the arms complete eight circles whilst the legs only three. The numbers show how challenging (if not impossible) the task is to execute them at the same time: try to divide a certain time span by eight and three simultaneously. This unrelatedness, lack of coordination, emphasizes in my eyes - as in the case of the sectors - the constructionist aspect. But unlike the previous 'montage' case where entire body sectors were autonomous here only limbs are. In this example the torso is neutral and uninvolved visually (this is not to say anything about its implicit force to encounter all the 'canoeing' of legs and arms). Interestingly, the arms resemble those present when walking a tightrope. There, in contrast, they compensate the legs' movement, tare and enhance the balance. Here, they hinder.



(fig. 3, Wood 53)

### Summary

1. 'Montage' is a choreographic procedure based on the isolation and recombination of limbs.
2. Isolation is an autonomous move independent (also in duration) of other limbs or surrounding body parts.
3. An easily detectable autonomous move is
  - 3.1 A part of a natural movement or
  - 3.2 A part of a familiar conventional movement.
4. The outcome of combinations of isolated limbs in *Trio A* typically bespeaks of a lack of coordination.

Just as building elements which are combined in a strange and non-functional way put forward the aspect of ("false") construction, so do unrelated familiar elements in dance. Both procedures, the de- and re-construction of poses by their involved sectors as well as the montage of isolated limbs' moves accentuate the constructionist aspect of *Trio A*.

### I.IV. Philosophical results

#### I.IV.1 Preliminaries

The dance analysis procedure of Claudia Jeschke, the MIP is a useful tool to discover relevant prominent syntactical features of dance. Yet, it does not treat only dominant obvious ones.

MIP helps to reveal also concealed motoric and functional aspects as it explicitly focuses on movement generating procedures.

MIP conforms to Goodman's and my phenomenal requirement to give an account of a basic dense perceptual category, namely bodily movement. In contrast to Susan Leigh Foster's approach to the Judson Church Choreographers MIP restrains itself to take political, psychological and intentional aspects of the artists into account. Art-programmatic announcements (like the No-Manifesto of Yvonne Rainer, see 1.VII) as well as biographic data are no legitimate source to argue for the relevancy of some 'discovered' features of the work. It may be that the features are there, and not "read into". In that case, it is up to our analysis to find and argue for them. No intentional state of mind of the artist is sufficient to make it relevant and thus syntactical. It is a happy coincidence though, if the analysis' results confirm the artist's program.

Thanks to empathy and kinesthesia we do have to more than purely visual features of dance access (see Part I.6.2). Therefore motoric, i.e. movement generating procedural aspects which can be captured and even "felt" by watching closely, repeatedly and analytically, are a legitimate part of the replete aspects of the dance work.

#### 1.IV.2. Reconsideration of the Results of *Trio A*'s Dance Analysis

The MIB analysis of *Trio A* sheds light onto three features: 1) *Trio A*'s specific dynamics, 2) its sectoral construction and deconstruction of two or three-dimensional figures and 3) the coordination of isolated limbs.

#### 1.IV.3 Dynamics: A Structural and Dense Aspect

I begin with the most dominant feature, the dynamics. Movement dynamics is the dense category par excellence in dance, as I argued in the first part of my work. In *Trio A* dynamics dominates through its structure-specific aspect: an unchanging evenness. We remember we attribute a structure-specific aspect to a work if it describes a structural property of a category. "Contrasting" is a commonly used example. Monochrome pictures are an excellent analogy of unchanging evenness in the category of colour. Actually, a series of such has been created by the Judson Dance Theater collaborator Robert Rauschenberg about ten years before *Trio A*. It is quite acceptable to recognize such a structure-specific aspect before asking: "of which colour?" or in our case, "of which dynamics?" Nelson Goodman mentioned in *SA* that often such derived aspects (he called them "size and shapes") were distinguished prior to the

involved shades: “this is quite consistent with our earlier observation that the pattern of qualia in a presentation is often noticed before the several qualia themselves” (SA 189). We can nevertheless answer the question of dynamics and precise it, e.g. in Laban’s terminology: the dynamics is of middle speed, middle weight, and space use. So it is situated quite in the center of the effort cube.<sup>137</sup> In the previous paragraph I answered the question of dynamics in terms of Claudia Jeschke’s MIP. In either case, given the density of the category, the artist’s very restricted choice is quite astonishing. No doubt, there exist activities to be executed evenly. But not the ones of *Trio A*. In addition, the activities in this dance piece are far too varied to justify an evenness. So it is not a mere epiphenomenon, a side effect of some more relevant feature. Therefore we cannot judge it as an irrelevant one to skip over. If we succeed in showing that the evenness of the dynamics is relevant and highlighted in the sense of Goodman, the condition of exemplification is fulfilled.

I agree with Robert Hopkins<sup>138</sup>, who pointed out that it is not sufficient for a property to be one of a dense category (here the dynamics) in order to be a basic *syntactical* one. It needs to be relevant in its *specificity* too. So I have a double charge: if I argue, as I did in the first part of my work, that dance pieces are artistic when the amount *and* degrees of its aspects matter, then I have to show two things. First, I have to argue for the relevancy of the structural aspect of evenness among many other relevant aspects (repleteness) and second I have to argue equally for the relevance of the specific degree of dynamics which prevails (density). I call to mind that it depends upon the latter that we can differentiate between musical, pictorial or sculptural art, and more accurately dance from other performing arts. It is (the relevance of) the dense category which is dance specific, not derived aspects like contrast or monotony. So I have to show that - just as no two monochromatic art pictures are alike (all other features being the same), and that the particular chroma matters - no two monodynamic dances are alike. And obviously even less is a monochrome picture alike a monodynamic dance, and the latter alike a monodynamic performance artwork. By showing that it is the specific middle-range of the dynamics that is decisive for *Trio A* I qualify the dense aspect as relevant. The monotony is an additional property, one derived from the category.

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<sup>137</sup> “the middle range of dynamics and bodily extension maintained throughout the dance” (Foster 176)

<sup>138</sup> Robert Hopkins draw my attention to this point in the discussion after my talk at the annual conference of the European Society for Aesthetics in Prague, 2013.

Let me give an example of an even dynamics where its degree does not matter: If a theatre piece pronounces its dialogues or monologues during dynamically constant walks, this even walk may not be meaningful at all. The fact of continuously moving and walking whilst speaking, yes, this might be meaningful, but not *its specific* dynamic or speed. At least not within limits. A case of such a constant feature is the metric of let's say hexameters. This metric underlies the dactyls, spondees and trochees. It is rather a precondition. Its evenness does not enter the syntax of the speech, nor does it contribute to its meaning. If the theatre piece accompanies the speech with an even walk, certain aspects of the dynamics like space or weight use during the walk are within limits more or less irrelevant as long as it conforms to the metric of the speech. To sum up my theatre analogy example: the specific dynamics of the walk are not relevant, as long as the syncategorematic aspect of *being metrically coordinated to the speech* in hexameters prevails.

Accordingly we could imagine irrelevant dynamics in dance, too. Let's consider an even baroque dance which has interesting floor patterns, drawn by several dancers. Their floor patterns result in interesting group constellations. In accordance, they are those formations and patterns which we would count among the syntactical aspects. Even more so, if they – in addition - connote or convey symbolic or narrative meaning. In this case we might be tempted to renounce to the dense category of dynamics altogether from being relevant. Probably we might agree, too, to reject that the *unchanging* dynamics has anything to say. The evenness might be irrelevant. As it might have been the case in dance history when a given music – in stately tempo – urged the courtly dance to adapt. This is not to say that no dimension of the dynamics is relevant: if a folk dancer entered the room and, without changing his use of weight, joined the baroque suite, the decisive difference would have become apparent. But not as decisive as long as he copes with the formations and patterns.

In the following, I give three arguments to show why the case of dynamics is different with *Trio A*:

- a) There is no external necessity for the particular dynamics,
- b) There is no internal necessity,
- c) The even middle-range dynamics is highlighted by corresponding syntactic features.

Ad a) There is no music whatsoever to urge the dance to adapt its dynamics. Despite the lack of external motivation, interestingly, the evenly distributed steps or movements, as well as the sequences of multiply repeated movements, suggest an underlying metric. The specific metric is of a comfortable speed, approximately one beat per second. Most of elemental everyday movement conveniently fits in to this tempo.<sup>139</sup>

Ad b) The dynamics are often counterintuitive to the motoric or functional requirements of the involved movements. The dancer does not execute even activities in *Trio A*. Quite the opposite: as I listed in the dance analysis, there are varied jumps and floor work, each of which would become easier if executed with an *élan* or varied rhythm. To ignore differences is an active choice. To adapt so varied activities to a metre becomes relevant. So its external and internal lack of motivation is in fact highlighting the specific dynamics.

Ad c) The even middle-range dynamics finds correspondence in some other aspects of *Trio A*.

i) The specific middle-range muscular tension and effort corresponds to an *unspectacular performance style* without any performative power. The wandering focus of the dancer and the lack of contact with the audience, the apparently distracted glance underscores the understated performance style.

ii) The specific middle-range dynamics has an analogy in the structure of the dance piece: The undramatic structure of the entire piece without beginning, peak and obvious ending parallels the undynamic phrasing without momentum.

iii) An additional feature which underlines the relaxed middle-range muscular tonus is the use of focus. Often not focusing in the direction of the movement intentionality itself is questioned. In that case automatization is suggested, accustomed movements with no more need for attention, in short: casualness.

iv) By integrating some movement segments of everyday life into the dance the fact becomes apparent that the medium of effortless dynamics is the most common in daily life. Let's call it casual dynamics and it suits the casual stereotyped or hackneyed movement Yvonne Rainer builds into the dance. The correspondence between a

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<sup>139</sup> “What is seen is a control that seems geared to the *actual* time it takes, [...] much as one would get out of a chair, reach for a high shelf, or walk down stairs when one is not in a hurry” (Foster 174-175). Here Foster quotes Yvonne Rainer.

certain dynamics prevalent in every day life and movement segments of common life make the specific dynamics relevant.

Conclusion: My aim is to maintain the claim that a dance piece not only contains a high number of syntactic aspects, but further, that dance pieces contain dance-specific dense aspects at the basis, namely the dynamics. In order to be a syntactic feature precisely the specific dynamics in question need to be proven relevant. To show this I excluded its being an epiphenomenon, its being an inevitable side-effect of some more relevant feature. As was the case in the theatre piece example. With this bias I excluded any dependence of *Trio A*'s even middle-range dynamics from an external or internal motivation. Having done so I showed how the specific dynamics is underlined, shown forth. I did so by enumerating four features of the dance piece which correspond in one or another respect to the middle-range dynamics. A fourfold correspondence highlights the specific dynamics enough to render it syntactic and turn it into an exemplification. By this we are justified to conclude that the middle-range dynamics is exemplified and in an abbreviated manner that its casual aspect is exemplified, too.

In order to check the result's overall validity for the dance – that is: if casualness is its main meaning – I have to confront it with the two constructivist features and evaluate their relation.

#### 1.IV.4 Sectoral Construction and Deconstruction of Two or Three-Dimensional Figures

In a dance without accents and highlights it is difficult to make out units or categories (dense or not dense) which are relevant. If there were musical or dance phrases one could begin to decipher, is there an envisaged ending or is the beginning motivated by an impulse? And if yes which one? Two contrasting examples illustrate how positive answers might mark meaning: Classical ballet often aims for a memorable phrase ending which catches the eye and – in concordance with other bodies – bespeaks the figures' relation. As a second example, Martha Graham's impulsive contractions at the beginning of phrases cause the entire phrase to follow. My MIP-driven dance analysis approved the lack of these in *Trio A*. Yet it revealed two categories which led me to the constructivist thesis. Yvonne Rainer did not altogether dispense with poses (well known from ballet and modern dance) as we might suspect from an avant-garde dancer. But she arrives to them seemingly 'by accident'. By giving body sectors

some autonomous life, from time to time they create a figure, a shape. My examples were two-dimensional. They decompose as accidentally as they arise, body sector after body sector.

The poses not being known or obvious, nor virtuoso, I do not wonder that they are not treated expansively in previous scientific dance analysis. Neither are they a relevant category in my account. What is relevant is rather the procedural fact that they are mostly not build simultaneously by the involved body sectors. So in my account, what is meaningful is the movement procedural motoric aspect, namely that separate sectors act autonomously and create ‘by accident’ from time to time a ‘whole’, an entity, they create a shape.

This procedural aspect amidst the fragmentation is not conspicuous. Yet, its discovery does not stem from a (presumed) knowledge of choreographic process. Unlike the conviction of Susan Foster for who such work external knowledge is part of the piece’s meaning (see Chapter 7, “Susan Leigh Foster’s Semantics of Dance”), I am guided by phenomenistic and kinesthetic aspects mainly. To decide if this second feature revealed by MIP, the autonomous shape composing and decomposing feature, is a general one and typical enough for *Trio A* to constitute its motoric identity and meaning needs some additional investigation.

#### 1.IV.5 Discoordination of Isolated Limbs

Analysis with the tool of MIP revealed another procedural feature: isolations of body parts and their coordination. Here, too, only temporarily do we see coordinated movement. If so, here, too, they often appear “by accident”. An example showed autonomous arm movements, which, after a while, were joined by leg movements. Their coordination is built only on one aspect: they circle. The discrepancies are numerous: neither in speed nor in direction does one adapt or help the other. On the contrary. They rather hinder one another. The ‘coordination’ disappears as it came. Isolated body parts after isolated body parts, one by one.

Hindrance, lack of coordination, and unrelatedness in bodily moves I take as one possible emphasis the aspects in question need in order to count as relevant and syntactic, in the present case: the constructionist aspects of a) autonomy of body sectors and b) the montage.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> I take mismatch as mentioned before as an artistic mean of emphasis in art works. See Alexandre Declos, “The Aesthetic and the cognitive value of surprise”

### 1.V. Semantics of *Trio A* as a Network of Exemplified Aspects

The final philosophical question concerns the constitution of meaning of formal art works. According to my semantics the meaning of formal art is a network (structure) of exemplified aspects. Our analysis yielded some formally exemplified aspects in a preponderant status. If their coexistence creates tension and we cannot subsume them under one notion, this is a problem of language, not of the art work. If casualness stands alongside fragmentation, if an ever changing new montage is made up of isolated common-place-fragments and disintegrates again, this irritation and tension is “meaning”, too.

### 1.VI. Results Compared to Scientific Publications

Casualness is generally considered to be the dominant feature of *Trio A*. Most of the publications mention in this context Yvonne Rainer’s use of quotidian movement, for example, Jill Sigman and Sally Banes/Noel Charoll. Some mention quotations of classical ballet.<sup>141</sup> Yet as in the case of everyday movement here, too, it has not been taken enough into account that the quotations are never entire – because permanent construction is underway. What is missing in the literature as *Trio A*’s prevalent and therefore meaningful feature is the constructionist aspect of the piece.<sup>142</sup> In my eyes one reason – besides its subtlety – is that it does not easily suit casualness as the widely acknowledged meaning of *Trio A*.

### 1.VII. A Brief Historical Excursion<sup>143</sup>

In the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century dance theoreticians were conscious of the different aspects of one and the same movement: its physiological, visual (spatial appearance), temporal (its expansion in time and its rhythmical design), as well as its experiential aspects.

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<sup>141</sup> “fleeting glimpses of classical placement and design” - see Foster *Reading Dancing* 175

<sup>142</sup> Susan Foster comes close to my idea. Yet her description remains somewhat vague or too general without a concrete illustrating example and, more importantly, the principle behind it leading to the phenomenon: “the combinations of bodily articulations worked to distort, even as they recalled, the conventional lines of design-oriented dance. Just when one saw a familiar dance shape, the configuration of the body would shift, sometimes to a foreign shape, sometimes to a commonplace shape that seemed oddly out of place in the dance” (Foster 175). Nevertheless she comes close to my result of constructionist aspects: The dance is “a vigorous investigation of syntactic procedures” (Foster 176). My analysis can be considered to show what this ‘vigorous investigation of syntactic procedures’ consists of.

<sup>143</sup> The reason why this paragraph stands at the end of chapter 1 and not as an introduction at the beginning is a methodological decision. In contrast to Susan Leigh Foster I prefer to lead the reader through dance internal knowledge. External knowledge comes therefore at the end.

The latter became more central at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Laban treated the experiential aspect scientifically in his Effort Cube. There he focused on intentionality. How varied might intentions of a dancer towards the necessary elements of dance (space, time and gravity) be? To answer this question he elaborated a systematization which represents that variety in the so-called effort cube. Doris Humphrey – in a similar vein to the pioneers of the Free Dance, Isadora Duncan and her teacher Ruth St. Denis,<sup>144</sup> – saw experienced feeling as motivation of any movement to be executed. Obviously, feelings may cause movement. In case of mostly immediate and unreflected movement reaction we say that it expresses the feeling. But in opposite to the "inspirational" (Maynard 85) style of the pioneers, the more analytical Humphrey considered also the phenomenology of the movement as (repeatable) motivation. As Olga Maynard quotes Doris Humphrey:

My entire technique consists of the development of the process of falling away from and returning to equilibrium. ... Falling and recovering is the very stuff of movement. ... I recognized these emotional overtones ... and instinctively responded very strongly to the exciting danger of the fall, the repose and peace of the recovery. But this theory and technique had two natures, one physical, the other psychical. The simple process of *fall* and its natural corollary *recover* contained three elements of dance. These were *design*, in the changing positions, *rhythms*, the accents that occurred at definite intervals; and *dynamics*, the varying degrees of tension. With these three Humphrey recognized a fourth and integral element, that of *drama* or emotion – the feeling experienced in the fall and in the recover from the fall. (Maynard 130-132)

Free Dance of the early 20th century, the German *Ausdruckstanz* and Modern Dance were eager to exploit the experiential side of dance. After decades of doing so, the following post-modern dance countered that tendency. Under the influence of the avant-gardist John Cage, choreographers like Merce Cunningham, Trisha Brown, Steve Paxton, and Yvonne Rainer wanted to place the physical movement in the center - consciously avoiding the psychological aspect all together. The mentioned no-manifesto of 1965 pronounces explicitly the points which had to give way:

NO to spectacle.  
No to virtuosity.  
No to transformations and magic and make-believe.  
No to the glamour and transcendency of the star image.

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<sup>144</sup> see Maynard 84-85.

No to the heroic.

No to the anti-heroic.

No to trash imagery.

No to involvement of performer or spectator.

No to style.

No to camp.

No to seduction of spectator by the wiles of the performer.

No to eccentricity.

No to moving or being moved.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> See also an interesting juxtaposition of manifestos in a chronological order: Rainer 1965, 2008 and the "After No Manifesto" by the performance artist Bozic (Bozic n.pag.). The refusal of virtuosity, wide spread in today's contemporary dance (Turner, *Beredte Körper* 197), can be dated that far back as to the so-called pedestrians, i.e. postmodern dancers of America.

## 2. *Rosas danst Rosas* by Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker

The second dance work *Rosas danst Rosas* is a choreography for four women by the belge choreographer Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker which premiered 1983 in Brussels. It is a classic of contemporary dance and, just as *Trio A*, performed in our days. My analysis, however, is based on a filmed version by one of *Rosas danst Rosas*' composers, Thierry de Mey, in 1997. The excellent film contributed to the actual fame of the piece. Its formalistic aesthetic points out conveniently the minimalistic features exemplified in the dance.<sup>146</sup> The underlying criteria for my choice of the four cases under study remain valid: *Rosas danst Rosas* 1) has contemporary dance (and performance) aesthetics based on mediality among others, 2) has no (dominant) narrative, representational or expressive features, 3) uses movement as material for (complex) choreographic procedures instead of habitual, vocabulary'.

### 2.1 General Structure of the Piece

*Rosas danst Rosas* is divided in four dance sections, the 1<sup>st</sup>- 4<sup>th</sup> movement, bracketed by an introduction and a coda. Introduction and coda link the dance by casual events to everyday life (in the filmed version: rain, walk through a factory, taking off the shoes etc), and thus to us observers. The four dance sections inbetween have clear and distinct dancespecific qualities: a) spatial level of corporal commitment (lying, sitting, upright inside and upright outside the building)<sup>147</sup>, b) use of space (pattern)<sup>148</sup>, c) relation among figures<sup>149</sup>, d) the rhythm<sup>150</sup> and last but not least e) the dynamics<sup>151</sup>. This piece has in contrary to the other case studies an outstanding analytical documentation of the choreographic structure. In the following I can therefore draw upon this available resource to sustain my claims.

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<sup>146</sup> Early performances of the eighties have been received with a different dominant meaning, a certain feministic 'message'. Dance scientist Claudia Jeschke confirms this reception according to her visit of *Rosas danst Rosas* in the eighties. Keersmaeker acknowledges this early reception with a certain disapproval in her documentary book (Keersmaeker and Cvejic 85). Theatre scientist Peter Boenisch, too, reports from the preponderant gender-specific discussions of the piece so far (Boenisch 267).

<sup>147</sup> Keersmaeker calls this 'architecture' (see her graphics in: Keersmaeker and Cvejic 83).

<sup>148</sup> Keersmaeker call this 'geometry' (ibid.).

<sup>149</sup> The dancers' constellations is implicit in the 'geometry'.

<sup>150</sup> The choreographers calls this 'division' (ibid.)

<sup>151</sup> Dynamics are mentioned as distinct characteristics of the four movements (I- IV.) (ibid.).

In contrast to the loosely held introduction, the 1<sup>st</sup> movement is strictly composed: four figures lie parallel, displaying movement sequences rhythmitized by an alternation of rollings, gestures and semi-lifted postures. It exemplifies various half-awake-half-asleep states. The 2<sup>nd</sup> movement is danced entirely on chairs distributed in an order we know of open-plan offices, namely in loose rows. The dancers having put the shoes on before taking their seat the subsequent rather jerk dance connotes labour. The 3<sup>rd</sup> movement is basically a relaxed dance endlessly moving ahead (in lines) and dwelling in the sunlight on various floors of the factory's building and the roof. The 4<sup>th</sup> movement leaves the building behind and is a passionate open air dance at night. Its increasing expenditure of energy proceeds in various spatial formations, at last in a round dance – until the first drop out and the piece ceases. It ceases by some casual behaviour exposed in the coda.

## 2.II. Analysis in detail

It is up to the detailed analysis to show which syntactical aspects constitute the above mentioned four different characteristics of the 1<sup>st</sup>- 4<sup>th</sup> movement and thus structure the piece.

### 2.II.1 Introduction

From 0:30" until 1:00" the opening scene starts off with a leading motif of Rosas' dynamics. A side step whirls into a turn prepared by a twisting gesture (the arms thus speed up the turn to a maximum). After half a turn the arms now help to break the turn: firmly gathered around the abdominal muscles they accumulate the force around the central region of the body to become immobile. On the way back, again after half a turn, the arms stop even more explicit: tensed fists accumulate the force around the abdomen. In a break of a second the (half) turn is done, but the motif goes on for half a minute. The introduction presents this characteristic motif scarcely visible in the first twilight, the camera passing-by catches many casual events: walkings through immense halls, running through rainy court yards of the industrial complex. It is the forced breath of the mentioned spin-stop-spin-girl, which delivers the only sound for the introduction, then the echo of steps in empty halls, and the rain. The minimal moments of composition are introduced. Reflects in wet yards, long shadows, and even longer floor patterns lead our eyes to formal aspects. Besides the formal aspect there is an important additional feature which is emphasized and exemplified: a prominent feature of contemporary art, the so-called mediality. We observers are not supposed to succumb artistic illusions, not to forget having passed a theatrical framework in which the artwork is presented. In *Rosas*

*danst Rosas* the figures step in and out of art, their privacy seems never switched-off (cf. Boenisch 270).

## 2.II.2 The 1<sup>st</sup> Movement

Getting off the shoes, neat and pairwise (3:43"-50"), the four girls first face a wall. Then out of a sudden a back fall, and they land parallel on the floor, the head pointing to us, the audience (4:18").

A sequence of repetitive rollings and communicative postures unfold (4:24"-12:00"). Alternate rollings and postures are formal elements in a row mirroring thus minimal music. The elements, some of them iconic postures, rhythmize the on-going phrase.<sup>152</sup> Systematically added accents give the phrase a systematically varied gestalt.

However, the time aspect of the formal elements sustain also a representational reading: the enduring and seemingly everlasting aspect corresponds to the one of sleep, its characteristic process over time.<sup>153</sup> Sprinkled by some accents, dissolving soon, connote dream reactions or short awakings. Its evolution in time, when stage by stage, higher corporal levels are attained (kneeling, sit-up) might mean 'to get up' (10:45"-12:00").

The structure of the 1<sup>st</sup> movement I do not discuss here in detail as the film obviously<sup>154</sup> cuts off the aspect of spatial distance of *Rosas danst Rosas*' 'geometry' in favour of the effectful parallelity of the four dancers for close-ups (see fig. 4). The rhythmical pattern however is clear. The subsequent movement themes A, B, C, and D are interspersed with attacking accents. Done in a systematic manner, we see the same themes over and over, yet never identical. This fact emphasizes the 'everlasting' aspect or better: it constitutes it in the first place. The slow and so-called "suspended" (Keersmaecker and Cvejic 89) repetitions of themes overweigh the accents and stretch individual motifs like a chewing-gum. The exemplified slow-down dynamics together with some gestures like covering the shoulders up (as if with a blanket) the eyes shut (8:54"- 58", 9:50", 11:45"- 12'), accompanied by silence

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<sup>152</sup> Boenisch talks of a "pastiche" of iconic postures like "egyptian pyramidesphynx" and "thinker pose" (probably referring to Rodin's sculpture finished 1882) (Boenisch 281).

<sup>153</sup> Dance unlike painting is less apt to represent in the strict sense (described in "4.B.2 Representation", i.e. to denote an existing or fictive person or object). Strictly speaking, properties of sleep are exemplified. However, as exemplification underlies also representation (see 4.B.2) I would agree to use 'representation' – in order to meet the common sense distinction between representation, expression and 'mere' exemplification of arts – under following conditions: (a part of) an artwork shares a multitude of its exemplified properties with an event, object or person. Alternatively we have the option to say: the 1<sup>st</sup> movement refers indirectly to sleep.

<sup>154</sup> compared to the graphics illustrating the structure of the I. movement (Keersmaecker and Cvejic 89).

and bare breath clearly refer to a sleep-half-awake-sleep state. I leave it open at this stage how dominantly representational reference imposes.



(fig. 4 © Herman Sorgeloos)

### 2.II.3 The 2<sup>nd</sup> Movement

The second movement is entirely danced sitting on chairs. In the filmed version they seem to wake up on chairs. A mechanistic music begins to clatter, the four figures cast a glance at one another and join the pulsating rhythm with the first dance theme (A).<sup>155</sup> Their shared agreement through that gaze to start off suggests the four figures to be on piece-work.

Theme A ends in a posture of boredom: the legs crossed on the seat, the chin supported by the right hand, the right elbow supported by the crossing leg. Interestingly, the pieces the piece-work is made off are mainly boring positions. It is the interchange, the rhythm of interchange which makes up the fascinating dance. The decision which posture of boredom to use in attack-mood (so-called 'tjack', Keersmaecker and Cvejic 245) and in which to pause

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<sup>155</sup> The names of the themes in movement I. are A-D and in movement II. A-E. On the first sight they are not similar at all. After closer consultation, the ones of movement I. have one or another gestures in common with those of movement II.: to hold the right breast is one example (9:54" I. movement, 10:56" II. movement), the opening of a forearm (10:39") and a closing (10:43"), if repeated one after the other, corresponds to the movement in 13:01" (this time the upperarm does not rest immobile but accomplishes through alternate moves a sort of 'pedalling'). There is no mention made in Keersmaecker and Cvejic, if A-E of the II. movement relate in one or another way to A-D of the I. movement.

shapes the dynamic structure of the theme: it creates diverse variations. The tight speed of the music invites the postures to be placed in a rather staccato way. Thanks to some round motifs the phrases are not robotic in their shape:

a) In theme A the right arm has a soft momentum of rebound before being gathered in front of the pelvis and curled over by the upper body. The curl initiated by the head at this speed followed by an upright posture is itself a rebound (12:46").

b) In theme B the right arm flies sideways (12:50") and using the elan after the momentum it brushes subsequently over the hair. Following the form of the head the gesture is round (12:56").

c) Theme C is dominated by a vertical axis, however it starts off with the brush over the hair by two hands simultaneously, which emphasizes the roundness of the head.<sup>156</sup> The curl forward of the upperbody creates half a circle in the sagittal plane softening thus the resulting hanging arm and its verticality.

d) Both arms of theme D have a short biking movement in the sagittal plane (13') which emphasizes even more the following rebound of the head in the same plane.

e) Theme E is dynamically a very strong phrase which Keersmaecker calls 'Samurai'. The first movement explodes (13:06"): legs split apart and the straight right arm strikes from the right to the left following the horizontal plane (a semicircle). Both straight arms continue as holding a sword and cross in front of the seat and the gathered legs. The upright head is launched in a bow (a quarter circle) to counterweigh the crossing 'sword' movement. The head hurls itself into a back bend passing over its zenith (this motif is called 'release'<sup>157</sup>), guarding the 'sword' between the knees.

Let me recapitulate the opposing moves: smooth round movements contrast to crossed postures (with narrow angles) like the ones involved in the first boredom position described above, but also to straight lines of vertical axis, 'swords' etc. The smoothness of round movements and rebounds contrast to abrupt accents, too, ex.g. when the boredom postures break-off as the elbow slips from the knee and all the supported weight clips (17:25"-18'). These contrasting aspects mutually emphasize each other, providing thus exemplification.

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<sup>156</sup> It is however not by mistake that this round movement is framed by the angles of both sideways pointing elbows. Given this contrasts (also to the subsequent vertical line) the angles become a syntactical aspect, not a mere (meaningless) instantiated one.

<sup>157</sup> At least since Martha Graham.


On the one side, it is the busy dynamics eager for precision (exact posture at a precise time, identically achieved at various moments of the miminal dance) which these movements share with piece-work labour. On the other it is the relational aspect between the figures, their coordination in timing, which resembles piece-work labour: whilst one figure effectuates two moves another four before they tune in again and match the pace of the 'assembly line'.

The reference to labour is therefore indirect, by the means of certain subtle exemplified properties they share. There is no litteral resemblance at the first sight, not in gestures or postures. Quite the opposite: ironically, the gestures and postures the 2<sup>nd</sup> movement uses stem as mentioned from boredom or pausing. Cause and effect seem reversed: the postures resulting from the monotonous labour which express psychological states like boredom are here at the basis of a working procedure representing labour. It is this re-ordering of (involved) categories artworks are capable of as Goodman pointed out.<sup>158</sup> This re-ordering *is* the meaning; case by case, a different one.

For the semantic of this 2<sup>nd</sup> movement it is not relevant which systematic procedure Keersmaecker applies in order to achieve these variations.<sup>159</sup> However, the observer perceives the systematicity just as the listener the one of the minimal music.

#### 2.II.4 The 3<sup>rd</sup> Movement

The third movement is a relaxed joyful dance. Released moves unfold in an endless way: the pattern on the floor shows continous lines without being monodirectional (see fig. 5). Not only back and forth are combined in a sequence, the front is interchanged, too, heading thus often the point of departure. This does not yet sound like exemplifying leisure and the atmosphere of a 'free soul'. How comes then, that it does?



(fig. 5)<sup>160</sup>

<sup>158</sup> "Successful [art]works transform perception and transfigure its objects by bringing us to recognize aspects, objects, and orders which we had previously underrated or overlooked" (R 22).

<sup>159</sup> See chipotage, éventail, and rétrograde (Keersmaecker and Cvejic 93-96.)

There are three syntactical aspects that give the impression of leisure: a) the dynamics, b) the constellation, and c) syncategorematic features involving light and music.

ad a) various levels or parts of the body exemplify a characteristic dynamics. First, the *release* of arms: the arms follow a previous impulse and its released energy. If the impulse is a body spin then they 'fly' or circle as a reaction to that spin due to their own inertia. The spin may be a 1/4, 1/2, 1/1 or 1 1/2 turn. Two features of this flying aspect contribute to the mentioned 'free leisure feeling': i) its momentum and ii) its delay. The momentum is per definition the 'highlight' of a dynamic cycle where the sensation of weight is for an instant eclipsed.<sup>161</sup> ii) The delay (with regard to the impulse of the spin) and its continuously diminishing force bespeaks leisure: there is time to enjoy movement which has no primary function<sup>162</sup> (to be seen with alternate precise gestures: 24:23"- 24:54"). The 'unintentional' arms fly until they collide with the waist or the pelvis. In my movement category this dynamics belongs to motion, i.e. externally moved or initiated body (parts).

Second, *suspension* of vertical axis: the vertical axis which includes the head is in the 3<sup>rd</sup> movement subject to various suspensions. The suspension as Keersmaecker understands it is a bow in a movement to slow down a phrase (Keersmaecker and Cvejic 245). Such a bow typically has its own momentum which explains its contribution to the 'feel of leisure'. The inertia of the head after a previous impulse has a similar effect as the one of the arms: after a body spin of 1/4, 1/2, 1/1 or 1 1/2 turns there is a corresponding delay (32:20"-33'). It is emphasized optically by flying hair.

ad b) the characteristic constellation of the 3<sup>rd</sup> movement consists out of a collective versus a temporary solo. In case of stage performances the constellation of the figures is 3:1, in the film the collective is more numerous. Having danced together for a while, alternating individuals split up to perform a solo with a highly personal movement profile. The dynamics of the solo dance is energetic and powerful (21:50") or in another case suspended, the dynamics of the theatrical solo is once passionate (22:33"), neurotic (25'), or a nervous staccato (26:55"), seductive (35:21") etc. Meanwhile the collective continues its phrase like a 'basso continuo' (Keersmaecker and Cvejic 99). In the course of the 3<sup>rd</sup> movement more and

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<sup>160</sup> Figure 3 is a detail of the frontpage of Keersmaecker and Cvejic (2012) depicting a (planned) floor pattern in *Rosas danst Rosas*.

<sup>161</sup> The highest point of jumps is also called momentum or in ballet 'aplomb'. Accordingly, those dancers who succeed in prolonging the momentum appear to be lighter.

<sup>162</sup> Laban called these movements "shadow movements" (cf. Laban, *Kunst* 173).

more figures join the collective. We see more than one hall of the factory filled, then more than one floor. The leisure time everyone seems to share at some point, sharing the same themes and the same rhythm.

ad c) emphasized syncategorematic features are music, light, architecture and its reflecting surface. The music is a continuously repeated sequence of a rhythmic chain of 7 subdivisions. Each subdivision consists of a triple or double bar, or a combination of them. This very uneven rhythmical pattern creates a hypnotizing and eternally on-going effect which the movement follows: "The movement doesn't rhythmically emphasize the division above, yet the [movement] cells are distributed around it in the sense that each cell lasts the number of counts from eight to two" (ibid.). It is this interesting rhythm which prevents the endless lines from monotony. Far from being a synchronous forced collectivity its paths branch out through the building flooded with sunlight. Individual constellations head different directions, no hurry, no goal (perhaps) either. Forever on-going paths with playful altering directions bespeaks a precious freedom. It is reinforced by some mirroring effects. Not only the choreography mirrors its own sequence back-and-forth, but some shiny vertical surfaces in the factory duplicate the length of these lines (31:50"-55") or alter the directions.

Let's recapitulate: the semantic property 'leisure' is build upon formal syntactic features like a) released dynamics with momentum and suspension, b) a seemingly free and infinite alternation of individual and collective dance and c) some syncategorematic emphasis like hypnotizing rhythmical sequence, sunlight and playful mirrors.

#### 2.II.5 The 4<sup>th</sup> Movement

The music of the 4<sup>th</sup> movement is influenced from the minimal music *Hoketus* by the dutch composer Louis Andriessen.<sup>163</sup> A sequence is a repetition of eight subdivisions consisting of two triple and a double bar (3+3+2) each. The sequence is superposed in a canonic manner. The 4<sup>th</sup> movement presents thus one after the other three canons. The canonic superposition happens with a certain system: already the first canonic delay is minimal: only two beats, the second and third canons stretch the delay by additional two beats each.<sup>164</sup> The result is a change in the overall rhythmic pattern which gives the characteristic to each of the three canons. The characteristics are adapted by the dance. Especially the third so-called 'Carmen'-

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<sup>163</sup> Under his influence elaborated Thierry de Mey and Peter Vermeersch in cooperation the music of this movement (Keersmaeker and Cvejic 111).

<sup>164</sup> Please note that the corresponding graphics (Keersmaeker and Cvejic 111) does not represent the 2 bars delay correctly. The drawn graphics on the blackboard ( DVD2 1h:26') by the choreographer is preferable.

sequence is particular: "The music here is reminiscent of *Carmen*, thanks to the rhythmic pattern similar to Bizet's 'L'amour est l'enfant de bohème'." (ibid.). The dance phrase has accordingly spanish influence and accents as follows: a) a sudden pull-back of parallel feet simoultaneously, b) *after* strong beats the head and the eye focus turns in a decisive manner a quarter to the right (syncopatic), c) grabbing and waving a fictive skirt, d) dominant (forward) pelvis caused by the mentioned simoultaneous pull-back of parallel feet (Keersmaecker and Cvejic, demonstration DVD2 1:28-29") – close to the cliché position of toreros. These dominant motifs stick nicely out of the complicated floor pattern.

The complexity in floor pattern and the figure constellation is due to the following visible compositional structures ("intricate counterpoint in space" ibid. 111): each canon is structured by i) éventail and ii) chipotage. Éventail means that a motif of the first dancer is copied subsequently by another, then by two, finally three. The chipotage means that these subsequently copied motifs are combined with a shift in spatial direction. So by the end of chipotage, when the fourth dancer joins the motif, three different spatial directions are at place. This compositional complexity is perceivable thanks to the common ground rhythm and movement material they share. (We would not make out a systematic shift if everyone's material or rhythm would differ). We can abstract from the common rhythm and dynamics and observe other features on the way to be varied: a) the mentioned space directions of chipotage, b) parallels (shared directions) or the figure's arrivals in sudden lines. The long forward step-hop-step<sup>165</sup> regularly serves to adjust pattern and make thus dancers appear in surprising new (geometrical) formations. c) Another feature on the way to be varied are slight shifts of accents. Éventail and chipotage are as mentioned a sort of canonic following-ups, dancer by dancer. The underlying dancing phrase consists of a certain movement material (phrase) which is repeated. Characteristically the repetition is a slightly shorter version of the material. This produces in the canonic follow-up a certain clash. This subtle shift is only visible where accents (ex.g. spanish leitmotifs) occur. These rhythmical shifts or clashes, draws our attention to an interesting syncategorematic feature: they coincide with the delayed musical phrases explained above. It is not a dancer who is conform to an (entire) canonical

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<sup>165</sup> The small jump inmidst the step-hop-step is an about-turn so that by the end the dancer faces his point of departure. The same sequence can serve for the way back.

voice but parts of its material. We become testimony of a constant new relation between music and dance. A new texture<sup>166</sup> woven by syncategorematic material.

A spanish motif lends itself well for vivacious dynamics: the explosiv accelerations and the sudden halt. No wonder that the intensified expenditure of energy and the 'carmen'-motif correlate at the end of the piece. And no wonder probably that a ritual-like circle appears and with it the formal means for a melodramatic end: the piece peters away when dancers, exhausted, are dropping out.

#### 2.II.6 The coda

The coda attenuates the complexity. It recapitulates the dance specific variety one by one: use of space (running through the yard), various corporal hight (lying, sitting, standing), dance cells ('tjak' of the 4<sup>th</sup> movement, exposed already in the prologue) versus theatrical solos (neurotic gestures, casualness) to catch up again with reality. The film's last image: the loosening fist after a spin, a release. Does here the name of this contemporary dance style come from: the release-technique?

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<sup>166</sup> I owe the term 'texture' to Claudia Jeschke who proposed as an external advisor of this dissertation to replace thus the linguistically loaden term 'syntax'. As I'm about to apply Goodman's art theory I decided, however, to use as far as possible his terminology.

## 2.III Semantics of *Rosas danst Rosas*

In contrast to *Trio A* this case under study does not avoid displaying psychological states (ex.g. theatrical solos).<sup>167</sup> *Rosas danst Rosas* has therefore expression in the traditional sense.<sup>168</sup> However the psychological moments become mere building blocks of formal structures. Expression in the Goodmanian sense characterizes the individual movements (1<sup>st</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>) of the piece. An eminent task of my dance analysis was to show to which syntactical aspects each movement (1<sup>st</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>) owes its expression. It is another question which role expression plays in the piece as a whole. My analysis showed that formal structures dominate. Not because they constitute the respective expression of a movement (1<sup>st</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>) – we remember for instance, it is the piece-work use of boredom poses which makes up the 3<sup>rd</sup> movement's expression of labour.<sup>169</sup> No, formal aspects are dominant because they span the entire piece and provide pleasure in their own right. It is a pleasure to discover a manifold of round forms amidst of endless line patterns on the floor described in the 3<sup>rd</sup> movement. Besides the rounds I enumerated in the 2<sup>nd</sup> movement on the chairs which contrasted rather to sharp dynamics, here in the 3<sup>rd</sup> movement the rounds (1/4, 1/2, 1/1 or 1 1/2) superpose the straight endless lines the feet follow. The rigour between clear geometrical clarity and the free flow of arms, head and hair is indeed pleasurable to watch, we can empathically feel some freedom. Given the astonishing dynamic combinations between exact sharpness and free flow we sense the virtuoso body control. It is not a demanding technique they employ, however the (contradictory) control of unhindered flow: to let go ('release!') *and* be in time, not too far Off-balance. There are literally thousands of little discoveries to do, reminiscent of Susanne Langer: thousands of "articulate forms" (*FF* 31), enabling temporary illusions of dynamic experiences. Thousands, which make up the piece. Miminallistically.

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<sup>167</sup> Some consider the expression of the dancer's personality ("autoportrait") as one of *Rosas danst Rosas*' most important features (see the final phrase of Guisgang 60).

<sup>168</sup> In contrast to the traditional, i.e. common sense, of expression as a term for psychological states or traits we remember that Goodman extends its meaning: every exemplified property an artwork cannot have literally can be expressed. Goodman's example was music being blue.

<sup>169</sup> An interesting work external information seems to sustain my claim, yet according to my conviction it is not appropriate as argument: Anne-Teresa De Keersmaeker repeatedly asserted that the impression of energy expenditure (as an expression of the piece, "overall sense of *dépense*", 112) is to a great part due to the "formal-thinking" ("Exhaustion quality was not planned but result of formal thinking", DVD2, 1:34:50'. In the book Cvejic quotes the choreographer saying: "We didn't have the intention of working on endurance and exhaustion. It was simply the consequence of a structural decision that couldn't be reversed", 112). The lengthy non-stop acceleration-decelerations varied in four movements cause exhaustion. It is however an aesthetic decision not to hide it.

## 2.IV Brief Reflections On External Knowledge

In this case study, exceptionally, I did not leave work external knowledge to the end. Two reasons obliged me to do so: first, my analysis is based upon a work external 'knowledge', i.e. on an artwork itself in form of an artistic film recording. Second, my structural analysis used external material to justify my claims. In both cases I tried to take up a critical stance.

Concerning the film I mentioned the main differences (site-specific atmosphere of the factory, choreographic alterations due to cinematic concerns, e.g. the extreme zoom-out in order to see the dancing on three levels of a factory, the extreme close-ups when in favour of effective formal features (parallel lying figures) some spatial structural features in the original choreography were sacrificed.<sup>170</sup> But with regard to the artistically and semantically most important features I find his work 'true'<sup>171</sup>, it even eases the access to the – otherwise difficult – formal features.

As to the external knowledge in form of the print documentation of choreographic procedures and plans by Anne Teresa de Keersmaeker and Bojana Cvejic, I announced in the introduction of the doctoral thesis, not to use it as a guide but as affirmations. The reason is on the one hand a methodological one: I analyse first in order to sense the 'weight', i.e. the relevancy of formal features in our kinesthetic perception. On the other hand many of the described structures in the documentary book are not perceptual. E.g. it is not possible to visually identify the themes A-D given that they are interspersed with external motifs, intersected by accent or extremely slowed down.<sup>172</sup> However, the fact that a handful phrases are basically the same and varied systematically is a perceptual feature. This interesting result reminds me at Goodman claiming that some structural properties are easier to identify as their constituents (*SA 189*, see also 1.IV.3 "Dynamics: A Structural and Dense Aspect").

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<sup>170</sup> Fig. 3 shows the stage version where not all four figures lay parallel in accordance with the spatial structure in the original choreography.

<sup>171</sup> In comparison to a performance of the company I have attended in Geneva, Théâtre Forum Meyrin, the 19th January 2011.

<sup>172</sup> We can learn to decipher them with the help of the DVD attached to the documentary book demonstrating the themes A-D in an unvaried state.

### 3. A Comparative Study

#### 3a. Third case study: *Entity* by Wayne McGregor

*Entity* is the most recent choreography of the case studies I undertake in this 2nd part of my Doctoral thesis. Wayne McGregor's style has its due place among the case studies given that it is extremely different from the previous ones and is mainly used for abstract dance. I have chosen a piece that is easily accessible as for sale at Sadler's Wells Theatre.<sup>173</sup> *Entity* is a full-evening dance piece of 60 minutes without break by the British choreographer Wayne McGregor and its Random Dance Company which premiered in April 2008 in London. It uses various compositions by his landsmen Joby Talbot (string quartet) and Jon Hopkins (electronic arrangements). The movable stage design by Patrick Burnier consists of immense mechanics which carry, lift and fold stage-size screens. In its enfolded state the mechanics resemble the proportions of a human being. The dancers wear identical costumes, black pants and either white sleeveless shirts or bare upper body for men and black brassieres for women.

##### 3a.I. General Structure of the Work

Before a close look at the movement characteristics I begin with an overview of some relational aspects, namely on the structural level of the piece.

At the beginning and end of *Entity*, over a black empty stage, a large screen projects a chasing-hound video in a digitally stylized aesthetic. The exposition, the first five minutes of the dance, introduces several dancers without any particular characteristic role or outfit. All wear black pants and white shirts.<sup>174</sup> The exposition presents the main features of the movement style:

- Its over-extension in arms and legs,
- The dislocated spinal column,
- The fairly disjointed limbs.

All three features are visible in (fig. 6).

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<sup>173</sup> The basis for the following analysis is however the RandomDance Comapany's promotion DVD. The steady frontal perspective of filming is more suitable for a dance analysis than the more artistic approaches of filming.

<sup>174</sup> We cannot make out a distinction in the shirts' pattern. Yet the program note tells us that the pattern's design is based on DNA fingerprints. Individually designed on behalf of the dancer's respective fingerprint.



(fig. 6, © Ravi Deepres)

Figures dancing together either in spatial proximity or in unison I call a *constellation*. In the exposition amid these constellations no interaction takes place. Therefore no partnering. The second movement of the string quartet, which succeeds the exposition, is danced by men exclusively. Alternating duos present the first interactions between dancers. So we have partnering, even a remarkably intricate one. The spectacularly twisted partnering generates “plaited” configurations (I call it a *configuration* if a constellation interacts physically and it creates a “seamless” formal unit. The unit is an architectural figure made up by two or more dancers). With psychologically laden gestures, the configuration of the second movement of the string quartet yields the impression of intimacy and eroticism. The first interaction with a woman happens in the fifteenth minute in a trio. The ensemble work, which I will analyze first, follows hereafter (19:10’). The closely woven movement material induces me to call it a *fugue*. It is interrupted by a short duo and solo, and continues until 22:40’’. A woman with two alternating partners in a greenish-blue stage light leads over to the 2<sup>nd</sup> ensemble dance which I will discuss (26’-27:40’’). Due to diverse phrases shared simultaneously dispersed in space I will call it a *dispersed polyphony*. It ends quite exactly in the middle of the piece. The

end marks in some respect a turning point: it ends inadvertently in a black-out, the strings “break down” all of a sudden, after a crescendo the dancers literally throw themselves into their last standstill position, visible only as silhouettes facing the audience. Ironically, this position is seemingly the one of eternal rest (sitting and standing stiff upright) with one static vertical arm *à la couronne* above their head. Not visible at first sight, de facto the ensemble is split in two: the men stand whilst the women are sitting dispersed between them.

From this “turning point” on the music changes (electronic soundscore by Jon Hopkins). The genders remain split: the men walk off, and the women begin to dance on the floor in varied constellations for four minutes (30’-35’). Their piece is formally very diverse: beginning with a quadruple unison, it changes to a varied partnering consisting of mirroring one another or interacting, manipulating the limbs or joints of each other. Given this global structure, namely that in the first half of the piece there is an all-men part, in the second an all-women part, and that beginning and end is made up of an ensemble-dance bracketed by a chasing-dog-video, *Entity* gives us the impression of a symmetrical arrangement. But the piece lends itself to an alternative interpretation, the one of an endless variation of constellations and themes without evolution, too. Like an arbitrary extract of ‘chasing life’<sup>175</sup>. This interpretation can be sustained on the micro-structural level with regard to the figures’ constellation (see the following paragraphs). The dances following the women’s piece are various duos (39’-45’). Minute 45 starts the third ensemble dance, however not danced collectively. White chalk projections of geometrical and relational graphics on the black floor mark the space and attract dancers in varying constellations. They are obviously influenced by the graphics’ specific structure and relate to it. After an additional five-minute duo of a woman and a man (50’- 55’) a last ensemble dance leads in crescendo to the *furioso* Finale.

### 3a.II. Structures and Prominent Aspects in Detail

I will focus my analysis on the ensemble dances as they seem to be more formal than the rather personal exchanges between two and three figures, and thus closer to my topic. In a chronological order I present the characteristic aspects and explain what makes them exemplified rather than merely instantiated. The arguments are quantitative as well as qualitative in nature.

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<sup>175</sup> I use this ambiguous term as a provisory semantical description of *Entity*. The ambiguity is in the sense of Langer’s “unconsummated symbol” (*FF* 31, *New Key* 240).

### 3a.III.1 1<sup>st</sup> Ensemble Dance (a Fugue)

The first minute of this ensemble dance is a fascinating interwoven material (19:10'' - 20:10''). As not all ten dancers are present at the beginning the material becomes 'thicker' by time (19:50'' three dancers join the five present on stage, 20:04'' the two missing complete the group). But from the very first moment constellations are formed and interaction (per definition: configuration) takes place. There is rarely one second when someone is dancing on his own. I counted in this first minute twelve interacting constellations (duos or trios), i.e. configurations, partly overlapping one another in time. As all the dancers change partners it is legitimate to ask how I fix the ontological "limits" of a configuration. My criteria are:

a) If one dancer changes partner, that means two duos follow another, I count two different configurations.

b) If a duo is joined by a third dancer I consider the configuration only enlarged. In the reverse case I consider it to be thinned out. I count it as "one and the same" configuration nevertheless.

c) If a configuration ceases for a short time to function (interacting in a new constellation) but picks up again the original constellation after the interruption, I consider it a new configuration.

The mostly seamless<sup>176</sup> re-configurations dispersed all over the stage are ever more impressive because this happens at a high speed (100 beats per minute). Some running steps to join one or another constellation are therefore not surprising but still an exception (the man with the ponytail in 19: 43'' and at 19: 52'').

### 3a.III.2 Exemplification Versus Instantiation in *Entity's* 1<sup>st</sup> Ensemble Dance

The interaction seems to be a dominant feature in this 1<sup>st</sup> ensemble dance. I tried to argue for the dominance with quantitative as well as qualitative observations. In the following I delve into the qualitative evaluation of interaction.

### 3a.III.3 Varied Interactions

It is the constant Goodmanian look for repleteness that helps discover diversity. The 1<sup>st</sup> ensemble dance is an opportunity to verify if diversity is not only present, but exemplified, too. The interactions (partnering) are extremely varied: lifts by one man, lifts by two men,

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<sup>176</sup> There is all in all three times pausing (19 :20''-28'' ; 19 :25''-30'' ; 20 :05''-13'').

drops cushioned by a male dancer, by a female (20:13''), promenades, spinning turns, carryings by two male (19:49''–52'' and 19:59''–20:03''), cartwheels over the shoulder (19:14'') etc. This inevitably means very diversified (architectonic) configurations at all level of height: we see sky-scraping legs at three meter heights (lifts) as well as flat floor turns on the bottom. The movement material is even more varied. The motifs known from the exposition are alternated: a motif of overstretched legs and arms subsequences angular joins (elbows or knees, sometimes wrist), and contrasts then to undulating spine (often initiated by the head). If one lists these motives in their sequencing for several dancers separately, a remarkable alternation is to be detected. This becomes even more conspicuous when, from 20:19'', after a short duo, the ensemble suddenly moves (nearly) in unison: we have angular (20:20''), followed by straight legs in jumps or *grands battements arabesque* (20:22''), loosened up by spine circles (20:23'') of two dancers and spine waves of four other dancers (20:24'') respectively. Let me repeat this feature as it will prevail as a characteristic of the piece: contrastive features alternate through space over time. It is this structured use of diversity which proves it to be relevant.

Another distinct motif is the movement trace of straight limbs circling fast around ball-and-socket joints, which we perceive as a wheel. Such a wheel constitutes the beginning of the first two ensemble dances (in 19:11'' and 26:45''). Most pertinent is this phenomenon in the case of butterfly-arms frontal to the audience (20:27''). Two “butterflies” are lifted in the air whilst a third is even carried across the stage. According to the just mentioned feature of *Entity* that the contrastive motives succeed one another this butterfly motif is picked up again only after i) turns (20:31'' three dancers), ii) spine wave (20:32'' by again four dancers) and iii) stiff legs. The picked up wheel-like arm motive is at minute 20: 32'', 33''–35'', and 37''. The ensemble sequence ends in a climatic lift of a woman, upside down with an upright leg straightened to the ceiling. The ensemble thins out, fades away and only five remain, the same as at the beginning.

#### 3a.III. 4 A Quintet as Quintessence of the Collective Dance

In half a minute (20:38''-53'') five dancers interact so narrowly that the collective dance seems to be boiled down to its essence: its interrelatedness. However we count only three configurations that vary in size and members. (Due to my definition of configuration a group – more than two dancers – exchanging one participant remains ‘identical’. In this case the configuration diminishes or grows). Unlike so-called round dances which proceed in

linearity,<sup>177</sup> this intricate dance proceeds multi-dimensionally: wherever in the surroundings a dancer appears, an individual of the configuration interacts with him.<sup>178</sup> I mentioned the numerous lifts. If technically feasible, McGregor would happily eliminate the ground floor and interact even into the depth (as if in the universe' space). To sum up: the remarkable intricacy and variety of physical interconnections accentuate the feature of interrelatedness, in short *exemplify*. Together with a further compositional mean of intricate interrelation, the counterpoint, discussed in the next paragraph I propose to call the choreographic form a fugue.

### 3a.III.5 End of the 1<sup>st</sup> Ensemble Dance (with Counterpoint)

After a short solo the ensemble gathers for 45 seconds together executing a rhythmically highly elaborated dance (21:43'' - 22:27''). The music seems faster having now dominantly an unpair bar (6/8).<sup>179</sup> Bars of 100 beats/min filled in by triples are obviously faster then filled in only by doubles which was the case at the beginning (19:10'' - 20:20'').<sup>180</sup> Due to pauses (mostly on each third beat) we have an uneven rhythm. This uneven rhythm is accentuated by an additional layer which shifts the rhythm by 1/8.<sup>181</sup> As the ensemble follows the dominant rhythm of both layers the dance rhythm becomes very intricate. The ensemble is divided in couples, remaining constantly in this constellation and on place. This helps to obtain a precise visualization of the rhythm. Unison moves shared by the different couples (or halves of couples) whilst the other follow the second layer of rhythm with their unison moves give the impression of a rigorous counterpoint. Counterpoint is defined as a simultaneous use of more than one melody with an equal interest in the quality of the melodic line as well as its interrelation, the mutually created harmony in the sense of simultaneous perception. Due to the notational documentation in music, the partition, the simultaneous perception is called verticality. Traditionally, dissonance forms part of this interrelation. I understand the slight rhythmical shift in dance phrases of the couples, or better: rhythmically split couples, being

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<sup>177</sup> Round dances (in German: *Reigen*) line up dancers in a large circle.

<sup>178</sup> Obviously McGregor does not deprive himself from linearity as option. When he uses one-dimensionality the sequence (20:46'') suddenly resembles abstract dances by Balanchine, where dancers slip through their concatenated fellows.

<sup>179</sup> If unpair bars are  $\frac{3}{4}$  or  $\frac{6}{8}$  depends on the partition which I had not opportunity to consider.

<sup>180</sup> At the beginning of the first ensemble dance only occasionally appeared a mild accompaniment of bass triples, a cello in 6/8, not made visible by steps.

<sup>181</sup> This is a common device in Jazz and results in syncopes.

such a dissonant interrelation.<sup>182</sup> The counterpoint is constitutive for the fugue,<sup>183</sup> and as a building block it emphasizes the entire choreographic unit of this ensemble dance as one formal entity.

### 3a.III.6 Expression

Given that my semantic analysis acknowledges the multiple functions of a symbol I am bound to pay due tribute to its expressive or narrative role. So before I turn to the next ensemble, dance expression needs to be treated. So far, it might seem we face an utterly formal and constructionist dance. In this case the very warm sound of the chamber music, in particular the intimacy of string chamber music, would not be taken into account. But the range of the strings in the case of a quartet suggests psychological aspects of a dialogue between the respective instruments. High voices and deep answers inevitably connote a discourse. In this very case additional features add psychological value. The music to the ensemble dance is in the Phrygian mode known from the Greek chorus. In ancient Greek theatre the chorus had the function of displaying the atmosphere and commenting upon the protagonist's fate.<sup>184</sup> In the case of tragedies by lamentation. 'Mi-re-fa-mi' of the melody in *Entity* is a typical Phrygian sequence.<sup>185</sup> Added the uneven rhythm sobbing with the uneven breath is not so far-fetched. The intense tremolo of the beginning, the *sforzato staccato*, as well as the fast and accentuated glissando, do not seek to inhibit dramatization. The strong atmosphere conveyed by the music contrasts with the movements. Stiff limbs are not generally apt to convey human expression, moreover, nor are they apt to convey human behaviour either. That is why this "estrangement effect" gives some extraterrestrial aspect to the motoric identity of the piece (see fig. 7). This contrast is somehow refreshing given the emotional burden of the music. Even the somehow innocent spasticity of angular fists or feet at the end of hypertonically overstretched limbs de-dramatizes the music. Is it because we do not associate intentionality with these (robotic or spastic) movements? Nevertheless, the choreography of *Entity* is by no

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<sup>182</sup> see the entry "Counterpoint" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

<sup>183</sup> "Fugue, in music, a compositional procedure characterized by the systematic imitation of a principal theme (called the subject) in simultaneously sounding melodic lines (counterpoint). The term *fugue* may also be used to describe a work or part of a work. In its mathematical intricacy, formality, symmetry, and variety, the fugue holds the interest of composers, performers, and listeners of Western art music" "Fuge" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

<sup>184</sup> see "Chorus" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

<sup>185</sup> see an exemplary analysis of a lamentation with these notes in the Psalm Symphony by Stravinsky in: Bárdos, Lajos.

means “formal”: the eye contacts, shared gestures, however stylized they may be (see the hand kiss at 23:27’), as well as partnering and manipulation as subject matter submitted to countless variations (see the women sequence following the 2<sup>nd</sup> ensemble dance 30'-35' and my example of the 3<sup>rd</sup> ensemble dance discussed below) give evidence for expression. I cannot make out some coherence in psychological terms, however. It is, as if the psychologically laden gestures with their characteristic motoric feature were not more than ‘building blocks’, units of the same import as the other characteristic leitmotifs. The more alternated and interspersed they are in the piece, the more randomly or formally they seem to be used.



(fig. 7, © Ravi Deepres)<sup>186</sup>

### 3a.IV.1 2<sup>nd</sup> Ensemble Dance (a Dispersed Polyphony)

After a long steady part of unchanging lighting – which is not as usual in this piece – in a greenish-blue connoting technology (old TV screens), and a melodic music (lyrical legato) the second ensemble dance follows (26:29’-27:34’). Just as the first ensemble piece began with a reduced group, here too only the women start. The music has intensified over the past 40 seconds, and the women start on a tremolo of a violin out of their phalanx-like formation. The powerful *staccato* moves, the sharp positions which they launch into and hold until their next

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<sup>186</sup> The photo depicts a scene from 36 :13’’, after the 2<sup>nd</sup> ensemble dance. The spastic walk with overstretched legs and undulating spine is a constant part of the motoric identity.

“attack” lend an overall violence to the first sequence (about four seconds).<sup>187</sup> In the subsequent part the musical beats are increasingly filled with two moves per beat. If more and more women fill in the beat this way the result is a diminished attack quality of dynamics yet augmented repleteness: a) more directions can be incorporated and stand in contrast to the ones simultaneously held by other dancers, b) numerically more contrasts take place, c) an additional complexity appears between upper and lower body.

Ad a) Out of the phalanx-like mono-directional (frontal) starting position of the women, the upper body twists and distorts in various ways. If the beat gets filled by twice as many positions, our attention shifts from the sharp dynamics to a non-stop change of directions. (The most extreme example: the exact succession of distortions of the blond dancer with longer hair 26:20'' - 40'').

Ad b) Doubled-up positions create a sequence we “read” in their chronological order and simultaneous context. Obviously, contrasts stand out the most in perception. We find all the leitmotif contrasts: i) overstretched versus curved or angular, ii) disjointed limbs versus limbs concatenated through meandering waves (example: the chronological succession of both sorts of contrasts by the very right dancer once performed towards the audience once with the back 26:20'' - 40'').

Ad c) As soon as the beats are doubly filled, new positions can emerge in two stages: the lower body can move “ahead” separately, the upper accomplishing this half a beat later. (Examples of successive partialized postures are the left dancer at 26:38'' and the blond dancer with short hair 26:35''). Note that this increase in complexity corresponds to the music. The pair bars and their rhythm receives a supplementary rhythmic layer which is shifted by 1/8. The syncopated effect pertains (and is reflected in the dance) throughout the ensemble dance (see bellow).

When the men thread through the group of women to catch up their dance of the beginning, for a moment the ensemble stands upright. It seems to be the stillness before a storm. Lined up either in profile, frontal or exactly 45° to the audience with an alert tension in the body, the musical beat triples: from now on the continuous beat is divided (by the cello) in triplets constituting thus a 6/8.

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<sup>187</sup> In Laban’s terms the dynamic corresponds to the effort cube’s corner S,G,T (maximal intention to constrain/contain space, gravity and time).


### 3a.IV.2 Less Configurations, More Shared Moves

The initiative for the ensemble dance comes – just as in the 1<sup>st</sup> ensemble dance at minute 19:10 – from a man moving across the stage with a windmill arm. The windmill comes to rest on the shoulder of a fellow dancer, a standstill for the duration of a bar. Followed by a few others with simultaneous moves and outreaching arms by the end of the next bars some additional constellations are formed with similar horizontal connections at the shoulders. Connected they build configurations, and them being amidst the chaos of the group is a prominent feature. Even more so, as we find a) two or three such configurations at the same time and b) the connections (straight arms) happen to be identical with the leitmotif of overstretched limbs. This double emphasis justifies us to consider these standstills in configuration as an exemplified feature.

Yet these configurations remain rare. Unlike in the first ensemble dance here there are no varied duo, trio or quartet groupings, no lifts, promenade. The fast beat allows them merely some arm contacts and synchronous steps to share. In rare cases, an entire constellation succeeds in crossing the stage preserving their formation: at 27', four people partly attached by the above-mentioned arm-shoulder-contact shift downstage from left to right in running steps (that could be called a sequence of *pas de bourré ouvert à la seconde*). This could be considered a travelling configuration. In order to distinguish spatially close constellations from discrete ones I would introduce a new term, “cluster”. A cluster is a bundle of figures interacting or dancing unison in a relatively close space. So this travelling configuration is an instance of a cluster. The most shared synchronous steps however occur in this ensemble dance on quite discrete locations of the stage. We could say: ever ongoing new constellations are formed at varied distances. Some are nearby, some at opposite ends, hence dispersed. We find these dispersed unison constellations from the first seconds until the end of the piece, so I consider it to be a characteristic feature of this ensemble dance. As we find simultaneous cases of dispersed constellations each with distinct movement material together they build a polyphony. A cluster like the mentioned travelling one across the stage is therefore one additional “melody” hereby. How ever difficult it might be to detect the discrete constellations as such they are nevertheless perceived by the observer as a regulator of the chaos. It should be pointed out here that the rest of the group behaves in contrast individually, autonomously or - seemingly randomly.

### 3a.IV.3 Regularities and Irregularities of Discrete Constellations

An obvious regularity in the two minutes ensemble dance is when two people share the same or nearly the same sequence. Given the extreme width of the stage in use and the considerable number (ten) of dancing people on it, this regularity passes unperceived. Nevertheless there are two women (the blond ones) who dance more or less the same sequence, and two pairs of men dancing two other identical sequences. I include here a sketch which demonstrates the congruencies between the dancers in the two minutes of this ensemble dance (see fig. 8). The same colour and pattern marks out a more or less identical movement sequence. The first two lines represent the two blond women, line 5-10 represent men.



(fig. 8)

To perceive identity of movement sequences in dispersed constellations is a difficult task already. In this 2<sup>nd</sup> ensemble dance it is further complicated, as mentioned, by the quantity of dancers and because of irregularities and subtleties inherent in the movement sequence.

### 3a.IV.4 Irregularities and Subtleties

Irregularities. i) the shared sequence is not executed in the same direction, ii) slight variations suffice to distract the eye: different legs are bent in the standstill, heads differ in position etc., iii) at some point or another every dancer has an individual dance, (like the “solo” of the dancer in the middle of the stage 27': 15'' onward), iv) the size of otherwise identical steps can vary enormously.

Subtleties (overlapping regularities). v) the general leitmotifs like overstretched arms are part of several sequences (e.g. vertically in 27:03''), vi) some characteristic motives are

shared from everybody synchronously (like dropping in a deep *plié* with a largely shared forward bend of the upper body in 27': 05'') vii) short sequences are shared by more than two dancers (27':22'' - 27': 33 by three men and one woman), viii) entire (short) sequences are shared by the whole ensemble (27':12'' - 27':17'').

Summary: This second ensemble dance seems to distribute a specific movement material among the ensemble members in varied ways and in discrete places. This leads to a contradictory general perceptual experience: on the one side one sees chaos and individualistic behaviour, on the other side one sees regularities. The regularities do not create stable perceptual units like division in groups, or constellations, (geometrical or other) formations as in conventional or narrative dance. Nevertheless or namely because of it the ensemble can be seen as an organic body (*corps de ballet*), though acting multi-functionally, yet continuously acting in a coordinated way, sharing here or there a task, and obeying the drive of the musical pulse. Interpreting this feature metaphorically as the functioning of an organic entity, or literally as a composition of dispersed polyphony which construes an "entity", it is a variation on the theme "entity".<sup>188</sup>

### 3a.V 3<sup>rd</sup> Ensemble Dance

The third ensemble dance appears at a point where three quarters of the duration of the piece have passed, however I will not consider it as ensemble dance and therefore not analyze it in detail. I give three reasons which at the same time characterize it sufficiently:

1) It is not a collective dance. It gathers together all participants of the previous solos and duos without a change of lighting to let them dance simultaneously.

2) Instead of a collective dance it is a sum of individual dances. The autistic feature of the dance becomes obvious when dancers get physically close without interfering with each other (e.g. the blond women near to a couple of men in 46:00''-06''). Interrelations are proportionately rare.

3) Relations are created through the projection of sketches of geometrical shapes onto the floor. Each projection has some additional drawn lines which relate some of its features to each other. Individual dancers are attracted by the projections and relate to them. The white projections seem to be the sole source of light for the dance. Shining into a black environment

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<sup>188</sup> "I wanted to make a piece about the ,other', something with its own grammar, syntax, a sense of identity. " (McGregor in an interview, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zhpw8zQV60>, minute 3:20")

and background, they are quite suggestive. This makes up, together with the behaviour of the dancers, a complex aesthetic idea. The design of celestial bodies, the fate or faith in astrological influence, and the predestinations or laws underlying human relations in communities are connoted. As the projections regularly change, this aesthetic idea emphasizes my proposed interpretation of the piece as being about the ever-changing goings-on of communal life: the individual determined by a community that is never stable, and vice versa, the community determined by individuals and their unstable relations. Communal and individual life may be seen as an ever-changing flux. In the case of this piece, a flux at a high pace.

How ever hard individuals try, one by one, to relate individually to their fate, to its ever-changing pattern, from the perspective of the spectator seeing them simultaneously – their resemblance is striking.

Here I would call the costumes of the first part of *Entity* to mind. As mentioned in the introduction, they were individually produced based on the fingerprints of each dancer. However, in the context of the group (i.e. from the perspective where a group is in our field of vision) the similarity outweighs slight differences. As a human kind the individual features are just lost in the collective.

4) The relatively rare interrelations in this third ensemble dance become even more conspicuous.<sup>189</sup> To enter into contact, to communicate and to manipulate seem to be a subject matter: a dancer's hand manipulates joints of the fellow dancer, thereby evoking the reaction of related limbs. This reaction seduces the former to repeat the manipulation. This in turn leads to autonomous moves of the latter even when finally manipulation ceases (48:28" - 48:46").

### 3aVI.1 Final Ensemble Dance: A Statement

The final ensemble dance comprises the whole variety of the piece. We have solo, duo as well as different kinds of ensemble dance: configuration, both kinds of constellations, unison in close formation (clusters) as well as at spatially discrete places, and an ensemble made up by pairs. One major characteristic is its drive. It is the music's fervour which leads to this climactic end. Its speed is 120 beats/m with a dominant percussion accentuating the pace and

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<sup>189</sup> The fact that there is a development in this respect and that the last minutes of the six minute dance accumulate interacting couples does not weaken my argument: The ways of interaction between individuals (maximal two) is consciously elaborated and tested, and this exemplified feature is not one of a collective, an ensemble dance.

no complicating rhythm or melody to soften the impression. After an *intermezzo* of a *decrescendo* from 58:30'' until 59:06'' the music regains the speed with higher tones and increased loudness. This climactic aspect is emphasized by very fast movements, dancers running when entering the stage, getting to their starting point (59:23''), or changing partner. By explicitly positioning the dancers far from their starting point or exit (60:13'', 60:19'') the whole piece has the character of a race, which is very effective for a piece's end. The final image is a concise exemplification of the climactic drive in another medium: the video of the chasing hound.

The final ensemble dance comprises the whole variety of leitmotifs, too. They are without exception recapitulated, at different points of the finale in different proportions. E.g. the curling, undulating spine dominates the duo between the asiatic looking dancer and the smallest dancer (57:52'' - 58:30''). The former has in 28 seconds 17 curls of different sizes, half of which include the head. This means that the man is scarcely upright. Given, that this characteristic applies to his partner, too, both bound together by the hands, their dance seems to build an ever-moving chain. This means: an entity.

We can discern one feature which all the partnerings of the finale share: they all join one another by hands. Some begin when a partner is "dubbed knight" with an overstretched arm landing on the head of the person opposite. Some are dragged (58:48''-51''). Others do not leave the hands of the partner until the duo ends (57:52''- 58:28'').

Another example for the systematic recapitulation of the leitmotifs, as I said 'in different proportions', is the finale unison quintet (58:32''- 59 :04'') which turns into an octet (four couples in unison) (59:10''- 59:40''). Here the overstretched limbs are at stake. The minute-long dance is a sequence of eminently exposed long straight lines (interrupted only by some angles and curves): we have split jumps (58:34''), repeated *dégagés arabesques* (58:35''), *échappé battu* (by definition straight legs beating against one another) (58:38'') followed by a leg lifted 45° *à la second*. Straight legs on half point assemble and stick together for several seconds accentuating the vertical straight line (58:45''-47''). From here a *grand battement arabesque* bursts out (58:48''). A long sequence of ten seconds follows where arms take over the dominant stiffness. Arm stiffness is inflected in all varieties beginning with an arabesque arm (58:48''), hurling it as a wheel (49''), describing stiffly a minimal circle in front (50'') or at the sides (54''), carrying a stiff arm in front of the body during jumps (51''-52''). And so on. In general for the final quintet and octet it is valid to say: simultaneously performed lines reinforce one another, especially when parallel (see fig.

7). After a mentioned *descrescendo* where some lines soften, the beat regains its speed, the melody-poor tones become increasingly higher (and louder). This *crescendo* is sustained by a non-stop firework of whipped legs and smashing arms (59:10'' - 59: 30''). Bars without accents on a vertical or straight line are in clear minority.<sup>190</sup>

As a summary we can conclude: the final ensemble dance points once more to the formal features of the piece. It highlightens in a row, nearly one by one, the contrasting leitmotifs, and no less the interrelational formal features of partnering and collective dance, too: the final displays all formal features explored so far, – as a statement.

### 3a.VI.2 Expression

Structural and formal aspects are prevalent in this finale. We have the recapitulation of all leitmotifs, constellations, and configuration. Yet in the duos, in addition, undoubtedly personal exchange and expression takes place. When for instance the Asian dancer walks in on stage he looks around, left and right and left again. Seemingly as a result a partner runs in from offstage. This is one example. A second example is the exuberant joy visible in the close recording of the two unison final couples. The joy is as if the beats of their dance would drive them, despite their exhaustion after 60 minutes, into an ecstatic state, a shared event, perhaps a countdown. As a climax, the final couple risks off-balance poses and turns at high speed that challenge (and exemplify) confidence: the blond woman launches herself backward – into his arms. Dragging her in that horizontal position offstage is a lasting image, and ironic, too.

### 3a.VII. Semantics of *Entity*

The joyful chasing of vital life<sup>191</sup> conjugated in manyfold ways seems in *Entity* to cease only arbitrarily. Dragged-off the dance is faded out like the video of the dog. Neither (narrative or psychological) dramaturgy, nor a dramaturgic resolution fixes the end – the dance seems to be only an extract of life.

To say whether and in what way the several expressive moments in the dance add up to a general expression of the piece, as Goodman suggests with the simple cases of a sad picture or ferocious dance (Goodman, "After" 82) would need a profound analysis. According to my suggestion, mereology (see chapt. 1.4) could help him find more subtle and complex

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<sup>190</sup> I found six moments, some with the duration of two seconds at the most, where no straight lines are exemplified in the one minute dance (59 :10''-1 :00 :10'').

expression. Yet we can agree with Goodman that in *Entity* there is probably a general expression to be found: a vital or lustful chasing. As to Goodman it is expressed if the structure of the notion's literal use is transferred to the piece (see Part I, 4.10 "Expression: Metaphorical Exemplification"). Accordingly my endeavour was to find, here as in the case of the formalistic role of the dance, the syntactic properties which carry and constitute this – metaphorically transported – meaning. With the dynamics, the restless speedy activity, and the relational characteristics of focussing ambitiously onto a target (even though it is ever new and changing), the relevant syntactical properties are found.

Considering the title of the piece another exemplified aspect becomes dominant: the varying entities in the piece. E.g. each ensemble dance showed a different way to form a "body" (corps de ballet), in an intricate way like a fuge, dispersed or rather autistic, different ways to live in the collective.

### 3a.VIII Historical Background

Wayne McGregor has an unusual upbringing as a choreographer. He did not undergo an academic dance formation, yet (or because of this) he was driven by popular dance waves. He mentions John Travolta as the idol of his youth. This fresh and unbridled lust for dance is visible in his dynamics. A curiosity towards different dance styles is paralleled by the same freshness and curiosity towards different fields of science. These he did not drop as a scholar as he opted against professional dance studies. With the passion of the first young informatics-driven generation he was fascinated by the functioning of computer language and mathematics. No wonder then that in the privileged position of choreographer in residence at the Sadler's Wells Theatre, where he and his company are discharged from the common institutional needs of average theatres, McGregor affords experimentations and research in dance and science in order to combine them in a unique way.

“*Entity* is the third panel in a triptych of pieces examining the relationship between the brain and the creative processes”, according to the program notes.<sup>192</sup> Psychologists, linguists, and cognitive scientists from Cambridge, San Diego and Sussex worked with McGregor's Random Dance Company on this relationship and the communicability of creative processes. One part of the three-year interdisciplinary research project on “Cognition and Choreography” aimed at what team member Scott deLahunta calls “an artificially

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<sup>192</sup> [http://www.randomdance.org/docs/entityautumn08finals\\_0.pdf](http://www.randomdance.org/docs/entityautumn08finals_0.pdf)

intelligent choreographic entity.” (ibid.) A piece of software that was not ready for the production of *Entity*, but entered McGregor’s choreographic tools shortly after in 2010 as “Avatar”. Another focus was on the theory of perception of movement. “What is considered as a unit?” Given a recorded movement sequence of a dancer this question had to be answered by several observers. The rigorously processed experiment with the company members, as it is to be read in the report on their webpage, is only the first research state to be continued and evolved. But we understand the scientific intention: what criteria do observers (in this case professional) use to find units, what aspects do they look at?<sup>193</sup> The results reveal large variability, yet some concordance. Given that a sequence of one dancer was under consideration in this status it is not so far-fetched to expect that at a later stage observers look for units of spatially close dancers (clusters), and subsequently for (formal) units which appear dispersed in space and over different bodies (as I did analysing in 3a.IV.1 "2<sup>nd</sup> Ensemble Dance (a Dispersed Polyphony)")

The diversity of interest in this three-year research project is summarised by the choreographer as follows:

In the meantime, I am immersed in the languages of AI [artificial intelligence], its particular syntax and grammar, its algorithms and evolutionary dynamics, and its discourse, and it is from here that the first phase of ENTITY for the stage has emerged. Throughout this research I have been constantly reminded of the power of numbers. Mathematics returns time and time again as the translation mechanism of an abstract idea into something other, into something meaningful and tangible. (McGregor, random.org, n.pag.)

Obviously, this context information is thoroughly consistent with the aesthetics and movement style I described. However, it does not lend us a heuristic path for our semantic analysis. It affirms our findings of extremely formal, mathematical (fugue-like) construction, but does not give a hint where to find syntactic clues for it. As in music we have not literally numbers in movement neither. We have to detect the regularities we subconsciously sense. The analysis I offer is one heuristic procedure to “understand” the dance, that may in the aftermath reveal convergences between the piece’s style and a choreographer’s declared aesthetic intentions.

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<sup>193</sup> see the same topic in the chapter treating Susan Leigh-Foster.

### 3b. Pablo Ventura's *MADGOD 2.001*

Wayne McGregor's dance style is the most recent among the three case studies I offer in this doctoral thesis. It might seem that his "cutting edge" style – as his public relation communication goes – his randomness, and his computer animated choreography were unique or unprecedented. I would like to compare *Entity* with *MADGOD 2.001* by Pablo Ventura, another choreographer who uses a similarly alien, futuristic style. His choreography, too, is computer based. In fact, more categorically so. Above the question if the most recent dance style is unique or less so, a philosophical question motivates me. I want to find out the semantic impact inherent in styles: does a style favour (or artistically condition) certain topics (of meaning)? Emerging styles do not offer quantitatively sufficient cases for an empirical evaluation, yet in my eyes the range of these too cases already may give a preliminary answer. Remaining true to the framework given in this dissertation, the topics of the cases chosen are not primarily narrative or expressive. True to my thesis that meaning is based on the syntactic properties of the artwork, in particular on genre-specific properties, and true to the results of the second part of my doctoral thesis that the dance-specific properties are best reported by the MIP and summarized in motoric identity, I will compare the motoric identity of both cases. Before I enter into the comparison I explain my choice of *MADGOD 2.001*, introduce it, and describe its structural characteristic. Given that there is, unlike in other dance pieces, already on the structural level a high interlink between the media (video projections, lights, and soundtrack) I will present them inasmuch as they structure the dance.

#### 3b.I. General Features of *MADGOD 2.001*

*MADGOD 2.001* is the first futuristic computer aided dance piece of the Ventura Dance Company which was founded in 1986 in London. The piece had its premiere 2000 in Zürich. My analysis is based on the documentation of the performance in Hellerau (Germany) in November 2000. Six dancers perform in a coherent futuristic stage setting a sixty minute long non-narrative dance to a computer generated electronic soundtrack without instrumental music (no melodies, no characteristic rhythms). They are dressed uniformly in white leotards closing at the neck without sleeves or leggings, but white knee pads. In *MADGOD 2.001* some 'alien' beings arise progressively to life until their robotic functioning comes – repeatedly – to a more or less spectacular end.

I have chosen this piece of the company as it is the company's first futuristic style, has been well received (mentioned as "the most innovative production" in the yearbook 2001 of Ballet International/Tanz aktuell) and because it is an autonomous creation unlike the succeeding trilogy.

### 3b.II. Structure

The piece can be divided into five parts. All parts begin and end on the floor, with lying or sitting figures. Given this unusual limitation in the compositional setting I propose to consider what distinguishes the five parts from one another. Three of them (parts 1, 4, and 5) begin with one individual robotic<sup>194</sup> figure standing in a beam of light right at the center of the stage, as if explicitly placed in the focus.<sup>195</sup> In the first part, which takes seven minutes, the robotic figure initialises or at least contacts his lying fellows one by one before they get off the floor. The six figures dance in isolation from each other. But increasingly their movement achieves a very subtle mutual coordination before a nervous lighting effect (like the shimmer preceding a short-circuit) "triggers" a discharge of their batteries followed by a blackout (7'). The next part which begins with the robotic figure, part four (33' - 42:50'), his fellows are once again awakened one by one. However this time at the end they all sit down – unlike in the first part - without any remarkable impact whatsoever, besides an accompanying gentle fade-out of light, in their usual puppet position. The very last part has no individual initialisation of the group: in part five (43' - 49') a general mechanical breathing, or better: puffing on the soundtrack accompanies the central robotic figure executing his solo. When the projected planets gently turning around him in his universe begin to flicker and their degrees of longitude and latitude melt into an all-covering net, he sits down. A storm of pulsating numerals rises over the figures' head and wakes them up urging them to function. After three minutes of virtuoso dance a voice from offstage and an increasingly penetrating sound break down some evolving interaction, the figures begin to manipulate their own joints, folding limb by limb, and give them a rest on the floor. The remaining ten minutes of the piece is not danced anymore. The stage setting, lights, and soundtrack take over dominance, and animate

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<sup>194</sup> The property robotic refers to the figure's movement and will be extensively treated in the comparison of the respective motoric identity of *Entity* and *MADGOD 2.001* in the following paragraphs.

<sup>195</sup> The standing pose may contradict the above proposed defining criteria for the parts. But obviously, this figure has an exceptional position, and beginnings and endings of the parts, with the respective sitting or lying figures, are made sufficiently clear through other media like fading or, on the contrary, with sudden flickering lights and accentuating sound.

immobile figures through effects only. An anticlimactic and unspectacular end in dance movement respects.

### 3b.III. Dramaturgy of Structure

Observing the structure of the piece, can we see a development throughout the five parts? If we include part two and three into our global systematic consideration, we can perceive an increasing coordination or collaboration between the figures. When in the first part only very short phrase-particles have been shared by the dancers temporarily, in the second we find the first duets (synchronous movements), group constellations (in pauses, e.g. 18:50") as well as a trio in unison. In the third part, for the first time, configurations are presented (interacting duets – and even a very funny one – at 26:08" - 28:10", three interacting duets simultaneously in minute 30). In parts four and five we do not see any more interacting configurations (partnerings), but movement material that is dispersed throughout the stage and in varied constellations. We remember, constellation does not mean necessarily spatial closeness (which would be called a 'cluster', see my definition in 3a.IV.2 "Less Configurations, More Shared Moves"). We detect changing and varied dispersed constellations that do not affect floor pattern and the distribution of figures over the place: e.g. three figures (47:57" - 49:04"), after a while two others (48:36"- 49:04") share a (different) movement material, continuing a floor pattern in which they were already engaged in (see also 42:00" - 42:08", 42:22" - 42:28").

Does the increase in collective collaboration and the decrease in external impact for their dissolution or ending say something? It is difficult to decide at this point whilst considering only the general structure of the piece. Is it solely a coincidence that at the end of the last part a persevering tone which turned out to be a call for obedience becomes excruciating when the only partnering of this part is about to evolve (47:34")? Is it coincidence that it is the main figure, the robotic protagonist, who is about to partner at that time? However the answers will be, it is important to show that on the syntactical structural level there is a guideline to find the meaning. To show that a guideline on that level is in principle available in all dance pieces is one purpose of my case studies.

### 3b.IV. Problematic Causal Reading

Obviously, whilst describing the structure of the piece including the different media involved, we perceive chronological order of sequencing effects easily as causality (see my above

description “triggers”).<sup>196</sup> I am conscious that in the semantic interpretation this gives room for differentiation or correction. Given the different layers or perspectives of the piece (manipulated figures versus manipulators) the media used may be interpreted accordingly in at least two ways: On the one hand as an instrument of the manipulator (suggested by the act of scanning, monitoring spot-light, loudspeaker transmitting voices from offstage etc.). On the other hand as an artistic means for carrying expressive signification (state of mind, atmosphere, emotion). In this latter case it still remains open of whom: of the figures? Of the general setting? Of the second layer, a certain mad-God? Has he the last word to say, once the figures are silenced and immobile, and yet the piece continues for ten more minutes? Is the ten minutes of projected animation – much like a screen saver resembling a space journey – an epilogue belonging entirely to him alone? Yet, one wonders, without human beings (however robotically enhanced they may be) the apocalypse risks to be pointless - and boring for a spectator.<sup>197</sup>

How far artistic movements are read as actions (in Davidson’s<sup>198</sup> sense) is a philosophical question I cannot treat in this frame work. We should consider however that our way of seeing might lead us to look for action in the movements of any living creature. Unwillingly so, just as the *gestalt* theorist showed how we tendentiously see in contours *gestalts*, in particular human ones.<sup>199</sup> When observers face strongly abstracted or reduced motion (to only a few parameters) the result is surprising. “[C]areful experimental work has shown that people are exquisitely sensitive to subtle differences in human gaits.” (Palmer 511). We are prepared to restrain ourselves from some tendentious perception or at least reflect upon if we are in artistic context. Accordingly, if we see robotic movement evolving and dissolving, we have the choice to read it as a (represented) action (in a time frame and perhaps represented space), or we have the option of reading it as an exemplification of the property “to become robotic”. In artistic context we learn to draw our attention to isolated

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<sup>196</sup> See "Perceiving causation" in Palmer 513.

<sup>197</sup> As I did not had the chance to take part on a live performance I cannot judge the phenomenistic impact of the medias dominating the last ten minutes. According to reports (see critic by Thurner, 4th Nov. 2000) the movement empty stage at the final does not seem to spoil the overall impression of the piece.

<sup>198</sup> Action in the action theory of Donald Davidson is defined as a person's activity caused by a state with the mental content of a wish and his belief that the activity is appropriate to fulfill the wish (Davidson, "Action" 685-700).

<sup>199</sup> See for unlearned processes (nativism) Palmer 51.

aspects of action, movement or motion alike. It is Goodman's achievement to give a (symbol) theoretic explanation for how this might function (see exemplification).

However, Goodman does not help us to decide when – in which cases – exemplifications make up representation. An attempt to define philosophically which or how many sequencing properties count as action and make up narration may be doomed to failure given the notion's inherent vagueness. I consider this piece non-narrative due to the indubitable dominance of formal features of the motoric identity.

### 3b. V. Context Information

The proposed tentative interpretation based on the structural properties of the piece are backed up by the title as well as the program notes. The program notes inform us that the dramaturgy is inspired by Stanley Kubric's film *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968). Given that in the film mysterious monoliths influence the evolution of human race, we are justified to read the piece in the proposed way. The final part can be read therefore as an intervention from offstage (second layer): if the group represents the crew of the spacecraft, and the robotic protagonist represents the spacecraft's board computer HAL, then it is the madgod which disconnects the spacecraft and its crew. The reason for this action however we obtain by external knowledge only, namely that HAL had attempted to gain dominance over the crew. Here, again, I consider the exemplification – of overwhelming external power over the manipulated figures present on stage – far more relevant than the information about the cause (the madgods' mental state) adding by that work-external narration.

A third layer is not excluded if we have attended the lectures "The Gospel According to Hal" that preceded the performances. There we are told, that the title refers to the choreographer's "Dogma" (being a play on words). The rules he established there for the creation of computer aided choreographies aim at breaking the habits that a dancer's body picks up in the course of its education. The goal is a dance «de-ideologised» by computer. A dance composition delivered for the 'choreographer', not bearing his mood nor (style of) motion.

Another case of (external) context dependent meaning is the projection of words like "deterritorialized". Video projection of letters belonging to "deterritorialised" and "movement in all directions" are more or less present all along since the 30<sup>th</sup> minute up to the end of part 3, when words playfully fade in and out and take over the dance projected unto the "corpses"

of the pausing figures (32'). Deterritorialisation is a concept from Deleuze and Guattari signifying an alienation of the individual in times of (among others, cultural) globalisation (Deleuze 263-285). As this context is not given in the work and artworks should make sense without additional investigations I prefer to take the deconstructed words as a case of media manipulation, i.e. media "made apparent" just as e.g. lighting and sound "from offstage" or rather from a mixing desk. Admittedly, if we consult external information of Deleuze, the dissolving letters of "deterritorialised" gain an additional aesthetic feature, namely exemplifying what the word denotes. Goodman considered this selfreferential function as implicit in exemplification: "Exemplification relates the symbol to a label that denotes it, and hence indirectly to the things (*including the symbol itself*) in the range of that label" (LA 95, my italics). In each case, the media manipulation emphasizes mediality, a topic and stylistic aspect of contemporary performance arts.

### 3b.VI Differences Between *Entity* and *MADGOD 2.001*

#### 3b.VI.1 Psychological Versus Mechanistic Style

Unlike Wayne McGregor's choreography *Entity*, *MADGOD 2.001* has no emotional connotations. Deprived of any eye contact, mimetic expression as joy (see the finale of *Entity*), and gestures, as well as musical intimacy (see the string quartet in *Entity*), *MADGOD 2.001* does not convey emotional expression. The comparatively rare duets are just as mechanical as the solos. No distinction is made in the movement material of the gender underlining thus their androgyny or robotic character. There is prevalent motoric identity based on mechanic, robotic movement.

#### 3b.VI.2 Motoric Identity of *MADGOD 2.001*

What do the mechanic, robotic movements consist in? The mechanical movement has seven characteristic features which together constitute the motoric identity of *MADGOD 2.001*. First, a) the motions obviously have the task of achieving poses, as poses are often held once obtained (see the sequence 38:18", 20", 23", 25", 29") b) achieved poses are often 'clicked home' like machines do (38:46"), c) extremities are used in an isolated manner unlike coordinated movements or "natural"<sup>200</sup> movements with complementary limb movement (40:46"-55"), d) axis are sometimes isolated and carry rigidly fixed limbs in mechanically repeated rotations (40:35''-40 :40''), e) unlike in the case of organically moving bodies in

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<sup>200</sup> For the definition of natural or organical movement see the case study of Yvonne Rainer.

*MADGOD 2.001* the movements emerge from multiple centres. Multi-centered movement is to be seen in (1) a sequence (changing centers one by one) in the example of the folding down to the puppet-position in 12:30"-36" or (2) simultaneously (simultaneous centers) in 13:26"-36". Movement chains initiated from one centre only or towards only one target<sup>201</sup> are rare.

f) The head has no (psychological, intentional) privileged function. It is not typically directed towards a target. The head is used in the same way as the extremities, creating thereby often a "centre" of its own (15:30"). Occasionally it even happens, unlike intentionally executed tasks guided by an eye focus, that the head moves in a reactional mode (48'-49'). Yet it is still different from a reaction which swings around a body center (creating centrifugal force), as in the case of the so-called Limón style or in *Rosas danst Rosas* (see Part 2 2.II.4 "3<sup>rd</sup> Movement"). g) The walking is reduced to its necessary motion, namely to advance the body forward (2nd part from 14:05" onward). No weight-softening use of the feet is involved (no rolling-down from the heels), no knees are involved to facilitate adaptation to changes in ground-level or to ease an acceleration of speed. This flat walk, similar to a glide, is sufficient in case of an impeccably horizontal smooth ground. The hips leave the stiff limbs free for motion in one dimension only (no lift, no rotation). h) Besides the legs, the arms are also often stiff and held in an overstretched position. This motif (2:19", 3:00") maintained during motion alienates the limb concerned from the rest of the movement (see e.g. the 2nd part from 9:52" until its end). This isolation in a stiff position is reminiscent of machines whose compound functioning can be operated by degrees, and decisions can be made part by part regarding their involvement in some motion or task.

### 3b.VI.3 Similarities in Motoric Identity of *Entity* and *MADGOD 2.001*

We find similarities between *Entity* and *MADGOD 2.001* in numerous features: the isolated limbs (point c), multiple centers (point e), motorically reduced walking function (point g), and in h) stiffness of limbs. In some extremely stretched or bent positions *MADGOD 2.001*, too, uses hypertension: e.g. the curled-in arms with pointed elbows (17:36", 37:39"), which is an oft-repeated leitmotif (see fig. 9)

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<sup>201</sup> Movement towards only one target corresponds to Laban's distinction "directness" in his effort cube, also called "minimal space". (In German: *einstrebig* versus *vieltrebig*. See my chapter "Conclusion And Outlook For a New Category: Bodily Movement")




(fig. 9, © Lorenzo Pusterla)

So despite the differences in the motoric identity, the rather mechanistic of *MADGOD 2.001* and the rather psychological of *Entity*, there is enough similarity to suggest a subordinate style that both belong to: an alien motoric processing, uncommon to usual human movement with respect to a sort of over-functioning (extreme curls and stretches, hypertonicity). The hypertonicity gives us the impression of a disproportionate energetic over-dose. Whilst in *MADGOD 2.001* this is due to a suggested mechanics, in *Entity* this might be due to some suggested overreaction in the body (spasm) accentuating thus the figures' – surprisingly effective – attempts to socialize.

#### 3b.VI.4 Homogeneous Unpersonal Style versus Eclectic Idiosyncratic Style

The use of the mechanistic style extends to all involved media in *MADGOD 2.001*. The lighting, sound, and video projections are fully integrated artistic means which underlie *MADGOD 2.001*'s mechanistic or computer based technological processing. All three undergo obvious perceivable treatment and manipulation. By no means pleasant or decorative, their technological manipulation is overwhelming and frightening, and thus fits the artistic concept. Quite often one or more of the media dominate what is happening onstage. E.g. when the presented bodies run out of battery, the projection changes to an intermittently blinking and flashing underlining the disorder of machines not moving smoothly anymore (end of first part, 6:55"). After a complete blackout, a sort of scanning runs through the discharged bodies on the floor from right to left and vice versa. Another example for the artistically coherent use of media is a grid projected homogeneously all over the stage (back, sides and floor), including the bodies of the figures (especially in part 3 from minute 20 onward). It carries overlapping meanings, like "figures being trapped in a net", or "sketched on a drawing pad". The grid is overwhelmingly present when the line of the

squares pass over bodies which are not illuminated: only from the deviation of the rays can we infer the existence of bodies (21:41"; 32:41") (see fig. 10).



(fig. 10 © Lorenzo Pusterla)

In contrast to this mechanistic topic of the projection media, the topic of the black-and-white projections in *Entity* is quite rhapsodic. We have letters (upside down "A"), microscopic bacteria or cells moving, black spots fading in and out like tumours on an X-ray, followed by numbers, then mathematical operations, spirals (34:15"), a grid being locally concave and convex (35:25"-36"), followed by a swarms of birds (35:36-50"), reflecting water and a sequence of extremely zoomed-in details of body parts (eyebrow, nasal cavity, a hand, hairs, 41:50"-44:27"). The lighting is not homogenous in style either: it varies between soft and romantic orange and cold, technological lightening. The sound of *MADGOD 2.001* is like the other media presented as "treated": a persisting tone which gets increasingly shrill, jarring sounds or noises of machines, hissing voices - we never hear something in a 'transparent' mode. We are made conscious of its transmission, of the distance it originates from. In general, movements and sounds of *MADGOD 2.001* share a working atmosphere and the underlying subtle beat. In contrast *Entity* presents its music ready to enjoy and dance to. Without disturbances of the auditiv media or any other artistic reflection upon sonority we never ask where the sounds come from, by which means they are spread. We do not find the criteria of mediality or materiality in the acoustic. The choice of music is a brave

combination, though. Whilst the first part is a contemporary chamber music, the second is an electronic beat music. In short: it is eclectic out of principle.

There is a further reason why the general mechanistic style is homogenous in *MADGOD 2.001*. This cause lies at the heart of the motoric identity: in the dynamics.

### 3b.VI.5 Difference in Dynamics

The main difference in the motoric identity of both cases lies in the dynamics. It is the dynamics that grants the homogenous persistence of the mechanistic style of *MADGOD 2.001*. The even rhythm dominated by the beats of unchanging bars (60 beat/min) structures the movement phrase. It mostly fragments the phrase just as Yvonne Rainer's silenced beat did in *Trio A*. No élan or drive can unfold.

In *MADGOD 2.001*, poses are achieved with the same levels of energy and muscular tonus in a continuous mode (with the exception of pauses). Variations, what MIP calls “modulation”, are very rare and we find them only occasionally and in short phrases. Whereas *Entity* privileges an exploding movement (besides the mentioned finale see, among many others, the solo 21:20"-40"), *MADGOD 2.001* prefers movements that are continuously carried out. The latter is a characteristic feature inherent to mechanical operations of machines, whilst the former with its acceleration is characteristic for (sudden) intention driven actions often associated with psychological or emotional states, and is typically found in impulsive and extroverted behaviour. Not apparent in most ensemble dances, the motoric identities of the figures in solos and duets are amazingly idiosyncratic. I mention only two examples: the coquettish shoulder lifting of the woman with pony tale is her private leitmotiv throughout the piece. The head-guided waves of the spinal column is another of one of the men (50:40"-54:18", in particular his solo in 55:20"-53"). It is not by accident that the motif 'belongs' to the man who resembles physiognomically the most to Wayne McGregor's snakelike movement style.

### 3b.VI.6 Summary

In *MADGOD 2.001* all the media and the motoric identity of the piece are homogeneously conceived and obey an artistic concept. In *Entity* the media are as eclectic as the motoric identities of several dancers (in the frame of *Entity's* paramount motoric identity), obeying thus the aesthetic concept of chasing varied social exchange. My reflections on coherence or explicit eclecticism go beyond Goodman's theory of aesthetics. Coherence

versus eclecticism describes how aesthetic parts of an artwork relate to one another, both are features of the structure in the sense of Susanne Langer (see Part 1 5.6 "Critique of Goodman's Art Theory Without 'Structure'").

### 3b.VII External Knowledge: Procedure Causing Dynamics?

In this paragraph I explicitly go beyond symbol theory. In the case of the two recent choreographies there is not yet much profound theoretic material to consult. Instead I consider the working method of the respective choreographers. Leaving temporarily the symbol theoretic methodology aside one has to do some field research. One studies the software and observes rehearsals.

Given that the constructionist feature of *MADGOD 2.001* is not due to a choreographer but in the first place to the choreographer's software<sup>202</sup> the software in question, Life Forms, needs to be considered. The software, conceived for and in collaboration with Merce Cunningham, can generate more combinations of joint and limb positions than are anatomically possible (Soldati, "Software&Tanz" 15-20). Pablo Ventura randomizes thousands of thus generated position and feeds them in life forms' time line of 1 pose/s. In this random sequence, there is not much chance to evolve an élan, it seems. Dancers try to copy unfeasible sequences. Not seldom, it is up to the choreographer to help dancers come out of awkward computer generated positions. The challenge for everyone is to find a solution to proceed from pose to pose. Characteristic and varied movement dynamics is the least that can be considered hereby. And obviously, neither the life forms nor the choreographer bridging the random poses take gender-specific movement into account.

The work method of Wayne McGregor is quite the opposite. He looks for the particular individual movement responses of his dancers whilst fulfilling some given tasks or parameters. No wonder then, that quite idiosyncratic movement styles (motoric identities) are generated. Integrating the individual styles of the dancers into one piece he comes close to eclecticism.

My findings suggest that the difference in their shared futuristic style is due to their work procedure and support thus my symbol theoretic results.

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<sup>202</sup> In comparison, this is an eminent difference to the constructionist choreography by Yvonne Rainer, our first case study (Part 2 1.III "Constructionist Movement Composition").

But then I came up with a hypothesis: both working methods, the one of Pablo Ventura and the one of Wayne McGregor might not be conclusive and compelling for the choice of dynamics. What, if the proposed dance solutions are grounded in some salient knowledge? Not even conscious to the participants?

To test this hypothesis common empirical methods are problematic. Knowledge in the following cases is inaccessible:

Hypothesis: (H1) Movement dynamics, including its speed, is a salient knowledge shared by company and choreographer. The dancers 'know' that Ventura would not accept relaxations or explosions between the poses (and therefore we do not see any in rehearsals). Accordingly, the dancers of McGregor 'know' that he would not accept continuously identical muscle tonus proposed for its tasks and sequences. (H2) This salient knowledge is not manifest in the tasks nor conditioned by the working methods. (H3) Salient knowledge implies that the involved artists might not be conscious of.

Having observed carefully the dance piece and made an inventory of the respective motoric identity I come to the conclusion that they are not explained by the working method. The working method yields what it yields due to a supplementary implicit style expectation, i.e. a salient knowledge the company shares. Confronting some of the dancers of both companies and Pablo Ventura with the hypothesis I obtained their affirmations. However, due to (H3), we cannot count on their 'testimony'.

This should serve as a warning against the use of external knowledge prior to analysis for three reasons. First, knowledge based on working procedures is not reliable, given the amount of salient decisions in the procedure. Second, working procedures do not explain aesthetic aspects, given the amount of possible alternatives the procedure admits for. (Already a small amount is sufficient to alter the style). Third, without a profound analysis of the dance piece we would not have come up with the hypothesis. Comparing the work method with the motoric identity detects the margin of possible alternatives.

## Part II Conclusion

Let me begin the conclusion with the comparative study. By presenting *Entity* as a case study of a recent movement style I concentrated on the pure abstract parts (ensemble dances) in order to prove both the utility of Goodman's symbol theory of exemplification and the utility

of MIP. There was not less at stake as to elaborate a motoric identity of an emerging movement style. I mentioned the expressive elements rather marginally. In the comparative study, however, I had to put forward the expressive parts of *Entity* and the idiosyncratic styles of the individual figures (in solos and duos). In the case of *MADGOD 2.001*, by contrast, they were the representational features and the use of medias I had to accentuate. In that comparison it became clearer that one major difference lies in their overall artistic style, what I called "choice of preference" in my introduction to the doctoral work. The style of *Entity* is eclectic and idiosyncratic whilst the overall style of *MADGOD 2.001* is homogenous and unpersonal. However, both I take to belong to a futuristic style, as I called it.

As Goodman's theory comprises exemplification, expression, and representation, I could show how expression as well as representation help to emphasize the previously found exemplifications: the pace of ever-changing contacts in the case of *Entity*, the evolving and dissolving robotic in *MADGOD 2.001*. These exemplified properties show, the decisive difference between the two choreographies can be fixed in the motoric identity. The dynamics is, once again, crucial.

In quest for the range of semantical topics – a quest which raises when we suspect a narrow semantic field facing the new futuristic style – these two examples suffice to show its width, and this, precisely due to contrasting dynamics.

If we compare all four cases, in respect of the muscle tonus the first two dances resemble: a relaxed non-strained modus of moving. In respect of modulation *Trio A* and *MADGOD 2.001* resemble due to their evenness, the other two due to their explosiveness. The four different combinations of the factors force and modulation, each close to the minimal or maximal range of the axis, yields the four variations in dynamics the pieces exemplify.

Generally, for all case studies is valid: as argued in Chapter 6. "Bodily Movement Category" and Part II "Preliminary: MIP and its Role in my Semantics" I went beyond the theories of Nelson Goodman and Claudia Jeschke in two respects: First, I did not take only phenomenal aspects of the pieces into account, but procedural motoric features and empathically felt features, too (e.g. multiply-centered movements, see 3b.VI.2 "Motoric Identity of *MADGOD 2.001*" or the feeling of freedom or leisure in the 'release' of *Rosas danst Rosas*, see II.4 "3<sup>rd</sup> Movement"). Second, I did not limit the motoric identity to characteristic features of the movement in general, but included its concrete evolution during

the piece (presented in the respective structural description). My thesis is that in such structural characteristics hides much of abstract pieces' meaning. This is a point neglected by Goodman, but addressed by Langer (see Chapter 5.6 "Critique of Goodman's Art Theory Without 'Structure'"). In all case studies, therefore, is a paragraph "general structure of the piece". In all case studies I did not refrain from mentioning external or contextual knowledge as additional information for affirmation. However, due to methodological concerns, I discussed the issue after having presented the results of the respective dance analysis.

## Final Conclusion

The result of my attempts to build a semantics of dance based on Nelson Goodman can be summed up as follows: In the main lines I follow Goodman's theory of art accepting his symptoms for the aesthetic which I applied to dance: syntactic density and repleteness, semantic density and exemplification. Given that the threefold function (exemplification, representation, and expression) of aesthetic symbols applies as well to the parts of the artwork as to it as a whole a semantics should explain how they interrelate. In the course of my investigations mereology showed up as an option open to Goodman's ontology. But it was Langer who emphasized the structure of the artwork (being perhaps chronologically closer to the structuralists): all the parts contribute – whilst having a function on their own – to the overall meaning. Given that this neglected point in his theory is so crucial for my case studies (see in each case study the paragraph "general structure") I had to complete my semantics with Susanne Langer's aesthetics.

My semantics owes to Langer a second important insight: it is dynamics which turned out to be – in analogy to other genre specific aspects – the fundamental aspect for dance. Given that she considered subjective, i.e. felt, "power", to be decisive and specific for dance and given that Laban elaborated simultaneously a dense category called "effort" I found dynamics a promising basis to build a new category upon. A category that I labelled "bodily movement category" enables me to apply Goodman's aesthetics to dance: 1) it grants the density of the genre, 2) the specific structure of the category, just as in the paradigmatic case of colour. The category helps to characterize dance pieces: a) What factors or dimensions of the movement are in a given dance in use (motoric identity)? b) What exactly is (syntactically) responsible for representation, expression or pure exemplification? c) What

derivative and relational, syncategorematic aspects are decisive? The combination of movement categorical aspects together with categories of other symbol systems (in the sense of Fischer-Lichte<sup>203</sup>) grants the symptomatic repleteness. I examine therefore in the case studies also relations with (technological) stage media like lighting, projections, music, costumes. Characteristic relations on this level is what I called in the introduction of the doctoral thesis "choice of preference", in other terms style of the piece.

The import of the quest for the bodily movement category has been made explicit. A major challenge, then, was to elaborate the theoretical framework for it. Only then are we in the position to answer the questions a) - c). We need to see in the first place (as Laban did for instance) what interconnections between dimensions are at stake in movement generally. Once recognized, we can subsequently apply Austen Clark's notions of 'necessary' or 'supplementary dimensions' to them. Just as Clark did paradigmatically for the "quality space" of colour.

The next steps have been prepared by Sheets-Johnstone. Her kinesthesia is in nucleo what I was looking for: the sense modality which provides us with the sensation of the involved factors: weight, energy, use of space and time constitutive for dynamics. Empathy is, as she correctly states, a capacity which evolved successfully in correlation with all our sensory modalities: our capacity to feel to a certain extent kinesthetically what *others* do. Empathy is therefore the clue, the missing nexus, I needed in order to grant that the motoric and proprioceptive aspects become part of dance-specific aspects and are in principle available for the observer. The kinesthetic aspects constitute one part of the bodily movement category. The other part is constituted by visible (formal) features. Only then, if inner and outer perspectives of dance is available for the observer, is replete dance also replete *aesthetic* dance, that is perceptual art.

Bodily movement category, based on Laban's Effort, has therefore been extended by aspects available only from outer perspective. With these extensions I arrived at a point to be able to apply all the symptoms for art to the genre dance: The underlying dense category dynamics grants the symptom of syntactic density (and is not the last neither to grant the semantic density). It grants, in addition, various aspects which are derived from dynamics like monotony or contrast as well as those in junction with other categories, like musical accents, that is syncategorematic ones. They all together make up the repleteness of dance.

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<sup>203</sup> see "heterogene signifikative Einheiten" Fischer-Lichte, "Zeichensprache" 239.

Before inner and outer perspectives of the founded bodily movement category were applied to concrete cases of dance a side-step had to be done: a comparison with another proposed semantics of dance was required, the one of Susan Foster. In course of my investigations methodological divergencies appeared which I contributed to her communication theoretic background.

The results of Part II, the application of my elaborated semantics, is more difficult to resume. This is comprehensive given my claim that it is the large amount of interrelations that *are* the meaning – in the case of abstract dance the only meaning – of dance. I tried to provide a detailed analysis of the respective dance piece as in my theory the concrete and detailed syntactical aspects carry the meaning.

In order to differentiate which of the characteristics are indeed exemplified, i.e. shown forth, and enter thus the characteristic network of formal interrelations I had to 'scan' the piece repeatedly and from different angles. Often only retrospectively, after numerous and slowed down observations and sometimes through emphasis of other media (syncategorematically), could I justify the relevancy of certain instantiated aspects.

Where contradictory aspects remain until the end, like in *Trio A*, it is explicitly by the means of the symbol theory of Langer that I can consider this tension as meaningful. Where endless varied formal aspects and dynamics are at stake like in the case of *Rosas danst Rosas* it is again by the extended movement category (including empathically felt dynamics) and in particular by the large field of derivative aspects Goodman proposed that it is explained best.

The challenging task to elaborate the motoric identity of the emerging style of McGregor and Ventura could be tackled in my eyes with MIP. The motoric identity helps to explain how it comes, why we can say, that *Entity* expresses 'chasing vital life' or *MADGOD 2.001* the struggle of 'becoming and passing away' of robots. My analysis stops, however, here avoiding assumptions what these metaphors in turn might stand for.

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#### List of Abbreviations

SA	Goodman, Nelson. <i>The Structure Of Appearance</i> .
LA	Goodman, Nelson. <i>Languages of Art</i>
R	Elgin, Catherine. <i>Reconceptions in Philosophy</i>
FF	Langer, Susanne. <i>Feeling and Form</i>

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